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Abstract of Thesis 
I n January 1929, King Alexander of Yugoslavia proclaimed a Royal 
Dictatorship over his country. He believed that such strong action 
was necessary because there was a very r e a l danger of c i v i l war, 
fo r the animosity and disagreement which had existed between the 
Serbs and the Croats since the inception of the Kingdom had reached 
the point of open murder with the k i l l i n g of the Croat leader and 
two of his colleagues i n the Yugoslav Parliaments 
Alexander believed that national unity was his chief r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and he hoped t h a t , by removing the party p o l i t i c a l system, he might 
inspire his people to think of themselves as Yugoslavs rather than 
as Serbs or Croats. But despite his e f f o r t s to improve the q u a l i t y 
of government, to streamline the methods of administration and to 
eliminate corruption, he f a i l e d - not only because of an entrenched 
h o s t i l i t y towards absolutism amongst an intensely democratic people, 
but also because of the dearth of men with any capacity f o r sound 
government or inspired leadership. 
During the course of his Dictatorship, he came to realize .that 
even i f he secured a viable settlement between his people at home, 
there could be no sure future f o r his Kingdom unless he took steps 
to secure i t s in t e r n a t i o n a l position. To t h i s end, he attempted to 
come to terms with Mussolini recognizing these men as Yugoslavia's 
most immediate opponents. (Only when his e f f o r t s f a i l e d - through 
no f a u l t of his own - did he seek to strengthen Yugoslavia's 
ex i s t i n g t r e a t i e s with the L i t t l e Entente and to complement 
t h i s alliance i n the north with a similar Entente i n the 
Balkan peninsula. 
I t was precisely becauserjof his successes abroad, rather than 
his f a i l u r e s at home, that his enemies arranged his assassination. 
His death united the Yugoslav nation but greatly weakened i t s 
position abroad. 
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( i i ) 
Preface. 
I t would be f a i r to say that i n the l a s t s i x t y years, 
Yugoslavia has twice been born. I n 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes was established to bring together the large 
number.of South Slavs l i v i n g i n the Balkan peninsula and, of them, 
to make one nation; i n 1945, the state was revived and reconstituted 
as a Federal Peoples* Republic. But both as a Kingdom and as a Rep-
u b l i c , the great problem facing a l l Yugoslav leaders, statesmen and 
p o l i t i c i a n s , has been t o make that unity a r e a l i t y and, at the same 
time, to protect t h e i r country from a l l those who seek to promote -
or p r o f i t by — national disunity. 
The history of Royal Yugoslavia i n the years 1918-1941 f a l l s 
i n t o three clea r l y defined periods. At f i r s t , there was a period of 
con s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy when the nation was governed by a Government 
responsible to a democratically-elected Parliament (1918-28). Follow-
ing t h i s , there were s i x years of .;royal dictatorship under King 
Alexander (1929-34). F i n a l l y , there was the Regency of Prince Paul 
(1934-41). Each of these periods was brought to an end by some 
viol e n t act - murder i n the SkupStina, assassination i n Marseilles, 
a coup d*etat and the German invasion. 
To obtain a composite and balanced picture of Royal Yugoslavia, -
i t would be necessary to consider a l l these periods together i n a 
single work, but i n a thesis of t h i s size, such a task i s c l e a r l y 
impossible. I have therefore confined myself t o the central portion 
of Yugoslavia 1s inter-war h i s t o r y - that of the royal dictatorship -
and I have endeavoured to show not only how i t came about and what i t 
sought to do, but also t o o f f e r some c r i t i c a l appreciation of one manTs 
attempt to solve an apparently intractable problem which has faced a l l 
Yugoslav leaders since t h e i r country was born. 
( i i i ) 
But, unfortunately, t h i s period of Yugoslav history presents 
•considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the h i s t o r i a n . Immediately the royal 
dictatorship was proclaimed, strong laws were imposed to ensure 
that - i n newspapers, books, s t a t i s t i c s and agency reports - only 
the o f f i c i a l view would be heard. At that time, 76$ of the population 
were peasants and the i l l i t e r a c y rate f o r those over the age of 10 
was 44.6l#; I t w i l l therefore be seen that there exist very few 
personal records of l i f e under the Dictatorship. Of those who wrote 
f r e e l y about conditions i n Yugoslavia, some (such as Pribicevic and 
Adamicywere highly c r i t i c a l , w h i l s t others (such as foreign diplomats 
and responsible j o u r n a l i s t s ) were prepared to give the King a chance 
and therefore retained open - i f somewhat pessimistic - minds. Most 
of the books and memoirs which have been w r i t t e n about the royal 
dictatorship were w r i t t e n a f t e r Alexander fs death and t h e i r accounts 
are to some extent coloured by that event (Graham, Patterson, Armstrong). 
Other books (notably by French authors such as Faure-Biquet, Novak, 
Eylan, Augarde and Sicard) are so obviously hagiographs that they 
are of no use at a l l . 
Very few of the actual participants i n the events of 1929-34 
survived the Second World War i n a position - or with the opportunity -
to w r i t e t h e i r memoirs ( D j i l a s , Macek, Stojadinovic and Henderson 
being the exceptions) and, f o r many years, the history of pre-war 
Yugoslavia has been eclipsed by the more epic confrontations between 
the Partisans and the Axis and Tito and St a l i n . I t would perhaps not 
be f a i r to say that research i n t o the documents and records of the. 
royal era have been o f f i c i a l l y discouraged i n Yugoslaviai^but i t i s 
a f a c t that only recently have' Yugoslav historians (Culinovic, Stojkov) 
begun to publish t h e i r own studies of the inter-war period. 
I n order to produce t h i s study of the royal dictatorship, I 
have therefore had to re3y somewhat heavily on the one substantial 
body of material available to me which provides a continuous record 
of day-to-day p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y during the regime - namely the 
despatches and general correspondence of the B r i t i s h Legation i n 
Belgrade and i t s Ministers, Sir Howard William Kennard and Sir Nevile 
Henderson. These are contained i n the Public Records Office i n London, 
( i v ) 
under' the series F.O. 371, volumes 12978-87 (1928); 13705-12 (1929); 
14438-48 (1930); 15269-74 (1931); 15994-97 (1932); 16827-32 (1933) 
and 18452-64 (1934). 
I was w e l l aware of the disadvantages of using such a source 
- the narrow scope of the diplomatic world i n Belgrade, the absence 
of any r e a l comment as to what difference government decisions made 
to i n d i v i d u a l people at grass-roots l e v e l , and the detached acceptance 
of the status quo. But, on the other hand, there were certain advan-
tages. Both Sir Howard Kennard and Sir Nevile Henderson had easy 
access to King Alexander and both men were able to see the architect 
of the Dictatorship at close quarters, to hear his policies expounded 
at f i r s t hand (not through distant rumour) and to see precisely what 
King Alexander was t r y i n g to do. They were also able to witness the 
problems that faced the King, the s h i f t s i n power and could pinpoint 
the regime's f a u l t s and f a i l i n g s . They were also i n close contact 
w i t h many of the regime's leading men (Marinkovic, Srskic, Svrljuga) 
and, from time to time, they had private conversations with opponents 
of the Dictatorship, with the pre-Dictatorship p o l i t i c i a n s who -
although pensioned-off - s t i l l managed to keep close to opinion i n 
the c a p i t a l and fee l i n g i n the country. I n the foreign f i e l d , the 
B r i t i s h Minister was sometimes privy to aspects of royal diplomacy, 
unknown to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , and occasionally, 
he was instrumental i n changing the King's mind. 
I t w i l l therefore be appreciated t h a t , by using these despatches 
and general correspondence from the B r i t i s h Legation - together with 
such other books, memoirs, a r t i c l e s and reports as do exist - I have 
been able to obtain a valuable insight i n t o the inner workings of the 
roy a l Dictatorship. 
I n t h i s thesis, I have not set out to attack the regime because 
i t was a dictatorship and "anti-democratic" (which i t undoubtedly was). 
Nor have I accepted any pronouncements or claims by the regime at face 
value. What I have done i s - t o make three assumptions; (a) that the 
creation of a Yugoslav state by the peacemakers at Versailles was 
a wise and good act; (b) that a united and strong Yugoslavia i s an 
important factor for peace i n Central Europe and the Balkans; 
and (c) that everything done i n Yugoslavia - Kingdom or Republic -
should be judged by the extent to which i t consolidates that unity 
and adds to the well-being, happiness and security of her people. 
And i t i s i n t h i s s p i r i t , that I have approached the Royal Dictat-
orship i n Yugoslavia from 1929-1934. 
* Although I have made use of certain books - by Adamic, 
Stojadinovic and Mestrovic - i n the compilation and presentation 
of this thesis, I should l i k e to make i t clear that these sources 
must be treated with great caution. Because i n t h e i r approach to 
the Dictatorship and i n t h e i r consideration of events and person-
a l i t i e s , they contain errors of fact and judgement and a l l too 
often present t h e i r highly-coloured and very personal interpret-
ations i n a false and misleading way. As I have said elsewhere 
i n this thesis, my only j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n using such material i s 
that i t reveals the contemporary allegations - both l i e s and 
half-truths - made by those who were hostile to the regime. 
( v i ) 
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The H i s t o r i c a l Background 
2 
When Gavrilo Princip f i r e d his f a t a l shots i n t o the car 
carrying the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife through the 
streets of Sarajevo, he had l i t t l e idea that his impetuous act 
would provoke a major European war. Similarly, Count Berchtold 
and the other Austrian o f f i c i a l s i n the Ballhausplatz, when they 
issued t h e i r ultimatum and declared war on Serbia, l i t t l e imagined 
that the. outcome of that war would be the dissolution of the 
centuries-old Empire and the creation of a sovereign and independ-
ent South Slav state. Before the war, there seemed to be only two 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to the future inhabitants of the Kingdom. One 
wasx"Trialism" - the plan to turn the Dual Monarchy int o a Triple 
Monarchy and give the South Slavs a similar standing to the Hung-
arians w i t h i n the Empire.''" The other was "Greater Serbia" - the 
policy of expanding the Serbian Kingdom to include Bosnia-Herce-
govina, the Vojvodina and Montenegro and to obtain f o r Serbia a 
2 
suitable ou t l e t to the sea. The outbreak of war dealt a severe 
blow to both these projects. Following the assassination of the 
Archduke, a l l thought of "Trialism" was abandoned and the Empire 
reverted to a policy of severe repression. Serbia, f o r her part, 
was attacked i n force by Austria but, although her army put up a 
long and vigorous resistance f o r some eighteen months, the combined 
1. R.G.D. Laffan, The Guardians of the Gate ( H i s t o r i c a l Lectures 
on the Serbs), (London 1918) p. 169. 
2. C. Jelavich, "Nikola Pa^ic: Greater Serbia or Jugoslavia?" 
Journal of Central European A f f a i r s , 11 (1951) pp. 133-52. 
3. Laffan, op. c i t . . p p . 271-74-
3 
forces of the Central Powers eventually i n f l i c t e d defeat and 
the Serbian government and army retreated through the mountains 
•of Albania to the security and exile of Corfu. 
The main proponents of a sovereign and independent South 
Slav state were a number of Slovenes and Dalmatians who f l e d the 
Empire at the beginning of the war and formed a Yugoslav Committee 
i n London.^ With the f i n a n c i a l support of South Slavs l i v i n g i n 
America, the Committee drew attention to the sufferings and 
a t r o c i t i e s endured by t h e i r fellow-countrymen under the Austrian 
yoke. They publicized the great sacrifices made by the Serbs i n the 
A l l i e d cause and urged B r i t i s h and French statesmen to use t h e i r 
influence t o create a united Yugoslav state i n which Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes would each have an equal part. But t h e i r e f f o r t s met 
5 
with l i t t l e response. The A l l i e s were more interested i n defeating 
Imperial Germany than i n dismembering Austria-Hungary and, whilst 
there was any p o s s i b i l i t y of signing a separate peace with the 
Empire and bringing the war s w i f t l y to an end, there could be no 
o f f i c i a l support f o r a Committee whose policies were so obviously 
dependent upon dismemberment. The Committee also found that they 
had l i t t l e support from the Serbian government-in-exile. As early 
as November 1914, the Prince Regent and his Cabinet had declared 
t h e i r primary war aim to be "the l i b e r a t i o n of our subjugated 
4 . Notably Frano Supilo, a j o u r n a l i s t from Fiume, who had been 
a member of the Croatian Diet (the Sabor) and a chief architect 
of the Serbo-Croat c o a l i t i o n i n i t . Upon his death i n 1917, 
leadership of the Yugoslav Committee passed to Dr Ante Trumbic', 
formerly Mayor of S p l i t and a member of the Austrian Reichsrat. 
5. For the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by the Yugoslav Committee, see D. Sepic, 
Supilo Diplomat. Rad Frana Supila u Emigraci.ii 1914-7 godina, 
(Zagreb 196 l ) . 
.4 
brothers: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes"^ but Nikola Pasic, the 
Serbian Prime Minister, was deeply sceptical of the Committee's 
plans which he was sure would lead to an organic Yugoslav state 
7 -in which Serbia would simply be one of several constituent parts. 
The matter remained unresolved u n t i l the spring of 1917 with 
the Committee continuing i t s work i n London and the Government i n 
Corfu re-arming and re-grouping i t s forces. But, i n March 1917, 
there came news of a revolution i n Russia. The news had a profound 
effect upon Serbia's leaders who had always looked to Russia f o r 
p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic support and Pasic realized that unless he 
came t o some agreement with the Yugoslav Committee> the i n i t i a t i v e 
would pass elsewhere. Indeed, on May 30, 1917> the Yugoslav Club 
i n the Austrian Reichsrat put forward a declaration demanding 
"the u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l t e r r i t o r i e s of the 
Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and 
Serbs i n one independent p o l i t i c a l body, free 
from a l l foreign domination and founded on a 
democratic basis under the sceptre of the 
Habsburg dynasty." 
Rather than be l e f t behind, Pasic i n v i t e d Dr Trumbic and representat-
ives of the Yugoslav Committee to Corfu where they issued a j o i n t 
Declaration c a l l i n g f o r the union of a l l Southern Slavs in t o a 
single, independent, democratic state, a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy 
under the Karadjordjevic dynasty, to be known as the Kingdom of 
6. F. Sisic, Jugoslavenska Misao, I s t o r i j a ideje Jugoslavenskog 
narodnog ujedinjenja i oslobodjenja od 1790-1918 (Belgrade 1937) 
p. 268. 
7. Jelavich, loc. c i t . 
8. F. Sisic, (Ed) Dokumenti o Postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i 
Slovenaca 1914-1919. (Zagreb 1920) p. 94. 
5 
9 Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Both the Serbian government-in-exile 
and the Yugoslav Committee were agreed t h a t , w i t h i n the new King-
and C y r i l l i c alphabets retained, but they were unable to agree 
as to what type of p o l i t i c a l system they should adopt. Dr Trumbic 
and the.Committee favoured a federal system but the Serbs insisted 
on the "centralism" to which they were accustomed, and the Declar-
ation was l e f t deliberately vague on t h i s point. However, i n a l l 
other respects, the Declaration of Corfu marked a moment of great 
significance. The cause of Yugoslav unity now became the o f f i c i a l 
policy of Serbia and the A l l i e s were informed that no future 
arrangement f o r South-East Europe would be accepted unless i t 
embodied the principles enunciated at Corfu. 
But when the moment of l i b e r a t i o n came, neither the Yugoslav 
Committee nor the Serbian government found themselves i n a position 
9. The Declaration of Corfu was signed on July 20, 1917. The f i r s t 
publication i n Serbian was i n Pravda (Salonika) July 29, 1917. The 
f u l l t e xt can be found i n Sisic, Dokumenti, pp. 96-100. An English 
t r a n s l a t i o n appears i n Appendix A. 
10. I . J . Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, (Yale 
1963) p.26. I n the Treaty of London of A p r i l 26, 1915, which sec-
ured I t a l y T s entry i n t o the war, B r i t a i n , France and Russia promised 
her the Dalmatian:-,coast and parts of Albania. I t a l y , therefore, 
refused to accept the Declaration of Corfu and refused to l e t more 
than a few hundred of the 18,000 Austrian South Slav prisoners i n 
I t a l y go to Salonika and j o i n the Serbian army. On A p r i l 10, 1918, 
at the Congress of Oppressed Nat i o n a l i t i e s , I t a l y recognized the 
principle of self-determination but i t was not u n t i l September 8, 
1918 that the I t a l i a n government agreed that "the movement of the 
Yugoslav people f o r independence and the co n s t i t u t i o n of a free 
state corresponds to the principles f o r which the A l l i e s are 
f i g h t i n g and to the aims of a just and l a s t i n g peace." R.J. Kerner, 
Yugoslavia (London 1949) p. 94. 
dom, freedom of r e l i g i o n would be guaranteed and both the Latin Y 
6 
to influence events. As c i v i l authority w i t h i n the Austrian 
Empire disintegrated, p o l i t i c a l power passed to the l o c a l population 
v 11 
themselves. I n August 1918, Dr Korosec established a Slovene 
National Council i n Ljubljana and, throughout a l l the South Slav 
lands, s i m i l a r revolutionary councils were set up. On October 19, 
12 
1918, representatives of each of these councils gathered i n 
Zagreb to form a Yugoslav National Council (Narodno Vijece). For 
ten days, leaders from the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l parties met to 
discuss the formation of a national government and, on October 29, 
1918, the Croatian Sabor formally severed i t s l i n k s with the Empire 
and transferred a l l l e g i s l a t i v e and executive authority to the 
Narodno Vijece. Amid great popular enthusiasm, the Council 
proclaimed the creation of an independent and sovereign Slovene, 
Croat and Serb state"^ 1 - and announced that the government's f i r s t 
15 
task would be to effect a union with Serbia and Montenegro. 
11. See "Biographies of Leading Personalities" 
12. On the basis of one representative per. 100,000 people. 
13. The Narodno Vijece was given formal recognition by the Emperor 
on October 31, and the Austrian f l e e t was handed over to them 
(l a r g e l y to prevent i t f a l l i n g i n t o I t a l i a n hands). 
14. The order of n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n the t i t l e i s worth noting. The 
only party to oppose the Narodno Vijece were the Frahkists. 
15. Stjepan Radic, the peasant leader (see "Biographies") had 
supported the plan f o r union with Serbia since August 1917, although 
he would have preferred a republic to a kingdom and would have lik e d 
to see the Bulgars included i n the new state. Kerner, Yugoslavia, 
p. 89. However, as the Council planned to seek union with Serbia and 
Montenegro, Radic'is reported to have said: "During 800 years of 
struggle, we have not abdicated before the Austro-Hungarians; there 
i s no reason to abdicate before Serbia now that we are free." 
R.G.D. Laffan i n Yugoslavia. (Nations of Today Series, Ed. Buchan) 
(London 1923) p. 243. 
*7 
7 
Two delegations were dispatched by the Council, one to 
l 6 17 Geneva to meet representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and 
18 
Serbian party leaders, the other to Belgrade where they were 
19 
received by Prince Alexander. The delegation which t r a v e l l e d to 
Switzerland were most anxious to secure A l l i e d recognition f o r the 
Narodno Vijece. They also intended to protest vigorously against 
I t a l i a n occupation of Slovene and Dalmatian lands and, i f possible, 
20 
lay the foundations of the new Yugoslav state. However, they 
encountered strong opposition from Serbia's Prime Minister. Although 
f u l l y i n agreement with t h e i r desire f o r recognition and t h e i r 
protest against I t a l y , Pasic had not come to Geneva to decide the 
p o l i t i c a l structure of the new state. He had come simply to sign 
a declaration of s o l i d a r i t y with the Council delegation and the 
Yugoslav Committee. Since Pasic has often been accused of pursuing 
a "Greater Serbia" policy, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note his opinion, 
expressed only a few days before the Geneva meeting: 
"Serbia," he said, "regards i t as her duty to 
liberate the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Once 
freed, they w i l l enjoy the r i g h t of free d i s -
16. Led by Fr Korosec, newly-elected President of the Narodno Vijece. 
17. I n order to give support and status to the Yugoslav Committee, 
Korosec had appointed Dr Trumbic as the Council's o f f i c i a l repres-
entative abroad. 
18. Pasic was the sole representative of the Serbian government; 
but Milorad Draskovic (indep. Radical), Marko Trifk o v i c (Progressive) 
and Dr Vojislav Marinkovic (Dissident Radical) were there to rep-
resent the Serbian Opposition-in-exile. 
19. Alexander became Prince Regent on June 21+, 1914 and succeeded to 
the throne on August 16, 1921. Some measure of the precipitate nature 
of events can be gained by noting that the Serbian Army did not reach 
Belgrade t i l l November 1; the delegation arrived on November 8 and 
Prince Alexander and the Serbian General Staff on the following day. 
20. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 47 
8 
posi t i o n , that i s to say, the r i g h t to 
declare themselves either i n favour of u n i t i n g 
with Serbia on the basis of the Declaration of 
Corfu or, i f they wish, of const i t u t i n g them-
selves i n t o small states as i n the distant past. 
Not only do we not wish to pursue an i m p e r i a l i s t 
policy, but we do not desire to l i m i t i n any way 
the r i g h t s of the Croats and the Slovenes to 
t h e i r self-determination; nor do we i n s i s t upon 
the Declaration of Corfu, i f i t does not corres-
21 
pond to t h e i r own desires". 
Pasic therefore proposed that the Slovene, Croat and Serb 
state and Serbia remain separate f o r the time being. Within Serbia, 
there would be a c o a l i t i o n government, i n which members of the 
Opposition parties would act as spokesmen and representatives f o r 
the South Slavs formerly w i t h i n the Empire, whilst the Narodno 
Vijece would appoint t h e i r own committee to advise the Serbian 
Cabinet on matters of foreign policy. For obvious reasons, t h i s 
proposal proved completely unacceptable to Dr Trumbic and the Yugo-
22 
slav Committee. They wanted a j o i n t Yugo-Slav government with 
twelve p o r t f o l i o s equally dist r i b u t e d between the Serbian government 
and the Narodno Vijece. I n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n the Slovene, Croat and 
Serb state would continue to be managed by the Council - as would 
a f f a i r s i n Serbia by the Serbian government - u n t i l a popularly 
elected Constituent Assembly had drawn up and approved a new 
23 
national Constitution. 
At the insistence of the French government, who wished to see 
21. La Serbie. October 28, 1918. 
22. A.S. Pavelic, Dr Ante Trumbic: Problemi Hrvatsko-Srpskih Odnosa, 
(Munich 1959) p. 175. Also, Lederer, op. c i t . , pp. 47-49. 
23. Lederer, i b i d . 
•the Yugoslavs united at the moment of v i c t o r y , Pasic deferred 
to the wishes of the Yugoslav Committee and the delegation from 
Zagreb;. A declaration, embodying t h e i r proposals was published 
2ZL 
on November 9, but i t s impact was blunted by the subsequent 
V p r 
resignation of Pasic who claimed that neither his Cabinet nor 
the Prince Regent would accept i t . This was not i n fact the case, 
26 
and the whole episode caused much i l l - f e e l i n g and d i s t r u s t . 
Fortunately, there was l i t t l e time to quarrel. The I t a l i a n s were 
busy extending t h e i r forces at Zara and Sibenik. A l l manner of 
I t a l i a n intrigues - designed to disrupt the Yugo-Slav union -
27 
were reported. The subjects of the newly-created Slovene, Croat 
and Serb state began to panic. Disturbances occured i n Zagreb. 
Within the Narodno Vijece, b i t t e r arguments arose between the 
" f e d e r a l i s t s " and the " c e n t r a l i s t s " . The economy was at a stand-
s t i l l . Despite the Geneva declaration, there were rumours that 
the A l l i e s regarded the South Slav- state as enemy t e r r i t o r y to be 
parcelled but and s t i l l more urgent demands by the Slovenes and 
Dalmatians that immediate action should be taken to withstand the 
I t a l i a n s . 
Faced with these serious problems, the Narodno Vijece asked 
the Serbian government to send Serbian troops in t o t h e i r t e r r i t o r y , 
and, on November 24, the Council voted i n favour of a complete 
29 
union between Serbia, Montenegro and themselves. A second deleg-
24. For the text of the Geneva declaration, see Sisic, Dokumenti, 
pp. 236-37. 25. On November 12, 1918. 
26. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference, pp.50-1. 
27. I b i d . , pp. 63-66 28. The representative of the Serbian Gen-
er a l Staff was Col. Dusan Simovic ( l a t e r architect of the 1941 coup) 
who worked very close with Pribicevic, a member of the Vijece. 
I b i d . , p. 51. 29. S i ^ i c , Dokumenti, pp. 255-56. A similar 
declaration was made by the Montenegrin Assembly on November 26. 
28 
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Q Q on 
- a t i o n , led by Ante Pavelic and Svetozar Pribicevic, was sent 
to Belgrade on November 25 to s e t t l e the d e t a i l s . With the p o l i t i c a l 
and diplomatic s i t u a t i o n so pressing, the delegation was i n no 
32 
position to dictate i t s own terms. The Serbian Government demanded 
that the Narodno vijece should accept the Karadjordjevic dynasty 
and the i n s t i t u t i o n of a centralized administration based on Belgrade. 
The delegation agreed. Thus, on the evening of December 1, 1918, 
Prince Alexander formally proclaimed the union of Serbia and the 
lands of the independent Slovene, Croat and Serb state i n t o a 
33 
United and Sovereign Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
But although the Triune Kingdom had been proclaimed, much was 
s t i l l t o be done before that Kingdom could become a r e a l i t y . The 
new state consisted of many disparate parts. Slovenes from the 
Austrian Empire; Croats s t i l l smarting from t h e i r experience of 
Hungarian domination; peasants from the highlands of Bosnia; 
30. Pavelic was leader of the Croat exclusivist Starcevic party. 
31. Pribicevic was a Serb, l i v i n g i n Croatia, who had been leader 
of the Serbo-Croat c o a l i t i o n i n the Croatian Sabor. I t was at his 
i n s t i g a t i o n that the vijece sent a second delegation to Belgrade 
without waiting f o r the return of Korosec from Geneva. Pavelic, 
Dr Ante Trumbic, pp. 189ff. Pribicevic was a man of many moods 
(see Biographies) who at t h i s time was a strong believer i n a 
centralized, unitary state. The hand of Col. Simovic may also be seen. 
32. The delegation brought proposals f o r the se t t i n g up of a State 
Council, containing the Vijece, 50 members from Serbia and 5 each 
from the Vojvodina and Montenegro. They also wanted the Prince Regent 
to choose a united Yugo-Slav Cabinet from t h i s Council. They sugg-
ested that the Council, which would s i t u n t i l a Constituent Assembly 
had been elected, should meet i n Sarajevo (neutral ground). However, 
the delegation fs terms of reference made no provision f o r any break-
down i n the talks or f o r the r a t i f i c a t i o n of any terms obtained. 
The delegation therefore had a free hand. 
33. s'isic, Dokumenti, p. 282. 
Aifct feve/Vc uxis P*s,<k*t of iva. H<uob„o lA}e« , huY was / W ^ « ^ 
V PoMth 'c uko was- /bg/awufc MJL.-1a.ter "Inie^he^r ShiUL of Cvoa^a. 
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seafaring f o l k from the coasts of Dalmatia; w i l d farmers from 
the Kingdom of Montenegro; proud and independent Serbs and the 
poor, backward and often i l l i t e r a t e inhabitants of Macedonia, who 
had only recently been liberated from Turkish misrule. Each of 
these groups w i t h i n the Kingdom came from d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l , 
p o l i t i c a l and administrative backgrounds, some basically Austrian, 
others basically Turkish, but each with d i f f e r e n t variations to 
s u i t l o c a l conditions. Within the new state, there were also many 
minority groups - Germans, Hungarians, Albanians and Turks - i n 
a l l , some 1,876,923 people - each with t h e i r own cultures and 
35 
t r a d i t i o n s . Five and a half m i l l i o n s of the population belonged 
to the Orthodox Church; over four and a half m i l l i o n t o the Roman 
Catholic Church; and w e l l over a m i l l i o n were Moslems. I n the 
34. According to one source, the proportions were as follows:-
Serbia and Macedonia 4,129?638 Croatia 2,710,883 
Montenegro 199,857 Slovenia 1,056,464 
Bosnia - Hercegovina 1,889,929 Vojvodina 1,380,413 
Dalmatia 650,139 Total 12,017,323 
C.A. Beard and G. Radin, The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia, (New York 
1929), p.29. 
35. According to the 1921 Census, the n a t i o n a l i t i e s were:-
South Slavs 9,931,506 (83$) Rumanians 231,068 (l.9#) 
Other Slavs 176,482 (1.5/0 Turks 150,322 (1.3%) 
Germans 505,790 (4.2jO I t a l i a n s 12,553 (0.1#) 
Hungarians 467,658 (3-9/0 Others 69,875 (0.6$) 
Albanians 439,657 (3.7$) Total 11,984,911 
Central Bureau of the Presidency of the M i n i s t e r i a l Council, 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1919-29, (Belgrade 1930) p. v. 
36. According to the 1921 Census, the religious persuasions were:-
Orthodox 5,593,057•(46.1%) Jews 64,746 (0.5$) 
Roman C'lic 4,708,657 (39.350 Greek C'lic 40,338 (O.45O 
Moslem 1,345,271 (11.2$) Others 3,325 (0.01$) 
Protestant 229,517 (1.950 Total 11,984,911 
Central Bureau, i b i d . Percentages given by the Bureau are, i n a l l 
instances, approximate. 
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spoken language, there was a remarkable homogeneity but, i n the 
manner i n which i t was w r i t t e n , there was a clear d i v i s i o n between 
Croak \*>Ko 
the U I . I J I l'n i lEsfeaiigaf 1.1 n. Ki nudum wtwrii wrote i n the Latin s c r i p t , 
and the houLlibrn half which used C y r i l l i c . 
I t had been the hope of those who had signed the Declaration 
of Corfu that the new state would transcend a l l these differences of 
culture, worship, outlook and t r a d i t i o n , but the fact that those who 
created the Kingdom chose to r e t a i n the cumbersome t i t l e of "Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes""^ seemed, to many, to perpetuate a disunity and 
a d i v e r s i t y , which could so easily be exploited. 
But f o r almost two years, any i l l - f e e l i n g between the d i f f e r e n t 
national groups - or any sense of i n j u s t i c e or grievance - was over-
shadowed by the exhilarating f e e l i n g of v i c t o r y and triumph that the 
South Slavs were at last one nation. P o l i t i c a l leaders realized that 
t h e i r f i r s t task was to consolidate t h e i r achievement and protect 
t h e i r new state from a l l i t s enemies. A c o a l i t i o n government was 
formed i n December 1918?8 bringing together p o l i t i c a l leaders from 
a l l parts of the country. Dr Trumbic, the chief architect of the 
Corfu Declaration, was made Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s and Nikola 
Pasic, the wartime Prime Minister of Serbia, was sent to Paris to 
39 
represent the new country at the Peace Conference. Between Nov-
ember 1918 and November 1920, treaties were signed with Austria, 
Hungary and Bulgaria, agreement was reached with Rumania over the 
37. Rather than the simpler t i t l e of "Yugoslavia" by which the 
state was immediately known abroad. 
38. Stojan Protic (Prime Minister) Fr Korosec (Deputy Premier), 
Pribicevic ( i n t e r i o r ) , Davidovic (Education), Trifkovic (Justice). 
39. By his a t t i t u d e to the Zagreb delegation at Geneva, Pa^icf had 
temporarily los t the confidence of the Prince Regent. But his 
powerful character, his shrewd p o l i t i c a l judgement and his great 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reputation made him an excellent choice f o r the 
Peace Conference. 
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d i v i s i o n of the Banat and a plebiscite was held i n Southern 
Austria to determine the wishes of Slovenes l i v i n g near Klagenfurt. 
Most important of a l l , the long drawn-out quarrel with I t a l y over 
her claims i n Dalmatia (and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the occupation of Fiume) 
was s e t t l e d . ^ When peace and security had at l a s t been f i r m l y est-
ablished and the boundaries of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slov-
enes f i n a l l y drawn, the secondary task of determining the p o l i t i c a l 
structure of the Kingdom began. The Provisional P a r l i a m m e n t w h i c h 
had sat since March 1919, was dissolved and a Constituent Assembly 
elected. But as the great work of constitution-making began, the 
differences i n a t t i t u d e betwen the two halves of the Kingdom were 
revealed. 
The Serbs,-who had-been at war almost continuously since 1912, 
returned from exile with an intense desire f o r peace and security. 
They regarded themselves - quite j u s t i f i a b l y - as one of the v i c t o r -
ious A l l i e s and they were f u l l y determined to share i n the f r u i t s 
of v i c t o r y . I n the course of the war, t h e i r country had been deves-
tated by the enemy, t h e i r c i t i e s and towns destroyed, and so the 
f i r s t i n s t i n c t of the Serbs was to b u i l d : -
'•Most of the people who wanted to b u i l d , 
having l o s t everything i n the war and suffered 
40. By the Treaty of Rapallo, November 12, 1920. 
41. A body chosen to include representatives from a l l parts of the 
Kingdom and to prepare f o r a Constituent Assembly. I t consisted of 
84 Serbs, 62 Croats, 32 Slovenes, 24 from the Vojvodina, 12 Dal-
matians , 12 Montenegrins, 24 Macedonians, 42 from Bosnia-Hercegovina 
and 4 from I s t r i a . 
42. Elections to. the Constituent Assembly were on November 28,1920. 
The results were as follows:- 92 Democrats (Davidovic-PribicevicD, 
91 Radicals (Pasic), 50 Croatian Peasants (Radic), 27 Slovene People T 
Party (Korosec), 32 Moslems (Spaho), 58 Communists and 69 others. 
great pri v a t i o n during the times of occup-
ation and e x i l e , lacked money even f o r a decent 
s u i t of clothes, but t h e i r passion f o r prosperity 
had been enhanced by t h e i r recent experiences and 
they now begged, borrowed and stole everything i n 
sight t o finance t h e i r building projects. For 
years, there was p o l i t i c a l chaos i n Yugoslavia, 
accompanied by a wide scramble f o r government jobs 
and most of those who got good jobs stole enough 
i n a couple of months to erect homes f o r themselves, 
which were better than t h e i r pre-war dwellings, and 
finance the building of a couple of apartment houses, 
a h o t e l , an o f f i c e - b u i l d i n g or a warehouse." ^ 
Proud of t h e i r role as liberators and regarding the new, united 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as t h e i r own particular ach-
ievement, the Serbs did not confine t h e i r e f f o r t s simply to bricks 
and mortar. They began to assert themselves i n every aspect of 
national l i f e and showed l i t t l e i n c l i n a t i o n to share authority or 
power with anyone - not even with t h e i r fellow Slays:-
"The average Serb," said one w r i t e r , " w i l l sooner 
t r u s t an Orthodox Serb of dubious character and 
honesty than a Craot or Slovene of proven high 
43 • I n 1921, 1&% of the population were peasants or i n some way 
dependent on agriculture. Of the other 21$, only 21.2% could actually 
be regarded as c i t y dwellers. Central Bureau of the Presidency of 
the M i n i s t e r i a l Council, Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1919-19291 pp. v - v i . 
44- L. Adamic, The Native's Return, (New York 1934) .p. 244. His 
description of the re-building of Belgrade (pp. 245-6) explains 
much about the Serbian character i n the post-war period. The 
population of Belgrade grew from 25,000 i n 1918 to 226,070 
i n 1929. 
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character and unquestionable i n t e g r i t y . . . . 
Two second cousins are closer than two blood 
brothers or a father and son i n France or some 
Western country. They adhere to one another through 
t h i c k and t h i n . I f one Serb gets ahead, his f i r s t 
impulse, which he never disobeys, i s t o help a l l 
his r e l a t i o n s . 
Mow, take the Serb d i s t r u s t of everything and 
everybody who i s not a Serb, couple i t with Serb 
clannishness and you have a general explanation why, 
a f t e r the Serbs had i n i t i a l l y occupied the commanding 
positions i n the new Yugoslav state, a l l the big jobs 
were immediately f i l l e d with Serbs; why Slovenes and 
Croats were and are kept out of them; why most of 
the non-Serbs who have government jobs are mere clerks 
(and) why a Croat or Slovene, no matter how able, i s 
almost invariably elbowed out of a high position, i f 
he accidentally attains i t . " ^ 
And so, when the time came to make the new C o n s t i t u t i o n , ^ the Serbs 
proposed that the Constituent Assembly should adopt an enlarged and 
extended version of t h e i r own pre-war Serbian Constitution. The 
national government and parliament would be established i n Belgrade 
and a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l executive and j u d i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of pre-
war Serbia would be retained. For the l a s t two years, the country 
had been ruled by a centralized m i l i t a r y command and a centralized 
c i v i l a uthority - both emanating from Belgrade - and i t seemed, to 
45. I b i d . . pp. 249-50. 
46. For the background to the Vidovdan Constitution, see H.L. McBain 
and L. Rogers, The New Constitutions of Europe, (New York 1922), 
pp. 344-78. See also Beard and Radin, The Balkan Pivot, pp. 30-56. 
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the Serbs, that the continuation of a strong, centralized 
government had the advantage not only of perpetuating t h e i r own 
p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n but would also be the wisest and most sensible 
policy f o r the new state. 
But the Croats and Slovenes f e l t d i f f e r e n t l y . For years, t h e i r 
sole p o l i t i c a l aim had been to secure a greater measure of freedom 
and autonomy f o r the South Slav provinces of the Empire. Now, fowmg 
fi&L <po>\« foreign ^ O^^cxir^o^. 
rmiglifr AVU\ c n r r m W l i n WLV l w u i n g J I I - I V M I I A ^ -i gi • • • f-i.i 'Ant . j ay -h i n 
j . i i i i . w»-ii-Tf l i i - i M i a + . i r i n j they confidently expected to have an equal 
share i n running the new Kingdom and shaping i t s p o l i t i c a l future. 
When they discovered that t h i s was not to be the case, that the Serbs 
had seized a l l the main administrative posts and that the centre of 
power would be Belgrade, there was great resentment and bitterness. 
I n the elections f o r the Constituent Assembly, Stjepan Radic, leader 
of what was then considered an extreme form of Croat f e e l i n g , rec-
eived a large popular vote. Together with the Frankist and Federalist 
parties and others who resented Serbian domination of the new Kingdom, 
they put forward t h e i r plan that the country should be divided in t o 
49 
six autonomous provinces, each with an independent government and 
con s t i t u t i o n , which could be modified only by unanimous consent. 
Within t h i s , the loosest of confederations, the functions of a central 
47. Kerner, Yugoslavia, pp. 121-122. 
48. Radic, who by t h i s time was a staunch republican and autonomist, 
had been i n prison from March 1919 - February 1920 and March-November 
1920. Yet, was released i n time to take part i n the elections f o r the 
Constituent Assembly, i n which his party gained 50 seats. 
49. ( l ) Serbia and Macedonia, (2) Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and I s t r i a , 
(3) Montenegro, (4) Bosnia-Hercegovina, (5) Vojvodina, (6) Slovenia. 
The Croat tendency to lump Serbia and Macedonia together i s s i g -
n i f i c a n t , implying a common "barbarism" i n non-Catholic provinces. 
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government ( i e . i n Belgrade) would be minimal - simply defence 
and foreign a f f a i r s . ^ 
To the Serbs, the proposals put forward by the Croats seemed 
a dire c t threat to the precarious un i t y of the Kingdom, a r e p e t i t i o n 
51 
of the unhappy dualism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, i n 
the prevailing i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l idea that 
52 
was p o l i t i c a l l y unsound. But to the Croats themselves, these 
proposals did not seem unreasonable. Having been under Austrian and 
Hungarian rule f o r so long, the Croats wanted to be free. They wanted 
to have t h e i r own say i n everything that happened. They wanted to 
escape domination by some distant central government. They wanted 
53 
power i n t h e i r own hands - i n Zagreb. They did not believe that 
the freedom they expected, the power they wanted and the l o c a l 
autonomy they needed could be achieved i n a l e g i s l a t i v e assembly 
over two hundred miles away. Because they now distrusted the Serbs 
and suspected that they intended to impose t h e i r own views b r u t a l l y 
and unfeelingly throughout the Kingdom - whatever alternatives were 
suggested - the Croat proposals f o r confederation were advanced not 
only on the merits of "Federalism" or " l o c a l autonomy" over "centralism" 
but also as a test of Serb s i n c e r i t y towards both Croats and Slov-
enes i n l e t t i n g them have an equal and i n d i v i d u a l say i n the structure 
and administration of the Kingdom. 
50. But there were some who thought that Croatia should have separate 
diplomatic representation abroad. See Kerner, Yugoslavia, p. 518. 
51. The Times. 5 Apr. 1922. 
52. From 1918-1941? there was always the fear t h a t , at the f i r s t 
sign of weakness, I t a l y would occupy and annex Croatia and Slovenia. 
The i r r e d e n t i s t a c t i v i t i e s of Bulgaria and Hungary added to t h i s fear. 
53* The Slovenes - unlike the Croats - preferred a strong central 
government but t h e i r proposals aimed to balance Catholic and Ortho-
dox provinces i n favour of the Catholics, to prevent Serb domination. 
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Although many other proposals were l a i d before the Const-
ituent Assembly,^ they carried no great weight and did l i t t l e to 
resolve the deadlock between the main protagonists. The Serbs would 
not compromise. Neither would the Croats. For over s i x months, the 
Assembly engaged i n b i t t e r and protracted debate. However, by t h i s 
time, Nikola Pasic had returned from Paris, his reputation as a 
statesman greatly enhanced. Appointed by the Prince Regent as the 
only leader capable of commanding a majority, Pasic used his consid-
erable s k i l l and bargaining powers to obtain p o l i t i c a l support f o r 
the Serbian proposals. With the help of the Moslems and other smaller 
parties - but without the desired two-thirds majority - Pasic suc-
ceded i n getting the Assembly's approval f o r a highly centralized 
state, a single national parliament and a range of administrative 
and j u d i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Serbian t r a d i t i o n . Despite the 
whole-hearted opposition of many Croats - who eventually boycotted 
the Assembly - the Prince Regent accepted the majority decision 
and promulgated the Kingdom's f i r s t Constitution on June 28, 1921. 
For four years, the Croats refused to accept the Vidovdan 
Constitution and kept away from Belgrade. Their leader, St^pan 
Radic was a curiously eccentric f i g u r e : -
"Extremely short-sighted and generally untidy, 
he looked l i k e a cattle-buyer. Often he went about 
c o l l a r l e s s , s h i r t open, disclosing his broad hairy 
chest. At p o l i t i c a l meetings, he appeared i n peas-
ant boots and a well-worn, soiled sheepskin coat. 
He was an eccentric, a demagogue. Anything but a 
great mind. He made p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l out of the 
54. Beard and Radin, The Balkan Pivot, pp. 30-56. 
55. McBain and Rogers, New Constitutions of Europe, p. 347. 
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c o n f l i c t i n g impulses, vague desires, aspirations 
and keenly f e l t wants of the r u r a l masses who had 
been neglected and exploited f o r centuries. Play-
ing upon the vanities of the i l l i t e r a t e , s o c i a l l y -
backward peasantry, he gradually moulded i t s i n s t i n c t s 
and prejudices i n t o new p o l i t i c a l aims and t a c t i c s . 
He spoke i n parables often he talked f o r three, 
foun, f i v e hours at a str e t c h , rhythmatically ( s i c ) 
repeating and contradicting himself, u t t e r i n g no end 
56 
of nonsense; but that never hurt him." 
Radio" was greatly loved by the ordinary people and i t was 
perhaps not surprising that some, regarded him as the "uncrowned King 
of Croatia". His party, the Croatian Peasant Party, grew steadily i n 
size as Radic unrelentingly attacked the central government i n Bel-
grade. He made his followers aware of the unfair treatment Croatia 
and her people had received. He condemned - with some j u s t i f i c a t i o n -
the way l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s rode roughshod over l o c a l feelings 
57 
and exercised t h e i r petty tyrannies over the peasants. He alleged 
58 
that the Croats were taxed more heavily than the Serbs. He consist-
ently denied the central governmentTs r i g h t to speak f o r Croatia 
abroad and, throughout 1922, he engaged i n a f i e r c e controversy over 
the new electoral law, claiming that the Croats were e n t i t l e d t o at 
least half the seats i n the Skups'tina (Yugoslav National Assembly). 
He accused successive governments of dragging t h e i r feet i n the 
59 
matter of Agrarian reform and b i t t e r l y condemned them f o r a l l o t t i n g 
25$ of the 1922-23 budget to m i l i t a r y purposes. I n 1923, Radic paid 
a v i s i t , to Moscow and was w e l l received by leaders of the Communist 
56. Adamic, The Native's Return, pp. 274-5. 57. Kerner, op. c i t . , 
p. 125. 58. E.J. Patterson, Yugoslavia, (London 1936) p. 101. 
59. See below, pp. 21-22. 
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In t e r n a t i o n a l . He made no secret th a t , i n the years a f t e r the war, 
he corresponded regularly with Lenin. Fearful not only of a resurg-
ence of Communist a c t i v i t y ^ 0 - but also of the dangers of separatism -
the Government closed down many Croat societies and, from time to 
time, some of Radices meetings. But no matter what steps the central 
government took, Radio's popularity increased. I n 1920, f i f t y CPP 
(Croatian Peasant Party) deputies were elected; i n 1923, seventy; 
i n 1925, sixty-seven. Even i n t h e i r absence from the Skupstina, 
the Croats could not be ign o r e d . ^ 
Although Radic did change his mind and allow his party to 
62 
attend the Skupstina i n Belgrade.,. his decision did not make p a r l i a -
mentary l i f e any easier:-
" I n ten years, there were twenty-five m i n i s t r i e s , 
only one of which was reversed by di r e c t vote of 
the Skups'tina. Intrigues w i t h i n and without the 
60. Following a bomb attack on Prince Alexander i n May 1921 and the 
assassination of the Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Milorad Draskovic, on 
July 21, 1921, the Communist Party was proscribed. 
61. The boycott of the Skup^tina by 50 CPP members and 16 other Croat 
deputies -'together with the expulsion of 58 Communist deputies -
reduced the Assembly to 295 members, i n which there was a delicate 
balance of coalitions between the Radicals and Democrats. The a t t i t u d e 
of the Croats outside the Assembly, produced strong ripples w i t h i n , 
which constantly affected the p o l i t i c a l complexion of the Skupstina. 
62. Radio's decision to allow CPP members to s i t i n the Skupstina 
was accelerated by the widespread anger among the Croats and Slovenes 
that Pasic's government should have signed the Pact of Rome on Jan-
uary 27, 1924 - ceding Fiume (and many Croat nationals) to I t a l y . 
Radic hoped that i f his party a l l i e d themselves to the Democrats, 
he might defeat Pasici I n f a c t , his intervention led to a permanent 
s p l i t i n the Democrat Party. I t i s also worth noting that, even when 




Cabinet were responsible f o r the f a l l of the 
re s t . For the greater part of that period, there 
were 21 d i f f e r e n t parties and minority represent-
ati o n was not solely responsible f o r t h i s state of 
a f f a i r s . A l l kinds of p o l i t i c a l motives and i r r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t i e s were i n operation and parties, both 
large and small, s p l i t into smaller fragments or 
coalesced into unstable u n i t i e s . Even the h i s t o r i c a l 
Radical party was only a federation of three groups -
that of Vukicevic, of Pasic and of Uzunovic. Party 
d i s c i p l i n e was almost absent and, on one occasion, 
Radic' i n f u l l parliament, described the ministers, 
whose colleague he was, as pigs." 
The constant crises which plagued each of the twenty-five 
governments from 1919-1929 ^ meant that essential l e g i s l a t i o n was 
65 
continually delayed. Few laws were passed and, often, the s i t t i n g 
of the Skups'tina was suspended f o r several months to avoid further 
dissension:-
"How the country suffered from parliamentary 
i n t r i g u e may be judged by the records of the 
Ministr y of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The 
most pressing need a f t e r the war was the adjust-
ment of land systems and the re-organization of 
63. Patterson, Yugoslavia, pp. 99-100. 
64. For a complete l i s t of ministries between 1918-1929, see 
F. Culinovic, Jugoslavija izmedu dva rata, (Zagreb 196l), Vol 2, 
pp. 287-301. 65. The number of laws passed i n the period 
1919-28:- 1919 - 9 ; 1920 - 2; 1921 - 18; 1922 - 113; 1923 - 6 
1924 - 21 ; 1925 - 13; 1926 - 19; 1927 - 14; 1928 - 5. 
Central Bureau, Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1919-29, p. x i v . 
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ag r i c u l t u r e . Serbia owed a l l to the peasants 
and had a duty to them. And the people most i n 
need of help i n Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina were of farming stock. Yet less was 
done f o r the peasants than f o r any other class 
of the community. A competent Serb authority 
remarked that the peasant had not improved his 
position since the days of Kara George.... 
From 1918 u n t i l the di c t a t o r s h i p , there 
were some twenty changes. The f i r s t Minister f o r 
Agriculture lasted a month; the second, four 
months; the t h i r d , two weeks; the fo u r t h , four 
months; the f i f t h , three months, when a Minister 
f o r Agrarian Reform was appointed. But the heads 
of the two ministries were constantly changed and 
the only man who could stand his job f o r more than 
a year was Krsta Miletic', who lasted from 18 July 
1921 to 6 January 1923. I t w i l l be clear that 
nothing resembling a five-year plan f o r agriculture 
could be made when there was no prospect or even 
desire f o r continuity of o f f i c e . " ^ 
Recognizing that Radio" and his Peasant Party were the main 
source of unrest w i t h i n the Kingdom, Nikola Pasic eventually decided 
to take f i r m action against them. I n January 1925, following a number 
of v i o l e n t "separatist" speeches by the Croat leader, Radic was a r r -
ested and imprisoned. His party was banned and i t s newspaper, the 
Slobodni Pom suppressed. Such strong measures induced an immediate 
change of heart i n the Croat leader, who announced, i n March 1925, 
66. S. Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) p. 122. 
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that he would now accept the Vidovdan Constitution and recognize 
the Karadjordjevic dynasty. His declaration came as a great sur-
prise - not least to his own supporters - but i t brought, immediate 
results. Radic was released from prison i n July 1925, the r e s t r i c t -
ions on his party were l i f t e d , the CPP joined the Radicals to form 
a Serbo-Croat c o a l i t i o n government and, i n November 1925} Radic 
became Minister of Education. 
No one could claim that Radic was i n any way a success as 
Minister of Education. I n f a c t , i t was reported that he l e f t the 
department i n complete chaos. Nor could he be described as an 
easy person to work with. At one time or another, he viciously 
attacked a l l his government colleagues i n public speeches, causing 
no less than three Cabinet crises i n six months.^ The B r i t i s h 
Minister wrote l a t e r : -
"Radic was extremely indiscreet and would 
even give the Press such distorted versions 
of his conversations with the King and members 
of the diplomatic corps that i t was never safe 
69 
to hold any conversation with him." 
But, w h i l s t Radic and his party were i n government, working i n 
c o a l i t i o n with the Serbs, there.was always the p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
quarrels, resentment and d i s t r u s t of post-war years might be forgotten. 
Certainly i t showed that r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Croats and Serbs was 
67. Public Record Office, London. Foreign Office P o l i t i c a l Corres-
pondence, F.O. 371. Kennard (Belgrade) to Cushendun, 16 Aug. 1928, 
C6315/173/92. 68. His speeches i n Bosnia i n February 
1926 against Pasic produced a cr i s i s i n A p r i l (Pasic waited t i l l the 
Budget had been passed). I n mid-April, his public attacks caused 
Uzunovic to o f f e r his resignation; and i n October, he attacked a 
Czechoslovakian delegation i n Zagreb, again provoking Uzunovic to resign. 
69. Kennard to Cushendun, 10 Aug. 1928, C6202/173/92. 
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not impossible and that both could work together. 
But, unfortunately, the period of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n did not l a s t . 
The government of which Radic was a member had done i t s best to 
support and implement the Pact of Rome. Despite a l l the evidence of 
70 
I t a l i a n i n t r i g u e - i n Austria, i n Hungary and i n Bulgaria - i t had 
believed that an understanding could be reached with Mussolini. 
But, i n November 1926, the I t a l i a n s signed a p o l i t i c a l treaty with 
71 72 Albania, which was regarded i n Belgrade hot only as a blow to 
a l l hopes of friendship between the two countries, but also as a 
decidedly h o s t i l e act. The event led to a serious Cabinet c r i s i s , 
the downfall of the government and a new c o a l i t i o n , i n which Radic 
had no part. 
I t was a s i t u a t i o n which did not appeal to the Croat leader. 
For an uneasy eighteen months, he had held a position of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
he had been a respected Government f i g u r e , he had talked and dined 
with the King. But, what was more s i g n i f i c a n t , he had seen his 
I p o l i t i c a l opponents at close quarters. He knew what sort of men 
they were. During the period he had been i n c o a l i t i o n with them, a 
whole series of scandals had been discovered involving many leading 
70. For an outline of I t a l y ' s diplomacy i n the Balkans at t h i s 
time, see A Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, (Princeton 1970) 
PP. 315-352. 
71. Although the r u l e r of Albania, Ahmed-Zogu was helped to power 
by Yugoslavia, he subsequently turned to I t a l y f o r help. A f i n a n c i a l 
agreement was signed i n March 1925> the Treaty of Tirana i n November 
1926 and a m i l i t a r y alliance i n November 1927. 
72. Who, i t must be admitted, also had a p o l i t i c a l i nterest i n 
Albania . I n considering Yugoslavia's relations with I t a l y during 
t h i s period, i t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to decide whether Yugoslavia's 
hos t i l e reaction to the I t a l i a n presence i n Albania was motivated by 
a genuine fear of "encirclement" or was rather jus t plain jealousy. 
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73 figures. P a i l i ^ llriim»r IIMI-JI W M I I l.lifll. Min L,MUMII mi*, of +.wn BMf tS j 
a m i lii • i TI • l i i n m n i r » pnWi- i n n r l f f r n r l r <-t.-i i . iri +n fhr Rivl fvna. 
"Ft. WAS almi:is.t n i.-tialnm. Radic was therefore able to base his attacks 
on even more ju s t foundations. When he l e f t o f f i c e , he declared that 
although he loved and respected the Serb people, he was determined 
75 
to fight the corrupt men in power. At f i r s t , people paid l i t t l e 
attention to Radices attacks - they had heard them before - but, 
i n October 1927, the Croat leader surprised the p o l i t i c a l world by-
joining up with P r i b i c e v i c - hitherto a staunch " c e n t r a l i s t " and 
leader of the Independent Democrat Party - and Jovanovic i n a 
77 
j o i n t Opposition bloc against the Government. '' O f f i c i a l party newspapers i n Belgrade c a l l e d them the precani 
78 
front, but i t was not the Opposition's intention to confine .them-
selves merely to the precctnski. I n January 1928, an appeal was made 
73. Pasic himself was obliged to resign because of the involvement 
of his son. His resignation and subsequent death deprived the Kingdom 
of the one man capable of holding the warring p o l i t i c a l factions tog-
ether . Corruption was by no means confined to the Serbs. Mr Kennard 
quotes several examples of corruption, notably one Croat, Nikic, who 
made such a fortune out of his tenure of the Ministry of Mines and 
Forests that he was not only dismissed from o f f i c e but also expelled 
from his party ( a rare happening). However, he l a t e r bought his way 
back into p o l i t i c a l l i f e by large donations to public funds. Kennard 
to Cushendun, 16, Aug. 1928, C6315/173/92. 
7L. AriaJtiio. Tfto W a t l V o l f l K u t U M U . P . 3 k 2 . 
75. H.D. Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia, (London 194l), p. 180. 
76. The surprise was the greater i n that P r i b i c e v i c , as Minister of 
the I n t e r i o r , had been responsible for Radio's imprisonment i n March 
1919. The account of how the c o a l i t i o n was formed i s given i n 
S. P r i b i c e v i c , La Dictature du Roi Alexandre (Paris 1933) pp. 60-61. 
77. Jovanovic'was leader of the small Serbian Peasant Party. 
78. Precani i s the Serbo-Croat term for those who l i v e d to the north 
of the r i v e r s Sava and Danube. A t r a n s l a t i o n would be "trans-
r i p a r i a n " . 
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to the Democrat party, i n v i t i n g them to j o i n the CPP-ID 
79 
Coalition. Their appeal succeeded i n provoking yet another Cabinet 
c r i s i s , l a s t i n g sixteen days. The Democrats were tempted. The Radicals 
declared themselves w i l l i n g to form a c o a l i t i o n with the CPP - but 
neither party was w i l l i n g to co-operate with P r i b i c e v i c , who was 
regarded by a l l the Serbian parties as a turncoat or t r a i t o r and 
80 
whose aggressive nature had won him few friends. The Croat leader 
81 
refused to enter any c o a l i t i o n without his new-found friend and 
i t seemed, i n early 1928, that unless he could make the task of 
government impossible without the co-operation of the CPP-ID bloc, 
Radices p o l i t i c a l future would be bleak indeed. 
Radic and Pr i b i c e v i c therefore set about the task of making 
government impossible. Day a f t e r d a y - inside the Skupstina and 
without - they embarked upon a se r i e s of speeches, attacking and 
v i l i f y i n g Serbian p o l i t i c a l leaders and a l l things connected with 
Serbia. When the Skupstina re-assembled at the beginning of March, 
Radio was suspended for three days for misuse of the King ts name. 
The CPP boycotted the Assembly i n protest and then declared that the 
g 
Croatian people would never accept a budget debated i n t h e i r absence. 
79. I n o f f i c i a l documents and books, the Radic-Pribicevic Opposition 
bloc i s often referred to as the "Peasant-Democrat" Coalition, which 
gives the misleading impression that the Davidovic Democrats were 
united with the CPP. Since Radic was united with the Independent 
Democrats, I have chosen to refer to the Opposition c o a l i t i o n as 
the CPP-ID. 
80. On January 23, 1928, P r i b i c e v i c , who had consistently attacked 
the Serbs and called them barbarians, suggested i n a public speech 
that the great Serbian vic t o r y at Kajmacalan i n November 1916 was 
won as much by the Croats as the Serbs, a suggestion which caused 
enormous anger i n Belgrade. P r i b i c e v i c , l a Dictature...., p. 62. 
81. Even though, for the f i r s t time, King Alexander had invited 
Radic' to form a government. 
82. Kennard to S i r Austen Chamberlain, 7 Mar. 1928, C1956/173/92. 
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Big demonstrations were organized i n the northern part of the 
Kingdom and Dr Trumbic declared that i f there was war between 
I t a l y and the Kingdom, he did not believe that the precani" would 
fi g h t . The fa c t that the Croats had a genuine grievance was shown 
by the many voices which suggested that the Constitution should be 
modified - perhaps to include a second chamber, perhaps to modify 
the e l e c t o r a l law - but c e r t a i n l y to de-centralize and give greater 
l o c a l autonomy. But the Serbian parties i n government would not 
consider i t . One w r i t e r observed:-
"The State had got i t s e l f into a vicious c i r c l e . 
There was not l i k e l y to be a curtailment of 
party faction unless the Constitution could be 
reformed but the Constitution could not be 
reformed because of the existence of party 
f a c t i o n . " 8 5 
I t was at t h i s unfortunate moment that the Government decided 
to lay the Nettuno Conventions before the Skupstina for r a t i f i c a t i o n . ' 
Their decision raised the Opposition to fever pitch. There were 
student demonstrations i n Dalmatia and Belgrade. The CPP-ID Coalition 
were convinced that Croat i n t e r e s t s were again being s a c r i f i c e d . 
Within the Skup^tina, Pribicevic' and Radic organized a s e r i e s of 
83. Kennard to Chamberlain, 7 Mar. 1928, C1956/173/92. 
84. Kennard to Chamberlain, 15 Mar. 1928, C2166/173/92. 
85. Patterson, Yugoslavia, pp. 101-2. 
86. I n the prevailing atmosphere between the Kingdom and I t a l y , the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Nettuno Conventions (see Chapter 4) were reg-
arded by the I t a l i a n s as a token of Yugoslav s i n c e r i t y but the 
Croats, feared that the Serbs were going to repeat the Pact of Rome 
and "sign away" more of t h e i r land and people to I t a l y . On the other 
hand, i t should be noted that Vukicevic, the Radical Prime Minister, 
was under attack from his own party for s a c r i f i c i n g his party*s 
great t r a d i t i o n s . 
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obstructionist and provocative t a c t i c s which prevented any 
87 
serious work being done.. Opposition deputies sustained a 
continuous pandemonium - banging desk-lids and shouting abuse at 
the Serbs 
"One day, the doors of the Skup&tina were flung 
open and a naked man, alleged to have been beaten 
by the police, was carried i n to show his bruises. 
Another day, four members who had been expelled 
from the House for disobeying the President the 
day before, refused to accept his r u l i n g and i n s i s -
ted on taking t h e i r seats. When invited to leave, 
they refused. F i n a l l y a squad of gendarmes was 
cal l e d i n and amid a t e r r i f i c uproar, a most 
undignified game of hide-and-seek was played among 
the benches of the parliament before the four were 
caught and thrown out. When i t was a l l over and 
order had been restored, Pribicevicf rose and made a 
violent protest against the unconstitutional entry 
88 
of police into the Parliament." 
Such were the standards and conduct of parliamentary l i f e i n the 
Kingdom of Serbs.>! Croats and Slovenes. I t had become, i n the words of 
89 
one writer, "a circus and a madhouse". Few of the hopes of the 
liberators - or liberated - had been achieved. The goal of u n i f i c a t i o n 
90 
was as far away as ever. Croats and Serbs were s t i l l divided. I n the 
circumstances, i t did not seem that they could ever be reconciled. 
The only place where reform could begin - the Skup&tina- had become 
87. Annual Report for 1928, (Vol. 13708) C99/99/92. Para 104, p.23. 
88. Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia, p. 181. 
89. Adamic, The Native*s Return, p. 341. 
90. Central Bureau, Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1919-1929, p. x i i i . 
29 
a farce and thing of contempt. For t h i s , the Serbs were as much 
to blame as the Croats, but to those who were intensely n a t i o n a l i s t i c , 
i t seemed that the Croats were primarily responsible for a l l that 
had happened. Warnings were uttered i n the Skupstina that such 
provocation and such i n s u l t s would not go unpunished. There were 
threats that "heads would r o l l " . F i n a l l y , on June 20, 1928, a member 
of the Radical party, Punisa Racic, went to the tribune to utter a 
f i n a l warning:-
"Never," he said, /'have Serbian in t e r e s t s been 
91 
so endangered as now. As a Serbian and a deputy, 
as I see danger threatening my country, I must 
openly say that I s h a l l use another weapon to 
defend Serbian i n t e r e s t s . " 
Seeing that h is words had no effect and that the chorus of i n s u l t s 
continued, Racic drew a p i s t o l from his pocket and f i r e d f i v e shots, 
k i l l i n g two of the Croat front bench immediately and f a t a l l y wounding • 92 Stjepan Radxc. 
91. Racic was i n fa c t a Montenegrin. See "Biographies". 
92. For a contemporary account of the murders i n the Skupstina, 
see .Appendix B. 
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Chapter .2 
The Causes of the Dictatorship 
31 
The murders i n the Skupstina i n June 1928 marked a watershed 
i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the Kingdom. Before they took place, i t had 
been assumed that parliamentary democracy would work. Although Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes came from widely different backgrounds and trad-
i t i o n s , i t was thought that, given time and a l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l exp-
erience, a Western-type parliamentary system .would evolve. But a f t e r 
the murders, many people came to the conclusion that the type of 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e envisaged i n the 1921 Constitution j u s t could not 
be achieved i n a s i t u a t i o n where one national group was constantly 
at the throat of the other, where there was mutual mistrust, jealousy 
- even hatred. Some voices had already suggested that the Constitution 
should be revised. Others that the whole structure of the Kingdom be 
changed. There had been c a l l s for a non-partisan Prime Minister -
a General, perhaps - to over-ride the warring factions. The idea of 
dictatorship had also been raised. But some s t i l l clung to the hope 
that the parliamentary system could be made to work and believed 
(despite a l l that had happened) that i f the Croats would simply 
accept the system as i t was, and co-operate - instead of tearing 
t h e i r opponents to shreds - then d r a s t i c change would not be needed. 
For j u s t over s i x months, the matter was l e f t i n the hands of the 
p o l i t i c i a n s . There was time for assessment to be made. Time for 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . An opportunity for some acceptable a l t e r n a t i v e to 
be found. But, as the months passed and nothing was achieved and 
no settlement reached, the f u l l extent of the deadlock between the 
32 
Croats and Serbs was seen. The royal dictatorship was not imposed 
i n sudden fear and panic. Only when i t became clear that there 
would be no parliamentary solution to the problem did the King 
intervene. 
Although two of the leading members of the Croatian Peasant 
Party had been shot dead by Rac'ic and three others se r i o u s l y 
2 
injured, i t was a matter of some r e l i e f - p a r t i c u l a r l y to the 
Serbs - that Stjepan Radic had been wounded rather than k i l l e d . 
I t was f e l t that, i f he had died i n the Skupstina, there might w e l l 
have been c i v i l war.^ As i t was, there were violent protests and 
demonstrations i n Zagreb, i n which four were k i l l e d , t h i r t y wounded 
and 160 arrested. But the violence was short-lived. The Cabinet 
sent out immediate instructions to the l o c a l commanders to maintain 
law and order. A communique was published saying that a l l medical 
treatment for the injured deputies - and f i n a n c i a l support for 
bereaved families - would be paid for by the State. Telegrams of 
condolence were sent by the Prime Minister. But the most impressive 
contribution to peace was a v i s i t by King Alexander to the hospital 
where Radic had been taken. At his bedside, the King expressed his 
sorrow at what had happened. Radic was greatly moved by the King Ts 
5 
concern and kissed his hand. 
When the shock was over, there was universal condemnation of 
the shootings. Newspapers throughout the country examined the circum-
1. Radices nephew, Pavle Radic, and -Djuro Basaricek (see Biographies) 
2. Stjepan Radic, Dr Pernar and M. Grandja. 
3. Radic did not die u n t i l August 8. 
4. H.F. Armstrong, "After the Assassination of King Alexander", 
Foreign A f f a i r s (New York), Jan. 1935, p. 210. 
5. Mr Roberts (Belgrade) to Chamberlain, 20 June 1928, C4939/173/92. 
Pribicevic", who was no friend of King Alexander, claimed that he 
"flew" to the hospital to be with Radic, that the King Ts v i s i t 
did not take place and was invented for purely p o l i t i c a l reasons. 
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stances of the crime, some suggesting that the deaths were part of 
a plot,^ others s t a t i n g that the Opposition leaders were morally 
7 
responsible for what had happened and had got what they deserved. 
Many newspapers singled out P r i b i c e v i c , the Independent Democrat 
leader, as the v i l l a i n of the piece. Od.jek - the Democrat party 
paper - said that i t was "high time h i s satanic endeavours to make 
differences between the Serbs and the Croats, ever since the foundation 
of the Yugoslav s t a t e , should be shown forth i n t h e i r true l i g h t . " 
Other newspapers blamed right-wing Serbian extremists and pointed out 
that a scurrilous newspaper - Jedinstvo - had appeared i n mid-June, 
publicly suggesting that someone should murder Radic' and Pribicevic'. ^  
Whilst the newspaper editors interpreted the event according 
to t h e i r individual l i g h t s , the Croat deputies t r a v e l l e d home, 
vowing that they would never return to Belgrade."*"*"* Two large funerals 
were held i n Zagreb but although they were attended by large crowds 
there was no incident."^ The Croats were shocked and saddened, not 
only by what had happened, but also at the unfeeling attitude shown 
by the Serbs. I n Belgrade, there was only one hour Ts mourning for 
the dead and merely two black flags on view. I n the opinion of many 
6. For instance, the Novosti, (Zagreb). Roberts to Chamberlain, 
26 Jun. 1928, C5040/173/92. 
7. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the•Samouprava (Radical party paper) and the 
Slovenec ( L j u b l j a n a ) . 8. Odjek, 24 Jun. 1928. 
9. The editor of Jedinstvo, Dr Vlada Ristovic', was murdered i n Zagreb 
on August 4. He had v i s i t e d the c i t y incognito but had been recog-
nized. He was shot by a locksmith named Sunic, a f t e r being 
beaten up by the crowd. 
10. S. P r i b i c e v i c , La Dictature du Roi Alexandre (Paris 1933) P» 75. 
11. The funerals of Pavle Radic'and Basari^ek were paid for by the 
c i t y of Zagreb, the Opposition leaders having refused to accept the 
GovernmentTs condolences. Over 200,000 attended the funerals, at 
which the speeches were of an unusually moderate tone. I b i d . 
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Croats, Dr Pe r i c , the President of the Skupstina, was personally 
12 
responsible for allowing the crime to take place, but i t was noted 
sthat he had not resigned. Nor had the Radical Party made any effort 
to condemn Racic for his deed. The Government, too, remained i n 
power. The Croats f e l t that the le a s t they could have done would be 
to resign. Vukicevic was, i n f a c t , desperately trying to keep 
his Government together, unwilling to resign u n t i l he had seen 
Radic and made far-reaching concessions. But Radio was i n hospital, 
well-guarded against any such manoeuvres and surrounded by friends 
and party members who intended to get him sa f e l y back to Zagreb as 
soon as his health permitted. 
The p o l i t i c a l consequence of the murders was a hardening of 
attitude on the part of the Croats. At a meeting on June 21, the 
leaders of the CPP-ID Coalition declared that they would no longer 
s i t i n a parliament where the blood of t h e i r friends and colleagues 15 «/ had been shed. They would not attend the Skupstina again unless 
they received complete s a t i s f a c t i o n for a l l they had suffered, nor 
16 
would they return u n t i l t h e i r future safety was f u l l y guaranteed. 
Before Pr i b i c e v i c l e f t for the funeral ceremonies i n Zagreb, he had 
an audience with King Alexander, who asked him what he thought should 
be done. P r i b i c e v i c replied:-
"What ought to be done f i r s t i s for the Gov-
ernment to be dismissed, the chamber dissolved 
and free and honest elections held for a new 
Assembly. I f e e l sure that the f r e e l y elected 
12. Despite the atmosphere of murder, Dr Peric' had not suspended the 
s i t t i n g and had l e f t the Chamber, leaving Rafcic' to commit his crime. 
13. Roberts to Chamberlain, 27 Jun. 1928, C5103/173/92. 
14. Roberts to Foreign Office, 3 J u l . 1928, C5185/173/92. 
15. PribicVvid', La Dictature •..., p. 72. 
16. Roberts to Foreign Office, 22 June 1928, C4858/173/92. 
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representatives of the people w i l l quickly 
s e t t l e the question of reparations and sanctions 
which the Croats have demanded and also give 
guarantees for the f u l l equality of r i g h t s . " 
P r i b i c e v i c noted that the King did not seem very happy with his 
reply and said that he was unwilling to dismiss the Government and 
c a l l elections, f i r s t l y because t h i s would make people think the 
Government were to blame for the murders and, secondly, because he 
had "no wish to see the Croats exposing the corpses as part of t h e i r 
17 
election campaign." 
Both the Radical and Democrat parties held s p e c i a l meetings at 
the beginning of July to decide what should be done. Neither party 
was anxious to withdraw from the Government on i t s own but, fortun-
ately, both parties were agreed that there should be a "concentration" 
government (with representatives from a l l parties) and that t h i s 
18 y 
Cabinet should take charge as soon as possible. Vukicevic therefore 
handed i n his resignation on July 4 and l e f t the King with the delicate 
task of sounding out p o l i t i c a l leaders and trying to bring them tog-
ether. His f i r s t choice was Aca Stanojevic', an elder statesman of the 
Radical Party and a l i f e l o n g friend of Pasic. But Stanojevic^'s efforts 
19 
met with l i t t l e success for Radic refused to see him, and without 
Radic, there could be no concentration government. The King next 
invited Radic'himself to form a government. Radic'was not unwilling 
to t r y but i n s i s t e d that i f he were made Prime Minister, he would 
immediately dissolve the Skups'tina and order fresh elections. He also 
refused to have i n his Cabinet any Serbs who had been part of Vukicevic fs 
17 i P r i b i c e v i c , op. c i t . , pp. 73-74; 
18. Roberts to Foreign Office, 4 July 1928, C5211/173/92. 
19. Pribicfevicf, op. c i t . , p. 77. 
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government. The King told Radic that he could not agree to the 
dissolution and fresh elections unless the other parties agreed. 
' 20 Radic stressed that these were his minimum demands. 
But whilst Radic was negotiating with the King and suggesting 
a peaceful way out of the c r i s i s , other members of his party were 
publicly declaring that the time for negotiation was over. I n a 
speech on July 6, Josip Predavec, Vice-President of the CPP, said 
that since Croatia and Serbia came from quite different cultures, 
they could never form a united s t a t e . He told his audience that the 
idea of "Yugoslavia" was a "poetic f i c t i o n " and claimed that those 
who had been martyred for the Croat cause would soon see t h e i r hopes 
f u l f i l l e d . As f a r as he was concerned, the time was too late for an 
a l l - p a r t y government. By the crime of June 20, the Serbs had b u i l t 
21 
a w a l l between them, e f f e c t i v e l y dividing Serb and Croat. The 
22 ^ speech greatly annoyed King Alexander and he summoned Pri b i c e v i c " 
- the only active leader of the CPP-ID Coalition i n Belgrade - to 
the Palace on the evening of July 7 and suggested to him that i f 
Predavec Ts speeches were a f a i t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n of Croat fee l i n g , then 
i t might be better to "amputate" Croatia and leave the Croats and 
23 
Slovenes to fend for themselves. 
20. I b i d . , pp. 79-80. 
21. Roberts to Chamberlain, 11 July 1928, C5464/173/92. 
22. Pribicevic", op. c i t . , p. 78. 
23. The "Amputation" theory was o r i g i n a l l y put forward by the Serbian 
Radical, Stojan P r o t i c , i n the newspaper, Radikal, i n December 1920. 
His argument was that Serbia had made a mistake i n uniting with 
Croatia and Slovenia. She should instead have united with Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Southern Dalmatia, Vojvodina and parts of Slav-
onia. This smaller, united Kingdom should have been ca l l e d Serbia. 
The theory envisaged the withdrawl of Serbian troops, leaving the 
Croats and Slovenes on t h e i r own. Protic'believed that t h i s would 











MAP SHOWING RIVAL •AMPUTATION'PROJECTS 
The red line allegedly shows the frontier 
envisaged by the Serbs in 1928. 
The blue line was a Croat counter -
suggest ion, claiming the greater part of 
the Dalmatian coast. 
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According to Pribicevic^ the King said that, as f a r as he 
was concerned, when Radic returned to Zagreb, he could announce 
the separation of Croatia from the Kingdom. The Serbs no longer 
wanted to have anything to do with the Croats and, i n the King's 
opinion, separation would be best. A few Serbian detachments would 
be l e f t on the Yugoslav fr o n t i e r to prevent I t a l i a n annexation, but 
once Croatia had organized her own defensive measures, these units 
would be withdrawn. P r i b i c e v i c was amazed by the King's suggestion 
and said that the King and his advisers should pay no attention to 
people l i k e Predavec, who were e a s i l y carried away. He, P r i b i c e v i c , 
and Radic were the only spokesmen for the Opposition and, as f a r as 
he was concerned, he categorically rejected a l l idea of "separatism" 
25 
or "amputation". I t was l a t e r admitted that the policy of "amput-
ation " had only been mentioned i n order to secure from the Opposition 
26 
leaders a condemnation of the views held by Predavec and others. 
I f t h i s was the King's intention, then his plan worked. For that 
night, P r i b i c e v i c ' - i n consultation with Radic''- submitted to Alex-
ander a formal statement of the CPP-ID position:-
"The Peasant-Democrat Coalition r e j e c t s the very 
23. (contd) get back into the Kingdom - but on Serbia's terms. Pasic"' 
condemned the idea when i t was f i r s t mooted and, once the 1921 Const-
i t u t i o n had been adopted, the whole idea of amputation had been 
dropped. 
24. Radic'was due to leave hospital and return to Zagreb on July 8. 
25- Pribicevic", op. c i t . , pp. 80-84* Pribicevic" says that he told 
the King that i f the leaders of the other p o l i t i c a l parties had 
agreed to "amputation" they should have been arrested for high 
treason. I t seems - from t h i s incident - that the King was 
r e l y i n g on P r i b i c e v i c ' s t r a d i t i o n a l "centralism" to p u l l 
Radic' and the CPP back from the brink. 
26. Kennard to Cushendun, 6 Sept. 1928, C6797/173/92. 
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idea of opposition to the state as such and 
declares most categorically that i t has proved 
i t s e l f by i t s history and i t s labours more pat-
r i o t i c than i t s accusers. The speech of M Predavec, 
provoked as i t was by the methods of government 
recently adopted and by what has occured i n the 
Chamber, as also by the proposal to resolve the 
c r i s i s by renewing the old system, can at the worst 
be only interpreted as the expression of a desire 
to bring about the revis i o n of the Constitution by 
l e g a l means with a view to the guarantee of equality 
of rights to a l l sections of our people. By i t s 
proposals for the solution of the present c r i s i s , 
the Coalition demands a change i n the system, not 
i n the State." 2 7 
The King now ventured to create a neutral government led by a 
non-p o l i t i c a l figure. The idea of a general had been i n his mind for 
some time but, up to the end of June, he had been reluctant to put 
the idea into practice unless the various parties agreed. 2 8 Radic^ 
himself, had nothing against a general as Prime Minister - i n f a c t , 
he had upset many of his opponents by suggesting the idea i n February 
1928 - but he would only give his support to a neutral government 
which carried out his minimum demands - the dissolution of the Skup-
\i 29 
s t i n a and fresh elections. On July 12, King Alexander invited 
General Hadzic to form a non- p o l i t i c a l government, his intention 
30 
being that the new government should get a l l the urgent business 
27. Roberts to Chamberlain, 11 July 1928, C5464/173/92. 
28. Roberts to O.G. Sargent, 29 June 1928, C5146/173/92. 
29. Pribicevic', op. c i t . , p. 84. 
30. Passing the Nettuno Conventions, l e g i s l a t i n g for a foreign loan 
and the r a i s i n g of R a c i c T s parliamentary immunity. 
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through the Skupstina, then adjourn t i l l October 20, when 
parliament would be dissolved and elections fixed for December 1928 
or January 1929. But whatever the King Ts plans, he was disappointed; 
for, a f t e r almost a fortnight of waiting for distinguished non-pol-
i t i c a l personalities from a l l over the country, from I t a l y and from 
31 v London, to come to Belgrade, General Hadzic was forced to admit 
that he could not form a Cabinet and handed the matter back to the 
King. Alexander made no further effort to reconcile the different 
p a r t i e s . Instead, he recall e d one of the leading members of the 
Vukicevic Cabinet - Dr Korosec - and invited him to form any govern-
ment he could. Dr KoroMec, although a Slovene and a Catholic, was as 
unacceptable to the Croats as Vukicevic had been; and his Cabinet, 
chosen within four days, proved to be much the same as that which 
32 
had resigned on July 4. Far from bringing r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and an 
end to the c r i s i s . , i t seemed that the choice of the new Cabinet 
33 
would simply widen the breach between the two halves of the Kingdom. 
There can be no doubt that throughout the lengthy p o l i t i c a l 
c r i s i s , the attitude of the Croat people was one of extreme moderation. 
Perhaps they were thankful Radic was s t i l l a l i v e and able to fight 
for t h e i r cause. Certainly, they gave him a warm welcome when 
31. The Hadzic "neutral" Cabinet would have consisted of people 
such as Rakic, the Yugoslav Minister i n Rome; D j u r i t , the Minister 
i n London; Tarta g l i a , the Mayor of S p l i t ; and Dr Stampar, a leading 
Government health o f f i c i a l . 
32. Seven Radicals, four Democrats, two Slovenes and one Moslem; 
Kennard to Chamberlain, 2 Aug. 1928, C6014/173/92. 
33- According to the Times correspondent i n Belgrade, the Korosec 
government was not expected to l a s t longer than three months. " I t 
i s regarded as a makeshift to gain time for a bargain to be struck 
with M. Radio"." The Times, July 30, 1928. 
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he returned to Zagreb. Flags were f l y i n g i n the c i t y and his home 
was protected both by the police and by an honorary guard of 
peasants. But his health continued to cause concern. There were 
3 5 
complications. On July 27, Radio" was moved to a hospital and a 
s p e c i a l i s t brought from Vienna. Daily bul l e t i n s were published. On 
August 8, he died. For two days, his body lay i n state i n the 
Sel.jayki Donr^ i n Zagreb; then on August 12, he was buried. Over 
300,000 people attended his funeral, including thousands of peasants 
from a l l over Croatia. I t was estimated that the funeral procession 
37 
alone was over eight miles long. 
In the meantime, the Government had re-opened the Skups'tina 
to allow e s s e n t i a l l e g i s l a t i o n to be passed. But when the f i r s t 
38 
session was held, only 130 deputies were present. The Croats and 
t h e i r a l l i e s made i t c l e a r that they would boycott the Assembly 
u n t i l t h e i r demands had been granted. At a meeting of the CPP-ID 
Coalition, held on August 1 i n the building once occupied by the 
Croatian Sabor, three resolutions were passed. The f i r s t stated 
that, i n the opinion of the Coalition, the rump Skupstina l e f t i n 
Belgrade had no power to l e g i s l a t e for the Kingdom as a whole and 
that any f i n a n c i a l agreement (such as a foreign loan) entered into 
by the Government would not be regarded as binding. Secondly, they 
pledged themselves to conduct a determined struggle to obtain a new 
34 . Consular Report from Zagreb (July 1928) C5468/173/92. 
35 . Diabetes and pneumonia. 
36. L i t e r a l l y , "The Peasants' Home" - headquarters of the CPP. 
37. Kennard to Cushendun, 16 Aug. 1928, C6-316/173/92. 
38. The government raised the immunity of Racic, paid homage to 
BasariEek and Pavle Radic and presented t h e i r programme which i n c l -
uded a draft law for the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Nettuno Conventions. 
For a copy of the government programme ( i n Fr,ench) see Avala press 
agency hand-out i n despatch from Kennard to Chamberlain, 2 Aug. 1928, 
C6015/173/92. 
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structure for the state i n which a l l n a t i o n a l i t i e s would have 
equal r i g h t s . Thirdly, they invited a l l who shared t h e i r views to 
j o i n them.^^ As a r e s u l t of t h e i r appeal, Dr Trumbic^ and Dr 
Pavelic^"*" joined the Peasant Party to present a united Croat front 
against Belgrade. 
But, to the Government, the Opposition seemed a very makeshift 
a f f a i r . I t was a Coalition, but only i n name. I t had no constructive 
p o l i t i c a l programme. I t had no considered plans for constitutional 
reform. And i t was unlikely that i t would ever have any plans for 
constitutional reform because the Coalition now consisted of centr-
a l i s t s , f e d e r a l i s t s , autonomists and s e p a r a t i s t s , who would never 
be able to agree. The Government believed that the Opposition had 
nothing i n common except t h e i r desire to exploit a t r a g i c event for 
t h e i r own s e l f i s h purposes, and f e l t that i t would be only a matter 
of time before the Coalition s p l i t up. 
But a f t e r the death of Radic, the Croatian Peasant Party 
elected a new leader, Dr Vladimir Macek. Dr. Macek was not a colourful 
figure and lacked many of the more endearing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of his 
predecessor. But he had been one of Radio's chief advisers and, as 
a lawyer, he now brought to the dispute a professional tenacity and 
an incomparable ta l e n t for obstruction. On August 20, he issued 
39. For the f u l l text of the CPP-ID resolutions, see Pribicevic', 
op. c i t . , pp. 93-4. 40. The only Croat F e d e r a l i s t deputy. Joined 
the CPP on Aug. 4. 41. The only Croat Frankist deputy. See ch. 9. 
42 . Kennard to Cushendun, 16 Aug. 1928, C6315/173/92. 
43. Kennard to Cushendun, 16 Aug. 1928, C6316/173/92. There was r e l i e f 
i n some c i r c l e s that Macek - rather than Predavec - had been chosen, 
Predavec being regarded as ambitious and e a s i l y carried away. Once 
elected, Macek said that the Croats were now determined "to secure 
t h e i r freedom within the h i s t o r i c a l boundaries of the triune kingdom 
of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia or - as he put i t - from Zemun to 
Kotor." 
42 
h i s f i r s t statement denying the right of the Korosec government 
to represent Croatia at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference then 
meeting i n B e r l i n . ^ He also sent a delegate to the Conference to 
"represent Croatia i n the face of world opinion."^^ The Government 
warned Dr Macek that his behaviour represented "an attack upon the 
unity of the s t a t e " but P r i b i c e v i c r e t a l i a t e d by publishing i n his 
newspaper, Glas (The Voice), the f u l l story of how the p o l i t i c a l 
leaders i n Belgrade had suggested to the King i n July that he should 
"amputate" C r o a t i a . ^ His disclosures provoked a major row which 
lasted for over a week. Whilst accusations and denials were being 
made, Dr Macek made a statement to the Press. He said that since 
the Kingdom of Serbs:j. Croats and Slovenes was a voluntary creation, 
the idea of "amputation" was unthinkable. But, l i k e Radic before him, 
he stressed the absolute necessity for each section of the state to 
have equal rights and said that, i f these were not granted, then the 
Croats would not be a f r a i d to separate. The B r i t i s h Minister 
reported:-
"The statements of Dr Macek have caused no 
l i t t l e sensation i n the country as, i n the 
effort to c l e a r himself from the charge of 
separatism, he has for the f i r s t time unmis-
takably declared himself i n favour of a fed-
e r a l i s t s t a t e . ^ 
I n September, the CPP-ID Coalition decided upon a new method 
to embarass the Government and draw attention to t h e i r cause. There 
44. Kennard to Cushendun, 22 Aug. 1928, C6464/173/92. 
45. His delegate was Dr Juraj Krnjevic, a prominent member of the CPP. 
46. Kennard to Cushendun, 6 Sept. 1928, C6797/173/92. 
47. Kennard to Cushendun, 12 Sept. 1928, C7003/173/92. 
43 
would be a s o c i a l boycott. As from September 20, no member of the 
CPP-ID would have anything to do with any member of the Government 
or any of i t s supporters. They would discontinue s o c i a l relationships 
of every kind. The idea was widely debated i n the press before i t was 
put into operation and although i t proved impossible to enforce -
and not very ef f e c t i v e - the fa c t that the Croats were w i l l i n g to 
cut off a l l contact with a large section of t h e i r fellow-countrymen 
i g 
caused much bitterness and i l l - f e e l i n g . On October 21, at a mass-
meeting of some 10-15,000 peasants at Sisak, Macek re-affirmed his 
Party*s decision never to re-enter the Skupstina i n Belgrade. He 
said that they would carry on t h e i r fight outside the Skupstina 
u n t i l they won freedom for t h e i r people and t h e i r fatherland. He 
repeated Radices words: "There i s no longer any law. There i s no 
longer any constitution. There are only the people and the King." 
But, said Macek, the King had so far done nothing and he hinted that 
the Peasant Party might once again become republican i n outlook. 
P r i b i c e v i c , i n his speech, repeated that the Croats would not regard 
themselves bound by any foreign loan and Dr Pernar, one,of the 
survivors of June 20, made i t clear that the Coalition would not 
enter into any conversations with the Serbs u n t i l the Serbs were 
49 
ready for a free Croatia beside a free Serbxa. 
Many people i n Belgrade f e l t that the meeting at Sisak - and 
a l l that had been said - had made the task of re c o n c i l i a t i o n more 
d i f f i c u l t . There were unmistakable signs that the Croats were moving 
to an impossible position from which they would not be able to move 
50 
except at the price of eating t h e i r words and looking f o o l i s h . 
48. Kennard to Cushendun, 27 Sept. 1928, C7386/173/92. 
49. Kennard to Cushendun, 24 Oct. 1928, C8029/173/92. 
50. I b i d . See also Kennard to Cushendun, 18 Oct. 1928, C7852/173/92, 
which suggests an element of r i v a l r y i n the CPP-ID, each party 
t r y i n g to outdo the other i n extremism. 
44 
Many p o l i t i c i a n s therefore hoped that some i n i t i a t i v e might be taken 
before i t became too l a t e . Speaking at the Radical Party Conference 
on September 24, Stanojevic said that they must cl e a r a way for 
"a f r a t e r n a l agreement with our brothers, the Croats." The Radical 
Party had always believed that there should be agreement between 
Serbs and Croats and he was sure that a compromise could s t i l l be 
arranged. But although the many other speakers at the Conference also 
showed a great desire to c o n c i l i a t e the Croats, they did not consider 
c a l l i n g for the dissolution of the Skupstina and fresh elections which, 
51 
as was well-known, were the Croats* minimum demands. 
At the Democrat Party Conference on October 27, Davidovic 
s a i d that his party had nothing against constitutional r e v i s i o n , i f 
t h i s was the means of bringing Serbs and Croats together. But those 
who wanted to revise the Constitution should say i n what way they 52 y wanted i t revised. Dr V o j i s l a v Marinkovic, the Democrat Foreign 
Minister, was le s s c o n c i l i a t o r y . He told the Croats that> whether 
the Constitution was revised or not, he could personally guarantee 
that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes a l i k e would service any loan the 
53 
Government raised. But, as was pointed out at the Conference, the 
Constitution could not be revised unless 60$ of the Skupstina agreed 
and there would have to be negotiations and a rapprochement i f t h i s 
54 
was to come about. 
But there was s t i l l a sizeable - and powerful - body of opinion 
51. Kennard to Cushendun, 2? Sept 1928, C73.86/173/92. The Govern-
ment did i n fac t use a businessman, Milos Savcic (an ID member), to 
act as a go-between, but without success. P r i b i c e v i c ' s a i d to him 
that there could be no hope of agreement whilst the present "Serbian 
hegemony remained i n existence." 
52. Kennard to Cushendun, 30 Oct. 1928. C8181/173/92 
53. Annual Report for 1928, (Vol. 13708), C99/99/92, Para 118, p.27. 
54. Kennard to Cushendun, 30 Oct. 1928, C8l8l / l73/92. 
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i n Serbia which f e l t that the Croats should be l e f t to "stew i n 
55 
t h e i r own j u i c e . " The editor of the newspaper Vreme suggested 
that now the Croats had imposed a s o c i a l boycott, the Government 
should impose a f i n a n c i a l boycott which would soon bring the Croats 
56 
to t h e i r senses. The Director of the National Savings Bank, Dr 
Nedeljkovic, i n a most forthright a r t i c l e on November 1, said that 
the Croats had always hated the Serbs and that any agreement between 
57 
them would, of necessity, be to the detriment of the Serbs. Many 
Radicals i n the Vukicevic wing of the party made speeches d e l i b -
erately i n c i t i n g the Serbs against the Croats - ending t h e i r attacks 
with the cry "Ziveo R a c i c I " - and on November 18, the Minister of 
• 59 
Public Worship, Cvetkovic, led 700 supporters into a r i v a l Radical 
meeting i n Prokuplje,^interrupted a speech c a l l i n g for r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
with the Croats and broke up the meeting with f o r c e . ^ Such was the 
power exercised by the "hard-like" Radicals that the Government 
was a f r a i d to make any positive move for fear of resignations and 
another p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . ^ 
I n the end, i t was the Democrats who provoked the c r i s i s . At 
the beginning of December, there were several clashes between police 
55. The Times, 21, Nov. 1928 
56. Kennard to Cushendun, 19 Sept. 1928, C722l / l73/92. 
57. Vreme, 1 NDv. 1928. 58. "Long l i v e Racic!" 
Prime, 
59. Cvetkovic was l a t e r Yugoslav EoEeagjo-Minister under the Regency 
and signed the T r i p a r t i t e Pact with Germany and I t a l y i n March 
1941. 60. The Times, 20 Nov. 1928. 
61. On October 22, the editor of Narodni Val (National Wave), a CPP 
newspaper, was arrested for hinting that King Alexander would 
not long survive Radic. This was taken by the police as a threat 
against the King's l i f e , but i t also reflected current feeling 
i n Zagreb that the Serbian extremists who k i l l e d Radic might 
next turn upon the King - es p e c i a l l y i f he were to do anything 
to help or c o n c i l i a t e the Croats. Consular Report from Zagreb, 
12, Nov. 1928, C8574/l?3/92. 
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and students i n Zagreb as celebrations were being held to mark 
62 
the tenth anniversary of the Kingdom. I t was a minor akirmish but 
three people were k i l l e d . The CPP-ID Coalition accused the Government 
of provoking trouble by allowing the celebrations to take place. 
The Democrats blamed the CPP. The Radicals blamed Communist e x t r e m i s t s ^ 
As a protest against the deaths, the students at Zagreb University 
went on s t r i k e and the University was closed. On the i n i t i a t i v e of 
v 65 V / \ 
Dr Korosec, a new V e l i k i Zupan (Regional Commander; General Mak-simovic, was sent to Zagreb. At the time, t h i s appointment was seen 
as a movement by the Government against the C r o a t s ^ but with the 
benefit of hindsight, i t seems simply that the Government was anxious 
to preserve law and order. The CPP denounced the appointment as 
62. On December 1. The celebrations consisted of a Thanksgiving i n 
the Cathedral and a m i l i t a r y torchlight procession i n the evening. 
Students hung black flags from the Cathedral and were arrested. Upon 
t h e i r a r r e s t , shots were f i r e d at the police by persons unknown. 
Later, there were more blac.k flags and more shots. The torchlight 
procession was followed by a crowd shouting abuse at the Army. 
63. In f a c t , the Government had t r i e d to minimize any possible c o n f l i c t 
by holding t h e i r main celebrations on October 7-8 to commemmorate the 
breakthrough at Salonika- p r e c i s e l y to avoid the emotive national 
question. 
64. With some j u s t i f i c a t i o n . As P r i b i c e v i c noted, there had been a 
marked increase i n Communist a c t i v i t y during the summer as Commun-
i s t s sought to exploit the disunity. Kennard to Cushendun, 11 Sept. 
1928, C7005/173/92. 
65. The appointment of General Maksimovic, a Serb and formerly Prof-
essor at the M i l i t a r y Academy i n Belgrade, may well have been made at 
King Alexander fs i n s i s t e n c e . Kennard to Chamberlain, 18 Dec. 1928, 
C9712/173/92. 66. The r e t i r i n g Zupan warned the public 
of Zagreb that the law for the protection of public safety held pen-
a l t i e s of death or 20 years imprisonment for those who had caused 
trouble. 
67. A s i m i l a r appointment had recently been made i n Skopje. 
Kennard to Chamberlain, 7 Dec. 1928, C9251/173/92. 
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unconstitutional and Dr Macek sa i d : "the worse the Government 
measures, the better. The whole situ a t i o n w i l l turn into a conflag-
ration which w i l l swallow up the despots i n Belgrade."^ Using the 
excuse that Korosec had f a i l e d to consult his Cabinet colleagues 
before the appointment of the V e l i k i Zupan, Davidovic persuaded 
those of his party who were i n the Government, to resign. For some 
time, he had been disappointed by the bland, complacent way the 
70 
Government had been neglecting the Croat problem. He had been 
persuaded by Dr Marinkovic' that he should remain i n the Coalition, 
but Marinkovic" was now a s i c k man and had to go to Switzerland for 
71 y 
a cure. Davidovic'believed that now was the time to come to some 
72 73 agreement with the Croats. Against the advice of the King, but 
7ZL 
confident that he could gain some s l i g h t p o l i t i c a l advantage, 
Davidovic'withdrew his members from the Government and, on December 
30, Korosec also resigned. 
68. Kennard to Chamberlain, 12 Dec. 1928, C9407/173/92. 69. I b i d . 
70. Korosec's attitude was that nothing could be done for the moment. 
Eventually, he believed, a Coalition Government (including the CPP-IE) 
would be formed. But he thought that the choice of Prime Minister and 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of portfolios would prove extremely d i f f i c u l t . He 
therefore did nothing to hasten agreement. 
71. Marinkovic suffered from tuberculosis. 
72. Kennard to Chamberlain, 18 Dec. 1928, C9712/173/92. 
73. Who. wished to see the Budget passed before any decisive change was 
made i n the Government. The Times, 21 Nov. 1928. 
74. According to one wri t e r , Davidovic believed he had received 
reasonable approaches from the Croats and intended to bring about the 
Cabinet's f a l l by proposing to indemnify the peasants for recent bad 
harvests, even though no resources were available for t h i s . He then 
planned to use the ensuing elections to make peace with the Croats -
fighting on the slogan "a bonus for the peasants" - and would win wide 
support and form a government with the Croats. The King made efforts 
to prevent Davidovic precipitating the c r i s i s and managed to postpone 
i t for f i v e days. Armstrong,"After the Assassination...V, op. c i t . , p 212 
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Two courses how lay before the King. Ei t h e r he could go 
through another lengthy p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s with protracted negotiations 
with each of the p o l i t i c a l leaders, hearing the same s t e r i l e arguments 
and allegations, and eventually end up with another unstable govern-
75 
ment c o a l i t i o n . Or e l s e , he could exercise his personal i n i t i a t i v e 
and take power into his own hands. The idea had been i n his mind for 
many months, probably ever since the murders i n the Skupstina.'^ But, 
at that time, both public opinion and the Press had been against the 
77 
idea of dictatorship. Now, as the country faced i t s second major 
c r i s i s i n less than a year, with I t a l i a n troops close to the 
f r o n t i e r and a pressing need for a foreign loan to s t a b i l i z e the 
dinar, Alexander f e l t that t h i s was perhaps the time to a c t . 
But, before he made his f i n a l decision, he decided to have one 
l a s t meeting with the Croat and Independent Democrat leaders. Dr Macek 
and Pribicevic'were invited to come to Belgrade to see the King. Macek 
75. Kennard to Chamberlain, 4 Jan. 1929, C103/97/92, reports that 
"the Press and public opinion are, as usual, r e v e l l i n g i n every kind 
of possible and impossible combination, complication and a l l the 
features of the tragi-comedy which constitute a parliamentary c r i s i s 
here. And, no doubt, a l l the p o l i t i c i a n s are thinking how they can 
best exploit the s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s without regard for 
those of the unity of the Kingdom." 
76. Armstrong, op. c i t . , p. 212. According to the Times T Belgrade 
correspondent, plans for the dictatorship were l a i d as early as 
August 1928, whilst the King was on holiday at Han Pijesak i n Bosnia. 
Many of those who were to be his leading ministers under the d i c t a t -
orship were there - notably Marinkovic^ Uzunovic, S r s k i c , Maksimovic', 
and General ^ivkovic. The Times, 16 Jan. 1929. The King was c e r t a i n l y 
t a l k i n g openly about the p o s s i b i l i t y of dictatorship i n November 1928 
when he v i s i t e d P a r i s . See S.W. T y r e l l ( P a r i s ) to Chamberlain, 9 Jan. 
1929, C211/97/92 and the l e t t e r from C Howard Smith to Kennard, 
16 Jan. 1929, G405/97/92. 
77. Consular Reports for June 1928, C5466/173/92. 
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saw the King on the morning of January 4> 1929 and has given us 
his own account of the meeting:-
" I gave him (the King) a detailed account of a l l 
the grievances the Croats had been harbouring 
against the regime since 1918. I emphasized that 
the core of the trouble was that State policy was 
not only being decided without the Croats but was 
a c t u a l l y aimed to harm them; for i t had c e r t a i n l y 
proved detrimental to t h e i r rights and i n t e r e s t s . 
The p r i n c i p a l f a u l t rested with those i n Serbia 
who considered Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia 
rather than a new multi-national s t a t e . I then 
quoted the h i s t o r i c advice of the old Magyar 
statesman, Francis Deak to the Emperor Franz 
Josef: f I f a vest i s buttoned the wrong way, the 
only thing i s to unbutton i t and button i t again 
the right way.T To consolidate Yugoslavia, i t 
would be necessary to go back to 1918 and s t a r t 
a l l over, t h i s time with the true representatives 
78 
of Croatia taken into account." 
79 v According to the King, Alexander then asked Macek to state the Croats 1 
78. V. Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom, (Pennsylvania 1968) 
pp. 121-122. I t was Macek Ts f i r s t meeting with King Alexander. Mac'ek 
noted that "the King listened i n silenc e to what I had to say, s c r i b -
b l ing a few notes i n his agenda." Macek regretted that the meetxng 
lasted only half-an-hour, a f t e r which*he graciously dismissed me.T 
79. Armstrong, op. c i t . , p. 213. Armstrong says that not long a f t e r 
these t a l k s , the King gave him an account of the conversations and an 
exact description of the demands posed by Macek, reading them to me 
from the entries he had made i n his diary i n Macek Ts presence. Arm-
strong states that the demands harmonized with what he had ascertained 
i n his own t a l k s with Ma^ek "though now they were expressed i n much 
50 
minimum demands: 
"In reply, the Croat leader demanded that 
elections be called at once for a Constituent 
Assembly to draw up a new Constitution. The King 
must agree, he said, that under that Constitution, 
the country would be divided into seven states with 
h i s t o r i c f r o n t i e r s 1 , each with a separate l e g i s -
81 
lature and a separate administration. Delegations 
from these state l e g i s l a t u r e s would meet i n Belgrade 
to supervise foreign r e l a t i o n s . But the control of 
education, commerce (excluding foreign), finance 
(except i n t e r n a t i o n a l ) , railways, telegraphs and 
even the post o f f i c e would remain i n the hands of 
the l o c a l assemblies. F i n a l l y , the army was no 
longer to be national but each state would r a i s e 
i t s own forces and these could not be called upon 
for service outside i t s borders except with the 
82 
approval of the l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e . " 
79. (contd.) more d e t a i l and with solemn f i n a l i t y . " Although Macek 
does not say that his federal plans were discussed on Jan k (only 
on Jan 5), i t seems clear - both from P r i b i c e v i c and Armstrong -
that they were discussed on both days. 
•J v 
80. At a speech at K r i z e v i c i , on Dec 3G> Macek declared: "Once and 
for a l l " that he was seeking "complete autonomy for Croatia". He 
said that he hoped "to see the same happy r e s u l t also i n Slovenia, 
Bosnia Hercegovina, Vojvodina and Montenegro." He concluded by 
saying that i f , a f t e r t h i s , any Serbian p o l i t i c i a n persisted i n 
asking him what the Croats wanted, he must be either "a fool or an 
a s s . " Letter from H.M. Consul (Zagreb) to Kennard, 2 Jan 1929> 
C106/97/92. 81. The seven states would be Croatia -Dal-
matia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro. 
82. A l l accounts of MacekTs demands agree - except for t h i s r e f -
51 
The King saw Pribicevic" on the afternoon of January U, 1929. 
By a l l accounts, i t was not a happy meeting. According to P r i b i c e v i c , 
the King immediately read out what Macek had proposed. P r i b i c e v i c ' s a i d 
that he thought the proposals were not unreasonable and that the King 
should not miss any opportunity to remedy the s i t u a t i o n . He f e l t that 
the King should nominate a Government which would t e l l the Skup-
s t i n a that the Constitution was to be revised. The Chamber should be 
immediately dissolved and elections held for a Constituent Assembly. 
go 
The Constitution could then be revised l e g a l l y . According to what 
Pr i b i c e v i c told Macek, the Independent Democrat leader had reproached 
the King for his t o t a l incomprehension of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . 
He pointed out that the King had been able to spare "no more than 
twenty minutes" to t a l k to Dr Macek, the representative of a l l the 
Croats, while spending hours at interviews with r e l a t i v e l y obscure 
personalities from Serbia:-
"In answer to P r i b i c e v i c T s remonstrances, the 
King r o l l e d up the sleeve of his uniform and 
pointed to h i s veins with the bland remark: 
" I cannot possibly deny my own blood". Prib-
i c e v i c ' thereupon had challenged him: 'You w i l l 
82. (contd.) reference to the position of the Army, which occurs 
" "/ only i n Armstrong's account, After the Assassination.... (Foreign 
A f f a i r s , New York) pp. 213-4. Between August and December 1928, 
Macek stated that foreign a f f a i r s and defence would be l e f t to a 
c e n t r a l government; but the idea of l o c a l armies had been raised 
i n 1920-1. 
83. P r i b i c e v i c , La Dictature pp. 101-2. His views had not 
changed since the previous July and he s t i l l held firmly to the 
resolutions of August 1, 1928. His advice to the King corresponds 
exactly with what he told the B r i t i s h Minister i n December 1928. 
Kennard to Sargent, 21 Dec. 1928. C9747/173/92. 
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have to decide whether you want to be King 
of the Serbs alone or of the Croats as w e l l . 
Should the second be your choice then come 
to Zagreb and solve the Croatian question on 
the spot.* After t h i s , Pribicevicf told me, 
he had turned on his heels and l e f t the King Ts 
o f f i c e without another word, slamming the door 
hard behind him." 
King Alexander l a t e r told the B r i t i s h Minister that he had been very 
d i s s a t i s f i e d with his meeting with Pribicevicf, whom he had found 
"unbalanced and ins i n c e r e " . Pribicevic'was a man of energy and 
mercurial temper and a strange combination of f a n a t i c a l patriotism and 
egoism which led him to id e n t i f y his personal well-being with the 
86 
well-being of the State. The King had no further dealings with 
Pribicevic'. 
The King now consulted the Serbian p o l i t i c a l leaders and 
acquainted them with the CPP-ID proposals. They rejected them out 
of hand. But Davidovic suggested that, i f possible, a compromise 
87 
should be worked out. The King therefore invited Dr Ma^ek to see 
him again the following day to discuss the problem once more:-
"At t h i s second audience on January 5, Alex-
ander asked me to expound my conception of a 
re-organized Yugoslavia. I complied r e a d i l y 
enough. I said that the very existence of 
Yugoslavia depended on i t s being founded on 
a t r u l y federal basis that would keep i n t a c t 
the seven federal un i t i e s within t h e i r h i s t o r -
84. Macek, I n the Struggle for Freedom, pp. 122 -3 . 
85. Kennard to Chamberlain, 11 Jan. 1929, C480/97/92. 
86. Armstrong, "After the Assassination....", p. 213. 
87. The Times, 7 Jan. 1929. 
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i c a l boundaries as they had existed i n 1918 
A l l of these should have separate govern-
ments and parliaments for t h e i r autonomous a f f a i r s . 
A c e n t r a l government would assume authority over a l l 
common a f f a i r s , linking the different u n i t i e s 
together i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n to foreign countries 
as one representative state.-To the King's remark 
about possible divergences between the laws of the 
diffe r e n t u n i t i e s , I replied that I did not believe 
i n the probability of such c o n f l i c t s , since a l l 
autonomous laws would be subject to approval by 
the common King. Alexander had. no comment on my 
l a s t words but nevertheless thanked me for the 
'valuable information 1, adding determinedly: 'Be 
assured that I have been properly convinced that 
things cannot go on i n t h i s way. I s h a l l take them 
into my own hands and am confident that I can 
88 
succeed i n putting an end to a l l these c o n f l i c t s . " 
According to the King's account, the only modification that Macek 
proposed at his second meeting was that the future federal Kingdom 
might be best with j u s t f i v e s t a t e s . He thought that federal Croatia 
should consist of part of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Adriatic Coast 
as f a r as the Gulf of Kotor. I n return, the Croats would agree to 
the Serbian federal state absorbing the whole of Macedonia and the 
89 
remaining part of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Possessing the Croat's f i n a l demands, the King called i n 
Professor Slobodan Jovanovic, an expert i n constitutional law, and 
88. Macek, I n the Struggle for Freedom, pp. 123-24. The gap i n the 
account i s yet another l i s t of the seven s t a t e s . 
89* Armstrong, op. c i t . , pp. 213-4. 
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asked him whether "a monarchy, an army, a customs union - and 
the r e s t separate - would amount to a proper union?" Jovanovic 
said that, under constitutional law, i t was a union very s i m i l a r 
90 
to that of Austria-Hungary. The King said no more." 
When the B r i t i s h Minister went to Zagreb to see Dr Macek i n 
December 1928 to find out what the Croats r e a l l y wanted, he had asked 
Dr Macek what the Croats would do i f t h e i r demands were not accepted. 
Very h e s i t a n t l y , Macek had admitted that "revolution would be the 
91 
only a l t e r n a t i v e . " 
The King was now faced with the s i t u a t i o n where the Croats 
were resolute i n t h e i r demands for federalism and the Serbs equally 
resolutely opposed. At one extreme, there was "amputation", at the 
other "revolution". And i n the background was the Army - "the one 
9 
organization which i s u n i v e r s a l l y respected throughout the Kingdom" 
>» - whose opinion had been c l e a r l y stated.by General Kalafatovic i n 
July 1928: "The Army" said the General, " w i l l never allow i r r e s -
93 
ponsible p o l i t i c i a n s to wreck the future of Yugoslavia." 
The King told a leading French j o u r n a l i s t : 
"The machine i s no longer functioning. I had to 
decide- either to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon 
myself or to. declare publicly that I was incapable 
of saving my country from the chaos which was 
bordering upon anarchy. There was the dilemma: 
90. P r i b i c e v i c , La Dictature du Roi Alexandre, p. 103. 
91. Kennard to Sargent, 21 Dec. 1928, C9747/173/92. 
92. Kennard to Cushendun, 16 Aug. 1928, C6315/173/92. 
93• Report by the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Attache, Colonel G i l e s , 
on feelings within the Army a f t e r the death of Radic. 
23 Aug. 1928, C6468/173/92. 
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either to r i s k the unity and possibly the 
future of my country or to expose myself and 
my person, by taking the necessary power into 
my hands for the time being. I did not hesitate 
long." % 
94. Central Bureau of the Presidency of the M i n i s t e r i a l Council, 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1919-1929, (Belgrade 1930) p. i x • 
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Chapter 3 
The Royal Dictatorship 
57 
The timing of the coup d*etat was care f u l l y planned. I t took 
place early i n the morning of January 6 , 1929* at the very moment 
when the Orthodox Church was celebrating i t s Christmas Festival and 
the newspaper offices had closed f o r a three-day holiday. The news-
papers which had gone to press on the previous evening, made no mention 
of the impending coup and the only indication that something had 
taken place was a series of posters h a s t i l y stuck up on the street 
corners of Belgrade, which contained a Royal Proclamation by 
King Alexander: 
"To a l l Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
"The highest interests of the nation and of the State, 
as we l l as t h e i r future,'compel me, both as Sovereign 
and as a son of my country to address myself d i r e c t l y to 
the people to t e l l t"hem openly and sincerely the course 
my conscience and my love f o r my country compel me 
to take 
'My expectations, and those of my people, that the 
evolutions of our i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e would bring 
about order and consolidation w i t h i n our country, 
have not been realized. Both parliamentary l i f e and 
p o l i t i c a l outlook generally have become more and more 
negative, and both the nation and the State are today 
suffering from the consequences of t h i s state of 
a f f a i r s 
"The regrettable disputes and the events i n the 
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Skups'tina have undermined a l l the confidence 
of the nation i n t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n . A l l harmony -
and even those elementary relations between parties 
and individuals - have become altogether impossible. 
Instead of developing and strengthening the f e e l i n g 
of national union, Parliamentarism as i t has developed 
has begun to provoke moral disorganization and national 
disunion " 
The King declared that i t was his sacred duty to preserve 
national unity by any means i n his power and he announced t h a t , i n 
the interests of the State, he had decided to suspend the 1921 
Constitution and dissolve the Skups'tina. Henceforth, a l l laws and 
2 
executive authority would be conducted by royal decree. 
Later i n the day, as i f to give substance to the Proclamation, 
a special edition of the Sluz'bene Novine ( O f f i c i a l Gazette.) appeared. 
3 
I t gave the text of four new laws to be issued by royal decree. The 
f i r s t law defined the power of the Crown and the Supreme Administration 
of the State. The law declared that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes was no longer a " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and parliamentary" monarchy 
but a "hereditary" monarchy i n which a l l power and authority would be 
vested i n the King alone.^ The second law was a Defence of the Realm 
Act, giving the police extra powers to enforce public security. The 
1. Translation of the King fs proclamation from the French t e x t i n 
Augarde and Sicard, Le Roi Chevalier, (PParis 1 9 3 5 ) , pp. 112 -115 . 
2 . I b i d . A f u l l t e xt of the Royal Proclamation appears i n Appendix C. 
3 . Sluzbene Noyine III,(Belgrade, 6 Jan. 1 9 2 9 ) . For English texts of 
the f i r s t three laws, see contents of despatch from Kennard to 
Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1929 , C322 /97/92. 
4 . This law consisted of 21 clauses which replaced Parts i v , v, v i 
and v i i i ( A r t i c l e s 90 -93 ) and x i v of the 1921 Constitution. By i t , 
the powers of Government ministers were also substantially reduced. 
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Act made i t i l l e g a l to hold p o l i t i c a l meetings either indoors 
or out-of-doors,forbade the carrying of arms and empowered the 
police to act at t h e i r own discretion against "chauvinistic, 
5 
national or confessional associations". The t h i r d law abolished 
a l l country and d i s t r i c t councils and made provision f o r the 
appointment of royal commissioners - or commanders - (Velike Zupane) 
to exercise the King's w i l l at a regional l e v e l . ^ The fourth and 
7 
f i n a l law imposed complete censorship upon the Press. With the 
publication of these four laws, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes became a royal dictatorship - and remained so f o r the 
rest of Alexander Ts reign. 
For his- new government, the King chose fourteen ministers -
8 
including s i x Serbs and four Croats. Only three members of the 
previous Cabinet were retained and f i v e of the new ministers were 
unconnected with any p o l i t i c a l party. General Hadzic, who some had 
Q 
thought would be made Prime Minister, was given the War Office, whilst 
Dr Marinkovic remained Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , much to the 
r e l i e f of those who feared a change i n the foreign policy of the 
10 
Kingdom. Most of the other appointments were unexceptional -
*/ ' 1 1 
even d u l l - but the choice of General Zivkovic as Prime Minister 
5. Law on Public Security - again consisting of 21 clauses. 
6 . Law modifying Provincial Municipal Administration - 8 clauses. 
v 
Six Zupans were appointed on Jan 23 and four others on Jan 25 . 
7 . The Press Law consisted of 16 clauses and gave the new Govern-
ment complete power over a l l newspapers and publications. For a 
f u l l t e x t of the Law i n English, see t r a n s l a t i o n from Sluzbene 
Novine I I I ( 6 Jan. 1929) i n despatch C714/97/92. (Vol 13706). 
8 . A l i s t of the members of the Zivkovic government i s given i n 
Appendix D - together with subsequent changes. 
9. Kennard to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1929, C32] /97 /92 . 
10. Memorandum on'conversation between O.G. Sargent and Djuric, Yugoslav 
Minister i n London, 7 Jan 1929, C97/97/92. 
1 1 . See "Biographies". 
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aroused widespread speculation as to whether the coup had been 
forced on the King by the Army or whether Alexander was using the 
12 
General as an instrument f o r his own purposes. Time was to show 
that the King was very much i n command of his country but, nonetheless, 
many people wondered why he should have chosen such a controversial 
13 
figure as his chief minister i n the new Government. 
Mr Kennard, the B r i t i s h Minister, saw the King on January 11 
and asked him why he had made t h i s p a r t i c u l a r choice. Alexander 
explained that a complete impasse had been reached i n the parliamentary 
system and that the standard of administration i n the Kingdom was 
" a s i a t i c " i n character. 
" I n speaking of General Zivkovic, he (the King) 
did not i n s i s t that he was a man of great a b i l i t y , 
but that he had energy and, above a l l things, 
i r o n nerves - a most essential q u a l i t y i n t h i s 
country.""^1' 
Alexander might also have added that the General was a man of 
unquestioned l o y a l t y , i n whom he had complete t r u s t . Opponents of 
the regime, un w i l l i n g to attack the King, heaped on Zivkovic t h e i r 
15 J~ wrath. They described him as the most hated man i n Serbia and said 
12. Kennard to Chamberlain,. 10 Jan 1929, C321/97/92 
13. Zivkovic was well-known to be a member of the "White Hand" 
organization. Many rumours circulated about him - some, emanating 
from the I t a l i a n Legation i n Belgrade, alleged that he was a homo-
sexual, w h i l s t others declared that he had obtained lucrative comm-
issions from Government contracts. None of these rumours was ever 
substantiated. 14. Kennard to Chamberlain, 11 Jan 1929, Ci+80/97/92. 
15. See conversation between Kennard and Dr Gregor Zerjav, a Slovene 
lawyer and member of the CPP-ID Opposition Coalition, on January 12. 
Zerjav was a close f r i e n d of Pribicevic. Kennard to Chamberlain, 
12 Jan. 1929, C481/97/92. 
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that he was intensely unpopular i n the Army. They predicted an 
increase i n m i n i s t e r i a l corruption, ruthless suppression of 
opponents and ultimately c i v i l war. But Srskic' and Marinkovic", who 
v y 
were colleagues of Zivkovic i n the new government, assured Kennard 
that although he was 
"a man of l i t t l e education, he had considerable 
p o l i t i c a l sense, was energetic and hard-working, 
a pastmaster i n the a r t of compromise which ren-
dered i t un l i k e l y that he would act impetuously 
and without due regard f o r the exigencies of the 
s i t u a t i o n . " 
Marinkovic t o l d -Kermard that i t would take at least two to three 
years before the King fs programme could be f u l l y implemented and 
that the new regime would remain i n power u n t i l the administration 
17 
had been thoroughly overhauled and reformed. 
The new Government began i t s work with great zest. New laws 
establishing the lines of authority w i t h i n the State were rapidly 
18 
drawn up. The law courts, the Audit department and the Regional 
19 
Commissioners a l l had t h e i r roles defined. Further measures 
20 
af f e c t i n g schools and post-office savings were passed and many 
16. Kennard to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1929, C321/97/92. 17- I b i d . 
18. Law concerning Council of State and Administrative Courts, 
Sluzbene Novine, 8 Jan. 1929; t r a n s l a t i o n - C583/97/92. Reg-
ulations regarding the State Court f o r the Protection of the 
State, Sluzbene Novine, 17 Jan 1929; Regulation on the Compos-
i t i o n of the Council of State, i b i d . , translations - C722/97/92. 
Law on the Competence of the Council of Ministers, Sluzbene 
Novine, 29 Jan 1929; t r a n s l a t i o n - C903/97/92. 
19. Laws of Jan 20 (C722/97/92), Jan 11 (C556/97/92) and Jan 22 
(C722/97/92) respectively. 
20. Laws of Jan 17 and Jan 20 - translations of both i n C722/97/92. 
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minor administrative changes were introduced to ensure the smooth 
running of the State. Before the month was out, new laws governing 
contracts f o r public works and a proper scale of wages f o r public 
21 
o f f i c i a l s were announced. A Criminal Justice B i l l was signed but 
22 
publication was delayed. 
This spate of l e g i s l a t i o n was i n i t s e l f very impressive and 
made an appreciable change from the torpor of previous years. But 
the Minister of Justice admitted to Kennard that things were happen-
ing too quickly and that many of the b i l l s being published were 
poorly-drafted and had not been properly thought out. To remedy t h i s 
deficiency, a special law was passed on February 2, providing f o r a 
body of experts to j o i n the Ministry of Justice, who would be res-
23 
ponsible f o r improving the q u a l i t y of b i l l s being produced. 
On January 21, 1929, a l l p o l i t i c a l parties i n Slovenia, 
2ZL 
Croatia and Bosnia were abolished and those i n Serbia on January 24. 
Croatian clubs i n Dalmatia were also closed down and anyone l i k e l y 
25 
to be ho s t i l e to the regime was placed under s t r i c t police surveillance. 
Not unnaturally, the speed and a c t i v i t y of the King and his Govern-
ment l e f t the old p o l i t i c i a n s highly disgruntled. Trumbic and 
Pribicevic were s i l e n t but Dr Macek was reported to have t o l d a 
Hungarian j o u r n a l i s t that "he had no f a i t h i n the new Government and 
feared the worst." He denied the t r u t h of t h i s report but, not long 
afterwards, i n an interview with a j o u r n a l i s t of Le Matin, he spoke 
21. Laws of Jan. 26 and Jan 29? Details given i n C903/97/92. 
22. I b i d . 23. Law i n s t i t u t i n g a Supreme Legislative Council, 
Sluzbene Novine. 2 Feb. 1929. Kennard to Chamberlain, 6 Feb. 1929, 
Srskic t o l d Kennard that a number of Slovene and Croat legal experts 
would be appointed to the Council. 
24. Kennard to Chamberlain, 25, Jan. 1929, C722/97/92. 
25. V. Macek, I n the Struggle f o r Freedom, (Pennsylvania 1968), p. 126. 
63 
out strongly against the Greater Serbia policy of Maksimovic, Srskic' 
and Uzunovic. He denied that he had any wish to see the Kingdom broken 
up, but expressed his doubts as to whether the King could r e s i s t the 
26 
wiles of the Serbian p o l i t i c i a n s . At the end of January, there was 
t a l k of a "Democratic Front" against the new regime. The Front, i t 
was thought, would consist of Democrats, Independent Democrats and 
former members of the CPP, but nothing came of the plan, p a r t l y 
because of the strong determination of the Dictatorship to r e s i s t a l l 
opposition and p a r t l y because of the immense public support f o r the 
27 
King - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Croatia. There was a general fe e l i n g of r e l i e f 
that there had been no f i n a n c i a l repercussions as a resul t of the 
coup. I n f a c t , the economic s i t u a t i o n was much improved because the 
rapid s e l l i n g of the dinar had been halted and there was a growing 
28 
public disposition t o regard p o l i t i c s as "dead". 
But, even though the Government was spared immediate opposition 
and the acrimony of public debate, they s t i l l had many d i f f i c u l t i e s 
to face. Two months were spent w r i t i n g - and, i n some cases, r e - w r i t i n g 
- the laws of the regime and Ministers gradually came to grips with 
the problems which had been bedevilling the country since 1918. On 
March 21, 1929, they published a programme of reforms which they hoped 
to bring about. The main objectives of the programme, which had been 
prepared under the personal supervision of King Alexander, were:-
( l ) the reduction of administration and expenditure; (2) an end to 
26. Mr Boden (Zagreb) to Kennard (Belgrade), 23 Jan. 1929. Mr Boden 
also reported that the people seemed to believe i n the King Ts 
good f a i t h . The fact that there were f i v e Cr"oatians - reputed 
to be "good" Croatians - i n the Cabinet was also a re-assuring 
factor. Kennard to Chamberlain, 25 Jan. 1929, C722/97/92. 
27. Mr Boden to Kennard, 30 Jan. 1929, C905/97/92; the suppression 
of the Serbian p o l i t i c a l parties made a good impression i n Zagreb. 
28. Kennard to Chamberlain, 31 Jan. 1929, C903/97/92. 
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corruption i n the public services; (3 ) the u n i f i c a t i o n and c o d i f i c -
ation of laws and (4 ) the application of improved methods to agric-
29 
u l t u r e , mines, forestry and other commercial enterprises. The 
wording of the programme was extremely vague and Kennard observed 
that 
"there i s a general impression that General 
Zivkovic and his government are f e e l i n g nervous 
as to the magnitude of the task which they have 
30 
set themselves." 
There were also grounds f o r supposing that much of the cost of 
carrying out the fourth objective would be dependent on the Govern-
ment obtaining a foreign loan and, by the middle of March, t h i s seemed 
31 
more and more unl i k e l y . large c r e d i t s , obtained by previous govern-
32 
ments and now requiring repayment, had only jus t come to l i g h t , and 
the French government chose t h i s moment to i n s i s t on the rapid s e t t l e -
ment of war and pre-war debts on a gold basis. The French also l e t 
i t be known that they disapproved of the Dictatorship and M. Baud, 
the French Minister i n Belgrade, made representations f o r an early 
33 
return to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e . In these circumstances, there appeared 
l i t t l e hope of large-scale economic reform and the regime's plans 
f o r s t a b i l i z i n g the dinar, reducing d i r e c t taxation and maintaining 
29- Kenhard to Chamberlain, 26 Mar. 1929, C2326/97/92. 
30. I b i d . 31. I b i d . 
32. Kennard to Chamberlain, 4 Apr. 1929, C2468/97/92. For instance, 
2g m i l l i a r d dinars were required to pay f o r large arms purchases 
v 
.obtained from Skoda i n 1928. 
33• I b i d . Kennard added: "One cannot help f e e l i n g considerable 
sympathy with King Alexander who has acted throughout i n the best 
interests of his country and i t i s a tragedy that he should be unable 
to f i n d any adequate support from those whom he has chosen to assist 
him i n the task of regeneration." 
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a high customs barrier seemed optimistic indeed. 
The only hope f o r immediate action seemed to be i n the admin-
i s t r a t i v e sphere. Here, the programme had suggested that several 
Ministries - notably those f o r Agrarian Reform, Health, Posts and 
Telegraph and Religious A f f a i r s - be abolished and t h e i r functions 
taken over by other Ministers. Almost immediately, steps were taken 
to implement the programme. On March 31, Alexander signed a law on the 
Supreme Administration of the State, which came in t o force on A p r i l 3. 
The law reduced the number of Ministries from sixteen to twelve and 
Kr u l j (Minister of Health) and Alaupovic (Religious A f f a i r s ) were 
obliged to resign. Kumanudi, who had been Acting Minister of Foreign 
Af f a i r s w hilst Dr Marinkovic'had been i n Switzerland seeking treatment, 
( and whom many had expected would be dismissed) was retained as 
Minister without p o r t f o l i o . Other changes brought about by the law 
were the a b o l i t i o n of the post of "Under-Secretary" and the creation 
of a Press Bureau. One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t changes, however, was 
that i n future Ministers would be answerable to the King alone and 
could be impeached at his w i l l (previously an impeachment required a 
two-thirds majority i n the Skups'tina). Quite c l e a r l y , the lines of 
authority were being tightened, administration streamlined and expend-
i t u r e reduced; and, by the beginning of A p r i l , there was a v i s i b l e 
3 4 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 26 Mar. 1929, C2326 /97/92. Agrarian . 
Reform was to go to Agriculture, Religious A f f a i r s t o the Minister 
of Justice, Health to be a part of Social P o l i t i c s and Posts and 
Telegraphs come w i t h i n the Ministry of Works. 
3 5 . Law f o r the Supreme Administration of the State, Sluisbene 
Novine, 3 Apr. 1929; see Kennard to Chamberlain, 3 Apr. 1929, 
G 2 4 6 7 / 9 7 / 9 2 . This law represented an addition and emendation of 
the f i r s t law issued by the King on January 6 , 1929. 
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reduction i n corrupt practices i n government c i r c l e s . 
. I n the Army, too, there were cuts. On A p r i l 13, 1929, a royal 
decree was published, announcing the retirement of the Chief of Staff, 
two Army Commanders, eighteen d i v i s i o n a l generals, eleven brigadier 
37 
generals and others holding senior commands. Those host i l e to the 
regime immediately assumed that t h i s "purge" revealed a deep 
divergence of opinion w i t h i n the Army. But, as i n the c i v i l i a n 
administration, these changes represented an attempt at economy, 
a desire f o r improved ef f i c i e n c y and a.cutting away of "dead wood". 
The B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Attache reported that the King had said that 
"his senior generals were veritable T c o l o s s i f 
with the g i f t of l i v i n g f o r ever... there was 
also a considerable percentage of senior o f f i c e r s 
who had reached t h e i r present rank as rewards f o r 
services and bravery i n wartime, whose mental cap-
a c i t y did not reach the standard necessary f o r 
t r a i n i n g the Army i n time of peace When I 
hazarded the opinion that possibly such a drastic 
overhaul might create a certain amount of discontent, 
he answered that he was quite convinced that the Army, 
as a whole, looked on these changes as j u s t i f i a b l e 
and he was happy i n his own mind as to the present 
36 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 4 Apr. 1929, C2468/97/92. These cuts i n 
public expenditure produced an increase i n unemployment. For instance, 
the c i t y of Belgrade sacked 900 employees at once, and i t was believed 
that some 5000 c i v i l servants would eventually be dismissed. Kennard 
to Chamberlain, 16 Apr. 1929, C2822/548/92. The cost of paying pensions 
to those dismissed proved a heavy burden on the nation Ts finances -
f o r i n the 1929-30 Budget, no less than 13% of the t o t a l revenue of 
£44.2 mil l i o n s had already been earmarked f o r pensions. The Times, 
5 Feb. 1929, p. 23 (review Section). 
3 7 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 16 Apr. 1929, C2822/548/92. 
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condition of a f f a i r s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards 
the future e f f i c i e n c y of the Army, since the i n t e r e s t 
and the keenness of the younger generation of o f f i c e r s 
had thereby received a much-needed and wholesome f i l l i p . 
But the very fact that the Government was at t h i s stage unable 
to do more than carry out administrative reforms i n the c i v i l service 
and the Army seemed to many a cl e a r indication that things were 
d r i f t i n g . I n the -flfojvodina, there were b i t t e r complaints that the 
Government had dome nothing to reduce taxation and that there was no 
39 
one to represent the Vojvodina i n the Cabinet. There was also con-
siderable uncertainty as to how the Kingdom would be sub-divided i n 
any future scheme. Wild rumours circulated and, i n March, a group of 
leading Bosnians - including the Archbishop of Sarajevo and the 
Bishop of Banjaluka - published an a r t i c l e on "the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina" i n t h e i r newspaper, Franjevacki Vjesnik, and 
recommended a return to constitutional r u l e . ^ At the end of March, 
Toni Schlegel, the editor of Novosti, was murdered i n Zagreb. Schlegel 
had been one of the most active Croat supporters of the regime. Various 
interpretations were l a i d upon his murder - some blaming Croat extr-
emists, others the Communists and a large body of uninformed opinion 
suspecting that the Serbs had murdered him themselves to discourage 
the King from v i s i t i n g Zagreb - but there was l i t t l e doubt that the 
murder was p o l i t i c a l i n intent and was an unpleasant warning to the 
Government.^'"'' At a more humble l e v e l of discontent, there was also 
38. Col. Giles to Kennard, 23 May 1929, C3719/548/92. 
3 9 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 26 Mar. 1929, C2326/97/92. 
40. Consular Report (Sarajevo) contained i n despatch C2651/97/92. 
41. Consular Report (Zagreb) contained i n despatch C2651/97/92. 
See also Macek, I n the Struggle for Freedom, p. 135. Two members of 
the Ustase (see ch. 9) - Hranilovic and Soldin - were l a t e r arrested, 
t r i e d and hung for the murder. 
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much grumbling that the new Government had raised the price of 
raki.ja (brandy) from one to two dinars. 
The King and z'ivkovic, for t h e i r part, were quite sure that 
the old p o l i t i c i a n s were responsible for many of the rumours and 
much of the unrest. Grol and Davidovic, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were known to 
have campaigned widely for the replacement of Dr Svrluga, the Croat 
J O 
Finance Minister, and Dr Spaho and his Moslem deputies were behind 
much of the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n B o s n i a . ^ There were also regular 
reports of dissension i n the Cabinet - s t o r i e s of the King backing 
the Croats against the Serbs - and the resignation of Korosec and 
the dismissal of Maksimovic were continually predicted. A l l these 
rumours had a most unsettling effect and the Government had no d i f f -
i c u l t y i n tracing t h e i r source. On A p r i l 21, a royal decree was pub-
lis h e d , pensioning off and r e t i r i n g thirty-nine former Cabinet ministers, 
including Vukicevic and Davidovic.^ But although the decree had the 
effect of d i s c r e d i t i n g the former p o l i t i c i a n s , i t did not silenc e 
them. So the Government decided to make a public example of one of 
t h e i r number and, early i n May, i t was announced that Pribicevicf had 
been interned. Pribicevic" had come to Belgrade ostensibly to see his 
wife who was i l l , but he had stated publicly that he intended to meet 
and have t a l k s with p o l i t i c i a n s opposed to the regime. He was met at 
Belgrade railway s t a t i o n by the police, placed under house a r r e s t and 
v 47 
then moved to Brus, a small Serbian v i l l a g e near Krusevac. 
42. Kennard to Chamberlain, 16 Apr. 1929, C2822/548/92. 
4 3 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 10 Apr. 1929 , C 2 6 4 9 / 9 7 / 9 2 . 
4 4 . Consular RSport (Sarajevo) for Mar. 1929, C2651/97/92. 
4 5 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 4 Apr. 1929, C2468/97/92. 
46. Kennard to Chamberlain, 23 Apr. 1929, C3018/97/92. The despatch 
also brought news of further reductions i n the numbers of c i v i l s e r -
vants i n the Ministries of J u s t i c e , Commerce, I n t e r i o r and Foreign 
A f f a i r s . See, po^c 47. Kennard to Chamberlain, 22 May 1929, 
C3716/97/92. Pri b i c e v i c ' spent two years i n internment, either at Brus 
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On May 22, Kennard had an audience with King Alexander, who 
explained to him why Pribicevic had been interned. The King said that 
i t had been foreseen that former p o l i t i c i a n s would t r y to i n t r i g u e 
against the regime and i t was necessary to show that no intrigues 
would be tolerated. He went on to t e l l Kennard that the administration 
of the country was going along w e l l but that the future sub-division 
of the Kingdom and the degree of autonomy to be granted to i t s compon-
ent parts would not be considered u n t i l the u n i f i c a t i o n of the various 
laws and the co-ordination of the services of the State had been 
carried out. He t o l d the B r i t i s h Minister that he intended to go to 
Croatia before the end of the year but he feared that the t r i a l of 
Punisa Racic, which was due to be held the following week, would be 
exploited by the Croats and lead to renewed a g i t a t i o n by the p o l i t i c -
ians of the old regime. Kennard noted that the King was i n good 
s p i r i t s and seemed more s a t i s f i e d with the Zivkovic government than 
was popularly supposed.^ 
On May 27, 1929, the t r i a l of Punisa Racic'began i n Belgrade. 
I t was, i n many senses, a cause celebre f o r Racic was accused of three 
pre-meditated murders (Basaricek, Stjepan Radic and Pavle Radic), one 
attempted pre-meditated murder (Grandja) and one attempted murder 
(Dr Pemar). The defence lawyers claimed that Racic had been contin-
u a l l y insulted by Radic' and that the Croats had made the Skupstina a 
national shame. They had "thrown mud" at everything sacred to Serbia; 
but Racic, they claimed, had acted i n the best Serbian and Montenegrin 
4 7 . (contd.) or i n hospital i n Belgrade. According to Macek, op. c i t . , 
pp. 127-28, he was allowed to leave the country a f t e r representations 
by Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia.(For a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t 
account, see note 58 i n ch.5). He died of lung cancer i n Prague on 
September 15, 1936. 
4 8 . Kennard to Chamberlain, 22 May 1929, C3716/97/92. 
"&4-<o. A&&W)w&L NoY«.nVvi£ pe^SVo^iA^ oft .-fo^u- ( V A I A ! ^ CN^VSW 
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t r a d i t i o n l Racic, i n his own evidence, declared that he had only-
f i r e d his revolver when he noted that Dr Pernar was about to shoot 
him and that the other deaths were caused i n self-defence during the 
49 
ensuing uproar. T h i r t y - f i v e lawyers appeared f o r the accused. A 
Western magazine commented sarcastically upon t h e i r e f f o r t s : -
"Counsel f o r the defence came to the help of the 
Court i n regard to the d i f f i c u l t y of reconciling 
the size of the murderer Ts 'bag* with his conception 
of his honour, which only one of the victims had 
assailed, by inveighing against the Croats as a 
people, and leaving i t to the Court to endorse the 
contention that the k i l l i n g of Croats can be no 
murder. I f Racic had been content with one v i c t i m , 
i t might have been d i f f i c u l t f o r a Balkan bench to 
shut i t s eyes to the native temperament and to the 
cheapness i n which l i f e i s held among pri m i t i v e 
peoples; but the Belgrade Court w i l l appear i n 
Western eyes to have strained both logic and the 
meaning of words to allow an 'impulse* to d i s -
50 
charge a l l s i x chambers of a revolver." 
Racic^was found g u i l t y of murder without pre-meditation but the Court 
disallowed his plea of self-defence. They condemned him to twenty 
years penal servitude f o r the murder of Basaricek, f i f t e e n years f o r 
the murder of Stjepan Radic, twenty f o r that of Pavle Radic, with f i v e 
years f o r the attempted murder of Grandja and six months f o r his ass-
a u l t on Dr Pernar. Since the t o t a l sentence was greater than the 
legal maximum, the Court commuted the sentence to one of twenty years 
4 9 . Letter from Kennard (Belgrade) to Arthur Henderson (London), 
11 Jun. 1929, C4322/97/92. 
50. Near East, 13 Jun. 1929. 
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51 penal servitude. I t says much for the r e s t r a i n t of the Croats -
and even more for the strong controlling powers of the regime - that 
the verdict of the Court produced no violent reaction i n Zagreb. Former 
members of the Croatian Peasant Party remained convinced that there 
had been a travesty of justice, but, for the most part, there was a 
genuine desire to l e t the unhappy memories of June 20 die a natural 
death. No r e l a t i v e s of the deceased had been present i n Court with the 
exception of Basari(5ek ts widow, who said she did not seek punishment 
52 
but compensation. 
What interested the country most was what form the Kingdom might 
take i n the future and a wide va r i e t y of different opinions were 
voiced. The Croats suggested that the oblasts (regions) of Maribor 
and Ljubljana should be merged and two p r i n c i p a l oblasts should be 
established i n Croatia with t h e i r c a p i t a l at Zagreb. The Croats also 
claimed Bihac" and Banjaluka - both regarded by the Bosnians as part of 
t h e i r t e r r i t o r y - and Srem, a claim which was strongly contested by 
53 
the Serbs. By July 1929, rumours were c i r c u l a t i n g that the regime 
would come to an end i n the autumn'^ and various groups of former 
51. Kennard to Henderson, 11 Jun 1929, C4322/97/92. The t r i a l ended 
on June 7. Two others on t r i a l with Racic (Jovanovic - charged with 
attempted murder of Pernar; and Popovic'- charged with incitement to 
murder Stjepan Radic) were found Not Guilty. Dr Pernar was admonished 
for provoking Racic'. And Dr P e r i c , President of the Skup^tina, was also 
admonished for not having restrained Dr Pernar. 52. I b i d . 
5 3 . Kennard to Henderson, 18 Jun. 1929, C4592/97/92. The country was 
at that time divided into oblasts, srez ( d i s t r i c t s ) , and ops'tina 
(communes) with V e l i k i Zupan, Nacelnik, and Gradski nacelnik ( r o y a l l y 
appointed commissioners over each region, d i s t r i c t and town respectively) 
54. I b i d . Kennard reported that MarinkovicT was now so well recovered 
a f t e r his treatment i n Switzerland, that-he might w e l l supersede 
fivkovic" as Prime Minister, since Marinkovic was one of the few 
former Ministers who enjoyed the King*s confidence. 
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politicians banded together and busily prepared draft constitutions 
to replace the dictatorship. Davidovicf and Grol - with the support 
of many former Radicals - collaborated with Macek and Krnjevic' to 
produce an imaginative scheme sub-dividing the Kingdom and giving 
local autonomy to the different regions. They proposed that the 33. 
oblasts which then existed, should be reduced to seven distinct 
r c 
provinces, and that each province should have i t s own Governor-
General. A central government, with a bi-cameral legislature, would 
be set up i n Belgrade and be responsible for foreign a f f a i r s , army, 
finance, customs, commerce, and education. These proposals represented 
a considerable advance on the terms demanded by Dr Macek at his 
January meeting with King Alexander and the Croats declared that i f 
their new proposals were accepted, they would waive their claims 
to Bihac", Banjaluka and Eastern Srem.^ 
But the former politicians had no power to enforce their 
proposals - however far-reaching and imaginative they might be •-
nor was the King i n favour of any federal or quasi-federal solution. 
So, at the beginning of August, the internal administration of the 
Kingdom remained exactly as i t had i n January at the time of the coup 
d Tetat (with the addition of the royal commissioners) and, despite 
a l l the promises of reform, there was no sign of any imminent change. 
On June 21, a law had been passed, extending the authority of these 
57 
royal commissioners and re-defining the standards expected of public 
o f f i c i a l s (which had slipped) but this did nothing to dispel the 
55. The seven provinces were to be l ) Slovenia-Prekomurije; 2)Croatia 
-Slavonia; 3) Vojvodina and Eastern Srem; 4) Serbia (1912 frontiers); 
5) Macedonia and the Sandzakj 6) Dalmatia; 7) Bosnia-^Uercegovina. 
Apparently, Montenegro did not enter into their plans. 
56. Kennard to Henderson, 18 Jun. 1929, C4592/97/92. 
57. Leigh Smith (Belgrade) to Henderson, 27 Jun. 1929, C4855/97/92. 
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atmosphere of d r i f t and uncertainty which lay heavily upon the 
Kingdom. On August 23, Kennard wrote to London:-
" I hope to see the King i n about a fortnight fs time 
and t r y and get a frank expression as to what His 
Majesty really thinks of the results of dictator-
ship. There are a l l kinds of rumours that he is 
fed up with i t and seriously contemplated getting 
v ^ 
r i d of Zivkovic during the last two months. I cannot 
\i 
however obtain chapter and verse and Zivkovic Ts 
r rt 
position seems as strong as before." 
Kennard managed to see the King sooner than he expected. I t was his 
f i n a l meeting with Alexander and he found him:-
"in good health and s p i r i t s and by no means so 
nervous as to the general situation as some information 
had led me to believe. He did not,however, speak so 
enthusiastically about the regime as when I last 
59 
saw him." 
Alexander told him that the plans for internal reform were now well 
advanced and the number of oblasts would soon be reduced from t h i r t y -
three to seven or eight. In deciding the character of the new regions, 
Alexander was careful to point out that economics -and not history -
would be- the determining f a c t o r . ^ The King said that he knew a l l 
about the plans of the ex-politicians but thought that i t was far 
too early to talk about a new Constitution.^ 
Although the King seemed satisfied - i f not enthusiastic - with 
58. Kennard to O.G. Sargent (London), 23 Aug. 1929, C6626/97/92. 
59. Kennard to Henderson, 31 Aug. 1929, C696V97/92. KennardTs time 
as Minister i n Belgrade was drawing to a close. He was due to leave 
on September 11, 1929. 60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid. 
74 
the regime, Kennard f e l t that Alexander was not f u l l y i n touch with 
the mood of the country '— 
"Under the parliamentary regime, His Majesty 
had to grant audiences to many politicians who, 
while they may have endeavoured to mislead him as 
to their own interests, at least kept him informed 
of the malpractices of their opponents; but now his 
Majesty sees practically no one except his Ministers 
and a few intimate friends and thus, no doubt, learns 
62 
l i t t l e of the darker side of the situation." 
But, although there were many wild rumours circulating outside the 
palace, the King seemed determined upon his course. For, when Kennard 
paid his f i n a l courtesy v i s i t to General Zivkovic and said that he 
presumed that the Prime Minister would s t i l l be " i n the saddle" for 
quite some time:-
"General Zivkovic replied i n a subdued tone that 
this depended entirely upon the w i l l of the King 
and that he, personally, would prefer to return 
to his military duties." 
Kennard continued:-
" I have further questioned other members of the 
Cabinet whom I know well, but they can give me no 
indication that any change i n the regime is l i k e l y 
within the near future." 
Early i n October - less than a month after Kennard's departure -
a l l the uncertainty and speculation came to an end. After nine months 
62. Final letter from Kennard to Henderson, 10 Sept. 1929, C7092/97/92. 
63, Ibid. 
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of silent preparation, the King and his Ministers at last made 
public their plans for the future organization of the State.^ 
No longer would i t be called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes" but the"Kingdom of Yugoslavia" (Kraljevina Jugoslavija). 
For many years, the country had been known abroad as Yugoslavia but, 
since 1918, the over-wordy o f f i c i a l t i t l e had been retained, prin-
cipally to express the free association of Serbs, Croats and Slov-
enes i n a South Slav Kingdom. But, over the years, this had become 
a source of embarassment - an all-too-obvious reminder of the 
bitter divisions within the Kingdom - and the change to "Yugoslavia" 
represented very much the w i l l and the policy of the King, who 
was determined to suppress local nationalism and emphasize the 
common nationhood of the South Slav peoples. 
His policy was seen even more clearly i n the internal re-org-
65 
anization of the Kingdom. Here, the State was divided into nine 
Banovinas, each under the responsibility of a Ban (Governor). None 
of the t i t l e s of the old regions (Croatia, Serbia etc) was retained. 
Instead, each of the Banovinas was called after a river, and the 
re-drawing of the administrative map showed that oh many occasions, 
economic considerations had cut across traditional, historical 
boundaries. 
The new Banovinas were as follows:-
64. Leigh Smith to Foreign Office, 3 Oct. 1929, C7551/97/92. 
65. For o f f i c i a l translation of the Law proclaiming the new t i t l e 
of the Kingdom, see Leigh Smith to Henderson, 5 Oct. 1929, C7671/97/92. 
Although the t i t l e i n Serbo-Croat was "Jugoslavija" the custom of 
the British Foreign Office was to spell i t "Yugoslavia" - and this 
was approved by the Yugoslav Legation i n London. Letter from Djuric, 
8 Oct. 1929, C7699/97/92. 
66. Leigh Smith to Henderson, k Oct. 1929, C7606/97/92. Philip Leigh 
Smith was charge d'affaires i n Belgrade from November 1928 to April 
1932. 
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Banovina Area Capital Population 
1) Drava 2 Slovene oblasts Ljubljana 1,144,298 
2) Sava 3 Croat oblasts Zagreb 2,704,383 
3) Vrbas Part of Bosnia Banjaluka 1,037,382 
4) Primorje Dalmatia and West Herce- S p l i t 901,660 
govina 
5) Drina Bosnia'and West Serbia Sarajevo 1,534,739 
6) Zeta Montenegro and the r e s t Cetinje 925,516 
of Hercegovina 
7) Dunav Syrmia, Vojvodina and Novi Sad 2,387,295 
North Serbia 
8) Morava Central and Eastern Serbia Nis 1,435,584 
9) Vardar South Serbia and Macedonia Skopje 1,574,243 67 
One thing that was immediately obvious from the re-arrangement 
was that. Serbia was divided into three parts, none of which had i t s 
c a p i t a l at Belgrade. The object of the new sub-division therefore 
marked a decision on the part of the King to place the c a p i t a l , 
Belgrade, above individual claims and make i t the c i t y of the whole 
nation. I t was also designed to remove the impression of Serbian 
hegemony i n the Kingdom, which had long been regarded as one of the 
chief obstacles to national unity. By contrast, the central areas of 
Croatia were kept together and the c i t y of Zagreb put on a par with 
the other Banovina c a p i t a l s . This might have been interpreted as a 
s l i g h t to the second c i t y of the Kingdom, but i t was reported that 
the Croats were generally pleased with the new arrangements.^ 
Of the nine Bans appointed to administer the new areas, f i v e 
67. E . J . Patterson, Yugoslavia, (London 1936), p. 120. 
68. Leigh Smith to Henderson, 10 Oct. 1929, C7816/97/92. 
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were Serbs, one Croat, one Slovene, one Montenegrin and one Dal-
69 
matian; a l l were responsible men, who enjoyed the confidence of 
the King. They were made responsible for:-
" a l l general administration, particularly i n the 
sphere of agriculture, public works, forests, mines 
labour, sanitation, schools and economic and i n t e l -
70 
lectual developments i n their areas." 
But, despite these substantial responsibilities, the Bans would s t i l l 
be under the control of the central government and, :in everything 
they did, would act i n conjunction with the appropriate department i n 
71 
Belgrade. Beneath the Banovinas spread an even greater system of 
local government. The entire country was sub-divided into 33'8 dis t r i c t s 
(which embraced 6,575 municipalities) and 36 autonomous towns with 
72 
their own individual administration. But a l l government executive 
authority would be operated through the Bans and the Banovina system 
and the sub-divisions (gathered i n to six, seven or eight groups per. 
Banovina) ensured that decisions taken in.Belgrade would be imple-
mented along certain strong., clear and uniform lines. 
During the next month, several additions were made to the new 
system. A law of October 24, 1929 laid down that Bans could raise 
sur-taxes and also certain local taxes subject to the approval and 
control of the Minister of Finance. On the following day, departmental 
inspectors were appointed to ensure public security and inspect those 
aspects of Banovina administration which were inaccesible to the Ban 
69. See Appendix E. 
70. Leigh Smith to Henderson, 10 Oct. 1929, C7816/97/92. 71. Ibid. 
72. Central Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1919-1929, (Belgrade 1930), p. x i . 
73. Nevile Henderson to Arthur Henderson, 5 Feb. 1930, C114l/ll4l/92 
Para 137- 74. Ibid. 
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75 himself. A f i n a l law of November 7 , 1929 organized the inner 
workings of the d i s t r i c t groups within the Banovinas and made provision 
for a consultative body to be known as the Council of the Banovina. 
With a l l this system given rapid assent by the King, the Bans assumed 
their functions on November 11, 1929. 
With this system of internal government and with the new t i t l e 
of the State clearly showing the intentions of royal policy, the King 
and his Ministers consolidated the work of the f i r s t nine months of 
77 
the dictatorship. None of the former d i f f i c u l t i e s were removed. The 
Kingdom was s t i l l divided; the former politicians were s t i l l awaiting 
their return to power; memories of the parliamentary era were s t i l l 
78 
b i t t e r ; corruption was s t i l l to be found i n high places and emigre 
Croats were either plotting the overthrow of the Kingdom or urging 
European leaders to work for an end of the regime and a f a i r deal for 
79 
their homeland. But, at long last, the Kingdom of the South Slavs 
possessed a leader - albeit a King- with certain clear ideas of what 
could be done and what he could achieve. He possessed a w i l l i n g and 
75. Ibid. 76. Ibid 77. Leigh Smith i n his despatch to 
Henderson, 10 Oct. 1929, C7816/97/92, said that the new Banovina system 
was due entirely to the King and that his Ministers were not consulted. 
He also suggested that the King had only introduced the system 
after Mr Lionel de Rothschild had spoken to him at Bled and urged 
s t a b i l i t y as an essential pre-requisite to a foreign loan. This sugg-
estion was given substance by a remark by Dr Svrluga, the Finance 
Minister, that the October 3 reforms would be well received by finan-
c i a l circles abroad. However, later actions by the King suggest that 
the reforms were planned by a small inner Cabinet. The need for a 
foreign loan was a perennial problem - not one demanding lightning 
reforms. The extent and the complexity of the Banovina system show 
evidence of long and careful planning over many months, 
78. Kennard to Henderson, 10 Sept. 1929, C7092/97/92. 
79. See ch. 9. 
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obedient government and a loyal Prime Minister to enable those 
ideas to be turned into practical r e a l i t i e s . And with the authority 
of his own personal dictatorship - backed by the loyalty of the Army 
- i t seemed that he was also guaranteed the time and the security 
necessary to achieve those ends. 
80 
Chapter 4 
The Attitude of I t a l y 
81 
Having now come to grips with the internal problems which 
threatened the unity of his Kingdom, Alexander used the personal powers 
available to him by the dictatorship to tackle the major external 
problem which had troubled Yugoslavia ever since the war - the attitude 
of I t a l y . For six years, from 1918-24, Yugoslav diplomats had struggled 
patiently to resolve the many disputes between the two countries -
particularly over Fiume - and when the Pact of Rome was signed on 
January 27, 1924, i t seemed that a l l they had hoped for had been ach-
ieved.''" Outstanding differences had been resolved and they were now 
bound by a treaty of friendship which was to last four years. But, 
whilst the diplomats congratulated themselves on their achievement 
2 
and concluded a series of conventions to cover minor details, the 
Yugoslav government discovered that Mussolini had embarked upon a 
wholly different policy and was steadily building up the I t a l i a n 
position i n Albania, signing financial, p o l i t i c a l and military agree-
3 
ments with Yugoslavia*s southern neighbour. The duplicity of I t a l i a n 
foreign policy - which was only f u l l y realized when the Treaty of 
Tirana was signed on NbVember 27, 1926 - brought a l l the efforts of 
post-war years suddenly to a close. Those who. had worked for an 
understanding with I t a l y f e l t b i t t e r and disillusioned and such was 
the measure of Italophobia within the Kingdom, that no Yugoslav govern-
ment dared to present the Nettuno Conventions before the Skupstina for 
1. A Cassells, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, (Princeton 1970) pp. 142-5. 
2. The Nettuno Conventions were signed on July 20, 1925-
3. Cassels, op. c i t . , pp. 317-336. 
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fear of immediate riots and p o l i t i c a l upheaval: 
" I t is d i f f i c u l t , " wrote one observer, "to expect 
a suspicious and primitive country, which has 
suffered from centuries of aggression, to believe the 
re-assuring declarations of. M. Mussolini, when i t 
observes the ac t i v i t y displayed by certain I t a l i a n 
representatives here and i n other neighbouring states, 
which appears to be aimed at encircling i t with a ring 
of potential enemies. The periodical onslaughts of the 
Ital i a n press and the bellicose tone of public declar-
ations on the other side of the Adriatic further 
strengthen i t s nervousness and the Yugoslav has become 
so obsessed with the nightmare of It a l i a n aggression 
that he sees i t everywhere i n an exaggerated form.,f^ 
The reaction of Yugoslav leaders was to seek a closer link with 
France. But t h i s , i n i t s e l f , made things more d i f f i c u l t , for Mussolini 
5 
was then able to say that Yugoslavia preferred alliance with France 
to genuine friendship with I t a l y . Since Mussolini refused to consider 
any suggestion of a t r i p a r t i t e agreement between Yugoslavia, I t a l y and 
France,^* the Yugoslavs found themselves i n a very d i f f i c u l t position, 
the more so since they were surrounded by revisionist states whose 
claims against Yugoslavia were supported by I t a l y . Even though the 
7 
Pact of Rome was maintained - and even extended for a certain time -
there was a constant sense of insecurity and a permanent feeling that 
k. Final .despatch from Kennard to Henderson, 11 Sept 1929, C7093/965/92. 
5. A treaty was signed between France and Yugoslavia on November 11 1927. 
6. Cassels, Mussolini Ts Early Diplomacy, p.335. 
7. The treaty, which was due to expire on January 26, 1928 was twice 
extended by a period of six months and would continue u n t i l January 26, 
1929. 
83 
I t a l y was only waiting for the Kingdom to disintegrate before she- — 
and others - stepped i n . 
During the autumn of 1928, when the p o l i t i c a l situation. 
within the Kingdom was one of increasing deadlock and uncertainty, 
the Yugoslav government did everything i t could to show friendship 
towards I t a l y . The Mettuno Conventions were at long last r a t i f i e d by 
the Skupstina and an Ita l i a n military delegation was invited to 
Belgrade to share i n the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Salonika 
breakthrough i n 1918. In December 1928, the Yugoslav Minister i n Rome, 
Rakic, was authorized by his Government to renew the existing agree-
ment between the two countries or, i f Mussolini were w i l l i n g , to 
conclude a completely new treaty to replace the Pact of Rome. The 
Yugoslav Minister found Mussolini more than w i l l i n g and Rakic was 
invited to draw up - i n general terms - the sort of treaty his 
9 
Government required. In view of the diplomatic d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
the past three years, this was progress indeed. But, when the royal 
coup d'etat occured i n January 1929, the It a l i a n government changed 
their mind. They stated that they were now i n no hurry to sign any 
agreement"^ and proposed that, on January 26, when the Pact expired, 
a formal announcement should be made that the Pact would not be renewed"!"^  
Although the reaction of the It a l i a n government was a disapp-
ointment to King Alexander, i t was not unexpected. The Italians were 
i n the throes of an election campaign and Mussolini was understandably 
cautious i n recognizing a new regime whose inner s t a b i l i t y and future 
8. In the absence of the Croats. The Conventions were passed on Aug-
ust 13 and the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n were exchanged i n Rome on 
November 14, 1928. The Yugoslav government also agreed to compensate 
It a l y for the last round of anti-Nettuno riots i n Sebenico, where 
It a l i a n property had been damaged and the I t a l i a n Consul- — General 
injured. 9. Sir Ronald Graham (Rome) to Chamberlain, 1 Jan 1929, 
C123/123/92. 10. Kennard to Foreign Office, 16 Jan 1929, C437/123/92. 
11 . Kennard to Foreign Office, 24 Jan 1929, C634/123/92. 
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policy were as yet unclear. King Alexander was aware of this and, 
by private diplomacy, he endeavoured to assure Mussolini that the 
proclamation of a dictatorship had i n no way altered the course of 
12 
Yugoslav foreign policy. In early March 1929, Prince Paul, who was 
in I t a l y for a royal wedding, had a private meeting with the Ital i a n 
leader: 
"Paul, who found Mussolini quite affable, began 
the conversation by pointing out that i t was 
quite erroneous to suppose that the new regime 
had any bellicose intentions and that Zivkovic, 
whom he had known for 26 years, was essentially 
a tpacific' general who desired above a l l things 
good relations with I t a l y . Mussolini said that 
he for his part also desired good relations with 
13 
Yugoslavia " 
After this promising encounter, King Alexander tried to show that 
Yugoslavia^ desire for conciliation was not confined to mere words. 
Measures were taken to control the anti- I t a l i a n tone i n many Slovene 
newspapers and steps were taken to dissolve the Or,jurat, a nationalist 
organization which so often indulged i n anti- I t a l i a n demonstrations. 
Frontier o f f i c i a l s , too, were encouraged to be more friendly."^ 1" 
However, there arose i n April 1929 one of those freak outbursts 
of i l l - w i l l which so regularly punctuated I t a l y T s relations with Yugo-
slavia. The Giornale d T I t a l i a published an arti c l e by i t s Trieste 
correspondent, Dr Gaida, revealing the existence of a document appar-
ently published by the Yugoslav Government i n 1922, entitled "Instruct 
12. See "Biographies". 
13. Kennard to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 6 Mar. 1929, C1853/123/92. 
14. Memorandum by Chamberlain, 12 Apr. .1.929, C2602/123/92. 
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15 for War Service". These instructions were ostensibly written for 
use by comitad.jisjserving on the north and western frontiers of the 
Kingdom bordering on I t a l y , and gave a f u l l description of how 
guerilla warfare should be organized "in such minute and ghastly 
details that- i t would seem incredible that any War Office could 
16 
o f f i c i a l l y sanction them." The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
17 
immediately denied the authenticity of the document and expressed 
their surprise that the Italians should allow such an a r t i c l e to be 
published when the Yugoslav government was doing i t s best to avoid 
any further conflict between them. The I t a l i a n Government claimed that 
they had been unaware that Dr Gaida had secured permission for the 
18 
ar t i c l e to be published but this did not prevent him writing a 
19 
second, similar ar t i c l e i n the Giornale d*Italia on May 5. Further 
provocation was provided by a v i s i t of Signor Grandi - then Under-
Secretary of the I t a l i a n Ministry of Foreign Affairs - to Tirana on 
April 16 and slanderous allegations about the private l i f e of King 
20 
Alexander i n such papers as I I Popolo d i Trieste. On May 22, i n a 
speech to the I t a l i a n Parliament, Mussolini declared that the Yugoslav 
upper classes were hostile towards I t a l y and that the Government i n 
Belgrade had failed to carry out the terms of the Nettuno Conventions 
15. Giornale d * I t a l i a , 14 Apr. 1929. 
16. Daily Telegraph, 16 Apr. 1929. 
17. Jevtic, the Minister at Court, showed Kennard an original copy of 
the document which the Yugoslav government had obtained secretly from 
Hungary i n 1925. The French military attache claimed that he knew who 
had fabricated i t . Kennard to Chamberlain, 16 Apr. 1929;, C2823/123/92. 
18. They claimed that Dr Gaida had submitted the art i c l e to the censors 
when the highest o f f i c i a l s of the Foreign Ministry were away, Ibid. 
19- Text and translation of second a r t i c l e sent by Sir Ronald Graham 
(Rome) to Foreign Officej 6 May 1929, C3393/123/92. 
20. Kennard to Chamberlain, 28 May 1929, C3922/123/92. I I Popolo was 
founded i n 1920 and was regarded as the mouthpiece of the Partito 
Nazionale Fascista d i Trieste. 
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21 i n good f a i t h . A l l these incidents were a severe test of King 
Alexander's sincerity. With s t r i c t censorship of the press, no rec-
3-idminations were made against I t a l y and the outstanding differences 
22 
over the Conventions - which were by no means one-sided - were 
peacefully settled at Abbazia on August 22. 
As King Alexander began the task of uniting his Kingdom, giving 
i t i t s new o f f i c i a l t i t l e and re-drawing the administrative boundaries, 
fresh problems arose. During the I t a l i a n elections i n March 1929, 
five Slovenes l i v i n g i n I s t r i a , a l l members of the Gr.juna, were 
arrested for f i r i n g shots at the electors of.Pisino as they went to 
23 
the polls. The ringleader, Gortan, and his four associates were put 
on t r i a l i n Pola on October 16. A l l were found guilty. Gortan was 
sentenced to death and the others were sentenced to t h i r t y years* 
imprisonment. The decision of the court at Pola caused immediate anger 
throughout Slovenia - the more so as Gortan was swiftly executed -
and there were demonstrations i n Croatia and Dalmatia and two It a l i a n 
sailors were attacked at Gruz. On October 30, thirty-three other 
Slovenes l i v i n g i n I s t r i a were arrested for distributing leaflets 
25 
saying "Glory to Vladimir Gortan! Death to Fascism!" The Yugoslav 
government bore these pinpricks with restraint and replied calmly to 
the four notes of protest sent from Rome. 
21. Foreign Office memorandum following protest by Djuric, 24 May 1929, 
C3771./123/92. 22. Di f f i c u l t i e s had arisen over the 
organization of the international railway station at Fiume, and the 
Ita l i a n claim for the same preferential rates to be given to It a l i a n 
shipping i n the Thaon d i Reval dock at Fiume as was given to Yugoslav 
shipping at Susak. 23. One was k i l l e d , two wounded. Leigh 
Smith to Foreign Office, 16 Oct 1929, C7882/123/92. Djuric asked the 
Foreign Office for Britain's help i n exercising moderation i f the 
opportunity arose. I t did not. 
24- Leigh Smith to Arthur Henderson, 1 Nov. 1929, C8321/123/92. 
25. Leigh Smith to Henderson, 6 Nov. 1929, C8543/123/92. 
87 
These incidents gave r i s e to further h o s t i l e a r t i c l e s i n the 
I t a l i a n press, which did nothing to improve relations between the two 
countries. Towards the end of October, a Franciscan f r i a r from Albania 
26 
was murdered i n mysterious circumstances near the Yugoslav border. 
A few days l a t e r , Mussolini declared that, i f Yugoslavia attacked 
Albania, war would inevitably ensue. Signor Grandi declared that 
27 
I t a l y would l o y a l l y carry out the terms of her a l l i a n c e with Albania. 
28 
And yet, there was no Yugoslav threat whatsoever. The I t a l i a n 
m i l i t a r y attache i n Belgrade publicly boasted that he had stolen 
m i l i t a r y documents from the Yugoslav Ministry of War. Dr Marinkovic, 
the Yugoslav foreign minister, was convinced that I t a l y was determined 
to provoke a major incident and, for that reason, his Government was 
29 
a f r a i d to make an o f f i c i a l protest. On December 29, a French warship 
v i s i t e d Sebenico and the I t a l i a n press alleged that the v i s i t had 
been arranged to arouse fresh hatred against I t a l y . 
"Scarcely a day passes," wrote the B r i t i s h minister 
i n Belgrade, "without the appearance i n the Press, 
of either I t a l y or Yugoslavia, of mutually abusive 
a r t i c l e s . Small but i r r i t a t i n g provocations, un-
fri e n d l y demonstrations, charges and counter-charges 
i n respect of ill-treatment of minorities, the 
expulsions o f . I t a l i a n s from Yugoslavia or Yugoslavs 
30 
from I t a l y , succeed each other incessantly." 
Who was responsible for these continued outbursts of h o s t i l i t y ? 
S i r Ronald Graham reported a conversation he had had i n the middle of 
26. Leigh Smith to Henderson, 1 Nov. 1929, C832]/l23/92. 
27. Memorandum by S i r E r i c Drummond on conversations held with Muss-
o l i n i and Signor Grandi, 30 Oct. 1929, C837l / l23/92. 
28. Memorandum of conversation between Marinkovic and Drummond, k Nov\ 
1929, C861A/123/92. 29. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 2 Jan. 1930, 
C143/JAI/92. 30. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 31 Dec 1929, ClAl/lAl/92. 
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'December :-
" I was recently talking with the chief proprietor 
of the Giornale d ' I t a l i a and asked him why his 
31 
paper, which i s inspired by the Palazzo Chigi, 
was so consistently anti-Yugoslav and was always 
s t a r t i n g hares. He told me quite frankly that his 
instructions were to keep up a certain condition of 
anxiety and uncertainty as to relations between I t a l y 
and Yugoslavia so that Yugoslav efforts to obtain a 
loan i n London might f a i l owing to a lack of confid-
ence there. He added that a good proportion of any 
money the Yugoslavs received would c e r t a i n l y be 
devoted to armaments. This seems a dangerous game 
but one thing i s c e r t a i n , the I t a l i a n s have no 
desire whatever for a row with Yugoslavia; they are 
not i n the least prepared for a fight and even the 
rumour of a c o n f l i c t would bring about an economic 
32 
crash,with the l i r a depreciating to any degree." 
King Alexander seems to have reali z e d that the I t a l i a n Foreign 
Office and i t s newspapers were waging "a war of nerves" and that unless 
33 
someone put an end to i t , i t would continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . I n Jan-
uary 1930> Prince Paul was due to be present at the wedding of the 
I t a l i a n Crown Prince and Alexander l e t i t be known through Signor 
G a l l i , the I t a l i a n Minister i n Belgrade, that he would l i k e to 
arrange a meeting between Prince Paul and Signor Grandi i n Rome. 
31. The I t a l i a n Foreign Office. 
32. S i r Ronald Graham (Rome) to O.G. Sargent, 19 Dec. 1929, C10017/ 
123/92. 
33* This was also Henderson*s b e l i e f . N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 
31 Dec. 1929, C141/141/92. 
34. Henderson to S i r Robert Vansittart, 13 Mar. 1930, 02643/141/92. 
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Representations had also been made i n London through S i r Robert 
35 
Vansittart to bring an end to the press campaign. With the 
approval of Mussolini, the meeting took place and the exchanges between 
Prince Paul and the I t a l i a n Under-Secretary were most frank. The 
meeting established that there was no r e a l obstacle i n the way of a 
rapprochement between the two countries and i t was agreed that a 
"newspaper truce" should be i n i t i a t e d right away. Once the atmosphere 
had calmed down, then conversations on wider issues would begin. 
The existence of t h i s meeting was kept secret for over two 
months because King Alexander was uncertain as to whether Mussolini 
would r e a l l y approve the l i n e Signor Grandi had taken. However, 
Mussolini had subsequently received Rakic" - his f i r s t meeting for 
fourteen months - and had been most conciliatory, suggesting that he 
and Grandi pursue the matter further as soon as the Under-Secretary 
had returned from a conference i n London. King Alexander told Mr 
Henderson that 
"what he wanted was an agreement, not l i k e the 
Pact of Rome of limited duration, but for a long 
period of years. He disclaimed vehemently any 
thought of irrederitism i n I s t r i a or Gorizia, 
saying that Yugoslavia had a l l the t e r r i t o r y she 
aspired to. A l l Yugoslavia wanted was 40 years 
of peace...." 
But the f a i r words spoken by Mussolini and Grandi were hardly 
matched by t h e i r deeds. The "newspaper truce" lasted for a mere three 
37 
months - from February to A p r i l 1930 - and at the end of that time, 
f a r from entering into conversations on wider is s u e s , the si t u a t i o n 
35- Memorandum by Vansittart following conversation with Grandi and 
Bordonaro, 11 Mar. 1930, and subsequent l e t t e r to Mr Henderson, 14 Mar. 
1930, C2000/14.1/92. 36. Henderson to Vansittart, 13 Mar 1930, C2643/ 
141/92. 37. Henderson to Vansittart, 28 Mar. 1930, G256l / l4 l/92. 
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grew s t e a d i l y worse. I n early May, the I t a l i a n police arrested 
nine Slavs of I t a l i a n n ationality i n connection with an explosion 
38 
i n the o f f i c e s of the .newspaper I I Popolo d i T r i e s t e . This was 
only one of a s e r i e s of outrages which had occured i n the area and, at 
f i r s t , the police had been uncertain whether i t was the Communists, 
39 
the Slavs or even dissident F a s c i s t s who had caused the explosion. 
Suspicion eventually fastened upon the Slavs, who were arrested,:-.'and 
since a l l admitted to being members of the Or.juna (which had been 
o f f i c i a l l y dissolved on January 6, 1 9 3 0 ) ^ there was ample scope 
for accusations of bad f a i t h on the part of the government i n 
Belgrade.^ Furthermore, although Signor Grandi had by now returned 
from his conference i n London, there was s t i l l no sign of the promised 
tal k s between himself and Rakic. I n addition, the press polemics had 
been resumed. On May 30, 1930, two thousand I t a l i a n troops were landed 
i n Albania and, soon a f t e r , the I t a l i a n government announced that 
a further £5 millions would be spent on i t s armed forces. 
The King told the B r i t i s h Minister that a quarter of I t a l y T s 
revenues were spent on arms. Against whom were they directed? Mr. 
Henderson suggested that I t a l y was trying to keep up with F r a n c e . ^ 
Signor G a l l i , the I t a l i a n Minister,agreed. " I t a l y , " he said, "had no 
designs against Yugoslavia." I f that were the case, s a i d the B r i t i s h 
Minister, why had the proposed t a l k s between Grandi and Rakic come to 
nothing? Rather lamely, G a l l i said that the I t a l i a n s were waiting for 
Rakic' to make the f i r s t move. Mr Henderson told the I t a l i a n Minister 
38. On 10 Feb. 1930. One reporter and three members of s t a f f were k i l l e d . 
39. H.M. Consul ( T r i e s t e ) to S i r Ronald Graham (Rome), 26 Feb. 1930, 
C1725/141/92. 40. As the Yugoslav's contribution to the private 
agreement concluded between Prince Paul and Grandi i n Rome i n Jan. 1930. 
41. Graham (Rome) to A. Henderson, 7 May 1930, C3638/141/92. 
42. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 20 Jun 1930, C5025/141/92. 
43- N„ Henderson to A. Henderson, 10 J u l 1930, C5663/1A1/92. 
44. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 20 Jun 1930, C5025/141/92. 
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that, from his talks with King Alexander, he knew that Yugoslavia 
was w i l l i n g to see a great increase i n economic co-operation with 
45 
I t a l y once agreement had been reached. G a l l i asked whether Yugo-
s l a v i a would spend les s on armaments i f I t a l y signed an agreement. 
Mr Henderson said that he thought t h i s was very l i k e l y providing 
that the agreement was of ten or twenty years d u r a t i o n . ^ 
But, despite a l l these omens of goodwill," the I t a l i a n attitude 
remained unchanged. Symbolically, a Yugoslav pleasure steamer - the 
"Karadjordje" - was sunk by an I t a l i a n ship during the summer and, 
i n the f i r s t days of September 1930, a further t r i a l of Slovenes 
was mounted i n T r i e s t e . This was the t r i a l for those arrested i n 
connection with the explosion i n the offices of I I Popolo but, since 
May, the s i z e of the case had greatly increased and by now there were 
eighteen i n the dock, charged with a t o t a l of 99 crimes, including 13 
murders, 31 armed a s s a u l t s , 8 acts of p o l i t i c a l terrorism and 18 acts 
of incendarism. I t was c l e a r l y going to be a cause celebre. But the 
Yugoslavs noted that the t r i a l was timed to co-incide with the s p e c i a l 
f e s t i v i t i e s l a i d on to mark the seventh birthday of the Crown Prince. 
Great crowds would be gathered i n Belgrade for the occasion and many 
foreign delegations had been invit e d . The Yugoslav government sus-
pected that the I t a l i a n s intended to announce the sentences j u s t at 
the moment when i t would make the most impact. This they did. Although 
the t r i a l was one of great complexity, i t was rushed through the Court 
45. Throughout the period 1929-32, despite a l l the polemics, Italy., 
remained Yugoslavia fs best customer and fourth i n the l i s t of coun-
t r i e s exporting goods to Yugoslavia. Graham to S i r John Simon, 
13 Nov. 1933, C10138/L231/92. (Vol. 16830). 
46. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 10 J u l . 1930, C5663/1A1/92. 
47. I t was reported from Austrian and Czech sources that a t o t a l of 
2172 Slovenes and Croats had been arrested and shot i n I t a l y during 
the past 7 years. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 10 Sept 1930, C6985/141/92 
48. S i r Ronald Graham .to A. Henderson, 5 Sept. 1930, C690l/l4l/92. 
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i n three days - the l a s t s i t t i n g being from 9am to 11pm on September 
5 - and sentence passed a quarter of an hour l a t e r at 11.15pm the 
same n i g h t T h e executions of four of the accused were performed 
the following morning - on the Crown Pr i n c e T s birthday - at 6am 
and ten I t a l i a n warships were brought to T r i e s t e harbour to discourage 
50 
protest by the l o c a l population. To prevent any ho s t i l e reaction 
against I t a l y , the Yugoslavs withheld a l l mention of the sentences 
u n t i l a f t e r the f e s t i v i t i e s were over.^"'" The I t a l i a n press promptly 
52 
attributed t h e i r s i l e n c e to g u i l t but, l a t e r , both Signor G a l l i and 
Signor Grandi said that they had been impressed by Yugoslavia*s r e s t r a i n t 
I t was suggested - not l e a s t by the I t a l i a n s themselves - that 
the chief d i f f i c u l t y standing i n the way of a rapprochement between 
the two countries was Yugoslavia's close dependence on - and friend-
ship with - France. Ever since the war, French influence had been 
very strong within the Kingdom and the relationship was not e n t i r e l y 
due to sentimental attachments formed i n b a t t l e . Large pre-war debts to 
France gave French commercial int e r e s t s a great opportunity and were 
55 
frequently used to further sales of French arms. Any loan which was 
49. No appeal against the sentences was permitted. 4 were condemned to 
death and 12 to prison terms of 2\ to 30 years. Mr "Osborne (Rome) to 
Foreign Office, 6 Sept. 1930, C6838/141/92. For good measure, there 
was also a f r o n t i e r incident at S l j i v i c e on Sept 3, where, i t was 
claimed, 3 I t a l i a n militiamen clashed with 2 Or.juna members. One 
I t a l i a n was k i l l e d , another wounded. 
50. Leigh Smith to Foreign Office, 5 Sept 1930, C6837/141/92. 
51. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 10 Sept 1930, C6985/141/92. 
52. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent, 19 Sept 1930, C7213/l4l/92. 
53. Graham (Rome) to A. Henderson, 1 Oct 1930, C75P9/141/92. 
54. Graham (Rome) to A. Henderson, 30 May 1930, C434l/l4l/92. 
55. For example, the sa l e of 4 French submarines i n early 1930. Letter 
from N. Henderson to Sargent, 14 Feb 1930, C1354/141/92. See also a 
l e t t e r from R. H. Porters (a representative of Rothschilds), 7 Mar. 
1929, C1910/47/92. 
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was required would almost always be raised on the Paris market and 
strong pressure would be put on Yugoslavia should she show any signs 
56 
of going elsewhere. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of 
November 1927 was regarded by many observers as the most serious 
57 
obstacle to any improved relations with I t a l y . The I t a l i a n s were 
sure - or, at l e a s t , said they were sure - that the Treaty contained 
eg 
secret m i l i t a r y clauses directed against them. Yugoslavia, they 
believed, was France Ts "Trojan horse" i n the Balkans, an obstacle 
to t h e i r own imperial designs. They were convinced that France was 
responsible for the a n t i - I t a l i a n campaigns and demonstrations and 
that her chief policy was to deny I t a l y of her r i g h t f u l status as 
a Great Power. The French Press did l i t t l e to discourage these views. 
Nor, except under severe pressure, would the French minister i n 
Belgrade: 
"The French government c e r t a i n l y do l i t t l e to 
dis p e l these f e a r s , " wrote Kennard, "and i t i s 
unfortunate that they should be so u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
represented i n Belgrade. I have ra r e l y succeeded i n 
inducing my French colleague to j o i n me i n any 
counsels of moderation here, either because he has 
no instructions from Paris or else because he i s 
af r a i d of giving offence and affecting French pop-
u l a r i t y . The only occasion when the French legation 
become aroused i s when there i s a chance of a contract 
56. Confidential Treasury Report by Mr Leith Ross following v i s i t to 
Belgrade, 28 Mar. 1929, 02411/47/92. 
-57. Foreign Office memorandum by Mr Balfour, Jan. 1931, 0179/129/92. 
58. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 23 Feb. 1931, 01399/129/92. " I would 
mention here that M. G a l l i has always expressed to me and did so on 
t h i s occasion, his firm b e l i e f that there i s a secret m i l i t a r y annexe 
^o the Alliance i n addition to the text as communicated to the League 
of Nations." The French minister solemnly and with equal frequency, denied 
i t . 
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going to a B r i t i s h or other foreign firm. 
On the other hand, the country i s continually 
flooded with French propaganda of the most naus-
eating nature which keeps a l i v e the s p i r i t of 
the war and whose object i s merely to remind 
t h i s country that they owe t h e i r salvation to 
59 
France alone." 
I t was Mussolini's declared b e l i e f that "Yugoslavia may be friends 
with I t a l y or friends with France. She cannot be friends with both." ' 
So, wrote O.G. Sargent, i n a Foreign Office memorandum of October 
1930, " i t i s almost hopeless to expect that there can be any 
Yugoslav-Italian detente u n t i l France and I t a l y have come to terms 
with each other." ^ This, both then and subsequently, did not seem 
very l i k e l y . 
But, i t was not ju s t a question of France. There was also Bul-
garia. Ever since the Treaty of San Stefano i n 1878, the Bulgarians 
had believed that Macedonia was legitimately t h e i r s . The outcome 
of two Balkan wars and the Great War, i n which they had supported 
the Central Powers and were u t t e r l y defeated, had done l i t t l e to 
diminish t h e i r claims and, a f t e r the Peace Conference, I t a l y 
became the chief supporter of successive Bulgarian governments, 
who made the annexation of Macedonia a fundemental issue of policy. 
The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which perpetrated acts of 
terrorism within Yugoslavia (but which was sheltered by Bulgaria) 
received arms and money from I t a l y and i t s leaders were frequently 
59. Kennard to A. Henderson, 11 Sept 1929, C7093/965/92. 
60. Foreign Office memorandum, 21 Dec 1932, C10764/51/92. Grandi had 
sa i d the same thing to Prince Paul. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 
13 Oct. 1930, C7809/141/92. 
61. Memorandum on Henderson's despatch, 13 Oct. 1930, C7809/l4l/92. 
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62 and warmly received i n Rome. But i t i s extremely doubtful whether 
the I t a l i a n s were r e a l l y interested i n Bulgaria fs aspirations except 
as a means to extend t h e i r own influence i n the Balkans and threaten 
Yugoslavia on every side. 
"The I t a l i a n Government," wrote one observer, 
"would seem to have a very de f i n i t e policy, 
namely that of preventing Yugoslavia from 
developing into a Great Power, r i v a l l i n g 
I t a l y on the Adriatic and enjoying a prominent 
position i n the Danube basin on the one hand, 
and i n the Balkans on the other." 
I t was t y p i c a l of King Alexander fs methods that, soon a f t e r 
proclaiming the dictatorship, he should have taken steps to improve 
relations with Bulgaria. In March 1929, negotiations were i n i t i a t e d 
with Bulgaria with a view to preventing the continual violations of 
the f r o n t i e r by t e r r o r i s t s , the settlement of long-standing matters 
of land ownership and the establishmemt of a Permanent Mixed Commiss-
ion to investigate and s e t t l e incidents occuring along the border. 
Alexander Ts i n i t i a t i v e found a temporary response i n Sofia and, 
on February 14, 1930, a Convention was signed at Pirot to deal with 
a l l these problems.^ But i t could hardly be imagined that a Yugoslav-
Bulgarian rapprochement would commend i t s e l f to the Palazzo Chigi and 
i t was not long before I t a l y made her disapproval f e l t . Athanas Bourov, 
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, who had conducted his country fs side 
62. For a f u l l consideration of Yugos l a v i a ^ relations with Bulgaria, 
see D. Shepherd, Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 1918-1941» 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis - University of Durham) - p a r t i c u l a r l y for 
t h i s period, pp. 115-159. 
63. Memorandum on Yugoslav-Italian r e l a t i o n s , 20 Jan 1930, C575/141/92. 
64. L.S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement to-
wards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, (Northampton, Mass. 1944) p. 228. 
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of the negotiations, was subjected to I t a l i a n - i n s p i r e d attacks i n a 
65 
Sofia newspaper. The Macedonian t e r r o r i s t s , who had taken f u l l 
.advantage of the opening of the f r o n t i e r to mount a vigorous campaign 
of bombings and shooting, were sent increased shipments of arms from 
I t a l y ^ and, i n March 1930, a M.R.O. bomb exploded i n the War Office 
i n Belgrade. But I t a l y T s efforts were not merely subversive. On 
October 4, 1930, i t was announced i n Rome that King Boris of Bulgaria 
would marry the Princess Giovanna d i Savoia of I t a l y . The marriage, 
which had been the subject of rumour for over two years, took place 
on October 25; but there were many who considered that the match had 
67 
been arranged s o l e l y i n the in t e r e s t s of diplomacy. 
The royal marriage, coming as i t did a f t e r to so many tangible 
signs of I t a l i a n h o s t i l i t y , seemed to give Alexander l i t t l e hope of 
coming to terms with M u s s o l i n i . ^ His minister i n Rome, Rakic', despite 
Signor G a l l i T s advice to i n i t i a t e a demarche, was s t i l l unable to get 
65. J . Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, (London 1939), pp. 225-6. The 
attacks were inserted at the i n s t i g a t i o n of the I t a l i a n minister i n 
Sofia, Signor P i a c e n t i n i . 66. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent, 
14 Mar. 1930, 02147/141/92. Henderson reported that the American min-
i s t e r i n Belgrade, Dr Prince, had told him that he had "definite know-
ledge that the centre of the I t a l i a n organization for a s s i s t i n g the 
M.R.O. against Yugoslavia i s at T r i e s t e and that arms are being con-
s i s t e n t l y shipped to small Bulgarian ports for use by the comitadjis." 
I t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t that I t a l y was given free access to the port 
of Varna i n March 1930. 67. Henderson had a meeting with 
Alexander on October 10. Prince Paul, who was also present, declared 
that he had known Princess Giovanna from childhood, and that there 
could be no question of the marriage being a love-match. In Yugoslavia 
generally, the marriage was seen as a p o l i t i c a l arrangement directed 
against t h e i r country. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 13 Oct. 1930, 
C7809/141/92. 68. Since i t was widely believed that a secret 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e had been signed as part of the marriage deal. This, 
however, was l a t e r denied. N.P. Nikolaev, La destinee tragique d*un 
Roi, (Uppsala 1952), p. 56. 
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69 i n touch with Grandi. Not u n t i l December 5, 1930 was a meeting 
arranged but, even then, Rakic'was informed that Mussolini did not 
want to resume further conversations. As far as the I t a l i a n leader 
70 
was concerned, there was "no hurry". The Yugoslav Government dec-
ided that since relations were at a poor l e v e l now was the time to 
expel the I t a l i a n m i l i t a r y attache, Colonel Visconti. The I t a l i a n s , 
for t h e i r part, put pressure on the Credito I t a l i a n o to prevent any 
I t a l i a n bank participating i n the international loan, Yugoslavia was 
71 
trying to r a i s e . I n February 1931, the I t a l i a n s suggested that 
Albania was the only outstanding issue between t h e i r two countries 
and that, i f the Yugoslavs would recognize I t a l y ' s " s p e c i a l position" 
i n Albania, then the I t a l i a n s would put an end to a l l agitation i n 
72 
Dalmatia. The Foreign Ministry i n Belgrade were wary of such bland-
ishments. They had heard them a l l before. This was not the sort of 
agreement Yugoslavia wanted. So the I t a l i a n ^ proposals were studiously 
ignored. 
But King Alexander f e l t that i t would be a mistake to r e j e c t 
any p o s s i b i l i t y - however s l i g h t - which might lead to better relations 
with I t a l y . The regular processes of diplomacy had led nowhere - and 
seemed to hold l i t t l e prospect for the future - so Alexander decided 
to make a private approach to Mussolini without the knowledge of his 
s 73 
Foreign Minister, Dr Marinkovic. His choice of intermediary was 
Guido Malagola Cappi, an a r c h i t e c t , whom King Alexander had known for 
69. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 20 Nov. 1930, C8603/1A1/92. 
70. S i r Ronald Graham (Rome) to V a n s i t t a r t , 5 Dec. 1930, C9005/141/92. 
71. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent. 18 Feb. 1931, C1284/129/92. 
72. The sudden r a i s i n g of the issue of Albania was due to the i l l n e s s 
of Albania's r u l e r , King Zog. The Treaty of Tirana was due for renewal 
i n December 1931 and there were fears that, i n the event of Zog's death 
the I t a l i a n s would simply annex Albania. 
73. Dr Marinkovic^was not informed u n t i l the end of March 1932. 
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some time and who had recently designed a v i l l a for the I t a l i a n 
leader. Alexander f e l t that the international standing of his country 
7ZL 
had improved i n many ways during 1931 and that, with economic d i f f -
i c u l t i e s facing most European countries, the climate was favourable 
for t a l k s . Throughout the autumn of 1931, the principles governing 
a new Italo-Yugoslav Commercial Treaty were discussed and hopes that 
75 
both countries might reduce t h e i r m i l i t a r y expenditure, were raised. 
But King Alexander r e a l l y hoped to secure a long-term agreement, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y (as the I t a l i a n s had suggested) with regard to Albania. 
By March 1932, Alexander had received - through Cappi - the text of 
a draft agreement, consisting of three clauses. 
The f i r s t clause suggested that I t a l y and Yugoslavia should 
mutually guarantee the i n t e g r i t y and independence of Albania] the 
second that Yugoslavia should accept the predominance (prevalenza) 
of I t a l i a n i n t e r e s t s i n Albania (as recognized by the Treaty of Tirana 
and the Ambassadors* Conference of 192l); and t h i r d l y , that I t a l y 
should take no action i n Albania which might be p r e j u d i c i a l to 
Yugoslavia's i n t e r e s t s . 
The King told Mr Henderson i n confidence that whilst the f i r s t 
clause was exactly what he wanted, he could never agree to an I t a l i a n 
prevalenza i n Albania. He said that he was "prepared to admit.the 
importance of those in t e r e s t s and to undertake to respect them" and 
74. I n May 1931, Yugoslavia raised an international loan of £8.3 
millions (see ch 6) and, i n the same month, managed to avoid con-
siderable embarassment by carefu l handling of events at Zara, where 
the I t a l i a n s had set up guns, trenches, and wire entanglements, 
claiming that Yugoslavia was about to attack the town. N. Henderson 
to A. Henderson, 11 May 1931, C3443/129/92; and also 27 May 1931, 
Q3787/129/92. 75. Henderson was f i r s t acquainted with 
the secret processes of Alexander's diplomacy on November 23, 1931, 
by Signor G a l l i . N. Henderson to V a n s i t t a r t , 24 Nov. 1931, C9241/129/92. 
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.had returned the agreement to Mussolini with these suggestions. 
The King said that :-
" i f Mussolini would meet him half-way, he 
would be w i l l i n g to sign an agreement at once. 
His Majesty also l a i d s t r e s s on the economic 
advantages he was prepared to give I t a l y i f 
76 
the treaty was concluded." 
I n f a c t , according to Cappi's minutes of a conversation held with 
King Alexander on February 22, 1932, the King had even considered 
offering I t a l y the f a c i l i t i e s of the bay of Kotor, Yugoslavia's 
deep-water naval base on the Adriatic as a gesture of goodwill and 
77 
as an indication of his desire for I t a l y ' s friendship. In his 
conversation with Henderson:-
"His Majesty added that Mussolini had expressed 
a desire that any agreement should be for the 
duration of not less than 10-15 years. To t h i s 
he had replied that he was more than ready to 
consent. Mussolini also asked his views about the 
Albanian army. His Majesty had answered that, 
i n his opinion, no Albanian army, or one 
as small as possible, was probably i n the 
78 
i n t e r e s t s of both countries." 
(This remark was i n keeping with Alexanders oft-stated b e l i e f that 
\ 79 
Albania should be the "Belgium of the Balkans";. 
Although these were promising signs, Alexander was no more 
76. From S i r Nevile Henderson's meeting with King Alexander on 
March 26, 1932. S i r Nevile Henderson to S i r John Simon, 30 Mar. 1932, 
C2746/51/92. Henderson was knighted on January 1, 1932.. 
77. Quoted by J.B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia i n C r i s i s , 1934-411 (Columbia, 
1962) p. 19. 78. Henderson to Simon, 30 Mar. 1932, C2746/51/92. 
79V N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 23 Feb. 1931, C1399/129/92. 
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succesful than h i s professional, diplomats had been. Mussolini 
refused to meet him half way. He i n s i s t e d on prevalenza. According 
to those closest to him, the I t a l i a n leader was s t i l l hoping for 
a general revision of t r e a t i e s throughout Europe and was unwilling 
to prejudice his future expectations by any premature agreement with 
80 
Yugoslavia. But there i s ample evidence to suggest that Mussolini 
was r e a l l y only interested i n agreement with Yugoslavia whilst that 
country was strong. When negotiations f i r s t began i n 1930-1, i t 
seemed that Alexander had gone a long way towards consolidating his 
Kingdom. By 1932, there were many signs pointing the other way. 
And so, Mussolini decided to wait. " I am going to s i t at my window," 
he told Cappi, "and see what w i l l happen before I go on with the 
81 
negotiations." When Mussolini's words were repeated to King Alex-
ander, a l l attempts to reach agreement with I t a l y came to an end. 
" I suppose," wrote Henderson, "the truth to be 
faced i s that I t a l y w i l l never be friendly to 
th i s country u n t i l i t i s quite certain that 
Yugoslavia w i l l s e t t l e down as a united country. 
Instead of helping her to become so, and so poss-
i b l y creating a debt of gratitude, I t a l y would 
rather do what she can to upset that unity by 
intrigue or any method short of war so long as 
there i s a chance of getting r i d of a too 
82 
powerful neighbour." 
Following Alexander's f r u i t l e s s attempts to reach a personal 
agreement with Mussolini, relations between the two countries rapidly . 
deteriorated. This was not because of any deliberate act of government 
80. Henderson to Simon, 14 May 1932, C3980/51/92. 
81. Henderson to Sargent, 26 Apr. 1934, R2644/59/92. 
82. Henderson to Sargent, 22 Jun. 1932, C5504/51/92. 
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policy but simply because the previous r e s t r a i n t s - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
upon the Press - were withdrawn. The King, who i n the summer of 1932 
had a c t i v e l y discouraged his Foreign Minister from seeking renewal of 
go 
the five-year old Franco-Yugoslav treaty, now instructed his Govern-
ment to proceed with a l l haste and the a l l i a n c e was renewed on Decem-
ber 2, 1932. There was t a l k of Yugoslavia making considerable add-
i t i o n s to her f l e e t - two f l o t i l l a leaders, s i x torpedo boats and a 
submarine - but, although the regime did nothing to provoke a n t i -
I t a l i a n feeling, certain members of the public were swift to notice the 
change and to take advantage of i t . On December 1, 1932, the Venetian 
lions of St Mark at Trogir were destroyed by an unknown hand. For 
many years, the lions had been regarded as a symbol of " I t a l i a n " 
culture and predominance i n Dalmatia and t h e i r destruction provoked 
two weeks of r i o t s , protests and demonstrations i n Zara, Rome, and 
86 
T r i e s t e . The I t a l i a n Press seized eagerly upon the incident and 
87 
mounted another anti-Yugoslav campaign.. I n return, Novosti (of Zagreb) 
published a detailed l i s t of I t a l y f s h o s t i l e acts towards Yugoslavia 
83. Henderson to Simon, 22 Mar. 1933, C2183/44/92. I t w i l l be r e a l -
ized that, i n conducting his secret negotiations with I t a l y , King 
Alexander ran a considerable r i s k of offending France, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
since he intended to abandon the French a l l i a n c e i n exchange for 
an agreement with Mussolini. 
84. Lord T y r r e l l ( P a r i s ) to Simon, 2 Jan. 1933, C85/44/92. As a 
matter of courtesy, the I t a l i a n s were informed before the renewal 
was publicly announced. The treaty was to l a s t for a further f i v e 
years. 
85. Henderson to Simon, 19 Dec. 1932, C10898/51/92. 
86. The Times, 14 Dec. 1932. 
87. In p a r t i c u l a r , an a r t i c l e by Dr Gaida i n the Giornale d T I t a l i a , 
5 Jan. 1933, l i s t i n g a l l the a n t i - I t a l i a n organizations allegedly 
supported by Yugoslavia. Dr Gaida's a r t i c l e was generally regarded 
as the o f f i c i a l answer to those who were accusing I t a l y of aggression 
i n South-East Europe. S i r Ronald Graham (Rome) to Simon, 7 Jan. ,1933» 
C335/44/92. 
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and accused the I t a l i a n Government of supporting the disturbances 
88 
i n the Lika d i s t r i c t i n Croatia e a r l i e r i n the year. S i r Ronald 
Graham wrote to S i r John Simon:-
" I t i s unfortunately true that I t a l i a n comments 
on Yugoslav a f f a i r s have for a long time been 
at best unfriendly, at worst not only malevolent, 
but s c u r r i l o u s l y so; and i f i t would be too much 
to say, as some c r i t i c s do, that there i s a c t u a l 
Government ins p i r a t i o n behind the violent attacks, 
there i s no doubt at a l l that i f the Government 
89 
strongly disapproved, these attacks would stop." 
The Yugoslavs, a f t e r some ten years of diplomatic effort to 
reach a peaceful settlement with I t a l y - and a f t e r countless disapp-
ointments, were w e l l aware of the s i t u a t i o n . Nothing they could do -
and no concessions they might make - would change the attitude of I t a l y . 
Mussolini was only interested i n the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and he was prepared to wait - and work - for years to achieve that 
endi 
I n November 1932, General Gombos, the Hungarian Prime Minister 
and self-confessed admirer of Mussolini, v i s i t e d Rome and the Yugoslav 
Government suspected that his v i s i t was connected with a secret mil-
90 
i t a r y pact directed against Yugoslavia. Their suspicions were 
further increased when Wickham Steed published i n the Sunday Times 
a report of the Volta Congress, alleging that one of the secret 
agreements reached at that Congress was the destruction of Yugoslavia 
and the establishment of a Danubian Confederation under German and 
88. See ch. 9. The bombs used i n the disturbances bore the imprint — 
"Milano". 89. Graham to Simon, 24 Dec. 1932, C10954/51/92. 
90. Foreign Office summary of Yugoslav-Italian a f f a i r s i n 1932, 
C376/44/92. 
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91 Hungarian leadership. I n January 1933? "the Yugoslavs discovered 
that the I t a l i a n s were supplying Austria with r i f l e s and machine-
guns i n complete defiance of Articles 132 and 134 of the Treaty of St 
92 
Germain. In the same months they received warnings that two 
motor boats, f i l l e d with armed t e r r o r i s t s , were about to leave 
93 
I t a l y for Krk and Trogir to provoke yet another incident. A further 
supply of arms was shipped to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organiz-
a t i o n ^ and there were strong rumours that I t a l y was about to enter 
95 
i n t o a customs union with Albania. Faced with these many threats 
to national sovereignty and with such clear evidence of Mussolini's 
i l l - w i l l , King Alexander was i n no mood to acquiesce. In February 
1933, he said to Sir Nevile Henderson:-
" I s h a l l t e l l you one thing i n complete 
confidence; something i s going to happen this 
spring. I cannot go on being harried any longer 
I am only happy when I am taking action; what I 
cannot endure i s s i t t i n g s t i l l when I am being 
96 
attacked on a l l sides." 
What new policy the King had i n mind was - at that time - not very 
clear. But, certainly, King Alexander had no intention of any further 
dealings with I t a l y . Rakic', the Yugoslav Minister i n Rome, was recalled 
97 
and r e t i r e d . And i n his departure, the earnest hopes with which 
the King had begun his policy of conciliation, perished. 
91. Sunday Times, 20 Nov. 1932. 
92. The so-called "Hirtenberg" a f f a i r . Survey of International A f f a i r s , 
1933.(London 1934), P. 247. 
98. Although the r e c a l l of Milan Rakic from Rome coincided 
with a change i n King Alexander's policy towards I t a l y , his 
removal from that post was not primarily due to any change i n 
policy, but rather to personal antagonism between Jevtic, the 
Foreign Minister, and Rakic. 
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Chapter 5 
The Toils of Dictatorship 
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However, the a t t i t u d e of I t a l y made King Alexander only the 
more resolute to establish the unity and consolidate the security of 
his Kingdom. He found himself i n a strong position. A l l executive 
power was i n his hands; a l l laws necessary to implement his personal 
authority were i n force; he possessed a Council of Ministers obedient 
to his w i l l and, with the backing of a lo y a l army,all signs of opp-
o s i t i o n could be s w i f t l y and ruthlessly suppressed. Having such a 
strong position, the King was most favourably placed to see his 
policies brought i n t o being. I n October 1929, as we have seen, the 
King proclaimed that his Kingdom would henceforth be known as Yugo—• 
slavia and, l a t e r i n the same month, he had introduced a new structure 
of regional government which he hoped would supplant and overrule 
the old nationalisms of the past. 
But although the King was dedicated to making his Kingdom 
t r u l y Yugoslav, he s t i l l r e l i e d heavily upon the Serbs to see that 
his policies were carried out. I n six of the new banovinas, a Serbian 
majority had been a r t i f i c i a l l y established and f i v e of the Bans were 
Serbs."*" I t was also to be noted that whereas the Serbs comprised only 
one t h i r d of the population of the Kingdom, a large proportion of the 
2 
c i v i l servants and 90$ of the o f f i c e r s i n the Army were Serbs. The 
1. Henderson to Sargent, 31 Jan. 1930, C986/144/92. After a certain 
delay, Henderson took up his duties i n Belgrade on 14 Dec. 1929. 
Sir Nevile Henderson, Water under the Bridges, (London 1945), p. 169. 
See also N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 16 Dec. 1929, C9886/965/92. 
2. Henderson to Sargent, 31 Jan. 1930, C986/144/92. 
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new B r i t i s h Minister, Nevile Henderson, also observed with some surprise 
that the Narodna Odbrana (National Society), long a Serbian stronghold 
and widely regarded abroad as an instrument of the pre-war "Greater 
Serbia" policy, was s t i l l very much a l i v e and that General Zivkovic, 
3 
the Prime Minister, was i t s President. Despite t h i s overwhelming 
preponderance i n favour of the Serbs, the peoples of Croatia, Dalmatia 
and Slovenia seemed, at t h i s stage, r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d with the 
regime and, i f the reports i n the heavily censored press were to be 
believed, were w i l l i n g to give the King a f a i r opportunity t o make 
his policies work.^" No one - least of a l l the King - imagined a 
quick solution to the nation fs problems or a brisk return to cons t i t -
u t i o n a l r u l e . So, i n the autumn of 1929* the general atmosphere i n 
the country was one of waiting to see how the King fs plans would work. 
But not everyone was pleased. I n Croatia - and amongst the 
emigres abroad - there were some who wished to see the overthrow of 
the regime. I n December 1929, the Zagreb police discovered a plot by 
a number of students to cause a series of bomb outrages on the occasion 
5 
of the King's birthday celebrations. There had already been several 
incidents i n November^ and a bomb explosion on December 1, the 
7 
anniversary of the foundation of the Kingdom. The police, therefore, 
decided to take no chances. A f u l l investigation was made. The r i n g -
s' 8 
leader, Cvetko Hadzija, was arrested together with an accomplice. Sue 
3 . Henderson to Sargent, 31 Jan. 1930, C986/144/92. 
4. La Yougoslavie, (Belgrade 1929), Issues 12 (pp. 1-2) and 14 ( p . l ) . 
5. December 17. 6. The Times, 1 Nov. 1929 (p. 15) and 16 Nov. 1929, p.11 
7. The Times, 3 Dec, 1929, p. 13- 8. Cvetko Hadzija, former head 
of the Croatian Youth organization, had already been arrested i n 
connection with the murder of Toni Schlegel (see above p. 67) but was 
l a t e r released. On his release, he claimed that he had been approached 
by Professor Jacob Jelasic (a former CPP deputy) and asked t o take 
part i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . Jelasic promised adequate funds. A former 
Austro-Hungarian colonel, Vilko Begic, was also implicated and arrested. 
N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 27 Dec. 1929, ClOlOl/97/92, 
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other conspirators weife named, the majority of whom were members of 
Croatian n a t i o n a l i s t youth organizations. The objectives of the con-
spiracy were three i n number. F i r s t l y , i t was planned to blow up a 
t r a i n carrying Croatian delegates going to Belgrade f o r the celeb-
rations. Secondly, to blow up Zagreb Cathedral during a service and, 
t h i r d l y , to destroy the Hotel Esplanade i n Zagreb during a b a l l on 
December 17. Six bombs had been prepared by the conspirators and four 
9 
were discovered. 
Following police investigations and the interrogation of suspects 
(eventually twenty-four i n number) Dr Mac'ekts name was raised. Macek 
reports :-
"The police discovered that I often gave 
f i n a n c i a l help to the University organization 
of the CFP, most of whose members had taken 
part i n t h i s p l o t ; therefore I too was arrested 
on December 22." 
V 
Under examination, a l l the accused - with the exception of Dr Macek -
confessed t h e i r g u i l t . Macek, f o r his part, declared that the allegat-
ions against him were untrue and only obtained under d u r e s s N o n e -
theless, a l l the accused were taken to Belgrade to answer charges i n 
the Court f o r the Defence of the State. Looking back on his arrest , 
v 
Macek declared:-
"The regime hoped to have me condemned to 
several years of penal servitude and thus to 
12 
eliminate me from p o l i t i c s . " 
v 
There was perhaps an aspiration to martyrdom i n MacekTs a t t i t u d e . 
v v 
For Dr Decak, the lawyer acting f o r Macek, declared t h a t , on October 7, 
9. MacekTs account, minimizing t h i s incident, can be seen i n his book, 
I n the Struggle f o r Freedom, (Pennsylvania 1968), p. 129. 10. I b i d . 
11. The Times, 28 Dec. 1929, p. 7. 12. Macek, i b i d . 
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1929, the King offered Macek the post of Ban to the Ssara banovina 
but Macek had demanded that Dalmatia be made part of the banovina as 
the price of his acceptance. This the King refused to do. Dr Decak 
said that the o f f e r had greatly embarassed Dr Macek and that the 
Government, having f a i l e d to win him over, had decided instead to 
destroy him and had deliberately implicated him i n the December bomb 
p l o t . 1 3 
The stage was now set f o r another major p o l i t i c a l t r i a l . The 
charges were undoubtedly raised on criminal proceedings but the pres-
v 
ence of Macek and members of Croat n a t i o n a l i s t organizations in e v i t a b l y 
made the t r i a l a p o l i t i c a l cause celebre. Macek himself showed every 
desire to do b a t t l e with the regime f o r , although f i f t y Serbian 
lawyers offered to defend him, he chose Dr Trumbic, the Croat Federalist 
leader, as his defence counsel. Macek also contacted Krnjevic, one 
of his supporters abroad, and asked him to bring his case before the 
next session of the League of Nations. 
The t r i a l , which began on A p r i l 24, 1930, lasted forty-seven 
days. Macek was accused of giving money (about £ 5 6 ) to the defendants 
i n the f u l l knowledge that i t would be used f o r t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . 
He was also charged with giving instructions about p i s t o l s and t h e i r 
use; and f o r w r i t i n g a newspaper a r t i c l e encouraging a b e l i e f that 
13. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 24 Jan. 1930, C707/144/92. The 
remarks of the defence lawyer, although strongly h o s t i l e to the 
regime, reveal an i n t e r e s t i n g insight i n t o the inner workings of 
the d ictatorship and - i f true - suggest t h a t , even at t h i s stage, 
the King was t r y i n g to conc i l i a t e the Croat leader and give him a 
major part i n managing the Life and destiny of the Croat population. 
14. The choice of Dr Trumbic' came a f t e r Dr D r l j e v i c - MacekTs f i r s t 
choice of counsel - was arrested and confined to a small v i l l a g e near 
Nis. His arrest, only nine days before the t r i a l , was not explained. 
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Croatia would shortly secede from Yugoslavia to become a separate 
independent state. Macek strongly denied that he had given any 
instructions about the use of firearms and refuted the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
which had been placed upon his newspaper a r t i c l e , but he admitted 
that he had given money for "charitable purposes". Since a l l the 
defendants declared that the allegations against Macek had only been 
15 
extracted under t o r t u r e , the prosecution concentrated upon the 
"separatist" a c t i v i t i e s of the Croat leader. 
To t h i s , Macek had a clear reply. Croatia, he said, had l e f t 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire to j o i n the Triune Kingdom i n order to 
gain greater freedom. However, the Serbs had regarded the Kingdom 
as an extension of Serbian hegemony but there could be no free Croats 
without a free Croatia., He denied any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r "separatist" 
propaganda and asked whether there could r e a l l y be any need f o r prop-
aganda f o r something which was " i n the minds of old men and women, 
even on t h e i r deathbeds." He concluded:-
"No, gentlemen, propaganda i s not necessary for 
that which i s the p o l i t i c a l f a i t h of the whole people 
under any paragraph of the present emergency laws. 
And did such a penalty e x i s t , I would s t i l l refuse 
to conceal t h i s f a i t h and s t i l l less would I forswear 
i t , because I know that I am backed by the whole 
Croat nation and by the great majority of Serbs, at 
least i n the ex-Austrian provinces, the more so as 
behind me there stands my great country tortured, 
lacerated, down-trodden, f o r centuries persecuted, 
but never reduced to slavery." 
15. Dr Trumbic, i n a strong speech against the Zagreb police said 
that "methods of Turkish violence" would never solve the Groat problem. 
16. For a f u l l report of the t r i a l , N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 
19 June 1930, C5021/1M/92. 
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After t h i s highly-coloured and po l i t i c a l l y - l o a d e d defence, 
v 
the a c q u i t t a l of Dr Macek came as a great surprise. The Court found 
that no t e r r o r i s t organization had been responsible f o r the bomb plot 
but they remained convinced that there had been a genuine conspiracy 
i n which some - i f not a l l - the defendants were involved. Fifteen 
of the twenty-four were pronounced g u i l t y and given sentences ranging 
from f i f t e e n years hard labour t o permanent loss of c i v i l r i ghts and 
v 
imprisonment. The other nine defendants - including Macek - were found 
17 
"not g u i l t y " and released. 
Whilst the t r i a l was i n progress, a reconstruction of the 
" 18 government took place. Dr Stanko Sibenik, a widely-respected Croat, 
was made the new Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and his 
predecessor, Dr Franges was reduced to being Minister without p o r t f o l i o . 
Three other ministers centered the government - one Croat, one Slovene 
19 
and one from Hercegovina - among them Dr Preka who, on A p r i l 22, had 
brought 1500 Croats to Belgrade to demonstrate i n favour of the 
20 
regime. The .demonstration was arranged by the Government and was 
a c o l o u r f u l a f f a i r with many bands and flags i n evidence. I t seemed 
that the Government was t r y i n g t o broaden the basis of i t s support 
and to show that Macek was by no means the only p o l i t i c a l figure i n 
Croatia f o r i f men l i k e Sibenik could co-operate with the regime, 
others might follow t h e i r example. 
There i s l i t t l e doubt that the Government expected Dr Macek 
to be found g u i l t y of the charges levelled against him:-
" I understand that General Zivkovic assured his 
17. I b i d 18. See "Biographies". 
v 
19. Dr Neudorfer, Dr Svegel and Preka respectively. 
20. La Yougoslavie, (Belgrade 1930) Issue 31 ( p . l ) and Issue 33 ( p . l ) 
See also N. Henderson t o A. Henderson, 22 Apr. 1930, C324l/lW92. 
I l l 
colleagues that the proofs against him (Mac'ek) 
21 were s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to secure condemnation...." 
And that the reconstruction of the Council of Ministers - now including 
eight Croats and Slovenes - was designed ( i n the event of his condemn-
ation) to answer any charge from abroad that the regime was hos t i l e 
y 
to the Croats. So, when Macek was acquitted, Henderson wrote:-
" I am inclined to think that the outcome of the t r i a l i s a smack 
y s 22 
i n the face f o r Zivkoyic." But l a t e r , Henderson had secon thoughts:-
" I have reason to suspect that the a c q u i t t a l 
was inspired by the Government i n as much as i n 
May and June i t did not f e e l i t s e l f strong enough 
v 
to convict Macek and consequently refrained from 
producing a l l the proofs of his complicity which 
i t possessed" ^ 'Ttjshrank, i n f a c t , from 
exposing i t s e l f to the additional c r i t i c i s m , not 
v 
only i n Croatia but also abroad, which MacekTs 
condemnation might provoke." 
But i t may w e l l have been that the regime - and King Alexander i n part-
21. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent, 16 July, 1930, C58I2/144/92. 
22. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent, 18 June, 1930, 05030/144/92. 
y 
23. I t i s a matter worth noting t h a t , whilst Macek was on t r i a l i n Bel-^ 
grade, another t r i a l was proceeding i n Zagreb. Josip Predavec, a f r i e n d 
of Macek and formerly Vice-President of the CPP, was accused of mis-
handling the a f f a i r s of various peasant co-operatives of which he was 
a di r e c t o r . He was President of the Agrarian Co-operative Bank i n 
Zagreb, which went bankrupt whilst he was President. He was found 
g u i l t y and sentenced to 2>\ years imprisonment and 3 years loss of c i v i l 
r i g h t s . Macek, I n the Struggle f o r Freedom, pp. 133-4, gives a d i f f e r e n t 
slant to circumstances and i s not e n t i r e l y accurate i n his account. 
Henderson suggests that since most of the CPP leaders were involved 
i n the a f f a i r , had Macek not been facing more serious charges i n 
Belgrade, he might w e l l have found himself i n the dock with Predavec 
i n Zagreb. His t r i a l and a c q u i t t a l therefore preserved MacekTs repute 
as Croat leader. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 24 Jun 1930, C5190/144/92. 
24. Henderson to Sargent, 16 July 1930, C5812/144/92. 
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i c u l a r - s t i l l hoped to secure the support and co-operation of Dr 
Macek, whose authority i n Croatia was undoubted, and were unwilling 
25 
to press matters too f a r . 
Certainly, the King was not fi n d i n g i t easy managing the a f f a i r s 
of State. As royal d i c t a t o r , his was a lonely l i f e . Because of the 
s t r i c t censorship he had enforced, he was cut o f f from the frank 
opinions of his people and found himself dependent upon such inform-
ation as his o f f i c i a l s chose to lay before him. His ministers, although 
26 
hand-picked f o r t h e i r l o y a l t y , were of an i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y and his 
u t t e r dependence upon the Serbs - both f o r the purposes of administration 
and i n ensuring the unquestioning support of the Army - was highlighted 
by the Croat conspiracy and the p o l i t i c a l t r i a l s which followed. The 
King was anxious to win popular approval f o r his new plans f o r the 
Kingdom and was eager to see them implemented but, at the same time, 
he was reluctant to l e t the great powers he had assumed, s l i p from 
his control. The f u l l extent of the King fs dilemma was clearly seen 
i n the summer and autumn of 1930. 
In July, a f t e r nine months devoid of any additional reforms, 
the Government announced that each Banovina would have a Banovina ': 
Council to deal with l o c a l a f f a i r s . The Councils would be merely 
consultative bodies with no l e g i s l a t i v e powers and t h e i r membership 
27 
would be decided by the Minister of the I n t e r i o r . Although the 
scope of the^Council Ts a c t i v i t i e s was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d and completely 
25. The consideration of the Government towards Dr Mac'ek i s shown by 
the f a ct that when he needed medical treatment f o r a derangement of the 
b i l e (which had been aggravated by his term of imprisonment) the Gov-
ernment immediately issued a passport to permit him t o t r a v e l abroad. 
Macek, op. c i t , p. 134. 26. Henderson to Sargent, 16 Jul 1930 C5812/1A4/92 
27- The t o t a l membership of a l l the Banovina councils would be 512 
(ranging from 86 i n the largest —-Savska - to 31 i n the smallest -
Primorska). N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 4 July 1930, C54:06'/l44/92. 
The Government announcement was made on July 3• 
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under the control of the central government, many considered that 
the announcement marked a f i r s t step towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule and 
speculation was r i f e . So much so that the Governemnt was obliged t o 
issue a declaration on July 9 stressing the groundlessness of a l l 
the rumours currently i n c i r c u l a t i o n and re-affirming the Government's 
intent i o n to go on " t i l l the consolidation of the Yugoslav state was 
28 
accomplished." The Government declared that there would "never be 
a return to a parliament and party system i n the old form" and that 
"following the law of October 3 (1929), the old h i s t o r i c a l f r o n t i e r s 
were abolished f o r ever" and that the d i v i s i o n of the country in t o 
nine Banovinas was regarded as a f i n a l and irrevocable decision.The 
P o l i t i k a , considering t h i s declaration, observed t h a t , whilst i t 
i t 
said nothing new, i n i t s resoluteness, c l a r i t y and consistency, i t 
29 
bears the character of a d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l programme." 
"To my mind," wrote Henderson, "the declaration 
bears the stamp of the King's conception. The idea 
of Yugoslavia, one and i n d i v i s i b l e , i s His Majesty's. 
The dominating personalities i n the present Cabinet -
such as Zivkovic, MarinkovicT, Uzunovic and Srskic -
are a l l such arch-Serbs brought up on the old Pasic 
pan-Serb t r a d i t i o n s and i t i s evidence of the predom-
in a t i n g influence of the King that he has bent them to his 
w i l l i n t h i s respect Yugoslavism, i n my opinion, 
i s f a r from being a measure of desperation. I t has 
a certain s t r a i n of idealism which appeals to the 
Slav temperament. Time i s also i n i t s favour 
Providing that King Alexander survives, there i s no 
reason why he should not be able to realize his policies 
28. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 9 July 1930, C5658/lW92. 
29. I b i d . 
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30 and enforce hxs xdeals on the country." 
As i f to re-inforce the strength of the Government's position 
(but more probably to explore public opinion at l o c a l l e v e l ) , General 
Zivkovic embarked upon a month's tour of the country, making speeches 
31 
"ad majorem gloriam Regis Alexandri." The B r i t i s h Consul i n Sara-
jevo, Mr Gill i a t - S m i t h was not very impressed with his performance 
and reported that the Prime Minister's v i s i t s t o the Drina and Zeta 
Banovinas had f a i l e d to arouse much enthusiasm f o r the regime. How-
ever, the Consul expressed his view that i t was not so much the ideals 
of the regime which were d i s l i k e d , but rather the people who put them 
32 v ^ in t o practice. Later, i n September, General Zivkovic paid a similar 
v i s i t t o Zagreb where, much to the surprise of observers, he received 
33 
a warm reception. One of the most immediate results of the Prime 
Minister's tour was a Government decision to amend the Press Law. 
General Zivkovic discovered that the Law made i t p r a c t i c a l l y impossible 
to c r i t i c i z e the work of municipal, banovina or state o f f i c i a l s . The 
amendments to the Law were introduced on September 17 and enabled 
public c r i t i c i s m t o make i t s e l f heard, i n the hope that o f f i c i a l s 
would be more careful about corruption and the conduct of t h e i r 
administrative work. 
30. N. Henderson to O.G. Sargent, 16 July 1930, C5812/144/92. Hend-
erson also recalled t h a t , i n his f i r s t audience at Dedinje, King Alex-
ander t o l d him: "What I require i s 40 years of peace i n which to'-build 
up a t r a d i t i o n of honest administration. That i s the only foundation 
f o r Yugoslav u n i t y . " Henderson, Water Under the Bridges, p. 182. 
31. Henderson to Sargent, 15 Aug. 1930, C6595/144/92. 
32 . Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 5 Sept. 1930, containing consular 
report from Mr Gilliat-Smith (Sarajevo), C6885/144/92. 
33 . Henderson to Sargent, 26 Sept. 1930, C738l/l44/92. I t was f e l t 
t h at Zivkovic's v i s i t foreshadowed one by the King. 
34. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 17 Sept. 1930, C7152/144/92. 
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Before the General made his tour, the Government had been 
act i v e l y considering the p o s s i b i l i t y of launching an " o f f i c i a l " p o l i t i c a l 
party - the Yugoslav National Party - to which a l l people of eminence 
35 
would be i n v i t e d to j o i n . But, at the las t minute, the Government 
discovered that there was no great enthusiasm or support f o r a party 
sponsored by the regime. Memories of the previous p o l i t i c a l parties 
were s t i l l fresh; old l o y a l t i e s s t i l l strong. The King and his 
Ministers were much embarassed f o r they had intended t o launch the 
o f . 
new p o l i t i c a l party on September 6, the Crown Prince Ts seventh 
birthday. Great banquets had been prepared; Ministers and Bans were 
to be decorated i n solemn assembly; the body of Kara Djordje was to 
37 
be moved to i t s las t resting place at Topola and a large m i l i t a r y 
demonstration had been planned at Banjica, near Belgrade, to which 
many foreign delegations had been i n v i t e d . The celebrations went ahead 
38 
as arranged but, instead of some new p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e , the King 
and his Government produced yet another declaration:-
" A l l the Ministers i n the present Cabinet have only 
one programme, namely that which was pronounced i n 
the Royal Proclamation of January 6, 1929 and i n 
the Government declaration of July 9 l a s t . A l l the 
Ministers i n the present Government must therefore 
be considered members of a homogenous Cabinet. Being 
35 . Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 5 Sept. 1930 C6886/144/92. Later 
i n September, a proposal was made that 3 p o l i t i c a l parties should be 
created - one of the r i g h t under General Zivkovic, one of the centre 
under Dr Marinkovic' and one of the l e f t under Dr Topalovic - a leading 
S o c i a l i s t . 
36. N. Henderson t o A. Henderson, 29 Sept. 1930, C7443/144/92. 
37- The mausoleum at Oplenac (on the h i l l above Topola) i s the l a s t 
resting place of a l l the Karadjordjevic' family. 
38. Peter I I of Yugoslavia, A King's Heritage, (London 1955) p. 9. 
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convinced that a proper development of national 
and state l i f e excludes i n the future the return or 
r e v i v a l of former p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , they declare 
that they are prepared to participate i n t h e i r 
future p o l i t i c a l work unanimously and only on 
t h i s basis, regardless of the party to which they 
belonged." 3 9 
I n reading t h i s colourless and unnecessary statement, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to escape the impression t h a t , although the royal dictatorship had 
successfully abolished the old parliamentary regime and produced the 
administrative machinery f o r a new Yugoslavia,^ they were f a r from 
clear as to what they should do next. Even the very boldness of the 
language i n the declaration scarcely v e i l s the s t e r i l i t y and barren 
emptiness of Government policy. 
However, one man did not sign the declaration. Dr Anton Korosec, 
the Slovene leader, former Prime Minister and more recently Minister 
of Mines and Forests,^"'" found himself unable to co-operate with the 
Government any f u r t h e r . He l e f t Belgrade f o r Maribor before the 
declaration was signed but reserved his resignation f o r a Cabinet 
meeting l a t e r i n the month, when a proposal was made f o r the a b o l i t i o n 
of a l l r e l i g i o u s organizations throughout the country. The proposal was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y aimed at the "Mary organizations" i n Slovenia,, which were 
39. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 5 Sept. 1930, C6886/144/92. 
40 Although volume of l e g i s l a t i o n i s no proof of ef f e c t i v e government, 
i t i s worth noting t h a t , i n one year of dictatorship, 183 laws and -535 
rules and decrees were promulgatedj against 110 laws i n ten years of 
parliamentary government. E.J. Patterson, Yugoslavia, (London 1936) 
pp. 105-106. 
41. Although appointed Minister of Communications i n Jan. 1929, he 
took his new p o r t f o l i o on August 5, 1929, The Times, 6 Aug. 1929, p.9. 
As Minister under the regime, he played a very quiet and se l f - e f f a c i n g 
r o l e . 
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said to be a cloak f o r the old C l e r i c a l Party of which Dr Korosec 
was head, and i t was suggested that the Minister f o r Mines and Forests, 
together with other Ministers, should go to Slovenia and explain t h i s 
new government measure. Upon t h i s delicate and personal issue, Korosec 
chose to resign. Henderson wrote:-
"The King i s l i k e l y to be embarrassed by the 
resignation as i t w i l l now be harder f o r him to 
claim that he unites a l l Yugoslavs irrespective of 
race. There i s also the religious d i f f i c u l t y since 
the Catholic Church stands behind the Slovene Cle r i c a l 
Party and Korosec. The King i s also i n d i f f i c u l t y 
as to whether to refuse the Catholic Church privileges 
i t has elsewhere or whether to upset other religious 
bodies i n Yugoslavia by giving Catholics privileges 
which they have been refused." 
The King saw very c l e a r l y the dangers of Dr Korosec *s resignation 
and the impact on the regime should other Ministers follow his example. 
So, instead of issuing repeated declarations of l o y a l t y to the YugosHiav 
i d e a l and stressing t h e i r unanimity of purpose, i t was decided that 
the Council of Ministers would spend the month of October v i s i t i n g 
d i f f e r e n t parts of the Kingdom to see f o r themselves what needed to 
be done and to measure the strength of l o c a l opinion. Since the 
Press Law had been modified i n September to allow the free expression 
of c r i t i c i s m , the l o c a l newspapers revealed t h a t , as the Ministers 
toured the country, the complaints of the population became more and 
more vocal and, correspondingly, the promises of the Ministers became 
more and more l a v i s h l The most regular complaints were those of over-
42. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 29 Sept. 1930, C7443/1A4/92. 
Korosec Ts place i n the Council of Ministers was taken by Dusan 
Sernec, Ban of the Drava Banovina - also a Slovene. 
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taxation, f a u l t y assessment of taxes and the i n a b i l i t y of the 
peasants to s e l l t h e i r wheat at a decent price. The Ministers were 
t o l d that there were too many State o f f i c i a l s ; that they were i n e f f i c -
ient and often corrupt and that Press censorship had prevented t h e i r 
f a u l t s being exposed. There were not enough railway stations, not 
enough r o l l i n g stock, poor roads and too few technical schools. I t 
was also f e l t that the Government spent f a r too l i t t l e on education 
and that w h i l s t the salaries of teachers remained low, standards would 
44 
never improve. 
After hearing the feelings of the people at f i r s t hand, the 
Ministers returned t o Belgrade to l i c k t h e i r sores. Many of the 
criticisms voiced were undeniably true - especially about the 
State o f f i c i a l s - but the Ministry of Communications strongly denied 
that there was any lack of r o l l i n g stock. The Ministers were obliged 
to admit that the complaints about the peasant's wheat were more than 
j u s t i f i e d . The price of wheat on the world market was very low. Yugo-
slavia had no commercial tr e a t i e s abroad and t h i s meant that i t was 
extremely d i f f i c u l t to penetrate the markets of the i n d u s t r i a l nations 
without undercutting world prices. But, i f they did t h i s , they would 
have to meet the d e f i c i t from t h e i r own budgetary revenue, which was 
already hard pressed. ^ 
But the Government had promised to make reforms and on December 
11, 1930, a f t e r a Cabinet meeting presided over by the King, i t was 
agreed to lessen the general burden of taxation and lower the 
expenses of production. Land tax was reduced by 2%; the tax on 
pasture land by 50$. The export duty on wool was abolished as was the 
43- Total budget estimates f o r 1929-30 were £44,210,000 (12,158 m i l l -
ion dinars) of which 33% was to be spent on the armed forces. The 
Times, 5 Feb. 1929, p. 23. 
44. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 29, Oct. 1930, C8112/144/92. 
45. I b i d . 
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import duty on a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery. A reduction of 50$ i n the 
state excise on wine was agreed and i t was announced that the c o l l e c t i o n 
of unpaid taxes would be postponed for f i v e years. The Government 
promised to improve roads and v i l l a g e sanitation, to build more 
hospitals, modify communal laws and re-organize the work of municipal 
au t h o r i t i e s . Incompetent o f f i c i a l s would be dismissed. More f a c i l i t i e s 
would be provided for exports .and greater encouragement would be given 
to the building of hotels. Not without j u s t i f i c a t i o n , the P o l i t i k a 
described the GovernmentTs proposals as "comprehensive." ^ 
But, as the B r i t i s h Minister observed, i t was not the Govern-
ment that gained credit for the reforms, but the King:-
"People - and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the peasants - s t i l l 
pin t h e i r f a i t h on His Majesty, who i s regarded 
by them as the one sinc e r e l y disinterested man i n 
Yugoslavia, who honestly desires nothing but the 
good of the country. They are ready to give him almost 
unlimited credit and to believe that such errors that 
are committed are due to the e v i l influence and 
in 
guidance of his Ministers." 
Riding on the crest of popularity from his Government's recent 
reforms, the King decided to pay his long-expected v i s i t to Zagreb. 
Giving only two days warning of his intentions (to f o r e s t a l l any 
subversive preparations by his opponents), Alexander and Queen Marie 
arrived i n the Croatian c a p i t a l on January 25, 1931 and received an 
enthusiastic welcome from the people of the c i t y . The royal couple 
stayed i n Zagreb for ten days and toured a l l the l o c a l s i g h t s . Their 
car was regularly stopped by flag-waving crowds and the King was at 
46. P o l i t i k a , 12 Dec. 1930. 
47. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 27 November 1930, C8787/144/92. 
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pains to be informal and show that he thought the intense police 
precautions were unnecessary. The v i s i t was the occasion of great 
demonstrations by those l o y a l to the regime and during the whole 
of Alexander fs stay, only one bomb exploded - and that without i n j u r y ^ 
A l l i n a l l , the v i s i t was a conspicuous success and the King returned 
to Belgrade assured of the loyalty of his Croat subjects and confident 
of the i n t r i n s i c s t a b i l i t y of his position. 
Certainly, he had l i t t l e to fear from the old p o l i t i c i a n s . 
Without power and under constant police s u r v e i l l a n c e , they were reduced 
to drawing up "paper" plans for the re-organization of the Kingdom 
and c i r c u l a t i n g them to each other i n a vain attempt to reach a common 
mind as to how the country should be run. During the autumn of 1930, 
they drew up proposals - broadly s i m i l a r to those put forward i n the 
50 
summer of 1929 - suggesting that the State be decentralized and 
' f u l l powers given to each of the h i s t o r i c provinces to choose t h e i r 
own governor and el e c t t h e i r own parliament. They proposed that a 
provisional government should be formed to write a new Constitution 
v ^ 
but that no Minister i n the Zivkovic Cabinet be included. The new 
Constitution, thus written, would be submitted to Parliament and 
accepted or rejected eh bloc. The old p o l i t i c i a n s planned that once 
they had the agreement of a l l the former parties to these proposals, 
they would submit a memorandum to the King and to foreign governments 
to show that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were capable of planning 
51 
t h e i r own future and reaching agreement together. But the old mistrust 
and r i v a l r y between them prevented any useful or constructive agreement 
48 . Consular report from Mr G.H. Bullock (Zagreb) to N. Henderson, 
28 Jan. 1931, C723/304/92, 
49. The bomb exploded i n the Yugoslav Young Menfs S&ciety-icbuilding. 
50. See above p. 72. 
51. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 29 Dec. 1930, C9470/144/92. 
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being made and, by February 1931, they were s t i l l haggling over 
52 
t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r proposals with nothing concrete achieved. When 
v , 
General Zivkovic heard about t h e i r e f f o r t s , he issued a strong 
statement to the Press, saying that everything i n Yugoslavia was 
already being carried out according to democratic principles and 
that the Government of the regime would gradually develop into a 
53 
true democracy. 
The continuing disunity between the former p o l i t i c i a n s was 
accentuated by the r e f u s a l of Dr Korosec to be party to any of t h e i r 
schemes. When he resigned from the Government, many opponents of the 
regime confidently assumed that he had only resigned i n order to 
r a i s e a Catholic Front against the regime. But Dr Korosec was now 
to be found i n Belgrade University giving lectures on the co-operative 
54 v 
movement i n agriculture I Dr Macek, who had suffered poor health 
55 
from his time i n prison, did l i t t l e more than give interviews 
to foreign j o u r n a l i s t s and Svetozar Pribicevic', without whose 
approval no p o l i t i c a l scheme could ever get off the ground, was 
s t i l l very much at the mercy of the regime. For two years he was 
detained at Brus and then, because of i l l - h e a l t h , transferred to 
a nursing home where he lived i n comparative comfort. Rather than 
return to the narrow confines of Brus, he staged a hunger-strike and, 
57 
with the help of friends abroad, was allowed to go to Karlovy Vary 
52. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 1 1 Feb 1931, C1079/304/92. 
53. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 29 Dec 1930, C9470/144/92. 
54. Henderson to Sargent, 17 Mar. 1931, C1929/304/92. 
55- Macek. In the Struggle for Freedom, p. 134. 56. I b i d . , p. 137. 
57. A B r i t i s h M.P., Dr L e s l i e Burgin wrote to Mr Dalton, then P a r l i a -
mentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, asking for steps to be 
taken to get Pribicevic' released, on the grounds that there would be 
a serious r i s k of revolution i n Yugoslavia i f t h i s were not done. 
The Times, 9 June 1931. Dr Burgin Ts l e t t e r i s a s i g n i f i c a n t insight 
into B r i t i s h understanding of Yugoslavia's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . ( c o n t . p. 122 
122 
and, l a t e r , to Paris, where he wrote a vicious book attacking King 
58 
Alexander and his regime. 
But although the King and his Ministers had nothing to fear from 
the old p o l i t i c i a n s , they found themselves facing a deep and mounting 
unease, which manifested i t s e l f i n bomb attacks and rumour. After two 
months of peace - encouraged perhaps by the f i n a n c i a l reforms and the 
royal v i s i t to. Zagreb - violence erupted. Dr Milan Sufflay, a univ-
e r s i t y professor and supporter of the former Frankist party, was ambushed 
and k i l l e d i n Zagreb on February 19. Sufflay had helped Macek to 
translate foreign news reports i n t o Serbo-Croat and i t was believed 
by those hos t i l e to the regime that his death had been arranged by 
59 
agents of the c i t y police. Early i n March 1931* there were rumours 
i n Vienna of a plot to k i l l eighty leading Croats - including Dr Macek 
and Dr Pernar. Two conspirators were arrested; a t h i r d named.^ lat e 
i n February, a series of bomb attacks occured at Ni£ ( i n Serbia) and, 
throughout March, there were numerous explosions i n Belgrade i t s e l f . 
The magazine, Truth, reported nervousness inside Yugoslavia, with 
f i g h t s between peasants and tax-collectors, g u e r i l l a attacks on the 
(contd from p. 121) Dr Benes also contacted the B r i t i s h Foreign Office 
to see i f they could get him released: but Dr Benes* appreciation of 
PribicevicPs importance was somewhat diminished because, i n his l e t t e r , 
he referred to him as M. Preobrajensky, F.O. memorandum C4811/304/92, 
referred to i n memorandum C4064/304/92. Henderson was asked to use 
his good relationship with Marinkovic to a l l e v i a t e Pribicevic's 
condition - successfully, as i t appeared. Henderson to Sargent, 2 J u l . 
1931, C4905/304/92 . 58. S. Pribicevic", La Dictature du Roi Alexandre 
(contribution a 1*etude de l a Democratic), Paris 1933. 
59. Macek, op. c i t . , p. 135-
60. Stefan Tomljenovic, Branko Cverger and Ljubomir Belosevicf- a l l 
members of the Mlada Jugoslavi.ja organization ( s p e c i f i c a l l y t e r r o r i s t 
i n character). Sir Eric Phipps (Vienna) to A. Henderson, 16 Mar. 1931? 
C1802/304/92. 
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Orient Express and hundreds of a r r e s t s . ^ The reports were exagger-
62 
ated, but many security checks were made, those with i r r e g u l a r i t i e s 
detained and a number of Communists executed. 
Other rumours suggested dissension w i t h i n the Council of Ministers. 
General Zivkovic, never very popular i n the public eye, was reported 
to have had a b i t t e r quarrel with Dr Marinkovic, the Foreign Minister,, 
and t r i e d t o get him dismissed.^ There were regular reports, w e l l -
substantiated, that his policy of promoting personal favourites i n 
65 
the Army had provoked strong resentment and the elaborate security 
precautions taken at the funeral of General Hadzic showed that the 
Prime Minister did not underestimate the p o s s i b i l i t y of attempted 
assassination.^ The question arose: "Would Zivkovic be forced to 
resign?" One observer thought not:-
"General Zivkovic has long been t i r e d of the, 
to him, uncongenial task of Prime Minister and 
i s forced to remain i n o f f i c e by the King who 
needs a strong hand to r e l y on i n moments of 
c r i s i s against refractory ministers arid obnoxious 
opponents. I n t h i s case, i t i s not too much to expect 
6 l . Truth, 29 Apr. 1931. 62. Henderson, Water Under the Bridges, p.188. 
63. Annual Report f o r 1931. Henderson to Sir John Simon, 1 Jan 1932, 
C53/53/92. (Vol. 15994) 
64. Henderson to Sargent, 16 Apr. 1931, C2632/304/92. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
to note that rumour suggested that- Jevtic" (Minister of the Court) and 
a close r e l a t i v e of Zivkovic", would replace Marinkovic. This was l a t e r 
to happen. 65. Report from Major Oxley, M i l i t a r y Attache, 
contained i n l e t t e r from Henderson to Sargent, 30 Apr 1931, C2953/Q/304/92 
Particular distress was caused by the dismissal of General Kalafatovic, 
regarded as one of the best o f f i c e r s i n the Yugoslav army, who had 
been Chief of the National Defence Committee f o r 4 months before 
q u a r r e l l i n g with Zivkovic over a contract f o r a munitions factory. 
Henderson to Sargent, 5 Nov. 1930, C8277/1145/92. 
,66. Henderson to Sargent, 30 Apr. 1931, C2953/G/304/92. 
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that i f the s i t u a t i o n continues to improve 
during the present year, the King may f e e l 
General Zivkovic i s no longer indispensable and 
may replace him by a c i v i l i a n and more competent 
67 
Prime Minister." 
But f o r the moment, the King had no desire to change his.Prime 
Minister. He had no desire to change anything. Events i n Spain, where 
the monarchy was overthrown i n A p r i l 1931> were a frightening reminder 
of what could happen to a King. One day i n power; the next, i n e x i l e . 
But fortunately f o r Alexander, Yugoslavia was not l i k e Spain. Even 
though the malcontents, who gathered i n the coffee-shops, referred 
68 
with glee to the remedial effects of the new "Spanish mixture", 
Alexander was popular. He-rheld the reins of government t i g h t l y i n his 
own hands. His aim was to unite the peoples of Yugoslavia; that too 
was popular. The Army was l o y a l to the Crown and there was l i t t l e 
danger of conspiracy. I n June 1931? as i f to demonstrate the strength 
of his position, the King paid a second v i s i t t o Zagreb and was again 
warmly welcomed by the people. Security precautions were relaxed, the 
police less i n evidence and many speeches on the theme "King and People" 
were made. 
The royal dictatorship, i t seemed, not only occupied a position 
of unassailable strength i n the Kingdom but also had l i t t l e i n t e n t i o n 
of change. Despite the barren emptiness of Government policy, the un-
70 
popularity of the Council of Ministers, the bomb attacks, the rumours 
67. Leigh Smith to A. Henderson, 11 Feb. 1931, C1079/304/92. 
68 . N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 2 J u l . 1931, C4909/304/92. 
69. Mr K. Boden (H.M.Consul i n Zagreb) to M. Henderson, 2 June 1931, 
C3953/304/92. General Zivkovic, who was with the King, attended 
the funeral of Dr Drinkovic, which made a good impression on the 
Croats. 
70. During July-August 1931* there were 15 perpetrated or attempted 
bomb outrages. 
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of dissension and the fate of the Spanish monarchy, King Alexander 
gave the impression that he was s t i l l w e l l - s a t i s f i e d with the structure 
of his regime and would permit only minor modifications to i t . At 
the end of June, he contented himself with some small changes to the 
71 72 Cabinet, removing the more obvious f a i l u r e s , and bringing i n 
new blood to cope with his country's economic problems; and, at a 
meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 24, the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
73 
a return to some form of parliamentary government was discussed. 
But even though there was no evidence to suggest an early return to 
cons t i t u t i o n a l r u l e , the news that the subject had even been discussed,. 
7ZL 
produced a spate of rumours. The rumours spread so widely and so 
rapidly that the newspapers were compelled to publish the report of 
an interview accorded to a correspondent of the "Havas" agency by 
the King. I n the interview, the King stressed that there would be no 
early changes i n the regime and whatever developments were made would 
cer t a i n l y mark no return to the old system but rather be a co n s t i t u t -
75 
io n a l extension of what already existed. 
I n a conversation with Nevile Henderson on August 19, 1931, 
the King confirmed that the rumours were e n t i r e l y without foundation:-
."His Majesty gave me to understand that his plans 
were s t i l l incomplete and i n d e f i n i t e . He said he 
could not t e l l me more than that as he did not know 
71. See Appendix D f o r Cabinet changes. 
72. The most obvious f a i l u r e being Dr Svrluga, who had been a highly 
unsuccessful Minister of Finance. 
73. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 14 Aug. 1931, C6422/304/92. 
74. The rumours included the following:- Korosec would be the new 
c i v i l i a n Prime Minister; one t h i r d of the Parliament would be nomin-
ated by the King; the changes would be announced on August 15th -
the tenth anniversary of the King's accession. 
75- N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 14 Aug. 1931, C6422/304/92. 
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himself how the scheme could be worked out. 
A l l he could say was that he aimed at a Parlia-
ment which would share the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
Government with him; a return to normality along 
the lines of the Yugoslav i d e a l ; a Parliament 
which could afford scope f o r free c r i t i c i s m and 
give the peasant d i r e c t representation i n the 
Administration. He was not going to be l i k e 
King Alfonso, whose patience, i n the end, had 
f a i l e d him." 7 6 
From his conversation with the King, Henderson drew the following 
conclusions:-
" I t i s clear from the above that the date of 
promulgating a new constitution i s dis t a n t . I 
found the King worried and depressed and f a r from 
w e l l . He t o l d me that he was suffering and had 
always suffered from a disease of thejaladder but 
that he counted on the good effects of the cure 
which he always takes i n September at some waters 
near Nis. He complained b i t t e r l y about being over-
77 
worked and was seriously concerned about his health." 
Confident that nothing was l i k e l y t o happen i n the immediate 
fut u r e , Henderson went on holiday. His b e l i e f that there was no const-
i t u t i o n a l reform impending was shared by Dr Marinkovic who, on Sept-
ember 1 , assured the Greek Minister that the Government had nothing i n 
78 
mind. However, on the evening of September 2 , the King gathered tog-
ether his Ministers to dinner i n Belgrade and announced t h a t , on the 
following day, he would grant a new Constitution to his people. 
76 . N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 20 Aug. 1931, C6764/304/92. 




The Constitution of 1931 
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The question arises:- Why, at t h i s p articular moment, a f t e r 
such persistent denials, did the King proclaim the new Constitution 
at the time he did? A l l the evidence suggests that the Constitution 
of September 3 was not some speedy invention w r i t t e n i n a matter of 
days, but a complex and care f u l l y w r i t t e n document"'" composed over 
a period of months and kept i n cold storage u n t i l the time seemed 
ripe f o r a return t o co n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e . Why then, should he have 
chosen t h i s p a r t i c u l a r moment? Was i t r e a l l y the fear of a r e p e t i t i o n 
of the events i n Spain and the overthrow of the monarchy? Or was i t 
2 
because the King, always a f a t a l i s t , was worried about his health 
and feared that i l l n e s s or death would create a p o l i t i c a l vacuum at 
the heart of his Kingdom? After two-and-a-half years of personal 
r u l e , was he f i n d i n g l i f e as a d i c t a t o r too hard t o bear? Was he 
unhappy about his continued dependence upon the Serbs? Or distressed 
by the incompetence of his Council of Ministers? Might i t not be 
tha t , as he suggested to Henderson, there was a need f o r some public 
assembly where the voice of c r i t i c i s m could be heard? A l l these were 
cogent reasons f o r a return t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule but they were 
reasons that could have j u s t i f i e d the promulgation of the Constitution 
at many another moment i n the l i f e of the Dictatorship. What was i t 
1. The f u l l e s t study of the new Constitution i s given by D. Lucie, 
La Constitution du Royaume de Yougoslavie du 3 septembre 1931< 
(Paris 1933) where a f u l l t e x t of the Constitution i s given on pp . 2 6 3 f f . 
The o r i g i n a l Serbo-Croat t e x t i s given i n Sluzbene Novine, 3 Sept. 
1931; and i n Ustav Kraljevine J.ugoslavije (Zagreb 1933) i n book-form. 
2 . Sir Nevile Henderson, Water Under the Bridges, (London 1945) p. 194. 
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that compelled the King to act so suddenly a f t e r so many apparently 
sincere denials? 
I t was suggested at the time that the p r i n c i p a l cause f o r the 
King's sudden move was the steady deterioration i n the country's 
3 
f i n a n c i a l condition. U n t i l the summer of 1931, Yugoslavia had coped 
admirably with the inte r n a t i o n a l money c r i s i s and the recession i n 
world trade.^ She had even managed - at a time of exceedingly hard 
credit and i n the face of much h o s t i l i t y - to get a loan of £8.3 m i l l -
ions from France to s t a b i l i z e her currency and provide ready c a p i t a l 
5 
f o r i n d u s t r i a l 'development. But, gradually, the slump i n world 
prices f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l products and timber reached the point where 
the Yugoslav government was obliged - on p o l i t i c a l grounds - to buy 
wheat from the peasants at a highly uneconomic ra t e , i n the f u l l 
knowledge that when the grain was resold on the world market, they 
would perhaps lose £3 m i l l i o n s . ^ This was a sum they could i l l a f f ord 
to lose. For, i n June 1931, President Hoover had proposed a moratorium 
on German reparations and Yugoslavia, which had been receiving an 
annual sum of £4 m i l l i o n s from Germany, found that her previously 
favourable trade balance had melted away and there was severe pressure 
on the dinar on the world market. At home, the widespread distress of 
the peasantry was aggravated by a severe drought i n Southern Yugoslavia 
which meant that the harvests i n Montenegro, Hercegovina and Macedonia 
g 
were a complete f a i l u r e . A special commmittee of the Ministry of 
3. Leigh Smith to the Marquess of Reading, 3 Sept. 1931, C6856/304/92. 
4 . The Times, (Financial Supplement), 10 Feb 1931, P« 23. 
5- For detai l s of the loan and the economic position, see Appendix F. 
i 6. Annual Report f o r 1931. Section 6 . C53/53/92 (Vol. 15994) 
7 . The Yugoslavs stood to lose £1.7m i n goods and £2.2m i n cash. 
8. Memo by F.O. on Yugoslav economic condition, Oct. 1931, C7278/95/92. 
The additional cost of the harvest f a i l u r e was £900,000 - a sizeable 
sum f o r a country whose t o t a l budget was only £48millions. 
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Finance had been meeting a l l summer and i t s proposals - consisting 
of a series of drastic economies - had been placed before the Council 
Q 
of Ministers at the end of August. I t was therefore f e l t by informed 
cir c l e s i n Yugoslavia that King Alexander's unexpected proclamation 
of a new Constitution was the immediate outcome of the f i n a n c i a l 
c r i s i s which had a f f l i c t e d the country. Those " i n the know" declared 
that the French had refused to give a further loan to s t a b i l i z e the 
dinar unless there was a return to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule and enemies 
of the King suggested cynically that the economies proposed by the 
special committee were l i k e l y to be so drastic that Alexander would 
prefer the onus of re s p o n s i b i l i t y t o rest upon representatives of 
the people rather than upon himself."^ 
I t was also s i g n i f i c a n t that only a few days before the proc-
lamation of the new Constitution, the King had been involved i n talks 
with Stanojevic, Davidovic and Dr Korosec with a view to strengthening 
and enlarging the basis of Government support. He had also t r i e d t o 
win Croat approval by modifying the boundaries of the Sava Banovina 
to include Slavonia, which had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been regarded as part 
of Croatia."'""'' But his e f f o r t s were unsuccessful. Stanojevic' and David-
ovic' were either unwilling or unable to accept the conditions l a i d 
down by the King, the Croats proved unresponsive and when Dr Korosec, 
who had at f i r s t agreed to co-operate, saw that he was alone, he too 
12 
backed down. The former p o l i t i c i a n s , i t seemed, were adamant i n 
t h e i r refusal to have anything to do with General Zivkovic'' or the 
dictatorship. And yet the King desperately needed help:-
" I am convinced," wrote Henderson, "that His 
9. Leigh Smith to the Marquess of Reading, 3 Sept 1931, C6856/304/92. 
10. I b i d . 11 . The Times, 1 Sept. 1931, p. 11 . Aca Stanojevic was 
the spokesman f o r the former Radical Party. 
12. The Times, 3 Sept. 1931, p. 9. 
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Majesty Ts main objectives were to give the people 
some share i n the administration, to diminish his 
own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and to r e l i e v e himself of some 
of the excess of work which i s undermining his 
health. His honest desires i n t h i s sense were 
13 
accelerated by the increasing economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . " 
The conclusion can therefore be drawn that i t was not the f i n a n c i a l 
c r i s i s alone that prompted Alexander to act . Nor would i t be right to 
believe that the King produced his Constitution merely as a sop to 
French opinion. That was not his way. What can be said i s that the 
f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s facing Yugoslavia made Alexander r e a l i z e the l i m i t -
ations of personal r u l e . The former p o l i t i c i a n s - and many other 
l o y a l subjects - would not associate themselves with a d i c t a t o r i a l 
regime. There must be a return to constitutional r u l e . Only then would 
the King obtain a wider measure of popular support. 
But i t i s doubtful whether the Constitution of September 3 did 
anything to encourage the former p o l i t i c i a n s to co-operate more w i l l -
ingly with the King. F i r s t l y , i t was introduced by royal decree -
rather than by jpopuOiar. consent; and, secondly, i t was t a i l o r e d very 
much to Alexander Ts personal t a s t e . Under the terms of the Constitution, 
Yugoslavia was declared to be a "hereditary and co n s t i t u t i o n a l " mon-
archy"^* with l e g i s l a t i v e power vested i n the King and Parliament and 
15 
executive power i n the King and his Ministers. The King would r e t a i n 
the power to confirm and promulgate laws. He would appoint o f f i c i a l s , 
grant amnesties, and, with merely the consent of his Ministers, could 
13. Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 18 Sept. 1931, C7137/3©V92. 
14. A r t i c l e 1. I t i s worth noting that, under the Vidovdan Constitut-
ion, the Kingdom was described as a "constitutional and parliamentary" 
monarchy. 15. A f u l l study of the l e g i s l a t i v e structure 
can be found i n Lucie, La Constitution du Royaume de Yougoslavie, pp. 
55-141. 
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dissolve parliament and c a l l fresh elections. The King would possess 
special powers to intervene i n case of emergency or war1 and, more 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , he was granted the r i g h t to conclude p o l i t i c a l 
t r e a t i e s with other countries on his own i n i t i a t i v e - without p a r l i a -
mentary approval. U n t i l elections were held, the King would continue 
to issue laws by royal decree."*"^ 
The Skupstina ( or Parliament) would meet i n Belgrade on 
October 20 each year and would consist of two assemblies - the Senate 
and a Chamber of Deputies. Forty-eight senators would s i t i n the 
17 
Upper House, half appointed by the King and half elected by the people, 
and, i n the Chamber, there would be 305 deputies elected by universal 
male suffrage every four years. No b i l l could be considered unless 
i t had the support of more than o n e - f i f t h of the members i n either 
house and each assembly had the r i g h t to question a government minister 
on his policy or actions and receive a reply. In the event of any 
disagreement between the Senate and Chamber,the King would determine 
18 
the outcome. A l l laws promulgated since January 6, 1929 would 
remain i n force except that conferring upon the King supreme admin-
19 
i s t r a t i v e power i n the Kingdom, which was now repealed. 
Four days l a t e r , an ele c t o r a l law was issued, governing the 
16. A r t i c l e s 29-40. 17. A r t i c l e s 50-53. 
.18. A r t i c l e s 54-76. For a study ofittfe executive powers possessed by 
King and Parliament, see Lucie, op. c i t . , pp.142-209. One of the 
noticeable features of the new Constitution was the introduction of 
" m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " f o r each and every government decision. 
I t has also been pointed out t h a t , under the new Constitution, the 
King was no longer regarded as responsible f o r the actions and dec-
isions of his government. (Ed) ZlvftukuT, La Yougoslavie d tAu.jourd thui, 
(Belgrade 1935) p. 121. 
19. The laws regarding Banovina administration, issued during the 
f i r s t two years of the Dictatorship, were incorporated i n t o the 
"V- Constitution ( A r t i c l e s 77-99). See also Lucie, La Constitution 
du Royaume de Yougoslavie du septembre 3 , pp.... 176 - 189. 
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20 manner i n which deputies f o r the Lower House would be elected. 
Voting, the law stated, would take place on a Sunday and would be done 
i n public. There would be no b a l l o t boxes i n the p o l l i n g stations' and 
21 
each voter would record his vote verbally. As a further measure of 
cont r o l , no party was permitted to contest the election unless i t had 
nation-wide support. An elaborate procedure was drawn up, requiring 
a party t o be approved by the Court of Cassation i n Belgrade and then 
to secure 60 supporters f o r i t s programme i n each of the 305 const-
ituencies before i t could even begin to function as a p o l i t i c a l 
party. Having overcome these obstacles, i t could then hold meetings 
without having special permission from the Minister of the I n t e r i o r , 
merely by n o t i f y i n g the l o c a l police chief twenty-four hoursiin advance. 
When voting was complete, the votes f o r each party were to be added 
up and the majority party automatically given two-thirds of the seats 
i n the Lower House. The opposition party - or parties - would then 
occupy the remaining t h i r d of the House i n proportion to t h e i r size. 
Should a deputy elected t o Parliament as a representative of an 
approved national party desert that party, he must immediately resign. 
This l a s t provision ensured that there would be no fragmentation of 
the parties' once they were elected to Parliament. "The King's f i x e d 
i n t e n t i o n , " wrote Henderson, " i s to obtain a majority f o r a Yugoslav 
party which w i l l be free from the old r e l i g i o u s , regional or profess-
22 
i o n a l p o l i t i c a l t a i n t s . " 
20. Zakon o izboru narodnih poslanika za narodnu skupstinu od 10 sept-
embra 1931 sa izmenama i dopunama od 26 septembra 1931 (Belgrade 1932). 
The Electoral Law of Sept. 10 - together with the Senatorial law of 
Sept. 30 - is summarized i n Appendix G. 
21. I t was noted by a contemporary observer that verbal voting was a 
feature of Rumanian and Hungarian voting systems. The Times, 14 Sept. 
1931, p. I I 
22. N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 14 Aug. 1931, C6422/304/92. 
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"The"Times" correspondent commented:- . 
"The inten t i o n of the Law i s obvious. The Dictator-
ship i s to drop gently from the heights on to a 
well-stuffed Parliamentary mattress. The Yugoslav 
party w i l l applaud i t s descent, pass the new Constit-
u t i o n , vote supplies and then perhaps vanish discreetly 
u n t i l the next budget has to be passed. 
The achievements of the last two years w i l l thus 
be preserved and any acts of indemnity that are required 
w i l l be passed by a l o y a l majority. The Government w i l l 
then have time to devote special attention t o economic 
questions, which are less pressing i n Yugoslavia than 
i n some neighbouring states, but nevertheless require 
at t e n t i o n . Above a l l , the Law i s designed to promote 
the formation of the national Yugoslav Party, which i s 
King Alexander fs dream, a party i n which Serb and Croat, 
Moslem and Christian, Orthodox and Catholic w i l l forget 
t h e i r past differences and co-operate f o r the common 
good. I f the new Parliament lives f o r four years - so 
i t s champions argue - the whole nation w i l l have accepted 
the new id e a l and the organic u n i f i c a t i o n of Yugoslavia 
and i t s peoples w i l l be no longer an aspiration but a 
f a c t . 
These are the obvious advantages of an ele c t o r a l 
law which has been so framed as to leave the result of 
23 
the impending election i n no possible doubt." 
To prepare the way f o r a return to co n s t i t u t i o n a l rule and to 
secure a broader basis of representation i n his Government - which was 
23. The Times, 25 Sept. 1931, p. 13. 
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to be the backbone of his proposed Yugoslav Party - the King 
re-shuffled his Cabinet, bringing i n eight new Ministers, three of 
whom were Serbs, two Croats and two Slovenes. The immediate task 
of the enlarged Cabinet was to deal with the economic problems 
which faced the country. Very l i t t l e could be done to mitigate the 
effect of the Hoover proposals but, as has been said, the Special 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance had drawn up a series of drastic 
remedies to make more money available to the Government to buy up 
the peasants* grain, f o r which there was no immediate market, and to 
25 
make provision f o r those parts of the nation stricken by drought. 
On September 4 , the Cabinet approved economies of £2.6 millions 
26 
and, on September 23, raised tobacco duty by 20$. O f f i c i a l s and 
o f f i c e r s i n the Army and Navy found t h e i r pay cut by 5-6$, c i v i l 
servants by 5-8$ and Cabinet Ministers by 25$ - r e a l i z i n g a further 
27 
£1.4 m i l l i o n s . Early i n October, a l l the controls which had been 
relaxed when the dinar had been s t a b i l i z e d by the French loan i n May, 
28 
were restored. These measures were not as drastic as Djuric, the new 
29 
Minister of Finance, would have wished but they were enough to 
restore i n t e r n a t i o n a l confidence i n the dinar f o r , when he went to 
Paris on October 22, Djuric' negotiated a further loan of £2.4 m i l l i o n s , 
s t a b i l i z i n g the dinar and providing the necessary c a p i t a l to finance 
30 
the export of grain i n a very poor market. Fortunately f o r the 
24. See Appendix D f o r changes. 25 See above, p. 129. 
26 . This measure was extremely unpopular and did l i t t l e to help the 
Government i n i t s election campaign. Henderson to Sargent, 18 Sept. 
1931, C7180/304/92. 27. I t was said that the Prime Minister's 
cut i n salary was even higher. The Times, 23 Sept. 1931, p.11. 
28. Sluzbene Novine, (Belgrade), 8 Oct. 1931. 
29. Annual Report f o r 1931, Section 7, C53/53/92. (Vol. 15994). 
3 0 . Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 23 Oct. 1931, C7963/95/92. 
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Government, the world price f o r grain rose during the last two 
months of the year and Yugoslavia's expected loss of £3 millions 
31 
proved to be a loss of no more than £1 m i l l i o n . 
The Government, having grappled with the country's most pressing 
f i n a n c i a l problems, turned i t s a t t ention to the forthcoming elections 
- fix e d f o r November 8. Since there was no doubt about the outcome 
of the el e c t i o n , public interest turned upon the a t t i t u d e of the 
former p o l i t i c i a n s and how f a r they might co-operate with the new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regime. As early as September 18, there were rumours 
that Macek, Korosec, Davidovic", Jovanovicf and Stanojevic would boy-
32 
cott the elections and speculation mounted as to what would happen 
i f no one stood against the Government party. Henderson wrote:-
"The Opposition looks as i f i t i s going to 
thwart the well-meaning intentions of the King. 
I f i t does not participate i n the elections, I 
imagine a f i c t i t i o u s opposition l i s t w i l l be set up, 
possibly with Marinkovic, who i s s t i l l i n Geneva, 
as i t s leader. But such a course would make Parlia-
33 
ment f a r c i c a l . " 
These rumours of a boycott were confirmed on September 25, when a 
declaration, drawn up by leaders of a l l the former p o l i t i c a l p arties, 
was sent to the Press Bureau and to foreign correspondents, saying 
that they unanimously condemned the new Constitution and called 
upon thevpeople to keep away from the p o l l s . Because t h e i r declaration 
was unsigned, the Press Bureau refused to publish t h e i r views, so a 
31. Having secured the second French loan and done his best to improve 
Yugoslavia's finances, Djuric' asked the King to allow him to return to 
his post as Yugoslav Minister i n London. The King agreed. 
3 2 . Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 18 Sept. 1931, C7137/304/92. 
33- Henderson to Sargent, 18 Sept. 1931, C7180/304/92. 
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second and milder declaration - signed by Stanojevic', Koros'ec, Spaho, 
Davidovic' and Jovanovic - was submitted, making i t clear that they 
would not participate i n the elections because, i n t h e i r opinion, 
"the people were prevented by the Constitution and by the Electoral 
Law from manifesting t h e i r r e a l desires." Macek and Pribicevic' 
issued t h e i r manifesto l a t e r , committing t h e i r parties to a similar 
policy of non-co-operation:-
"The Constitution and Electoral Law, coming a f t e r 
three years of absolutism, preserve a l l the Dict-
a t o r s h i p ^ laws so that i t i s impossible f o r anyone 
under the electoral law to stand f o r election except 
candidates who are favoured by the police. Our 
adherents f i l l the prisons of Croatia f o r attempting 
35 
to c o l l e c t signatures f o r our l i s t . There can be 
no other answer of the people t o such developments 
than to abstain from the elections and leave the 
p o l l i n g booths empty and deserted on November 8. 
Therefore, the people have no re s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the decisions and resolutions passed by a parliament 
elected i n such a way." 
A suggestion was made by the Croats that a " j o i n t positive programme" 
should be considered by the main opposition parties, but the idea 
37 
came to nothing. I t was therefore noticeable t h a t , although the 
former p o l i t i c i a n s were united i n c r i t i c i s m , they had not one single 
item of constructive policy t o put forward. 
•3'4. Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 2 Oct. 1931, C7484/304/92. 
3 5 . The Croats had not been co l l e c t i n g names f o r electoral nomination 
l i s t s but f o r those prepared to support the Croat leaders i n abstain-
ing from the p o l l s . See The Times, 3 Nov. 1931,. p.H 
36 . Summary of the Croat leaders T manifesto, The Times, 23 Oct 1931, 
37 . Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 8 Oct. 1931, C7640/304/92. 
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In the meantime, the Government party under General Zivkovic 
continued i t s preparations f o r the election. A manifesto was issued 
on September 28, s t a t i n g that f o r the las t two-and-a-half years, the 
Council of Ministers had carried out the King's wishes to the f u l l . 
The people were therefore urged to demonstrate t h e i r desire f o r unity 
w i t h i n Yugoslavia, to s i g n i f y t h e i r approval of the Government's 
38 
record and give the General's party t h e i r vote on November 8. I t 
seemed to some that t h i s appeal made the election more of a referendum 
than a contest between opposing parties and t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
true i n Serbia where free use was made of the King's name and the 
population t o l d that a vote f o r General Zivkovic was a vote f o r the 
39 
King. But despite a l l the signs that the election would be a "one 
horse race", the Government wanted more than a mere vote of confidence. 
They wanted a "proper" election and, when i t became clear that the 
former p o l i t i c i a n s would not take part, the Government set up several 
of t h e i r own candidates i n each constituency to give the electorate 
a greater measure of choice i n whom they returned to parliament.^ 
Although there were rumours of unrest and disturbance - and 
s i n i s t e r references to the Obrenovic' dynasty and i t s fate^"- the 
election campaign passed comparatively q u i e t l y . Dr Marinkovic, 
speaking on October 25 to a mass meeting at Kucevo, t o l d his audience 
that the major problems r e l a t i n g to the organization of the State had 
been settled once and f o r a l l . The new Parliament would concentrate 
on the many lesser problems which troubled the State and, only when 
38. The Times, 30 Sept. 1931, p. 11. 39 The Times, 7 Nov 1931, P-9. 
40 . Henderson to the Marquess of Reading, 8 Oct. 1931, C7640/304/92. 
41. Henderson to Sargent, 2 Oct. 1931, C7489/304/92. Alexander Obren-
ovic", P r ince of Serbia (1889-1903) had dealt i n a high-handed manner 
with his p o l i t i c a l opponents and altered the constitution to s u i t 
himself. He was murdered, together with his Queen, i n June 1903. 
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the Government had proof that things which had happened i n the past 
would not recur, would there be any change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s i t u a t i o n . Clearly, the Government was taking no chances - either 
p o l i t i c a l l y or e l e c t o r a l l y . One former p o l i t i c i a n , Misa Trifunovic, 
v 
returned to his native town of Uzice to muster support against the 
i n 
regime and was promptly arrested and fined 19,000 dinars. Another 
p o l i t i c a l leader, Davidovic, went to Cacak and there urged the people 
to boycott the election. The police treated him with more respect than 
Trifunovic' but nonetheless ordered him to leave the town immediately 
or else be sent back to Belgrade on a vagrancy charge I ^ I n Croatia, 
reaction to the election was one of d i s i n t e r e s t . ^ Only i n Belgrade, 
three days before the p o l l was there any clash with the police. A 
group of students descended upon a cafe where Maksimovic, a Government 
minister, was about to speak. They were driven out by the police and 
returned to t h e i r hostel cheering the King, singing national songs 
and shouting "Down with ZivkovicJ" and "Down with the Government!" 
One student received a bayonet wound i n the clash, 18 students were 
arrested and the University was closed u n t i l the elections took p l a c e d 
The res u l t of the election was never i n doubt and when the 
returns had been counted, i t was found that no less than 65.4$ of the 
electorate had cast t h e i r vote f o r the Government l i s t - there being 
in 
no alternative but to abstain. A high p o l l of 80$ was recorded i n 
42. The Times, 26 Oct. 1931, p. 11. 
43• £83• Trifunovic was one-time Minister of Education under the 
parliamentary regime. 44 . The Times, 7 Nov. 1931, P« 9. 
4 5 . Henderson to Sir John Simon, 11 Nov. 1931, C8531/304/92. I n Zagreb, 
the only reported incident was a small bomb which exploded harmlessly. 
4 6 . The Times, 6 Nov. 1931, p. 13 and 7 Nov. 1931, P- 9. 
47 . 65.4$ i s the figure given by Henderson i n his despatch to Simon, 
11 Nov. I 9 3 I , C853l/304/92, but Henderson gives no actual figures to 
show how he reached t h i s t o t a l . The Yugoslav population (1931 Census) 
was 13,934,038, of which 6,791,627 were males. Of these, (contd. p.140) 
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Moravska (Central Serbia), but only 34$ i n Primorska (Dalmatia). 
Good turn-outs were reported i n Belgrade (66%), Ljubljana (82$) and, 
even i n Zagreb, 42$ of the electorate went to the p o l l s . The Opposition 
leaders immediately claimed that the figures were fa l s e . Only 22$ 
voted i n Zagreb, they said, and i n Zlatar, the constituency belonging 
to Dr Neudorfer (the Minister of Agriculture), they pointed out t h a t , 
whereas the Government claimed 3000 votes, t h e i r reports suggested 
i d 
that the r e a l figure, was only 320. 
With more than a touch of humour, Henderson commented:-
"Whatever the actual figures may be, the Government 
and the King, with whom I had a b r i e f conversation on 
the subject yesterday, profess themselves f u l l y s a t i s -
f i e d with the r e s u l t s . I n a declaration to the Press, 
the Prime Minister observed that the t o t a l of those 
who voted f o r his l i s t i n a l l Yugoslavia i s higher 
than the t o t a l votes cast f o r a l l the parties at the 
last election i n 1927 The l o c a l Press even adds 
that not only has General Zivkovic Ts l i s t received 
nearly twice as many votes i n Croatia as were given 
i n 1927 to the CPP but i t received i n t h i s Banovina 
alone 23,000 more votes than were given to the CPP 
throughout the whole of Yugoslavia; s i m i l a r l y , that 
General Zivkovic Ts l i s t received i n Slovenia alone, 
(contd) the t o t a l number e l i g i b l e f o r adult male suffrage was 3,483,345. 
E.J. Patterson (London 1936), p. 120. Patterson records i n his book, 
Yugoslavia, the t o t a l votes cast as 2,342,250 (p.108). S.Graham, 
Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) gives a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t 
f i g u r e of 2,342,245 (p. 157). On either of these figures, the t o t a l 
would be 67.24$. 48. Henderson to Simon, 11 Nov. 1931, C8531/304/92. 
The Opposition claimed an 11$ turn-out i n the Croat towns and 5-9$ 
i n the country d i s t r i c t s . 
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13,000 votes more than were given to the 
Slovene Clerical Party i n the 1927 elections 
throughout the whole country; and f i n a l l y , that 
General z'ivkovic''s l i s t received from two to f i v e 
times as many votes i n t h e i r own constituencies as 
were given i n 1927 t o the Democrats1, Independent 
Democrats' and Moslem leaders respectively. 
I n f a c t , i n 1927, there does not seem to have 
been a single person who was half as popular anywhere 
as General Zivkovic i s everywhere i n 1931. Such a 
chorus of approval sounds almost suspicious but, 
i f t r u e , j u s t i f i e s General Zivkovic i n concluding 
that on 'this h i s t o r i c a l day the Yugoslav people 
have thunderingly declared that the Kingdom of 
49 
Yugoslavia i s implanted on t h e i r souls.'" 
However, i t would seem that the outcome of the election was not 
so much a personal triumph f o r General Zivkovic but rather a vote of 
confidence i n the King and his honest attempts to bring the d i f f -
50 
erent national elements i n Yugoslavia together. The former 
p o l i t i c i a n s , f o r t h e i r part, were very surprised at the number of votes 
cast and immediately assumed that the returns had been f a l s i f i e d or 
obtained by police i n t i m i d a t i o n , although there was no evidence of 
51 
such methods. The high turn-out i n Slovenia was reported to have 
49. I b i d . 50. Mr R.T. Smallbones, the B r i t i s h Consul i n Zagreb, 
reported that the highest polls i n Croatia were i n those areas v i s i t e d 
by the King during his stay i n Zagreb i n Jan. and June 1931- Consular 
report from Zagreb, 11 Nov. 1931, C8533/304/92. 
51. The Times correspondent i n Belgrade, Mme-Samsonova, w r i t i n g before 
the election, pointed out that although the State Board f o r Elections 
was above reproach, the same could not be said f o r the l o c a l e l e c t o r a l 
committees which consisted of State Board nominee, one represent-
ative of the l o c a l chief of police and one representative of the (contd) 
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been encouraged by Dr Korosec, who himself abstained but who secretly 
52 
advised his followers to give the King t h e i r support. Doubtless, 
there were many instances of i n t i m i d a t i o n , corruption or f a l s i f i c a t i o n 
53 
of returns - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Croatia; but, i n the opinion of the 
Government, the election had been conducted f a i r l y and Yugoslavia 
had made the t r a n s i t i o n from pure dictatorship to l i m i t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
rule without d i f f i c u l t y . 
Having been returned to power, the Government proceeded to 
organize i t s e l f f o r f u l l parliamentary a c t i v i t y which had been planned 
to begin i n January 1932.The national party which had been led by 
General Zivkovic at the election, was re-named the "Yugoslav Radical 
Peasant Democratic Party" on December 7 , ^ and before the end of the 
year, the laws governing the period of f u l l d ictatorship were repealed. 
55 
Elections to the Senate were held on January 3 , 1932 and there was 
a Government re-shuffle on January 4 - 5 . ^ The size of the Council of 
Ministers was reduced from 22 to 14. Kumanudi, who had held a v a r i e t y 
of m i n i s t e r i a l posts since January 1929, l e f t the Cabinet to become 
President of the new Chamber of Deputies. A l l the extra Ministers 
(contd from p. 14l) Government Party. By refusing to take part i n the 
e l e c t i o n , the former p o l i t i c i a n s l o s t t h e i r place on the l o c a l 
e l e c t o r a l committees where they would have had a good vantage point 
to consider the honesty and genuineness of the returns. The Times., 
7 Nov. 1931, p. 9. 
52. Smallbones (Zagreb) to Henderson, 11 Nov. 1931, C8533/304/92. 
53- I b i d . For instance i n Zagreb, strong pressure was put on the 
police, state o f f i c i a l s and labourers employed by the State to go to 
the p o l l s . But, according to the 1931 Census, only 3.5$ of the pop-
ul a t i o n were employed i n the c i v i l service and government-paid jobs 
so t h e i r influence on the f i n a l result was not great. E.J. Patterson, 
Yugoslavia, p. 121. 54- A t i t l e obviously designed to accom-
odate a l l shades of p o l i t i c a l opinion! 
55. Although the Senatorial Law provided f o r 48 elected and 48 nomin-
ated, only 46 were elected and 28 nominated by the King. 
56. See Appendix D. 
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without p o r t f o l i o who had been appointed i n September 1931, were 
dismissed and General Zivkovic surrendered his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the Ministry of the I n t e r i o r to Dr Milan Srskic, but remained Prime 
Minister. The two new Houses were formally convened by the King on 
January 18, 1932 and the new parliamentary session was opened by 
the King i n the presence of the Government and heads of foreign missions. 
The B r i t i s h charge d'affaires reported that the King had re-stated 
the principles upon which Yugoslavia was to be run and was w e l l 
received by the deputies and senators, "his speech being regularly 
57 
interrupted by loud and sincere applause." 
But outside Belgrade's L i t t l e Theatre (where the new p a r l i a -
mentary session was formally convened) there was less enthusiasm 
f o r the new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regime. The students, who had already 
clashed with the police i n a minor way before the elections, now 
began to make t h e i r opposition f e l t . On December 7-8, there was a 
serious disturbance i n Belgrade University. After a few preliminary 
shouts of "Long Live the King!" students bombarded the police with 
stones, clamoured f o r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y and called f o r the dismissal 
of General Zivkovic. Extra police re-inforcements were used to break 
up the disturbance, several students were severely injured (some with 
57. Leigh Smith to Simon, 25 Jan. 1932, C910/433/92. 
58. Although the foundation stone f o r the new Skupstina (or "House of 
National Representatives" as i t was o r i g i n a l l y called) was l a i d on 
August 27, 1907, i t was not occupied by deputies and senators t i l l 
October 20, 1936. Information Service Secretariat of the Federal 
Assembly, Yugoslav Federal Assembly, (Belgrade 1965), pp. 6 -9 . One 
contemporary observer reported that the King, who was reported to be 
very superstitious and regularly consulting clairvoyants, had been 
t o l d by an old woman i n Macedonia that he would be assasinated when 
he opened the new parliament building. For t h i s reason, i t was bel-
ieved, the new Skupstina remained unfinished. L. Adamic, The Native's 
Return,(New York 1934) p.348. 
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bayonet wounds) and the University was closed down u n t i l December 20 . ' 
Sir Nevile Henderson was not p a r t i c u l a r l y worried by t h e i r demonstr-
ation and even believed that some good might come of i t : -
" I f they (the students) were instrumental i n 
removing Zivkovic, Srskic and Maksimovicf, the 
resu l t would be advantageous. Not that I have 
anything against Zivkovic himself. I believe him 
to be merely a l o y a l servant of the King but f o r the 
other two I have not a good word to say and I consider 
t h e i r influence to be e n t i r e l y and solely bad. The 
best thing f o r t h i s country would be a change of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet." ^ 
But there was no change of Prime Minister or Cabinet. There was 
simply a re-shuffle. The same a l l - t o o - f a m i l i a r faces continued to 
t r a v e l i n the large m i n i s t e r i a l limousines and y e t , they seemed to 
have no t a l e n t f o r solving the many economic problems which continued 
to bedevil the country. The d i f f i c u l t y that faced the Government was 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l one, a f f e c t i n g the whole world, over which the 
Yugoslav leaders had no control. But t h i s was not something the 
peasants understood. They only knew that sugar, s a l t , p e t r o l and 
matches were scarce, that i t was becoming increasingly d i f f i c u l t to 
s e l l t h e i r produce at an economic r a t e ^ and that the Government 
kept r a i s i n g taxes and making l i f e even more burdensome. The budget 
f o r 1932-33 3 which was the f i r s t - s i g n i f i c a n t matter to be discussed 
59. The Times, 12 Dec 1931, p. 9. The students' organization issued 
a statement stressing that the students were not Communists but 
Nationalists manifesting the general f e e l i n g of discontent. See 
also ch. 9. 
60. Henderson to Sargent, 11 Dec. 1931, C9332/304/92. 
6 1 . Adamic, The Native's Return, p. 290. 
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62 by the new Skupstina, did l i t t l e to help. The Minister of Finance, 
Milorad Djordjevic, t o l d the Chamber of Deputies that there would 
have to be a cut of 133 m i l l i o n dinars i n government expenditure 
during the coming year and, since 45$ of what was spent went i n 
wages to public o f f i c i a l s and government employees, there would be a 
reduction i s salaries rather than actual dismissals. The Minister 
stressed his determination to preserve the s t a b i l i t y of the dinar, 
but to the peasantsj who comprised over three-quarters of the Yugoslav 
population, the point was merely academic - i f not incomprehensible. 
The students, therefore, continued to show t h e i r h o s t i l i t y t o 
the regime,^ knowing that they had a large measure of support amongst 
62. The f i r s t act of the new Skupstina was an address i n answer to 
the Speech from the throne. The address expressed approval f o r the 
King's action of January 1929. I t asserted that i t was the r i g h t 
and duty of His Majesty as supreme guardian of the interests of the 
Yugoslav people to lead the country out of chaos, that the Dictator-
ship was the only legal way to the regeneration of the country and 
that General Zivkovic had acted i n accordance with the principles of 
f u l l l e g a l i t y and absolute equality. The Times, 28 Jan. 1932, p. 9. 
63. £ 5 8 0 , 0 0 0 . The King's C i v i l L i s t was reduced by four m i l l i o n 
dinars ( £ 1 7 , 4 6 0 ). Sir Nevile Henderson to Simon, 7 Mar. 1932, 
C1957/325/92. Adamic' quotes one of his informants as saying that 
although the King had his C i v i l L i s t cut by 5$ and had the f a c t 
printed on the f r o n t page of the newspapers, the following week he 
transferred a l l the employees of the royal household to the State 
p a y r o l l . Adamic', The Native's Return, pp. 346-7 . I t i s worth noting 
that Adamic gained much of his information from those b i t t e r l y h o s t i l e 
to the regime and has a tendency to present King Alexander - and his 
actions - i n the worst possible l i g h t . The debates on the budget 
continued u n t i l March 5, when the deputies voted 257-11 i n favour of 
the estimates. 
64. Student r i o t s i n January 1932 led to 50 arrests and those i n 
A p r i l I932 resulted i n afpr.ther closing of the University f o r a 
f o r t n i g h t . 
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the people, including a sizeable proportion of those who had abstained 
i n the November elections. Even i n Parliament, there were beginnings 
of opposition. Dr Andjelinovic, formerly Yugoslav Minister i n Vienna 
before becoming a deputy, gathered a number of his colleagues together 
and, i n the corridors of the Skupstina, they blamed the Government 
f o r the absence of freedom at the elections, f o r t h e i r Pan-Serbist 
a t t i t u d e s , f o r the oppressive influence of the Press Laws and the 
lack of c i v i l equality. Knowing the growth of public discontent, Dr 
Andjelinovic also spoke out against the further f i n a n c i a l burdens 
imposed i n the budget and - most s i g n i f i c a n t l y - his c r i t i c i s m was 
65 
widely reported i n the Press. 
Although there was no evidence to suggest that the Prime Minister 
was anything other than a l o y a l and dedicated servant of the King, a l l 
the blame f o r the country's misfortunes and a l l the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
with the regime were focused."' upon the figure of General Zivkovic. 
Sir Nevile Henderson, whilst conceding that the Prime Minister was 
unpopular both i n the Army and throughout the country, f e l t that 
t h e i r choice of scapegoat was somewhat unjust since many of the mis-
takes a t t r i b u t e d to the General were committed by other members of his 
Government or by subordinate m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i c i a l s . ^ 
"But," he wrote, "the fact remains that the chief 
h o s t i l i t y to the regime i s centred i n the opposition 
to the person of General Zivkovic. The King must be 
aware of t h i s and, though his reluctance to part 
with so l o y a l a servant i s understandable, His 
Majesty must also realize that the unpopularity 
of his Prime Minister i s re-acting against himself 
67 
with increasing force. Sooner or l a t e r therefore, 
65. Henderson to Simon, 5 Mar. 1932, C1955/433/92. 66. I b i d . 
67 . Evidence of t h i s i s given i n the report from Mr Smallbones (Zagreb) 
t o Henderson, 3 Mar. 1932, C2456/433/92. 
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he w i l l probably be obliged to make the inevitable 
choice between l o y a l t y t o proven friends and the 
interests of his dynasty." ^ 
There was also reported t o be opposition w i t h i n the Cabinet to 
the continued presence of m i l i t a r y men i n leading positions, now that 
the country had returned to con s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e . I t was also said that 
the King had t r i e d to persuade General Zivkovic t o surrender his army 
rank and become a c i v i l i a n Prime Minister. This, i t was said, led t o 
a quarrel between the two men, with Zivkovic t e l l i n g Alexander: " I am 
69 
a soldier, not a p o l i t i c i a n . " I t seems l i k e l y that the matter at 
issue was not whether Yugoslavia should have a c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y 
Prime Minister but whether there was any worthwhile reason f o r r e t a i n -
ing General Zivkovic now that he had become a p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t y t o 
the regime. I t was reported that General Zivkovic, himself, had been 
rapidly t i r i n g of his duties and position. For some, time past, he had 
been taking less interest i n state a f f a i r s and had allowed the reins 
70 
of power to s l i p i n t o other hands. The quarrel - i f quarrel there 
7 1 v ^ was - brought a parting of the ways. General Zivkovic was dismissed 
and his place taken on A p r i l 4 , 1932 by the Foreign Minister, Dr. 
Marinkovic'. 
68. Henderson to Simon, 5 Mar. 1932, C1955/433/92. 
69 . S. Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) , p. 157. 
70 . Notably those of Dr Srskic, Minister of the I n t e r i o r . See consular 
report from Zagreb, 3 Mar. 1932, C2456/433/92. 
7 1 . Reading the accounts of many confrontations between King Alexander 
and others, i t seems l i k e l y that there was a short and f a i r l y s p i t e f u l 
quarrel. On Zivkovic fs quarrel, Graham says:- "That humility or pride 
seems to have shocked the King and he neglected Zivkovic f o r the rest 
of his reign, even f a i l i n g t o nominate him as regent i n case of his 
death ."Graham, op. c i t . , p. 157. 
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I n considering the development of Yugoslavia from September 
v 
1931 u n t i l the f a l l of General Zivkovic, the following spring, i t 
cannot be said that the Constitution of 1931 brought any great or 
immediate benefit to the Yugoslav people. To those who preferred 
straightforward dictatorship, i t s i g n i f i e d an unnecessary weakening 
of the p r i n c i p l e of law and order and administrative e f f i c i e n c y ; 
to those who believed i n parliamentary democracy, i t was an inadequate 
sop. The elections, instead of acting as a safety valve, had proved 
an i r r i t a n t , opening the regime to accusations of corruption and 
dishonest e l e c t o r a l practice, which could not easily be disproved. 
The Constitution of 1931 re-intrbduced a pale shadow of parliamentary 
democracy which - f o r reasons beyond i t s control - could do nothing 
to improve Yugoslavians f i n a n c i a l position. By promulgating the 
Constitution, King Alexander did l i , t t l e t o reconcile the former 
p o l i t i c i a n s or diminish t h e i r h o s t i l i t y . Ultimately, he lo s t the 
one man who could be trusted f a i t h f u l l y and honestly to carry out 
his commands. Judged by these considerations, the Constitution of 
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Up t o t h i s point, we have considered three d i s t i n c t phases 
i n the history of Yugoslavia under the royal dictatorship. The f i r s t 
period was the opening months of the regime when the King and his 
Ministers were t r y i n g to make up f o r the lethargy of post-war years 
and lay the foundations of a genuinely "Yugoslav" state. The second 
stage was the period of almost two years when Alexander t r i e d to 
show how e f f e c t i v e l y the Kingdom could be run without the old 
p o l i t i c i a n s . His e f f o r t s , however, co-incided with a serious f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n which compelled him to seek a greater measure of consent 
fo r his actions and a broader basis f o r his power. But, as we have 
seen, his t h i r d step - the introduction of a co n s t i t u t i o n a l regime -
very quickly achieved precisely the opposite of what he had intended. 
With the appointment of Dr Marinkovicf as Prime Minister, we 
come to the fourth and f i n a l phase - a period of growing d i s i l l u s i o n -
ment , not only amongst the people.but also on the part of Alexander 
himself. He had united the Kingdom. He had provided new administrative 
machinery. But - and t h i s revealed the poverty of the regime - there 
was no so c i a l policy, no r e a l plans to help the peasantry, no part-
i c u l a r ideals to which the King Ts supporters could appeal. The only 
outward manifestation of the Dictatorship was a series of second-rate 
cabinets, f i l l e d with nondescript personalities, who were not only 
unrepresentative of the great mass of the people, but also proved 
to be just as incompetent (and occasionally, j u s t as corrupt) as 
the p o l i t i c i a n s of the p r e - d i c t a t o r i a l era. 
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But, at f i r s t , the appointment of Dr Marinkovic was seen as a 
great step forward. I t was reported that he had been instructed to 
draw up new administrative boundaries f o r the Banovinas which would 
conform more closely to t h e i r h i s t o r i c character, t o extend the 
powers of the l o c a l d i s t r i c t councils and to prepare f o r the restor-
ation of normal parliamentary l i f e . " ' " But, i n f a c t , the Cabinet chosen 
v ^2 
by the new Prime Minister was i d e n t i c a l to that of General Zivkovic 
and i n his statement of policy t o the Skupstina on A p r i l 6, 1932, he 
promised nothing new:-
"In order to uphold the unity of the State," he 
said, "the Government would muster a l l l o y a l elements. 
Convinced that the majority of the population app-
lauded that u n i t y , i t would endeavour by a new 
system of groupings, to foster a l o y a l national 
development The Government f e l t certain that 
i n the arduous economic struggle, the Yugoslav people 
would display the same readiness f o r s a c r i f i c e , courage 
and determination as i n the arduous f i g h t f o r national 
3 
l i b e r t y and u n i f i c a t i o n . " 
For those who had hoped f o r great changes, his words were a b i t t e r 
disappointment and the Times reported that one part of the Skups'tina 
had received his statement i n complete silence 
There were so many d i f f e r e n t problems facing the new government 
that Dr Marinkovic would have been w e l l advised to have announced some 
f i r m new policy - p a r t i c u l a r l y towards agriculture - rather than rep-
eating the stale old cliches about national unity which had been heard 
so many times before. Since he had a very small personal following 
1. The Times, h June 1932, p. 9. 
2. See Appendix D. 
3. The Times. 8 A p r i l 1932, p. 13- 4. I b i d . 
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i n the Skups'tina, i t i s probable t h a t , had he taken a strong l i n e 
on some matter such as help f o r the peasants, he would have immediately 
5 
been defeated; but then he could have gone to the country on an issue 
which commanded widespread support.^ As i t was, Dr MarinkovicT struggled 
v a i n l y and b r i e f l y to gain the support of his colleagues who were both 
7 
suspicious and unsympathetic. Very quickly, news of divisions w i t h i n 
the Cabinet became common knowledge and, before he had been three 
weeks i n o f f i c e , two ministers had resigned and several deputies 
g 
had seceded from the Government party. 
The issue which divided the Cabinet was precisely the one on 
which Marinkovic, as a c i v i l i a n Prime Minister, should have given a 
positive lead. For many years, high taxation and poor world prices 
f o r grain had caused great distress i n the r u r a l areas of Yugoslavia 
and deprived many peasants of what l i t t l e c a p i t a l they had. Each year, 
the peasants were obliged to seek credits from banks to purchase seed 
and then, i n the autumn, repay t h e i r debts with the money received 
from the Government i n exchange f o r t h e i r produce. I n a good year, 
t h i s was not d i f f i c u l t . But i n a bad year - such as 1931 - not only 
was there a poor harvest i n many parts of the country, but also very 
low prices abroad. As we have seen, the Government was compelled to 
help out the peasants by paying a higher price f o r t h e i r grain than 
9 
they could actually hope to recover on the world market. To meet 
t h i s deficiency, Yugoslavia had had to borrow money from France. No 
longer could Yugoslavia count on increasing revenue from taxation 
5. Henderson to Simon, 5 J u l . 1932, C5966/433/92. 
6. Since over three-quarters of the nation were employed i n agriculture. 
7. Henderson to Simon, 15 Apr. 1932, C3327/433/92. 
8. I n mid-April, Dr Nikic'and U other deputies seceded from the Govern-
ment party and formed a "National Peasants* Club" and on A p r i l 21, Dr 
Preka and Dr Sibenik, both Croats, resigned from the Cabinet. 
9. See above, p. 135 10. Board of Overseas Trade memorandum on 
Economic Situation in" Yugoslavia, 20 May 1933, C4590/266/92. (vo l 16830). 
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because the peasantry were already deeply i n debt to the banks - or 
to moneylenders. Many were considerably i n arrears i n paying t h e i r 
taxes - some as much as several years behind; and f o r those who had 
had a poor harvest i n 1931 and f o r those who had seen t h e i r property 
swept away i n the severe flooding i n the early months of 1932, there 
was the dismal prospect of no further security to o f f e r the banks 
and, perhaps, no further credit."'"''" 
v ^ 
To remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n , General Zivkovic and his Ministers had 
already t r i e d to l i m i t government spending and cut down on salaries. 
But what was r e a l l y needed was some caref u l l y thought out scheme of 
Agrarian reform. The Marinkovicf government inherited a three-part b i l l , 
prepared by the Minister of Agriculture, Juraj Demetrovic. This 
proposed that there should be (a) a permanent reduction i n the interest 
rates paid by the peasants both f o r those debts which had been out-
standing f o r several years and f o r those recently incurred; (b) a 
proh i b i t i o n on the forced sale of peasant property to repay creditors; 
and (c) a plan to convert a l l peasant debts to private creditors to 
government debts. This b i l l , which might have gone a long way towards 
protecting and helping the peasantry, provoked a major outcry amongst 
the f i n a n c i a l men i n Yugoslavia, many of whom had considerable bus-
iness interests at stake. On A p r i l 19, 1932, i n response to t h e i r 
pressure, the Marinkovic'government introduced a simple inoffensive 
b i l l postponing the sale of a l l peasant property ( f o r outstanding 
debts) f o r s i x months. This measure, which was designed merely to 
t i d e the peasants over the summer - i n the hope of better harvests 
12 
and better i n t e r n a t i o n a l prices - was immediately agreed. 
11. Mr Smallbones (Zagreb) to Henderson, 29 Apr. 1932, C4173/433/92. 
12. Henderson to Simon, 9 May 1932, C4172/325/92. One of the most 
damaging allegations against the Marinkovic' Government was t h a t , 
v- , 
whereas General Zivkovic had the reputation f o r being completely 
disinterested i n money, Dr Marinkovic - even a f t e r becoming Premier (contd 
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But t h i s did not solve the underlying problem of peasant 
indebtedness. Many i n s t i t u t i o n s were carrying on business on the 
strength of outstanding loans which could never be repaid. I n Sara-
13 
jevo, i n March 1932, many bankrupcies were reported and, i n A p r i l , 
dealings i n the Prva Hrvatska ( the F i r s t Croatian Savings Bank) were 
suspended a f t e r i t was revealed t h a t , because of outstanding loans, 
the Bank was unable to repay depositors the £8,000,000 they had 
invested."^ To the Croats, the suspension i n the BankTs dealings 
seemed clear evidence of the Governmentfs h o s t i l i t y towards them. 
Leading members of the Government, wrote Sir Nevile Henderson 
" may give l i p service to the well-intentioned 
theories of His Majesty i n regard t o the Yugoslav 
doctrine" but " i n practice, care i s taken by the 
Ministers and t h e i r agents to ensure that the non-
Serb population and o f f i c i a l s are treated as 
i n f e r i o r s . This i s the sore which r e a l l y rankles. 
Unless t h i s sense of i n f e r i o r i t y i s dispelled, 
there w i l l not only be no co-operation but serious 
15 
danger of some great upheaval." 
Amongst the peasants - not only i n Croatia, but also i n Serbia - there 
were many who talked openly of republicanism. I n Bosnia and Western 
Serbia, bands of destitute peasants entered towns and looted shops. 
In Uzice, 200 peasants made a lo c a l f a i r the. occasion f o r a r e v o l t , 
(contd) had retained" his connection with the Belgrade Stock Exchange 
and took a l i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n his personal fortune. I n a broadcast 
speech from Berne by a member of the Green Int e r n a t i o n a l , Dr Marinkovic' 
was accused of having banked 1 m i l l i a r d dinars i n Switzerland. Whnt-
rgatioii, the broadcast and subsequent rumours 
did l i t t l e to enhance the Governmentfs reputation. 
13. Consular Report from Sarajevo, 3 Mar. 1932, C2456/433/92. 
14. Smallbones (Zagreb) to Henderson, 29 Apr. 1932, C4173/433/92. 
15. Henderson to Simon, 9 May 1932, C4173/433/92. 
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overpowered the police and escaped i n t o the h i l l s . T h e r e was more 
unrest i n Belgrade University which was closed t i l l the end of June. 
17 
In Maribor, i n Slovenia, a m i l i t a r y conspiracy was discovered. 
"In many quarters of Belgrade," wrote the Times 
correspondent, " i t i s f e l t that a solution must 
come soon i f the country i s hot to f a l l i n t o 
disorder. Forseeing t h i s danger, the m i l i t a r y 
have begun to move i n d i f f e r e n t directions - some 
demanding an i n t e n s i f i e d d i c t a t o r s h i p , while others 
are supporting the old parties i n the hope of 
18 
saving the country from a dangerous explosion." 
In t h i s r apidly deteriorating s i t u a t i o n , a l l that Dr Marinkovic' 
appeared to o f f e r was the prospect of fresh elections i n the autumn 
or la t e summer. Since early May, he had been saying that his admin-
i s t r a t i o n was a temporary expedient and that he was preparing for a 
19 
"big change". But no change was yet to be seen. Such e f f o r t s as 
he had made to restore normal parliamentary l i f e (these were the much-
heralded revision of the Banovina boundaries and a modification of the 
electoral law) had got no further than the lobbies of the Skupstina 
and had succeeded solely i n d i v i d i n g the deputies i n t o two opposing 
• 20 21 groups, neither of which were w i l l i n g to give him t h e i r support. 
16. The Times, 4 Jun. 1932, p.9. 17. The army plot was alleged to be 
at Communist i n s t i g a t i o n , but was i n fact engineered by n a t i o n a l i s t -
minded o f f i c e r s h o s t i l e to the regime. Hp were involved; 1 f l e d the 
country, 1 committed suicide, 4 were sentenced to death, 6 imprisoned 
and 4 acquitted. The Times, 17 Jun. 1932, p. 13 and 2 1 Jun. 1932, p. 13. 
18 . The Times. 4 June 1932, p.9. 19. Henderson to Sargent, 18 May 1932, 
C4136/433/92. 20. The Maksimovic group, representing "no change" and 
the Bristolians ( so named because they met i n the Hotel B r i s t o l ) led by 
Dr Kramer - a younger and more progressive group, some 160 i n number. 
2 1 . Henderson to Simon, 5 July 1932, C5966/433/92. 
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Dr MarinkovicT's solution to t h i s deadlock was a dissolution. But to 
the deputies, themselves only recently elected, the thought of return-
ing t o the hustings again so soon seemed personally undesirable and, 
i n the prevailing s i t u a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l l y unwise. 
I t i s l i k e l y that at a f a i r l y early stage i n his premiership, 
Dr Marinkovic'realized the impossible s i t u a t i o n he was i n but - at 
the ^ £ingTs request - he stayed on long enough to represent Yugoslavia 
22 
at the opening stages of the lausanne Conference. That done, he 
resigned. I n A p r i l 1932, he t o l d Sir Nevile Henderson that he had only 
become Prime Minister because he f e l t that the country needed his 
23 
help. He said that he was " w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e his health and 
possibly his l i f e to get something done; but he was not prepared 
to r i s k them i n order to achieve nothing." 
As his successor, the King wished to appoint Dr Kramer, formerly 
25 
Yugoslav Minister i n Prague and a member of several recent Cabinets, 
who was a strong supporter of the King Ts "Yugoslav" policy and leader 
of a powerful body of opinion i n the Skupstina. But, according to one 
report, the Army brought pressure to bear on the King and encouraged 
26 s 
him to change his mind. The name of General Kostic was mentioned. 
But the King was opposed to General Kostic as much as the Army d i s -
22. The int e r n a t i o n a l conference which was held at the end of the 
Hoover moratorium to decide on the future of reparations. The Conf-
erence agreed to make the general conditions of the moratorium 
permanent, so that Yugoslavia - f o r her part - would receive no more 
reparations from Germany but would herself, i n t u r n , be no longer 
required to meet her outstanding i n t e r - a l l i e d debts. 
23. Henderson to Sargent, 4 Apr. 1932, C2823/433/92. 
24. Henderson to Simon,' 5 July 1932, C5966/433/92. Marinkovic resigned 
on June 30, 1932. 
25. He had previously been Minister of Public Works and Minister of 
Commerce. 
26. Foreign Office memorandum on report by Major Qxley, B r i t i s h m i l -
i t a r y attache i n Yugoslavia, 16 July 1932, C4173/433/92. 
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27 approved of Dr Kramer. I n the end a compromise was reached and Dr 
Milan Srskic, "the most energetic and probably the most able and 
unscrupulous of the King's ministers since the commencement of the 
28 
di c t a t o r s h i p " was appointed as Yugoslavia's new Prime Minister. 
There can be l i t t l e doubt that the choice of Dr Srskic represented 
a backward step so f a r as the King's regime was concerned. Dr Sr&kic 
had occupied a leading position i n a l l the Cabinets under the Dictator-
ship, had drafted many of i t s laws and had been the right-hand man of 
v ' 29 
General Zivkovic. He was believed to be a keen supporter of "Greater 
Serbia" and was alleged to have organized attacks upon the lives of 
30 
his p o l i t i c a l opponents. This was hardly l i k e l y to commend him t o 
the Croats. But neither was he popular with the Serbs. As an Austrian 
subject before the war, he had voted f o r the annexation of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and had made vi o l e n t speeches against Serbia following the 
31 
death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Sir Nevile Henderson considered 
that such an appointment "cannot but create an unfortunate impression" 
but he also saw one advantage:-
"In t h i s respect, his nomination as Prime Minister 
may be a blessing i n disguise, since as he cannot 
r i s e any higher, he may w e l l thereafter f a l l and 
27. Henderson to Simon, 5 July 1932, C5966/433/92. 28. I b i d . 
29. See "Biographies". 
3 0 . Henderson to Simon, 5 July 1932, C5966/433/92. On June 7 , Dr Mile 
Budak (Vice-President of the former Croat Constitutional Party) was 
stabbed and wounded i n Zagreb. Since Dr Srskic was Minister of the 
I n t e r i o r under Dr Marinkovic and since former p o l i t i c i a n s were kept 
under close police surveillance, i t seemed that the attack could 
hardly have happened without o f f i c i a l approval. The Times, 9 Jun 1932, 
p. 1 1 . See also, the l e t t e r from R.W. Seton-Watson, The Times, 1 1 June 
1932, p. 8. 
3 '1 . During the war,. Srskic l e f t Austria f o r Russia. Later he worked 
f o r the Yugoslav cause i n Entente countries, 
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32 disappear altogether.' 1 
But, i f the King had chosen Dr Srskic to restore a greater 
measure of authority over the country and to prevent a lapse i n t o 
anarchy, he could not have chosen a more suitable person. The very 
fact that Dr Srskic was now Prime Minister led to a complete l u l l i n 
p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n . His appointment also co-incided with the 
holiday season, a period of extremely hot weather and a very successful 
harvest. On August 6 , the new Prime Minister outlined his policy t o 
a meeting of the Government party. As might have been expected, i t 
contained no surprises. Dr Srskic r e - i t e r a t e d the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
returning to the old party system and stressed that the t r a n s i t i o n to 
liberalism must be a gradual process. With l i t t l e enthusiasm, he 
suggested that there might be some modification i n the laws to help 
35 
the peasants and held out distant hopes of greater decentralization. 
I t was not an ambitious programme and added l i t t l e l u s t re to the 
regime, as the King found when he toured through Bosnia and Hercegovina 
during July. The o f f i c i a l press described the royal v i s i t as having 
evoked great enthusiasm but according to those on the spot, he received 
a very cool welcome i n Sarajevo and many complaints i n Montenegro -
p a r t i c u l a r l y from the peasants. 
During a l l these months, the old p o l i t i c i a n s had been l y i n g low, 
waiting to see how the regime would develop, confident t h a t , as King 
32. Henderson to Simon, 5 July 1932, C5966/433/92. 
3 3 . Srskic chose as his Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Zika Lazic, who had 
been Ban of the Vardar Banovina since November 1929, and had administ-
ered Macedonia with fairness and j u s t i c e i n the face of MRO terrorism. 
As head of I n t e l l i g e n c e ^ Srskic chose Bedekovic", former chief of police 
i n Zagreb, who i s normally described by opponents of the regime as a 
"notorious sadist". 
3 4 . Srskic took o f f i c e on 3 July 1932. 
3 5 . Leigh Smith to Sijnon, 8 Aug. 1932, C6891/433/92 . 3 6 . I b i d . 
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Alexander faced increasing problems, he would ask f o r t h e i r help. 
But, although they remained on the sidelines, they were by no means 
inacti v e : -
"From 1931 on," Macek wrote, " my a c t i v i t y was 
l i m i t e d to receiving and t a l k i n g to people from 
a l l parts of Croatia who poured i n on me d a i l y 
and to giving interviews to foreign jou r n a l i s t s 
who poured i n . At such interviews, I i n e v i t a b l y 
expressed sharp c r i t i c i s m of the dictatorship 
37 
without worrying about what might happen to me." 
A close watch was kept on Dr Macek by the royal police but from 
time to time, fresh approaches were made to the Croat leader to see 
whether he had had a change of heart. One such approach was made whilst 
Dr Marinkovicf was Prime Minister.^^Dr. Svrljuga and Dr B e r t i e ^ made a 
special v i s i t t o Dr Macek to see i f there was any chance of him co-
operating with the Government. Mal$ek, apparently, was much amused 
and asked why, i f the Government had received an 85% vote at the p o l l s , 
should they bother t o consult the other 15$? ^ The government 
v 
emissaries reported that Macek s t i l l insisted on free elections and 
a new Constituent Assembly. To others who spoke to him, he stated 
that the Croats must be given complete f i n a n c i a l autonomy and be 
allowed to raise t h e i r own army. Unless t h i s was agreed, there could 
be no thought of co-operation. 
3 7 . V. Macek, I n the Struggle f o r Freedom (Pennsylvania 1968) p. 137. 
38. The Times, Letter from R.W. Seton-Watson, 11 Jun. 1932, p. 8. 
3 9 . Consular report from Sarajevo, 3 Mar. 1932, C2456/433/92. 
4 0 . Svrljuga, a Croat businessman, was made Minister of Finance i n 
Jan. 1929. His support for the King had made him highly suspect to 
the Croats. His wife was the Queenfs lady-in-waiting. Dr Bertie was 
a lawyer from Zemun. 
4 1 . Henderson to Simon, 9 May 1932, C4173/433/92. 
4 2 . Consular Report from Sarajevo, 3 Mar. 1932, C2456/433/92. 
160 
I t was u n l i k e l y that Dr Srskic, who was resolutely opposed to 
the old p o l i t i c a l system, would make any further approaches to the 
Croat leader - or to any party p o l i t i c i a n . Very soon a f t e r he took 
o f f i c e , the Agrarian leader, Jovanovic, was put on t r i a l under the 
Defence of the Realm Act and sentenced to twelve-months imprisonment. 
During October and November 1932, a series of highly-coloured reports 
about Yugoslav police a t r o c i t i e s began to appear i n the Daily Express^ 
and other foreign newspapers. Lurid headlines such as "Serbs use 
Bastinado on the Croats" and "Hideous Tortures now Revealed1,' appeared. 
45 
A group of B r i t i s h MPs who came to Zagreb saying they were only 
interested i n "c h i l d welfare and sanitation schemes" ^  returned home 
and produced a pamphlet e n t i t l e d "The Croats under Yugoslav Rule". 
Furthermore, a strongly-worded a r t i c l e was published i n the Manchester 
Guardian on September 3 0 , 1932. Although Dr Macek could by no means 
be accused of i n s t i g a t i n g these a r t i c l e s , i t was he who had showed 
the MPs round Croatia and i t was he who had given an interview to 47 « Brxtish j o u r n a l i s t s . The police therefore arrested Dr Macek but, 
when he declared that he had been mis-reported, he was released. 
However, i n November 1932, Macek, who had been reproached by 
certain of Pribicevic^s supporters f o r being too slack i n f i g h t i n g 
the regime, called together a meeting of a l l leading members of the 
former CPP-ID Coalition and produced an agreed Opposition statement, 
sometimes known as the "Zagreb Points". Those present at the meeting 
pledged themselves to work f o r the destruction of the dictatorship and 
t h e i r statement reflected both t h e i r indictment of the regime and t h e i r 
4 3 . The Times, 3 Oct. 1932, p. 13 
4 4 . In p a r t i c u l a r , the issues of 31 Oct., and 1-2 Nov. 1932. The special 
correspondent was H.J. Greenwood. 
4 5 . Notably Mr Rhys Davies and Mr Ben Riley. 
4 6 . Mr Boden (Zagreb) to Henderson, 19 Oct. 1932, C9159/433/92. 
47. I b i d . 48. Macek, In Struggle f o r Freedom, p. 137. 
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proposals f o r reform. 
"We must point out," Macek wrote, "that Serbian 
hegemony, imposed from the s t a r t on Croatia and on 
a l l other lands on t h i s side of the Sava, the Drina 
and the Danube, has acted destructively through i t s 
obvious incapacity to govern, i t s tyranny and i t s 
use of immoral means. I t has monopolized a l l the 
powers of the State and destroyed our moral values 
and our progressive i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as our 
t r a d i t i o n s . I t has not respected the material 
possessions of the people and even robbed i t of 
i t s s p i r i t u a l peace.This, state of misrule reached 
i t s peak when the absolutist regime was introduced 
on January 6 , 1929 , re-inforcing the hegemony with 
f a t a l consequences and worst of a l l , abolishing c i v i l 
and p o l i t i c a l freedom. 
Considering these disastrous experiences, we have 
arrived at the inevitable conclusion that we must go 
back to the s t a r t i n g point of 1918 i n response to the 
pressing need to conduct a decisive and organized b a t t l e 
against the hegemony, i n order to free our lands from i t 
and deprive i t of i t s power and influence by eliminating 
i t s representatives." ^ 
49 . My i t a l i c s . Macek gives the Zagreb points i n f u l l , op. c i t . , pp. 
139-140. (see Appendix H). Macek says that the signatories were himself, 
Trumbic', Predavec, and Sutej f o r the CPP; Budak f o r the Frankists and 
Vilder, Krizman and three others f o r the IDs. According to Mac'ek, Dr 
Pavelic of the Ustase (see ch 9) was very annoyed that Budak should 
have signed i t . I t i s also worth noting that at the time the "Points" 
were signed, Josip Predavec (supposedly a signatory) was s t i l l i n 
prison. He was not released u n t i l 13 July 1933 and was k i l l e d the 
following day at his home i n Dugoselo by a peasant who owed him money. 
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Copies of the statement were sent to leaders of a l l other parties 
proscribed under the Dictatorship. They expressed themselves i n broad 
50 
agreement with the CPP-ID. A copy of the statement reached the Gov-
ernment early i n December and the "Points" were published only to be 
51 V 
attacked. The Srskic government, i t seemed, were not a f r a i d of 
agreements between ex-politicians who, a f t e r a l l , had l i t t l e power. 
What they did object to was the image of Yugoslavia conveyed abroad,by 
interviews with foreign j o u r n a l i s t s . A r t i c l e s appeared i n the New York 
52 53 Txmes, the Freie Stimme and the P e t i t Parisien. The las t a r t i c l e , 
which appeared i n the French newspaper on January 28, 1933, proved 
the las t straw f o r the Srskic government. Macek and Trumbic were both 
arrested and i n t e r n e d . ^ 
At the same time, Dr Korosec, former leader of the Slovene party, 
and two of his supporters were arrested f o r issuing a manifesto i n 
55 
favour of a federal constitution f o r Yugoslavia. Dr Spaho, the Moslem 
50. Mr Macrae (Zagreb) to Henderson, 14 Dec. 1932, C24/24/92. (1933 f i l e 
Vol. 16827). See also the Times, 17 Feb. 1933 which reports a Manifesto 
issued by the Radical, Agrarian and Democrat party executives condemn-
ing the domestic policy of the regime and announcing that they - tog-
ether with a l l Opposition parties - are at war with the regime. However 
they were only united i n t h e i r opposition to the regime. There was no 
thought of co-operation f o r constructive purposes. Henderson quotes an 
unnamed Radical leader as saying t h a t , although Radicals, Democrats, 
Moslems, Agrarians and Slovenes were i n complete agreement and would 
work together at any time, they would not work with the CPP-ID which 
had gone too f a r towards republicanism. Henderson to Simon, 17 Feb. 1933, 
C1865/24/92. 51. Macek, op. c i t . , p. 140.. 52. 20 Nov. 1932. 
53 . 21 Jan. 1933- 54. Macek was interned at Cajnice i n Hercegovina. 
"The Times. 1 Feb. 1933, p. 9. 
55 . In Jan. 1933, Korosec di s t r i b u t e d a declaration on behalf of his 
former party throughout Slovenia. His attack on the Government came at 
the same time as the Catholic Church c r i t i c i z e d the regime f o r p o l i t i c a l 
motives i n the Sokol organization. Henderson to Simon, 21 Jan. 1933, 
C767/24/92. The Government denied the ChurchTs c r i t i c i s m and the King 
(contd) 
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56 leader, was also arrested f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g "false information". 
On March 6, the t r i a l opened i n Zagreb at which Dr Pernar, another 
former CPP deputy (and v i c t i m of the Racic shootings) was accused 
with f i v e others of d i s t r i b u t i n g seditious l e a f l e t s printed i n Vienna, 
c a l l i n g f o r the overthrow of the regime, urging the use of force t o 
resis t the authorities and advocating "the death of 10 Serbs f o r 
57 
every Croat peasant k i l l e d . " 
Three years before," when Dr Mac'ek was f i r s t arrested, the 
Government had shown i t s e l f most unwilli n g t o provoke the Croat people 
and very hesitant about bringing t h e i r leader to t r i a l . Then, the 
j u d i c i a l process had taken forty-seven days and Macek was acquitted. 
But, on t h i s occasion, the Sr&kic' Government showed i t s e l f much less 
concerned about Croat opinion. Mac'ek was charged with having agitated 
i n favour of a change i n the structure of the State and his t r i a l , 
t o 
which began on A p r i l 24 , 1933? lasted only two days. 
The case f o r the prosecution was that i n conversations with 
foreign j o u r n a l i s t s and i n the '-'Zagreb Points", Dr Macek had made,. 
(contd from p. 162) went out of his way, during the opening of a new 
school i n the Sumadija, to condemn a l l thought of federalism i n Yugo-
slavia. The Times, 17 Feb. 1933J P' H' Dr Korosec was interned at 
Vrnjacka Banja i n Serbia. 56. The Times, 2 Feb. 1933 , P- 9. 
57. The Times, 7 Mar. 1933, p. 13• The prosecution claimed that Dr 
Pernar was involved i n the Lika conspiracy (see ch 9 ) . Henderson to 
Sargent, 22 Oct. 1932, C9159/433/92. One of the " a t r o c i t y " stories 
given p u b l i c i t y abroad, was that Dr Pernar had had his finger nails 
torn out. This was revealed to be untrue. Henderson to Sargent, 
14 Nov. 1932, C9639/433/92. 
58. The i m p a r t i a l i t y of the Court may be judged from the f a c t that 
two Croats among the seven judges hearing the t r i a l were old enemies 
of Macek; that very few defence witnesses were actually heard and 
that two B r i t i s h MPs who wished to t e s t i f y on Macekfs behalf, were 
refused entry to the country. Henderson to Simon, 30 Apr. 1933> 
C413 0 /24 /92 . 
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•.statements i n favour of "separatism" which, under the Defence of the 
IRealm Act, was an offence. Mac'ek, i n his defence, repeated that he 
twas not i n favour of "separatism". What he was against was Serbian 
hegemony and domination over Croatia. The Croats, he said, must 
have a voice i n the organization of the State. When pressed, he 
declared that t h i s was impossible under the 1931 Constitution. For 
t h i s reason, he and the other p o l i t i c i a n s had come together to see 
how the State could be reconstructed afresh and how the Croat people Ts 
desire f o r an independent Croatia could be achieved w i t h i n the bound-
' I i 
60 
59 
aries of the present Yugoslav state. I f t h i s was a crime, he said, 
he was ready to bear the consequences. 
The Court decided that a crime had been committed. They declared 
that Dr Macek was g u i l t y of propaganda i n favour of "separatism" and 
on A p r i l 29 , they sentenced him to three years' imprisonment.^'"'' The 
verdict of the Court took many by surprise. I n Zagreb University, 
there were loud protests and demonstrations; a Croatian f l a g was 
hoisted and several students were injured i n clashes with the police. 
The leaders of the former p o l i t i c a l parties i n Serbia also issued a 
protest. They spoke of " p o l i t i c a l persecution" and "terrorism by an 
anti-national regime". Their protest was suppressed by the police but 
62 
s t i l l managed to gain wide p u b l i c i t y . 
59. The Tjjnes, 25 Apr. 1933, p . 13-
60. Macek gives an account of his defence, op. c i t . . , pp. 147-8. 
6 1 . One of the deciding factors i n the eyes of the Court, was that the 
Zagreb Points had been published i n the I t a l i a n Press before the Yugo-
slav authorities knew anything about i t . This seemed to disprove Macek's 
defence that the Points were a confidential agreement between the 
former party leaders. The Times, 1 May 1933* P- 13. Macek was sent 
to Mitrovica prison with the pr i v i l e g e of custodia honesta - which meant 
considerable benefits. Macek, op. c i t . , p. 148. Macek remained there 
u n t i l July 1934 when, suffering from o r a l sepsis and heart trouble, 
he was transferred t o a Zagreb hospital. Op. c i t . , p. 153. 
6 2 . The Times, 3 May 1933, p. 10. 
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Had the Srskic Government been as e f f i c i e n t i n the conduct of 
i t s administration as i t was assiduous i n the pursuit of i t s opp-
onents, there might perhaps have been some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the 
prosecution of the former p o l i t i c i a n s . But i t i s a fa c t that during 
the nineteen months that Dr Srskic was Prime Minister, nothing of 
any value or substance was achieved and such things as the Government 
did do, seemed to those who were concerned with the i n t e r n a l develop-
ment of Yugoslavia, l i t t l e better than "window-dressing". 
For instance, one of the promises continually being made by Dr 
Marinkovic was that the Banovina boundaries of 1929 would soon be 
revised to give greater l o c a l autonomy. This policy was inherited by 
Dr Srskic. I n October 1932, Dr Kramer t o l d Sir Nevile Henderson that 
when the Skupstina re-rassembled on October 20 , t h i s would be one of 
the f i r s t b i l l s to receive a t t e n t i o n . Dr Kramer said that the b i l l , 
which was already drafted, would be of a rad i c a l nature - proposing 
that the large sums of money which had previously been paid in t o 
the State Treasury, would i n future be retained and administered by 
the Banovina Councils themselves. I t was expected that the b i l l would 
face great opposition from the Serbian members of the Government -
and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , Dr Djordjevic - but the b i l l had the f u l l e s t support 
63 
of the King. Nevertheless, l i t t l e more was heard of i t . I n February 
1933y i t s delay was o f f i c i a l l y "regretted" and, i n A p r i l , Dr Srskic 
said that i t was being a c t i v e l y considered by the Cabinet.^ Yet, by 
January 1934* there was s t i l l no sign of i t . 
Another example was the revision of the Electoral Law of September 
1931« This Law, which had been Used i n the f i r s t elections under the 
new Constitution, had come i n f o r considerable c r i t i c i s m , since i t 
63. Henderson to Sargent, 3 Oct. 1932, C8419/433/92. Dr Djordjevic 
was Minister of Finance from November 1931 - December 1934. 
64. Henderson to Simon, 30 Apr. 1933, C4130/24/92. 
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made the rules f o r e l e c t o r a l candidates so demanding that i t was 
almost beyond the powers of any opposition party to muster a 
nationally-based l i s t of candidates. This, c r i t i c s of the regime 
would say, was probably what was intended, but i n f a c t plans were 
made early i n 1932 to make i t easier f o r opposition parties to take 
65 
part. These plans encountered strong h o s t i l i t y w i t h i n the Government 
and i t was not u n t i l February 1933> that they were approved. 
In Dr Srskic's defence i t must be stated that the p o l i t i c a l s i t -
uation existing during his premiership was considerably more complex 
v y v 
than that which faced General Zivkovic. The Skupstina, which had 
become divided i n t o two main groups during the premiership of Dr Marin-
kovic', was now divided i n t o f i v e or s i x competing factions, whose 
powerful lobbying made the passage of l e g i s l a t i o n a hazardous process. 
In November 1932, Dr Srskic was obliged to resign and rebuild his 
66 
Cabinet i n order to adjust to these changes and the complexion of 
his Government became, thereafter, not so much a group of like-minded 
men dedicated to a pa r t i c u l a r programme, but a c o a l i t i o n of the leaders 
of those factions whose support was essential i f the Government were 
. • 67 to remain i n power. 
68 
What the Government did "achieve" was a law on communal councils, 
65. Henderson to Simon, 20 Feb. 1933, C1926/24/92. The changes i n the 
Law provided (a) f o r a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats i n favour of towns and 
c i t i e s ; (b) the victorious party t o occupy 6C$ of the seats i n the 
Skupstina instead of 66$; (c) Parties would i n future need only 30 
signatures i n half the constituencies - but those constituencies to 
be i n at least 6 of the 9 Banovinas (This would enable parties t o put 
up candidates without dependence on Croatia or Slovenia, where i t would 
have been d i f f i c u l t f o r any non-Slovene or non-Croat party to obtain 
signatures); (d) elected deputies could now resign from the Government 
party so long as they joined no organization with r e l i g i o u s , party or 
regional connotations. 66. The Times, 8 Nov. 1932, p. 13. 
67 . Henderson to Simon, 3 Mar. 1934, R1568/30/92. (Vol. 18452) 
68 . The Times. 10 Nov. 1932, p. 13-
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69 a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the law on associations and meetings, and a 
much^needed moratorium on the repayment of i n t e r e s t by Yugoslavia on 
her loan from France, of which the f i r s t i nstalment was due i n the 
70 
autumn of 1932. The Government also achieved some s e n s a t i o n a l 
"successes" i n the m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s i n the summer of 1933- The 
o v e r a l l t u r n - o u t a t the p o l l s was reported t o be i n excess of 65$ 
and, of those who voted, the Government claimed between 92-96$ 
support! The r e s u l t s were so obviously f a l s i f i e d t h a t they were an 
71 
embarassment: 
" I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o b e l i e v e , " wrote Henderson, 
" t h a t he ( S r s k i c ) can remain so much longer. His 
Cabinet i s more co r r u p t than i n the days of Z i v k o v i c . 
I doubt i t i s ever f o r two consecutive minutes i n 
agreement. I t i s merely by the w i l l of the King 
t h a t i t holds together a t a l l . 
Why the King so w i l l s i t i s hard t o fathom. 
The d i f f i c u l t y i s presumably t h a t of f i n d i n g a 
s u b s t i t u t e who Would riot be even less s a t i s f a c t o r y 
than S r s k i c . For t h a t i s one of the main handicaps 
69. Henderson t o Simon, 2 Mar. 1933, C2216/24/92. 
70. The Times, 1..Aug. 1932, p. 15... 
71 . Henderson t o Simon, 16 Oct. 1933, C9144/24/92.F6ur examples from 
the o f f i c i a l r e s u l t s : ($ E l e c t o r a t e Voting) ($ f o r Government) 
Drinska _ 75$ 92% 
Primorska _ 60$ 95% 
Savska _ 55% 80$ 
Dunavska _ 65$ 96.4$ 
I t was immediately noted t h a t i t was extremely u n l i k e l y t h a t even 80$ 
of 55$ would have voted f o r the Government i n Savska ( C r o a t i a ) . The 
CPP estimated the f i g u r e s t o be nearer 20$vand a l l e g e d t h a t the Gov-
ernment had "au t h o r i z e d " the percentages before the p o l l . The M i n i s t r y 
of the I n t e r i o r l a t e r admitted t h a t the Government vote i n Croatia was 
26$ and Slovenia 37$ . 0»Malley t o Henderson, 5 Dec. 1933, C10608/24/92. 
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of the regime - the dearth of capable and honest 
72 
men w i t h a glimmering of statesmanship." 
Supporters o f the King might argue t h a t h i s considerable i n v o l v e -
ment i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s had removed him from the sphere of i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c s but Louis Adamic, who had a personal audience i n March 1933, 
r e p o r t s t h a t the King was i n r e g u l a r touch w i t h the Skupstina by 
73 
telephone d u r i n g the debates on the passage of the budget. This was 
a p a r t i c u l a r l y stormy occasion - reminiscent of the scenes i n the 
7ZL 
pre-1929 Skupstina, when the M i n i s t e r of Finance b a t t l e d not only 
against the Assembly but against h i s own Cabinet colleagues through 
75 
a debate l a s t i n g n i n e t y - f o u r hours. Both the M i n i s t e r s of Finance 
and A g r i c u l t u r e o f f e r e d t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s t o the King b u t , according 
t o rumour, the King informed them t h a t they were c i v i l servants and 
as such were o b l i g e d t o c a r r y through h i s p o l i c y . This p a r t i c u l a r 
i n c i d e n t shows not only t h a t King Alexander was s t i l l very much 
inv o l v e d i n the day-to-day a f f a i r s o f h i s Kingdom b u t , a l s o , t h a t 
having c a l l e d a C o n s t i t u t i o n i n t o being and permitted a Skupstina t o 
assemble, he was much less master of h i s own house. I n the o p i n i o n 
of S i r Nevile Henderson, by e a r l y 1933, the King had become the 
prisoner of a "time-serving c l i q u e " who were preventing him from 
governing as he had said he would i n h i s Royal Proclamation of January 
1 9 2 9 . 7 7 
What should the King do? Should he d i s s o l v e the SkupStina and 
hold f r e s h e l e c t i o n s ? Or should he merely dismiss his Prime M i n i s t e r 
72. Annual Report f o r 1933, 2 Jan. 1934, R47/30/92. ( V o l . 18452). 
73. L. Adamic, The Na t i v e T s Return, (New York 1934) p. 349. 
74. Henderson t o Simon, 3 Mar. 1934, R1568/3C-/92. "The Skupstina i s 
no longer an obedient servant o f the Government but a very c r i t i c a l 
body. Recent debates have suggested t h a t a democratic regime was i n 
power. " 75. The Times, 21 Mar. 1933, p. 13. 
76. The Times. 6 Mar. 1933'? p. 11. 
77. Henderson t o Simon, 12 Feb. 1933, C1864/24/92. 
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and choose someone else? One t h i n g was c e r t a i n . Most of the deputies 
who had been e l e c t e d i n November Hfffik were 
"of such a t a r n i s h e d r e p u t a t i o n t h a t the 
m a j o r i t y would be u n l i k e l y t o be returned 
78 
again, even i n rigged e l e c t i o n s . " 
I t i s q u i t e possible t h a t , i n view of h i s i n c r e a s i n g concern w i t h 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and h i s emergence as a f i g u r e of some i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
standing, King Alexander wished t o avoid any domestic e l e c t i o n contest 
which might cause him embarrassment or a f f e c t h i s r e p u t a t i o n abroad. 
I t i s e q u a l l y probable t h a t King Alexander r e a l i z e d t h a t , although 
Dr Srs^kicf was more of a l i a b i l i t y t o the regime than an asset,"^ he 
alone of a l l h i s M i n i s t e r s was the one man capable of keeping a l l t he 
f a c t i o n s i n the Skupstina behind the Government - an achievement . 
which a new Prime M i n i s t e r might f i n d impossible. 
But a f t e r almost two years of i n a c t i v i t y and s t a g n a t i o n , there 
were many matters r e q u i r i n g serious a t t e n t i o n . The moratorium on 
peasant debts, f i x e d f o r a year i n A p r i l 1932, had been extended 
i n d e f i n i t e l y i n December of t h a t year. But the debts i n c u r r e d could 
» 
80 
not j u s t be w r i t t e n o f f - they t o t a l l e d some £15 m i l l i o n s - and so 
78. Henderson t o Simon, 30 Jan. 1934, R906/30/92. 
79. I n October 1931, D j u r i c (speaking of S r s k i c , Uzunovic and Maksimovic) 
t o l d Henderson t h a t the King loathed some of h i s M i n i s t e r s b u t , f o r 
p o l i t i c a l reasons, could not get r i d of them. On another occasion, 
Henderson t o l d t h e Queen t h a t the King's f r i e n d s d i d him as much harm 
as h i s enemies. "Much more", r e p l i e d the Queen. Henderson t o Sargent, 
30 Oct. 1931, C8187/95/92. 
80. Because the t o t a l n a t i o n a l budget was s t i l l only £53 m i l l i o n s and 
the r e were no reserves or means f o r r a i s i n g t h a t sum. A Mbook t r a n s a c t i o n " 
would have l e f t many banks w i t h considerable d e f i c i t s and caused many 
bankrupcies, which would have a f f e c t e d other areas of the economy. 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e s were repayment or the conversion t o government 
debts. But t h i s r e q u i r e d l e g i s l a t i o n and the deputies would not vote 
against t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s . 
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long as the matter was postponed, there could be no hope of any 
m a t e r i a l improvement i n the l i f e of the peasantry and no measure of 
f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y f o r any i n s t i t u t i o n whose existence was dependent 
on the payment of these outstanding loans. 
"Thanks t o the generosity of France i n postponing 
various debt settlements and also very l a r g e l y t o 
the m i n t i n g of 1,000 m i l l i o n dinars worth of new 
s i l v e r c o ins, i t i s s t i l l being found possible t o be 
keeping up the pretence of making ends meet i n the 
budget. But those d e a l i n g w i t h Government finances 
and those f a m i l i a r w i t h f i n a n c i a l p r a c t i c e i n t h i s 
c o u n t r y are only too w e l l aware t h a t o f f i c i a l s t a t e -
ments are l a r g e l y f i c t i t i o u s The monthly r e t u r n s 
published since (1932-3) show t h a t on the whole, 
expenditure i s being g r e a t l y reduced t o meet f a l l i n g 
revenues No o f f i c i a l statements w i t h regard t o 
the f l o a t i n g debt are being published and i t i s no 
doubt p i l i n g up a t an alarming e x t e n t . Unquestionable 
proof of t h i s i s given by the Government p r a c t i c e of 
81 
i s s u i n g bonds i n s t e a d of cash payments." 
One of the other major(4ad by no means unconnected) problems 
f a c i n g the country was t h a t of c o r r u p t i o n i n high places. A s i n g l e 
82 
instance w i l l s u f f i c e - t h a t o f the N a t i o n a l Bank:-
" I t i s common knowledge t h a t no less than 300 m i l l i o n s 
81. Board o f Overseas Trade memorandum on the Economic S i t u a t i o n i n 
Yugoslavia, 20 May 1933, C4590/266/92. ( V o l . I683O). 
82. Other examples would be the Bosnian land scandal. The Times, 
3 Mar. 1934, p. 11; or the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n p l a c i n g r a i l w a y - b u i l d i n g 
c o n t r a c t s by R a d i v o j e v i c , M i n i s t e r o f Communications, which cost the 
Yugoslav Government 800 m i l l i o n dinars ( £4 m i l l i o n s ) . Henderson t o 
Simon, 3 Mar. 1934, R1568/30/92. 
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( i e . £lj m i l l i o n ) o f the Bank's c a p i t a l has been 
withdrawn i n the form of c r e d i t s t o themselves by 
the Governor and f o u r of the p r i n c i p a l d i r e c t o r s , 
none of whom are i n a p o s i t i o n t o replace the 
•credits and they have only been spared bankrupcy 
t o save the face of the Bank. A f u r t h e r 400 m i l l i o n s 
( i e . £2 m i l l i o n s ) i s known t o have been d i v i d e d as 
c r e d i t s among 25 other persons, e i t h e r d i r e c t o r s or 
f r i e n d s of the Bank. 
A moratorium has been granted i n the case of 
many o f the more important banks and the remainder 
are doing p r a c t i c a l l y no business I t i s g e n e r a l l y 
recognized t h a t the banking system w i l l sooner or 
l a t e r have t o be completely re-organized and undoubt-
83 
edly a large number of banks w i l l never be r e h a b i l i t a t e d . " 
I n the autumn of 1933> a f t e r considerable d i p l o m a t i c success 
abroad, King Alexander returned home w i t h the express i n t e n t i o n of 
coming t o g r i p s w i t h the domestic problems f a c i n g h i s country. I n 
t h i s , he acted from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h . On November 23, 1933s 
v / 
Dr Srskic announced t h a t , on the King's orders, the Government intended 
t o use i t s parliamentary a u t h o r i t y t o issue by decree a whole s e r i e s 
rtc 
of measures c a l c u l a t e d t o r e l i e v e the economic s i t u a t i o n . Amongst 
86 
these, were the repayment of peasant debts, the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of 
83. Board o f Overseas Trade Memorandum on the Economic S i t u a t i o n i n 
Yugoslavia, 20 May 1933, C4590/266/92. 
84. Henderson noted:- "Not since I have been here has h i s p o s i t i o n i n 
the country been stronger than i t i s today." Henderson t o Sargent, 
16 Oct. 1933, C9173/663/92. ( V o l . 16830). 
85. Henderson t o Simon, 27 Nov. 1933, C10526/266/92. 
86 By the new d r a f t laws, i t was intended t h a t the peasants would 
l i q u i d a t e t h e i r debts over a perio d of 12 years, beginning 14 Feb. 1934. 
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f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , the promotion of p u b l i c works t o r e l i e v e 
unemployment and new laws f o r banks and co-operative s o c i e t i e s . 
Behind a l l t h i s , t h e r e were plans f o r a g r e a t l y increased t a x a t i o n 
t o meet the cu r r e n t d e f i c i t - an increase amounting t o 650 m i l l i o n 
87 
dinars ( i e £3 m i l l i o n s ) . 
As i n the past, so now, the plans f o r reform became embroiled 
i n the f i n a n c i a l committee of the Skupstina. Nor could the Cabinet 
88 
agree. The f i n a n c i a l measures and the budget f o r 1934 would prove 
very unpopular. On January 24, 1934, Dr Srskic went t o see the King 
- most probably t o t e l l him t h a t there was l i t t l e hope of h i s p o l i c i e s 
being approved. By a l l a c c o u n t s , i t was a stormy meeting. Dr Srskic 
o f f e r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n and, a t the end of the meeting, the King 
t o l d Srskic t h a t 'toot o nly d i d he accept h i s r e s i g n a t i o n but he 
89 
never wanted t o see him again." 
There were many reasons why Alexander was w i l l i n g t o accept 
h i s Prime M i n i s t e r T s r e s i g n a t i o n , not l e a s t because of the delay i n 
implementing reform and the r e f u s a l of the Government t o t a c k l e 
c o r r u p t i o n . But, according t o Dr S r s k i c T s p u b l i c statements a f t e r the 
meeting, h i s r e s i g n a t i o n was simply due t o the f a c t t h a t he was against 
the higher taxes which were t o be introduced i n the forthcoming budget. 
This Alexander could not accept. He published a form a l r e p u d i a t i o n 
of Dr S r s k i c T s statements. He t o l d S i r Nevile Henderson t h a t "he was 
t i r e d o f shouldering the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e v e r y t h i n g which was 
unpopular i n the land and he was going t o h i t back." And what was more,; 
he had informed Dr Srskic p r i v a t e l y t h a t , i f he went on spreading l i e s , -
90 
he would put him i n p r i s o n . 
87. The Times. 25 Jan. 1934, p. 9. 
88. Telegram from Henderson t o Foreign O f f i c e , 24 Jan. 1934, R467/30/92 
89. Henderson t o 0»Malley, 17 Feb. 1934, R1244/30/92. 
90. I b i d . 
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As h i s new Prime M i n i s t e r , the King chose Niko l a Uzunovic, 
a one-time Prime M i n i s t e r i n the pre-1929 Skups'tina^ who had been 
M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t p o r t f o l i o i n many of the Cabinets under the d i c t a t o r -
s h i p . The most c h a r i t a b l e d e s c r i p t i o n of Uzunovic was t h a t he was "an 
92 
o l d Serbian Radical hack" and, c e r t a i n l y , he represented no improv-
ement on h i s predecessor except t h a t he d i d manage t o get the 1934 
Budget through the Skups'tina.^ I t was a s u r p r i s i n g choice on the 
p a r t o f Alexander. But perhaps i t was again only a temporary expedient. 
For there i s evidence t o suggest t h a t King Alexander was planning 
94 
another of h i s s u r p r i s e s . 
I n May 1934, the King t o l d Henderson t h a t he was working on plans 
f o r greater d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and l o c a l autonomy which he would event-
95 
u a l l y present t o h i s M i n i s t e r s as a f a i t accompli:-
"He had had before him f o r some t i m e , " i t was r e p o r t e d , 
the d r a f t o f an amended C o n s t i t u t i o n . He had a t l a s t 
decided t o y i e l d t o the advice of most o f the d i s s i d e n t s 
96 
and have a f e d e r a l Kingdom. For democracy t o have a 
91. See "Biographies". 
92. Comment by Foreign O f f i c e o f f i c i a l on news of h i s appointment. 
Telegram from Henderson t o Foreign O f f i c e , 24 Jan. 1934, R467/30/92. 
93. Henderson t o Simon, 14 Feb. 1934, R1246/1246/92, gives d e t a i l s 
o f the 1934 budget. Even a f t e r pruning by the f i n a n c i a l committee, 
t a x a t i o n (both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t ) rose by 12^% (538 m i l l i o n d i n a r s ) . 
Shops i n Belgrade closed as a one-day p r o t e s t . 
94- H.F. Armstrong, " A f t e r the Assassination of King Alexander", 
Foreign A f f a i r s . (New Y o r k ) , Jan. 1935, pp. 207-208. 
95. The Kings own words. Henderson t o Simon, 6 May 1934, R2.935/3P/92. 
96. I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t the King fs conversion t o f e d e r a l i s m - w i t h 
g r e a t e r autonomy f o r the Banovinas - increased a f t e r h i s month-long 
s t a y i n Zagreb from December 1933-January 1934. The Queen had spent 1 
s e v e r a l weeks i n Croatia i n October-November 1933 and i t was believed 
t h a t what she heard a l s o i n f l u e n c e d King Alexander fs o p i n i o n . Henderson 
t o Simon, 24 Dec. 1933, R30/30/92. ( F i l e d under 1934, Vol. 18452). 
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"chance, the jealous races must be put i n f e d e r a l 
compartments. He would grant autonomy on the American 
pl a n . Each of the e x i s t i n g provinces would become a 
separate s t a t e w i t h r e s i d e n t governor, s t a t e e l e c t i o n s , 
domestic budget, c o n t r o l o f education and p o l i c e , but 
federated i n the u n i t y o f Yugoslavia w i t h the King above 
p a r t y and s t a t e . He s a i d t h a t he had decided t o give 
e f f e c t t o t h i s a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from France. Then he 
would announce a general e l e c t i o n and appoint a new 
Prime M i n i s t e r having r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o Parliament. 
97 
I n h i s mind, he had moved towards freedom " 
There seems l i t t l e doubt t h a t some such plans were i n King Alexander Ts 
mind, but whether they were of such a generous and l i b e r a l conception 
i s open t o question. What the King s a i d t o Henderson was t h a t he had 
decided t o give more autonomy t o the l o c a l Banovinas, so t h a t i f t h i n g s 
went wrong i n Cr o a t i a , i t would be the Ban and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Croatia 
t h a t would get the blame; not Belgrade. And, i n a most r e v e a l i n g s l i p 
o f the tongue, the King added t h a t " i t would be easier f o r him t o 
98 
c o n t r o l nine Bans than three hundred odd deputies." 
97. S. Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) PP« 47-8. Graham 
says t h a t h i s evidence f o r the King Ts views a t t h i s time came from 
J e v t i c 7 , Yugoslav Foreign M i n i s t e r and l a t e r Prime M i n i s t e r , who was 
w i t h the King on the journey t o France. Macek says t h a t w h i l s t he was 
i n p r i s o n , the King contacted him through Subasic, because he was 
anxious about unrest i n Croati a . Macek refused t o help Alexander i n any 
way so long as he was i n p r i s o n . However, a few days before the King's 
v x s i t t o France, Subasic reported the King as saying: " I s h a l l f r e e him 
oncmy r e t u r n from France. But then I s h a l l deal w i t h him i n person." 
V. Macek, I n the Struggle f o r Freedom, pp. 153-4. Macek was released 
by Prince Paul on December 22, 1934. Before he l e f t f o r France, the King 
also spoke of the impending release of Dr Korosec and f o u r other Slov-
enes who were i n t e r n e d . They were t o be released w h i l s t he was away. 
Henderson t o Simon, 13 Oct. 1934, R5743/30/92."* 
98. Henderson t o Simon, 6 May 1934, R2935/30/92. 
Ouvb oxoovvv.pawe'd towjs- <D©&M -powv .SpUt +£> Beig-rtxQe. 
175 
Chapter 8 
The Royal Diplomat 
176 
I t was perhaps a r e l i e f f o r King Alexander t o t u r n from 
h i s t r o u b l e s a t home t o the more rewarding f i e l d o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
There, a t l e a s t , he was a f r e e agent. Unlike h i s plans f o r the i n t e r n a l 
development of Yugoslavia, which must needs be handled by i n e p t min-
i s t e r s and cut t o pieces by a f r a c t i o u s assembly, the conduct of 
Yugoslav f o r e i g n p o l i c y could be done i n h i s own way and i n h i s 
own t i m e . 
Recognizing t h a t I t a l y represented the most serious t h r e a t t o 
the i n t e g r i t y and s e c u r i t y of h i s Kingdom, Alexander had spent the 
f i r s t f o u r years of h i s d i c t a t o r s h i p t r y i n g t o come t o some long-term 
understanding or agreement w i t h M u s s o l i n i . Both orthodox and unorthodox 
channels of diplomacy had been used - t o no e f f e c t . I t was c l e a r - as 
indeed i t had always been c l e a r - t h a t I t a l y d i d not l i k e a s t r o n g 
Slav neighbour on the other side of the A d r i a t i c and t h a t , f a r from 
seeking a peaceful settlement o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , M u s s o l i n i was 
onl y i n t e r e s t e d i n Yugoslavia's d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . R e l u c t a n t l y accepting 
t h i s unhappy f a c t , King Alexander gave up h i s e f f o r t s t o woo I t a l y . 
I n s t e a d , he embarked upon a new p o l i c y which would achieve f o r h i s 
country a new place and a new r o l e i n European a f f a i r s ; a p o l i c y 
which would perhaps improve the standing of h i s regime a t home and 
e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g s e c u r i t y f o r Yugoslavia abroad. 
1. From J u l y 1932, King Alexander's Foreign M i n i s t e r was Bogoljub 
J e v t i c ' (see Biographies). J e v t i c was M i n i s t e r of the Court from Jan-
v r 
uary 1929 and was r e l a t e d by marriage t o General Z i v k o v i c . He was 
t h e r e f o r e very much a "King's man". 
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Since 1921, Yugoslavia had been a member of the L i t t l e 
Entente, a p o l i t i c a l combination of Central European s t a t e s , whose 
c h i e f aims were t o uphold the t r e a t i e s concluded a t the end of the 
war, t o maintain peace and prevent - by f o r c e , i f necessary - a 
2 
r e s t o r a t i o n of Habsburg r u l e . Every year, the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s of 
the three c o u n t r i e s came together t o discuss the problems f a c i n g 
Europe and the Entente, seeking a common approach t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
disputes and planning how best they might co-operate w i t h i n the 
League o f Nations t o reach a peaceful s o l u t i o n . This they had done 
f o r eleven years w i t h growing confidence and success. By 1932, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a Habsburg r e s t o r a t i o n seemed remote indeed. But there 
were by now much grea t e r t h r e a t s t o European s e c u r i t y . There was the 
economic depression which had caused grave d i s t r e s s i n a l l the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s t a t e s of C e n t r a l and South-Eastern Europe; there was 
the clamour f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n by A u s t r i a , Hungary and Bulgaria 
(assiduously encouraged by I t a l y ) ; and, most serious of a l l , a 
resurgence of German m i l i t a r i s m , the demand f o r e q u a l i t y of arma-
ments and the t h r e a t of H i t l e r . I n the face of these problems, each 
of which threatened the c a r e f u l l y - c o n s t r u c t e d s e c u r i t y of Europe, i t 
was n a t u r a l t h a t the L i t t l e Entente c o u n t r i e s should j o i n more c l o s e l y 
t o g e t h e r . 
I n December 1932, a t the second h i g h - l e v e l conference i n less 
2. The L i t t l e Entente consisted o f Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugo-
s l a v i a and was founded on t r e a t i e s between Rumania and Czechoslovakia 
(23 Apr. 1921), Rumania and Yugoslavia (7 Jun. 1921) and Czechoslov-
a k i a and Yugoslavia (21 Aug. 1922). These t r e a t i e s had been renewed 
on 21 May 1929 and an Act of Consolidation, A r b i t r a t i o n and J u d i c i a l 
R e gulation added t o them. From 1930, the L i t t l e Entente permitted any 
one of i t s f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s t o act on behalf of the others i n cases 
o f emergency. 3. On 29 Aug. 1932, France received a note from 
Germany suggesting e q u a l i t y o f armaments. When France refused, Germany 
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference. This was before the advent 
of H i t l e r . 
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than a year, the member states of the L i t t l e Entente decided t o put 
t h e i r a l l i a n c e on a f i r m e r f o o t i n g . There would be a Permanent Council 
of t h e i r Foreign M i n i s t e r s , a permanent s e c r e t a r i a t and an Economic 
Council t o promote a greater volume o f trade between them.^ As a 
r e s u l t o f t h e i r d e c i s i o n , a Pact of Organization of the L i t t l e 
Entente was signed on February 16, 1933• From t h i s moment onward, 
the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s o f the three d i f f e r e n t c ountries would proceed 
as one. No member would s i g n any other p o l i t i c a l t r e a t y w i t h o u t the 
consent of i t s two p a r t n e r s ; nor would any economic agreement having 
p o l i t i c a l consequences be made w i t h o u t the unanimous approval of 
the Entente Council. The Foreign M i n i s t e r s would now meet three times 
a year - ins t e a d o f j u s t once - and the o r i g i n a l t r e a t i e s o f a l l i a n c e 
5 
were extended f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . 
The L i t t l e Entente Pact was not conceived of as an exclusive 
or inward-looking o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t was considered t o be the f i r s t step 
i n the f o r m a t i o n of a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l community which would include 
a l l C e n t r a l Europe.^ E a r l i e r i n 1932, i t had been hoped t h a t a con-
f e d e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g a l l the Danubian nations might be achieved and 
M. Tardieu, the French Prime M i n i s t e r , had c i r c u l a t e d a memorandum 
proposing t h a t A u s t r i a and Hungary, together w i t h the L i t t l e Entente, 
should work out a means of economic co-operation between them. Once 
agreement was reached, the Great Powers would provide funds f o r a 
"durable r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " of each of the Danube s t a t e s . This had been 
4. Foreign O f f i c e summary of Y u g o s l a v - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s i n 1932, 
C376/44/92. ( F i l e d under 1933, Vol. 16828). 
5. R. Machray, The Struggle f o r the Danube and the L i t t l e Entente, 
1929-38, (London 1938) pp. 111-119. A f u l l t e x t o f the Pact of Org-
a n i z a t i o n can be found i n N.J. Padelford, Peace i n the Balkans, 
New York 1935) pp. 190-193. 6. Speech by Dr Benes t o Czech-
o s l o v a k i a ^ Parliament, 1 Mar. 1933, "Le Pacte d T o r g a n i z a t i o n de l a 
P e t i t e Entente e t L»Etat A c t u e l de l a P o l i t i q u e I n t e r n a t i o n a l e . " 
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a most promising idea, which would have done much t o remove the 
p o l i t i c a l vacuum i n Central Europe. But Germany was against i t ; 
I t a l y was opposed and M. Tardieu, h i m s e l f , was defeated i n the French 
7 
e l e c t i o n s . I n t h e absence o f the Great Powers, n e i t h e r A u s t r i a nor 
Hungary showed much de s i r e t o make any agreement w i t h the Entente 
and so, l e a v i n g the way open, should any other s t a t e wish t o j o i n , 
Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia embarked upon a p o l i c y , not 
only o f mutual s e c u r i t y , but a l s o of economic u n i t y and c o n s o l i d a t i o n 
i n Central and Eastern Europe. 
I t was t h i s p o l i c y which King Alexander now made h i s own. 
On January 23, 1933, he t r a v e l l e d t o Sinaia and held i n f o r m a l t a l k s 
w i t h King Carol and members of the Rumanian government. I t was h i s 
f i r s t such v i s i t abroad and proved very s a t i s f a c t o r y . I t was agreed 
t h a t , i f I t a l y were t o a t t a c k Yugoslavia, Rumania would m o b i l i z e 
350,000 men t o discourage Hungary or Bulgaria from j o i n i n g i n the 
a t t a c k and Yugoslavia would do the same f o r Rumania, should she 
become engaged i n war w i t h Russia. I n a d d i t i o n , i t was agreed t h a t 
a new bridge should be b u i l t across the Danube a t Turnu Severin, 
g 
l i n k i n g the two c o u n t r i e s . 
I t a l y , t o o , was i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n business a t t h i s moment. 
Considerable earthworks were being r a i s e d near Fiume, blockhouses 
were being set up and a large new motor road was being b u i l t i n great 
9 
haste t o l i n k Fiume w i t h T r i e s t e . There was also much r o a d - b u i l d i n g 
i n A l b a n i a . ^ At the same ti m e , i n f o r m a t i o n reached the Yugoslav gov-
ernment t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s had arranged f o r large-scale t e r r o r i s t 
7. Machray, op. c i t . , pp 88-93. 
8. P a l a i r e t (Bucharest) t o Simon, 31 Jan. 1933, C1742/663/92. 
9. S i r Ronald Graham (Rome) t o Simon, 10 Jan. 1933, C540/44/92. The 
road was due t o be complete i n October 1933• 
10. H.D. Harrison, The Soul o f Yugoslavia, (London 1941) p. 237. 
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incursions from Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria to be mounted i n 
the spring."'""'" I n the past, such reports would have created anxiety 
i n Belgrade but on t h i s occasion, as Henderson noted, there was a 
quiet confidence:-
"A good deal of t h i s increased confidence 
i s c e r t a i n l y due to the re-organization of the 
L i t t l e Entente which has given t h i s people the 
impression that, together with Czechoslovakia 
and Rumania, they r e a l l y almost constitute the 
12 
f i f t h great power m Europe." 
Confident i n his new-found strength, King Alexander hinted that he 
13 
might make some pre-emptive s t r i k e - possibly against Bulgaria. 
E a r l y i n February, he ordered widespread troop movements throughout 
the country and sent major re-inforcements to the Bulgarian border. 
These m i l i t a r y movements caused considerable anxiety to the I t a l i a n s ' ^ 
and led .to a sudden halt i n the I t a l i a n press campaign against the 
15 
Entente, s i l e n c i n g even the most die-hard anti-Yugoslav newspapers. 
I t a l y was swift to r e a l i z e the importance of the new pact and 
to see how great an obstacle i t was to her own designs i n Central 
Europe. I n March 1933, when the B r i t i s h Prime Minister was v i s i t i n g 
Rome, Mussolini suggested the idea of a Pact between the four Great 
Powers of Europe ( B r i t a i n , France, Germany and I t a l y ) Together, they 
would deliberate on a l l the problems facing the continent and, when 
they had reached agreement, they should make i t t h e i r task to see 
that t h e i r decisions were obeyed. Accompanying t h i s suggestion was 
11. Henderson to Simon, 22 Feb. 1933, C2183/44/92. 
12. Henderson to Simon, 17 Apr. 1933, C3795/24/92. 
13. Henderson to Samon, 22 Feb. 1933, C2183/44/92. 
14. Henderson to Simon, 16 Feb. 1933, C1866/1866/92.. 
15. Graham (Rome) to Vansittart, 10 Mar. 1933, C2388/44/92. 
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a proposal that the Pact should allow equality of arms to Germany, 
Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria and that steps should be taken to 
revise the Peace Treaties under A r t i c l e XIX of the Covenant. I n 
return for the Pact, there would be a guarantee of peace for ten 
years throughout Europe. 
Opposition to Mussolini !s proposal was widespread and vehement 
i n the L i t t l e Entente, Poland and the B a l t i c s t a t e s ; arid t h e i r press 
17 
was unanimous i n condemning i t . Just at the moment when the L i t t l e 
Entente had established i t s e l f - perhaps not as a Great Power - but 
ce r t a i n l y as the predominant power i n Central Europe - Mussolini 
was proposing that other nations, including H i t l e r * s Germany, should 
decide the fate of Europe over t h e i r heads. The rejectio n of the 
Four Power Pact was the f i r s t concerted act by the newly-organized 
Entente. Statesmen i n Western Europe were, at f i r s t , w i l l i n g to give 
a cautious welcome to the Pact, hoping that perhaps i t might s i g n i f y 
18 
an end to the h o s t i l i t y between I t a l y and France. But the'members 
of the Entente made i t abundantly clear that the Pact was not only 
contrary to the whole s p i r i t of the 1 League, but also that good 
relations between nations could hardly be helped by agreements aimed 
at the disposal or rights belonging to other s t a t e s . A s p e c i a l Conf-
16. Machray, The Struggle for the Danube...., pp. 119-128. 
17. I t was i n hearing J e v t i c / f s speech to the Skupstina on the iniqu-
i t i e s of the Pact - a judicious, sober and dignified speech - that 
Henderson Ts opinion of Jevticf increased 100$. Previously he had 
described him as "untrustworthy and inadequate". 'Henderson to Simon, 
5 J u l . 1932, C5966/433/92, and Henderson to Vansittart, 2 Apr. 1933, 
C3363/3363/92. 18. And correspondingly between I t a l y 
and Yugoslavia. This was the substance of A l i o s i f s t a l k s with J e v t i c 
i n Geneva. A l i o s i asked Yugoslavia not to be a f r a i d of the Pact bec-
ause i t would help I t a l y T s relations with France. Jevtic" suggested 
immediate Yugoslav-Italian t a l k s i n Rome i f t h i s were so. But A l i o s i 
s a i d that t h i s would be better a f t e r the Pact had been signed. 
Henderson to Simon, 26 Jun. 1933, C6074/44/92. 
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erence o f the Entente was c a l l e d , representations were made t o 
B r i t i s h and French leaders and, by June 1933, the M u s s o l i n i pact 
cl 
was reduced t o c o n s u l t a t i v e t r e a t y which recognized the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t the r i g h t s o f every s t a t e could not be a f f e c t e d w i t h o u t the 
19 
consent of the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y . 
The a c t i o n of the Entente had proved successful. By c a r e f u l l y 
concerted a c t i o n , they had made t h e i r o p i n i o n f e l t . But i t was c l e a r 
t h a t , i n the general u n c e r t a i n t y of the times, there would be s i m i l a r 
20 
t h r e a t s t o the s m a l l countries of Europe and t h a t unless the 
Entente stood f i r m , the peace se t t l e m e n t , the Covenant and the League 
might e a s i l y be undermined. I n June 1933, t h e r e f o r e , the f i r s t steps 
were taken t o set up the Economic Council of the Entente. Each 
country appointed a team o f f i v e delegates, a s s i s t e d by expe r t s , 
whose j o b i t was t o examine the commercial, a g r a r i a n , i n d u s t r i a l and 
f i s c a l p o l i c i e s o f the th r e e s t a t e s t o decide where co-operative 
a c t i v i t y could begin. The u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s of the Council were t o 
be a common economic programme but i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s would 
take some time. I n the meantime, mixed Chambers of Commerce were t o 
be e s t a b l i s h e d and s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n would be given t o j o i n t ventures 
21 
i n s h i p p i n g , a v i a t i o n , posts, telegraphs and touri s m . 
During the l a t e summer, King Alexander began t o make h i s own 
di p l o m a t i c moves. On September 18, he caused considerable s u r p r i s e by 
22 
spending an hour t a l k i n g t o King Boris i n the s t a t i o n a t Belgrade. 
King B o r i s , who had long been supported by I t a l y and whose a t t i t u d e t o -
19. Machray, The Struggle f o r the Danube pp. 126-8. 
20. For in s t a n c e , a t the World Economic Conference i n June 1933, 
Germany submitted a memorandum s t a t i n g t h a t her economic problems 
could, o n l y be solved by her permanent c o n t r o l o f raw m a t e r i a l s i n 
South-West Russia and South-East Europe. I b i d . , p. 129. 
21. I b i d . , pp. 127-8 
22. The Times, 19 Sept. 1933, p. 12-
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23 wards the IMRO extremists was ambiguous i n the extreme, had never 
met or spoken t o Alexander since 1918. Both kings had been i n 
opposing camps. The meeting was a f i r s t step on King Alexanders 
p a r t t o b r i n g Bulgaria i n t o some clos e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
Entente. 
Later i n the same month, King Alexander was present a t the 
25 
L i t t l e Entente Conference a t Sinaia. At the meeting, the recent 
26 
Nazi disturbances i n A u s t r i a were discussed ( i n the l i g h t o f the 
27 
r e c e n t l y signed convention d e f i n i n g "aggression") and the f i r s t 
s e r i e s o f proposals produced by the Economic Council were accepted 
28 
and approved. When the Conference was over, King Alexander t r a v -
23. D. Shepherd, "Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 1918-41" 
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis - U n i v e r s i t y of Durham) p. 128. 
24 . I t was the more s u r p r i s i n g because f o r years, King Boris had 
beli e v e d - or said t h a t he bel i e v e d - t h a t King Alexander was behind 
attempts t o assassinate him. J.Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy (London 
1939) p. 209. 25 . September 25-27, 1933. 
26 . During the year 1933, bomb attacks had reached the l e v e l o f 
200 a year; t h e r e was a considerable number o f attacks on the Jewish 
community and r e g u l a r rumours o f Anschluss. I n A p r i l 1933, D o l l f u s s 
v i s i t e d M u s s o l i n i t o ask f o r help and again went t o see him a t Rice-
ione i n August. Benes was i n favour of an Austro-Hungarian Customs 
Union b u t , from time t o time, t h e r e were r e p o r t s t h a t King Alexander • 
was i n favour of Anschluss i f only as a counterbalance t o I t a l y . 
See Annual Report f o r 1931, C53/53/92 ( F i l e d under 1932, Vol. 15994). 
Also, The Times, 21 A p r i l 1931, p. 13. Also a l e t t e r from Henderson 
t o V a n s i t t a r t , 22 Dec. 1933, R59/59/92 ( F i l e d under 1934, V o l . 18453) 
27. This was a convention signed i n London on J u l y 3 - 4 , 1933 between 
the USSR and eleven other s t a t e s . I t declared t h a t "support f o r forays 
by armed bands on another s t a t e " c o n s t i t u t e d an act of aggression. 
R.J. Kerner and H.N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the the Balkan 
Entente 1930-1935 (Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a 1936) pp. 117-9. 
28. I t was agreed t o co-operate on r a i l w a y and r i v e r t r a n s p o r t ; t o 
u n i f y t h e commercial and customs codes, t o ' a b o l i s h v i s a s , t o create a 
p o s t a l union. As a p r a c t i c a l s t e p , each s t a t e undertook t o draw up a 
l i s t o f commodities i t wished t o buy from the others i n 1934. Machray, 
op. c i t . , pp. 134-6. 
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e l l e d by sea, i n the Yugoslav Navy fs newly-acquired c r u i s e r , 
"Dubrovnik", t o Varna where he had a second meeting w i t h King Boris 
of B u l g a r i a . From t h e r e , he s a i l e d t o Constantinople f o r what was 
described as a p r i v a t e v i s i t . "The c h i e f s i g n i f i c a n c e of the v i s i t " , 
29 
wrote one observer, "was i t s occurence". The Turks themselves 
were s u r p r i s e d and d e l i g h t e d and t r i e d t o extend his s t a y , arranging 
s p e c i a l banquets and s i g h t - s e e i n g t o u r s . But King Alexander stayed 
only twenty-four hours. He managed t o have a p r i v a t e conversation 
w i t h Kemal A t a t u r k and, f i v e days a f t e r h i s v i s i t , i t was announced 
t h a t agreement had been reached f o r a Treaty o f Friendship and Non-
30 
Aggression between the two c o u n t r i e s , t o be signed l a t e r i n the year. 
From Constantinople, the King went t o Corfu where he met Greek 
leaders and thence returned home. S i r Nevile Henderson described 
the r o y a l t o u r as "a great success":-
"The contacts which His Majesty e s t a b l i s h e d 
are the best bases f o r developments....And 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , the impression created i n 
t h i s p a r t of the w o r l d has been most opp-
ortune and favourable.... i t i s the f i r s t 
time t h a t Yugoslavia has taken a leading 
31 
p a r t i n the game of Balkan u n i t y . " 
The v i s i t s of King Alexander were f o l l o w e d by many d i p l o m a t i c 
exchanges a t a lower l e v e l . T i t u l e s c u , the Rumanian Foreign M i n i s t e r , 
op 
t r a v e l l e d t o Sofia and Ankara. Jevtic' and the Turkish Foreign M i n i s t e r 
had t a l k s i n Geneva. I n November, the Turkish M i n i s t e r v i s i t e d Sofia 
and Belgrade. Gradually, i t became c l e a r t o observers o f the scene 
29- Mr Morgan (Constantinople) t o Simon, 12 Oct. 1933, C9174/663/92. 
30 . I t was signed on November 27 , 1933. 
3 1 . Henderson t o Sargent, 16 Oct. 1933, C9173/663/92. 
3 2 . A Rumanian-Turkish Treaty was signed on Oct. 18, 1933. Previous t o 
t h i s , a Turkish-Greek Pact was signed on September 14, 1933. 
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t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e s of King Alexander and the new s t r u c t u r e s of 
the l i t t l e Entente were not merely designed t o ensure the mutual 
s e c u r i t y of t h e i r three c o u n t r i e s , but t o achieve something much 
wider:-
" A l l these v i s i t s may be regarded as a c o l l e c t e d 
attempt by i n t e r e s t e d s t a t e s t o e s t a b l i s h a s e t t l e d 
guarantee of peace and amity i n South-East Europe. 
A powerful movement i s a f o o t i n almost every one of 
the s t a t e s concerned, t o l i b e r a t e Balkan and Central 
European diplomacy from the r i v a l r i e s o f the Great 
Powers. Behind t h i s r e s t s the b e l i e f t h a t the Balkan 
c o u n t r i e s , by s e t t l i n g t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s amongst 
themselves, may cease t o have an i n t e r e s t i n Cont-
i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e s and may thus make a d e c i s i v e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n towards the maintenance o f European 
33 
peace." 
By now, I t a l y had begun t o r e a l i z e the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f her own 
p o s i t i o n . She had l i t t l e l i k i n g f o r France and was s e r i o u s l y w o r r i e d 
as t o what might happen i n A u s t r i a . I f the Anschluss took place, 
what would be the German a t t i t u d e t o T r i e s t e r On October 14, 1933, 
H i t l e r announced t h a t Germany was withdrawing from both the League of 
Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The news of H i t l e r f s a c t i o n 
caused intense a n x i e t y i n Centr a l Europe and gave f u r t h e r encourage-
ment t o those who were t r y i n g t o form a new power bloc i n Eastern 
Europe. I n February 1933, Suvich, the I t a l i a n Secretary of State, 
had s a i d contemptuously t h a t t h ere was no p o i n t i n I t a l y having any 
3 3 . The Times, 11 Oct. 1933, P- 1 1 . 
3 4 . Henderson t o Simon, 27 Sept. 1933, C8744/44/92. 
3 5 . Henderson t o Simon, 23 Jan. 1933, C768/44/92. 
3 6 . Machray, The Struggle f o r the Danube , pp. 136-138. 
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dealings w i t h a " t o t t e r i n g regime" but now the leader of t h a t 
country, f a r from m a i n t a i n i n g himself by a "bloody r e p r e s s i o n " as 
37 
Suvich supposed, was t r a v e l l i n g round the Balkans encouraging 
f r e s h hopes and f r e s h a l l i a n c e s - c l e a r l y the c h i e f pace-maker i n 
Balkan diplomacy. By September 1933, I t a l y was h i n t i n g t h a t she 
was p e r f e c t l y ready t o meet the Yugoslavs half-way, "should the 
l a t t e r i n d i c a t e any d i s p o s i t i o n towards f r i e n d l i n e s s " . Indeed, i t 
was s a i d , t h a t the only reason why Signor G a l l i was s t i l l s e r v i n g 
i n Belgrade was because i t was proposed t o take a forward step i n 
38 
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia. 
J e v t i c , i n conversation w i t h S i r Nevile Henderson, agreed 
t h a t a l l the new developments i n the Balkans would be incomplete 
u n t i l Yugoslavia reached some understanding w i t h I t a l y , but there 
were obstacles t o such an understanding; i n f a c t , one obstacle i n 
p a r t i c u l a r - the King h i m s e l f . When Signor G a l l i returned from a 
v i s i t t o Rome i n November 1933* he t o l d the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r t h a t 
he had had a long i n t e r v i e w w i t h M u s s o l i n i whom he had found b e t t e r 
disposed than ever towards an agreement w i t h Yugoslavia and t h a t the 
I t a l i a n leader was q u i t e ready t o open n e g o t i a t i o n s on a long-term 
t r e a t y between them. Very unwisely, Henderson suggested t h a t he 
himself should r e l a y the o f f e r t o the King a t the e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y : -
" I mentioned t o His Majesty what M. G a l l i had 
t o l d me. The King f l a r e d up l i k e a r o c k e t . He 
said t h a t he d i d not want t o have anything t o 
do w i t h I t a l y . She was u t t e r l y , u n r e l i a b l e and 
f a l s e . An agreement w i t h her would be e n t i r e l y 
37 . Graham (Rome) t o Sargent, 18 Feb. 1933, C 1 9 5 2 M / 9 2 . 
3 8 . Henderson t o Simon, 27 Sept. 1933, C8744/44/92. Rumours of G a l l i T s 
departure had been a i r e d since December 1932. He e v e n t u a l l y departed 
i n January 1935 t o become I t a l i a n ambassador i n Ankara. 
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one-sided. He himself was a b s o l u t e l y l o y a l 
and i f he gave h i s word, he would keep i t . 
I t a l y never would. He was not going t o cheat 
his people by s i g n i n g an agreement t h a t they 
believed was genuine which he knew would not 
be. I t was, he s a i d , e x a c t l y as i f he had 
married the Queen knowing t h a t she intended t o 
deceive him. I f he had believed t h a t , he would 
not have married her and he was not going t o make 
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a t r e a t y w i t h Rome i n s i m i l a r circumstances." 
What Henderson d i d not know a t t h a t t i m e ^ was t h a t M u s s o l i n i had 
already put out f e e l e r s through a c e r t a i n Signor Cosmelli, f o r m e r l y 
F i r s t Secretary a t the I t a l i a n Legation i n Belgrade. Cosmelli had 
w r i t t e n t o a f r i e n d i n the Yugoslav Foreign M i n i s t r y s t a t i n g t h a t 
M u s s o l i n i was prepared t o o f f e r the most generous terms i n exchange 
f o r an agreement w i t h Yugoslavia. What M u s s o l i n i o f f e r e d were 
c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o the I t a l i a n f r o n t i e r i n Yugoslavia fs favour, 
a guarantee of the e x i s t i n g Yugoslav-Hungarian border and a s a t i s -
f a c t o r y arrangement between the two nations over Albania. I n r e t u r n , 
M u s s o l i n i demanded t h a t Yugoslavia surrender the i s l a n d of Krk, 
guarantee the I t a l i a n f r o n t i e r from Switzerland t o the A d r i a t i c and 
give up her membership of the L i t t l e Entente. On the King fs advice, 
t h i s magnanimous o f f e r was r e f u s e d . ^ 
3'9. Henderson t o V a n s i t t a r t , 25 Nov. 1933, C10569/44/92. 
40 . He was not t o l d u n t i l May 1934. 
4 1 . Henderson t o Simon, 6 May 1934, R2933/59/92. Italy»s de s i r e f o r a 
Yugoslav guarantee o f I t a l y f s f r o n t i e r i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect 
of M u s s o l i n i f s proposals. I t i s c l e a r t h a t he feared e i t h e r a German 
drang nach suden or a Yugoslav-German p a r t i t i o n of North-East I t a l y . 
A l l t h a t M u s s o l i n i d i d get from Yugoslavia i n the autumn of 1933 was 
a new trade t r e a t y t o replace the Commercial Treaty of 1924. 
Graham (Rome) t o Simon, 13 Nov. 1933, C10138/1231/92. 
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By December 1933, King Alexander was already too i n v o l v e d 
i n the next stage of Entente diplomacy t o be bothered w i t h unsubtle 
machinations by I t a l y . Together w i t h the Greek, Rumanian and Turkish 
leaders, he was about t o create a new p o l i t i c a l combination i n the 
Balkans which would support, strengthen and complement the L i t t l e 
Entente i n the n o r t h . 
The need f o r some such combination had been r e a l i z e d f o r s e v e r a l 
years. Ever since 1930, an u n o f f i c i a l s e r i e s of conferences had been 
h e l d , a t which the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r greater co-operation i n the 
Balkans had been considered. At f i r s t , the conferences had been 
concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h economic problems - more c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n 
areas of t r a n s p o r t and communications, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Customs 
Union, the c r e a t i o n of j o i n t Chambers of Commerce and I n d u s t r y - but 
very q u i c k l y , the delegates r e a l i z e d t h a t i f there was going t o be 
any worthwhile development or any r e a l economic co-operation between 
the d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , there would have t o be some measure o f 
p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . I t i s probable t h a t , had there been no e x t e r n a l 
t h r e a t t o nations such as Yugoslavia or Rumania, the conferences 
might have continued f o r some time before they made t h e i r p o i n t . 
But, i n the atmosphere of f e a r and a n x i e t y i n Europe, w i t h the 
s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g demands f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n and the renewal of 
German might ( w i t h the c e r t a i n dangers t h i s would pose f o r Eastern 
Europe), the g o a l of p o l i t i c a l confederation was no longer simply an 
a t t r a c t i v e idea; i t was an urgent necessity. And t h i s was recognized 
by the Fourth Balkan Conference meeting i n Salonika i n November 1 9 3 3 : _ 
"Our supreme duty i s t o advance more and 
more q u i c k l y i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n which i l l u m -
i n ates the i d e a l of the complete union of the 
42 . Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences...., pp. 3 0 - 4 1 . 
43- N.J. Padelford, Peace i n the Balkans, (New York 1935) pp. 13-22.-
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s i x Balkan n a t i o n s . " ^ 
But not a l l the nations were i n t e r e s t e d i n Balkan u n i t y . 
B u l g a r i a , f o r her p a r t , stood t o gain more from t r e a t y r e v i s i o n 
than from any a l l i a n c e w i t h Rumania or Yugoslavia; and Albania was 
by no means a f r e e agent. The v i s i t s t h a t King Alexander had made, 
were designed not only t o b r i n g a Balkan a l l i a n c e nearer, but also 
t o overcome the resentment and h o s t i l i t y between Bulgaria and her 
neighbours. Such changes could not be wrought o v e r n i g h t . A closer 
r e l a t i o n s h i p must be b u i l t . I n December 1933, King Boris and Queen 
45 
Ioanna came t o Belgrade f o r a four-day v i s i t . They were t r e a t e d t o 
s e v e r a l banquets and r e c e p t i o n s , a pheasant shoot, and they p a r t i c i p a t e d 
i n the b l e s s i n g o f the Slava cake i n the r o y a l chapel. Both the Bulg-
a r i a n Prime M i n i s t e r and Foreign M i n i s t e r were present d u r i n g the 
v i s i t and Mushanov t o l d the Press t h a t the v i s i t was intended t o 
"efface the sad memories of the past and t o f i g h t f o r the safeguarding 
of peace." He s a i d "he f e l t o p t i m i s t i c and convinced t h a t B u l g aria 
and Yugoslavia were advancing t o a happier f u t u r e . " ^ But despite 
a l l the optimism and the genuine welcome which was extended t o 
King B o r i s , the Bulgarian King s t i l l d i d not f e e l w i l l i n g t o j o i n 
i n any Balkan Entente. A trade agreement was signed between the two 
cou n t r i e s and a communique published, s t r e s s i n g the need f o r b e t t e r 
r e l a t i o n s , but n o t h i n g e l s e . I n January 1934, King Boris v i s i t e d King 
Carol i n Bucharest and again made i t p l a i n t h a t , w h i l s t B u l g aria was 
"LSI 
i n t e r e s t e d i n peace, she would not s i g n any pact/ 1" 
44 . Machray, The Struggle f o r the Danube and the L i t t l e Entente, 
(London 1938) p. 139. 
45 . December 10-13, 1933. 
4 6 . The Times, 14 Dec. 1933, p. 13-
4 7 . Machray, op. c i t . , p. 148. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , as T i t u l e s c u discovered 
on h i s v i s i t t o Sofia on Oct. 12-13 1933, B u l g a r i a s t i l l d i d not accept 
the Treaty of N e u i l l y as the post-war settlement i n the Balkans. 
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According t o the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade, h i s country-
f e l t unable t o si g n any document u n t i l her various disputes - no t a b l y 
w i t h Greece - had been s e t t l e d . I f these were s e t t l e d , then Bulgaria 
might s i g n pacts of f r i e n d s h i p and noh-aggression w i t h each of her 
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f o u r neighbours, but she would not be p a r t of an Entente. I t was 
ge n e r a l l y f e l t t h a t i f the Balkan nations were t o w a i t u n t i l these 
disputes were s e t t l e d , they might w a i t a very long time. But,on the 
other hand, what value would a Balkan Pact be - or what s t r e n g t h 
would a Balkan Entente have - i f B u l g a r i a d i d not j o i n ? There was 
the danger t h a t a Pact w i t h o u t B u l g a r i a might become a Pact against 
B u l g a r i a and then a l l Yugoslavia Ts f r i e n d l y e f f o r t s would be i n v a i n . 
The three f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s o f the Entente t r a v e l l e d t o Belgrade on 
January 23 , 1934, t o discuss t h i s problem w i t h King Alexander. 
King Alexander, although most anxious t o consolidate the 
Balkan na t i o n s a t the e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y , was i n c l i n e d t o w a i t a 
l i t t l e l l o n g e r and give the Bulgarians time t o re-consider t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e . T i t u l e s c u claimed t h a t he had found an ingenious formula 
f o r a general guarantee f o r the s e c u r i t y o f Balkan f r o n t i e r s w i t h o u t 
undue i n s i s t e n c e on the s t a t u s q u o . ^ T s a l d e r i s , the Greek M i n i s t e r , 
s a i d t h a t whatever Pact they made, i t should be w r i t t e n i n such a way 
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t h a t Bulgaria could sign i t . But, although King Alexander was s t i l l 
51 
i n c l i n e d t o w a i t , events i n Europe d i c t a t e d a s w i f t s e t tlement. I n 
A u s t r i a , a s t a t e o f c i v i l war between D o l l f u s s and the S o c i a l i s t s was 
4 8 . The Times, 25 Jan. 1934, p. 9. See also L.S. Stavrianos, Balkan 
Federation. A H i s t o r y of the Movement towards Balkan U n i t y i n Modern 
Times, (Northampton, Mass. 1944) pp. 238-9. 
49 . The Times. 24 Jan. 1934, p. 9. 50. The Times, 2 Feb. 1934, p. 11. 
5 1 . The Times, 24 Jan. 1934, p. 9. For a f u l l e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of King 
Alexander's f e e l i n g s towards Bulgaria a t t h i s t i m e , see Shepherd, 
Relations between Yugoslavia and Bu l g a r i a , 1918-41, pp. 145-53-
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i n the making and there was no t e l l i n g whether Germany might i n t e r v e n e , 
I t a l y go t o D o l l f u s s T support and Europe be plunged i n t o another war. 
The Yugoslavs overcame t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s . The Balkan Pact was i n i t i a l l e d 
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i n Belgrade on February 4 , 1934 and signed i n Athens f i v e days l a t e r . 
The f i r s t a r t i c l e of the Pact was a mutual guarantee of the 
s e c u r i t y o f a l l Balkan f r o n t i e r s . The second pledged the s i g n a t o r i e s 
not t o s i g n any p o l i t i c a l t r e a t y or assume any p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s 
t o any other Balkan country w i t h o u t the consent of the other partners 
T h i r d l y , the Pact was s a i d t o be open t o any other Balkan s t a t e and 
53 
t h e i r adherence would be warmly welcomed. 
There now e x i s t e d i n C e n t r a l and Eastern Europe two d i p l o m a t i c 
a l l i a n c e s , b i n d i n g together f i v e nations f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . 
The L i t t l e Entente was the guarantor of peace and s t a b i l i t y i n the 
Danube basin; the Balkan Entente i n the peninsula. Both these 
Ententes were designed t o m a i n t a i n the post-war s e t t l e m e n t , t o support 
t h e League o f Nations and t o r e s i s t t r e a t y r e v i s i o n . Each a l l i a n c e 
contained a group of s t a t e s whose combined populations e n t i t l e d them 
t o be considered ( n u m e r i c a l l y , a t l e a s t ) as a major European power,^ 
and t o g e t h e r , they amounted t o a p o l i t i c a l bloc 65,000,000 s t r o n g , 
second only t o the Soviet Union. The u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n of both 
Ententes was t o encourage the economic as w e l l as the p o l i t i c a l u n i t y 
o f t h e i r member s t a t e s and, t o g e t h e r , they c o n s t i t u t e d a considerable 
b e n e f i t t o peace and a p o t e n t i a l obstacle t o aggression i n Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
52. The f u l l t e x t of t h e Pact can be found i n Padelford, Peace i n 
the Balkans, pp. 186-7 53. I b i d . 
54- The Statesman's Year Book f o r 1933. The combined populations of 
the L i t t l e Entente were 46,050 , 325 - l a r g e r . i n number than France, 
B r i t a i n or I t a l y ; w h i l s t the combined p o p u l a t i o n of the Balkan Entente 
was 51 ,177 ,021 . The German p o p u l a t i o n was estimated a t 62 m i l l i o n s i n 
1933- Although the nations o f the Ententes were weak i n d u s t r i a l l y and 
m i l i t a r i l y , t h i s d i d not mean t h a t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l u n i t y was unimportant. 
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To those who had ambitions i n t h a t area, the c r e a t i o n of 
55 
a second Entente added considerably t o t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . The 
I t a l i a n response t o the s i g n i n g of the Pact was t o seek an even cl o s e r 
understanding w i t h A u s t r i a and Hungary. I n February 1934, Suvich 
t r a v e l l e d t o Vienna and Budapest and, the f o l l o w i n g month, D o l l f u s s 
and Gombos t r a v e l l e d t o Rome where a s e r i e s of protocols were 
signed. The f i r s t o f these was a c o n s u l t a t i v e pact p r o v i d i n g f o r 
r e g u l a r meetings between the three countries t o discuss matters of 
common concern. The second was an economic t r e a t y designed t o help 
Hungarian a g r i c u l t u r e and Au s t r i a n i n d u s t r y . Trade between them 
would be encouraged, f a c i l i t i e s i n the A d r i a t i c ports would be made 
a v a i l a b l e and a permanent commission of experts would be set up t o 
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formulate concrete proposals f o r f u t u r e economic development. 
This was i n many ways a smaller - and poorer - i m i t a t i o n of the 
Entente. But i t was s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , w h i l s t I t a l y was b u i l d i n g her 
own " r i v a l b l o c " , her Foreign Secretary f e l t o b l i g e d t o assure the 
Yugoslav M i n i s t e r i n Rome t h a t , i n whatever arrangements were made, 
57 
" I t a l y would always bear i n mind Yugoslav i n t e r e s t s . " 
The German r e a c t i o n t o the s i g n i n g o f the Pact was considerably 
more s u b t l e . The Germans knew p e r f e c t l y w e l l t h a t the Ententes were 
eg 
both d i r e c t e d against them. They also noted t h a t the power axis on 
which both pacts depended was the a x i s , Belgrade-Bucharest. Both 
nations were p a r t of the French a l l i a n c e system and t h i s was one of 
55. I n December 1933, the I t a l i a n Secretary of State^ Suvich, compl-
ained t h a t i t was very d i f f i c u l t t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h any member of the 
L i t t l e Entente, since one had t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h three nations a t once. 
Drummond (Rome) t o Simon, 9 Dec. 1933, C10899/44/92. 
56. The Protocols of Rome, March 17, 1934. I n Sept. 1933, I t a l y had 
submitted a memorandum on economic co-operation t o A u s t r i a and Hungary. 
Events i n Europe had an a c c e l e r a t i n g e f f e c t on t h i s - as on the Ententes. 
57. A l i o s i t o Ducic. Drummond (Rome) t o Simon, 2 Mar. 1934, R1422/59/92. 
58. I b i d . 
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the weak l i n k s i n the chain. Both Rumania and Yugoslavia were 
a g r i c u l t u r a l nations and both had s u f f e r e d considerably from the 
world depression. So, instead of a t t a c k i n g or r i v a l l i n g the Ententes 
i n any way, Germany set about i n c r e a s i n g trade w i t h Yugoslavia, buying 
up l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of Yugoslav products and paying f o r them prices 
w e l l above the world market l e v e l . The i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y was 
t h a t Yugoslavia - and the other Balkan countries - should become so 
dependent on Germany t h a t , e v e n t u a l l y , the economic weapon could be 
used as an instrument o f t a c t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l diplomacy t o d i v i d e 
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the Yugoslavs from t h e i r a l l i e s i n the East and the West. 
The f i r s t step i n t h i s process was the s i g n i n g of a Yugoslav-
German Commercial Treaty on May 1 , 1 9 3 4 . ^ The t r e a t y , which was very 
favourable t o Yugoslavia, was due t o come i n t o f o r c e t h e f o l l o w i n g 
month and l a s t f o r two years. J e v t i c t o l d Henderson t h a t he was very 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h the t r e a t y . Germany was anxious t o e s t a b l i s h her 
economic p o s i t i o n on the Danube and Yugoslavia was only too w i l l i n g 
t o get a commercial agreement i n her f a v o u r . ^ A f o r t n i g h t a f t e r the 
;59. G. Hutton, Danubian Destiny. A Survey a f t e r Munich^ (London 1939) 
describes the German methods o f economic p e n e t r a t i o n i n the Balkans, 
pp. 158-165 and 168-170. Yugoslav exports t o Germany rose from 8$ i n 
1929 t o 38$ i n 1938. Correspondingly, Yugoslav exports t o I t a l y dec-
reased from 25$ i n 1929 t o 9$ i n 1937. Henderson warned King Alexander 
of the dangers of such a course, as e a r l y as March 1934. Henderson t o 
V a n s i t t a r t , 9 Apr. 1934, R2295/59/92. 
60 . Henderson t o Simon, 5 May 1934, R2695/481/92. Together w i t h the 
Commercial Treaty, Yugoslavia signed a T o u r i s t and Consular Agreement. 
Mr Newton ( B e r l i n ) t o Foreign O f f i c e , 2 May 1934, R2587/481/92. The 
ways i n which Germany took advantage of t h i s agreement are o u t l i n e d 
i n H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-41 (London 
1945) p. 384- 6 1 . Henderson t o Simon, 6 May 1934, 
R2774/481/92. A secret supplementary agreement was signed on May 1 . 
This would increase Yugoslavia Ts minimum annual exports t o Germany 
•l-.ta--- £4.4 m i l l i o n s i n s t e a d of £3.85 m i l l i o n s as i n d i c a t e d i n the 
o f f i c i a l t r e a t y . I n exchange, Yugoslavia agreed t o denounce the (contd) 
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Treaty was signed, F i e l d Marshal Goering c a l l e d i n on Belgrade on 
h i s way t o Athens.He expressed himself " d e l i g h t e d " t o meet Yugoslav 
statesmen and t r i e d ( i n v a i n ) t o o b t a i n an audience w i t h the King. 
"The German people," he s a i d , "were g r a t e f u l t h a t a f t e r the world 
war, Yugoslavia had held out the hand of f r i e n d s h i p t o the German 
people w i t h o u t any reserve." ^ 
Although the Yugoslavs - and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , King Alexander.-
were under no i l l u s i o n s about Germany's ambitions, they were w i l l i n g 
t o show a greater measure of f r i e n d s h i p f o r Germany because, by 1934, 
Germany had es t a b l i s h e d h e r s e l f as the n a t u r a l counterweight t o 
I t a l y i n Central and Eastern Europe. Ever since H i t l e r had appeared 
and ever since the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Anschluss had increased, the I t a l i a n 
i n t r i g u e s against Yugoslavia had diminished. Even i n B u l g a r i a , one 
of I t a l y ' s s trongest a l l i e s , there had been a sudden coup d ' l t a t . 
A pro-Yugoslav government was esta b l i s h e d and immediate and successful 
steps taken t o destroy t h e t e r r o r i s t movement once and f o r a l l . ^ 
During h i s v i s i t t o Belgrade, Goering d i d not h e s i t a t e t o take 
advantage of Yugoslavia's t r a d i t i o n a l f e a r s and spoke of I t a l y w i t h 
65 
great b i t t e r n e s s and h o s t i l i t y . 
I n J u l y 1934, when there was an attempted Nazi coup i n A u s t r i a , 
the Yugoslavs gave help t o the Nazi t e r r o r i s t s who were f l e e i n g the 
(contd) a v i a t i o n agreement w i t h A i r France, f o r f l i g h t s from Belgrade 
t o Vienna and Budapest and concede the routes t o Germany's Lufthansa. 
Cowan (Belgrade) t o Carr, 11 June 1934, R3418/481/92. 
62 . Newton ( B e r l i n ) t o Simon, 25 May 1934, R293 9/293 9/92. 
63. S i r N. Henderson, Water Under the Bridges. (London 1945) p. 182, 
quotes Alexander as saying:- '•Yugoslavia's immediate danger i s I t a l y ; 
a f t e r her w i l l come Germany; but the l a s t and greate s t menace of a l l 
w i l l be Russia." 
64 . Shepherd, Relations between Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a , pp. 153-56. 
65. Henderson t o Sargent, 24 May 1934, R3186/2939/92. 
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c o u n t r y . ^ They made no complaint when the Yugoslav consulate a t 
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Kla g e n f u r t was damaged by bombing and there was reason t o bel i e v e 
t h a t some of the A u s t r i a n Nazi propaganda centres were t o be found on 
the Yugoslav side of the border. I t was also noted t h a t Yugoslav 
69 
e f f o r t s t o suppress such propaganda showed l i t t l e v i g o u r . I n 
August 1934, the I t a l i a n newspaper, Messagero, published an a l l e g e d l y 
genuine map of Grossedeutschland,with T r i e s t e and the Trentino i n 
70 
Germany and parts of Southern A u s t r i a i n Yugoslavia. King Alexander 
t o l d S i r Nevile Henderson t h a t he was q u i t e sure t h a t Germany would 
one day be supreme i n C e n t r a l Europe and t h a t i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t 
Yugoslavia would reach some understanding w i t h her. "Germany had 
assured him t h a t she regarded the u n i t y and s t a b i l i t y o f Yugoslavia 
71 
as a d e s i r a b l e and necessary f a c t o r i n European p o l i t i c s , " but he 
t o l d Henderson (on October 3 ) t h a t he had received r e l i a b l e r e p o r t s 
from a source w i t h i n the German Foreign O f f i c e t h a t " H i t l e r ' s main 
o b j e c t i v e s today i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y were a close understanding w i t h 
I t a l y and Hungary. As you w i l l see, s a i d His Majesty, no mention 
72 
of Yugoslavia!" 
Nevertheless, the growing independence of Yugoslavia i n f o r e i g n 
73 
p o l i c y and the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , l i k e Poland, she might make some 
b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y w i t h Germany, caused much a n x i e t y i n France. M. Barthou, 
the French Foreign M i n i s t e r , v i s i t e d Warsaw and Prague i n A p r i l and 
Bucharest and Belgrade i n June. His v i s i t s were designed t o discover 
66. Mr Murray (Rome) t o Simon, 11 Aug. 1934, R4556/59/92. 
67 . S i r W. Selby (Vienna) t o Simon, 13 Jan. 1934, R327/327/92. 
68. Mr Hadow (Vienna) t o Simon, 20 J u l y 1934, R4203/327/92. 
69 . Murray (Rome) t o Foreign O f f i c e , 23 Sept. 1934, R5207/59/92. 
70 . Murray (Rome) t o Simon, 11 Aug. 1934, R4556/59/92. 
7 1 . Henderson t o Simon, 6 May 1934, R2934/2934/92. 
72. Henderson t o Simon, 5 Oct. 1934, R5742/59/92. 
73 . The Polish-German Treaty was signed on January 26 , 1934. 
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how s t r o n g France Ts eastern a l l i a n c e s r e a l l y were and t o see 
whether an Eastern Pact, i n v o l v i n g the Soviet Union, could perhaps 
be achieved. M. Barthou was given a rapturous welcome i n Bucharest 
rtl 
and made an honorary c i t i z e n of Rumania. But h i s r e a l purpose was 
t o a t t e n d the Permanent Council of the L i t t l e Entente which was 
75 
meeting i n Bucharest from June 18-20. Barthou wanted t o be a t the 
Conference i n order t o make sure t h a t the L i t t l e Entente r e a l i z e d 
how important i t was t o create a s t r o n g d i p l o m a t i c f r o n t against 
H i t l e r i n Eastern Europe. The Russians themselves had seen the 
danger of German expansion and, on June 9, the L i t t l e Entente had 
taken the step of recognizing the Soviet Union and e s t a b l i s h i n g 
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . Both Czechoslovakia and Rumania had done t h i s 
77 
- 76 b u t , although J e v t i c was i n f a v o u r , the same could not be s a i d 
f o r King Alexander who had an intense l o a t h i n g f o r "bolshevism". 
On h i s v i s i t t o Belgrade, t h e r e f o r e , Barthou was not o n l y t r y i n g t o 
gauge the s t r e n g t h of the Franco-Yugoslav a l l i a n c e but also t o 
persuade King Alexander t o overcome h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o the Soviet 
Union and t o complete h i s already considerable achievements by 
78 
reaching accord w i t h Moscow. 
But King Alexander was not going t o be h u r r i e d i n t o any 
d e c i s i o n - l e a s t o f a l l a t r e a t y w i t h the Soviet Union - j u s t because 
France wanted i t . The Yugoslavs were now on good terms w i t h the Germans 
and the Germans - f o r obvious reasons - were s t o u t l y opposed t o any 
p o l i c y which might increase the French "encirclement" of t h e i r 
79 
country. Besides, the Yugoslavs were a l s o anxious t o reach some 
74 . Machray, op. c i t . , pp. 157-8. 
75 . I b i d . , pp. 155-6 . 76 . I b i d . , p. 155. 
77 . Henderson t o Simon, 25 June 1934, R3659/3643/92. 
78 . The Times. 26 June 1934, p. 13-
79. On September 10, 1934, Germany f o r m a l l y denounced the proposed 
Eastern Pact. 
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c l o s e r understanding w i t h Bulgaria and complete the t a s k of 
80 
c o n s o l i d a t i n g the Balkan n a t i o n s . Signing a t r e a t y w i t h the Soviet 
Union would gravely p r e j u d i c e the v i s i t King Alexander intended t o 
make t o Sofia i n September. I t could h a r d l y be imagined t h a t King 
Boris would welcome a Soviet a l l y ! I t was also f e l t t h a t France 
could have done a great deal more t o help Yugoslavia i n her economic 
81 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of the past few years. Why should Yugoslavia immed-
i a t e l y do what France wanted when France had done so l i t t l e t o help 
her a l l y when she was i n d i s t r e s s ? For a l l these reasons, King Alex-
ander was u n w i l l i n g t o make an immediate committment t o Barthou Ts 
p o l i c i e s . Nonetheless, the King allowed himself t o be persuaded t o 
the extent of promising t h a t he would v i s i t France some time i n the 
82 
autumn. 
What France had probably not y e t f u l l y r e a l i z e d was the extent 
t o which Yugoslavia had developed her own p o s i t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
since the e a r l y months of 1933• Yugoslavia was no longer a s a t t e l i t e 
of France. I n t a l k i n g t o Henderson about h i s forthcoming v i s i t , Alex-
ander stressed h i s determination not t o be dragged i n the wake (a l a 
remorque) of France. Yugoslavia was now a lea d i n g and i n f l u e n t i a l 
80. The Times, 26 June 1934, p. 13- According t o one w r i t e r , King 
Alexander had always p r e f e r r e d an a l l i a n c e w i t h B u l g a r i a t o any k i n d 
of Balkan Pact. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand. The Autobiography of a 
Rebel, So l d i e r and Statesman, (Chicago 1943) PP- 252-3 . 
8 1 . The Times, 26 June 1934, p. 13-
82. The French had o r i g i n a l l y proposed t h a t Alexander v i s i t France 
i n March 1934 as a demonstration of French support f o r the L i t t l e 
Entente. As such, the v i s i t had been announced i n the French Press 
i n March. For t h i s reason, the King decided not t o go. Henderson t o 
V a n s i t t a r t , 19 Mar. 1934, R2052/2052/92. The autumn v i s i t was promised 
as a personal gesture of f r i e n d s h i p t o Barthou. Mr Cowan (Belgrade) t o 
Carr, 28 June 1934, R3910/2052/92. I t has been s a i d t h a t , i f King 
Alexander had been a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch and had had a responsible 
Cabinet, h i s M i n i s t e r s might w e l l have opposed the v i s i t . S. Graham, 
Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) p. 31-
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member of two Ententes, e x e r c i s i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i n the a f f a i r s o f Central and Southern Europe. For her own s e c u r i t y 
- but not j u s t t o s u i t the French - Yugoslavia was w i l l i n g t o 
consider a pact w i t h Moscow. But King Alexander was i n s i s t e n t t h a t 
h i s country must preserve her f u l l independence of a c t i o n . I t d i d 
not seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t the v i s i t i n October would be very p r o d u c t i v e , 
and S i r Nevile Henderson, a f t e r l a st-minute conversations w i t h the 
King, reported t h a t the most t h a t could be expected would be a 
rtr 
r e - a f f i r m a t i o n o f the French a l l i a n c e . 
Before he l e f t f o r France, the King found himself i n v o l v e d 
i n another outburst of unpleasantness w i t h I t a l y . For months, the 
Yugoslav Press had avoided any clash w i t h the I t a l i a n s but - suddenly 
- i n September, both sides published a ser i e s o f polemics, a t t a c k i n g 
86 
each o t h e r . Whether t h i s o u t b u r s t was caused by I t a l i a n f e ars of 
a clos e r understanding between Germany and Yugoslavia or whether 
the I t a l i a n s r e a l l y feared t h a t Yugoslavia might l a y c l a i m t o the 
87 
Venezia G u i l i a , as I s t r a suggested, i s u n c e r t a i n . But many harsh 
t h i n g s were sai d - the most wounding being a j i b e i n a Yugoslav 
j o u r n a l t h a t the I t a l i a n army hel d the "world record f o r running 
88 
away".' Henderson believed t h a t the campaign had got out of hand 
because both J e v t i c ' and Alexander had been away - JwvtiCT i n Gmmva, 
83 . Henderson t o Sinon, 5 Oct. 1934, R5742/59/92. 
84. Jevtic' i s quoted as saying t h a t Alexander intended, on h i s r e t u r n 
from France, t o e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union, 
Graham, Alexander, p. 48 . This may have been J e v t i c T s view but I do 
not b e l i e v e i t was Alexander's. 
85. Telegram from Henderson t o Foreign O f f i c e , 6 Oct. 1934, R5482/5482/92 
86. Murray (Rome) t o Simon, 18 Sept. 1934, R5130/59/92; Cowan (Belgrade) 
t o Simon, 17 Sept. 1934, R5154/59/92; telegram from Henderson t o the 
Foreign O f f i c e , 2k Sept. 1934, R5236/59/92. 
87 . Murray (Rome) t o Foreign O f f i c e , 23 Sept. 1934, R5207/59/92. 
I s t r a was aZkgreb newspaper. 88 . Machray, op. cit.» p. 166. 
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89 the, King i n Sofia. Perhaps the h o s t i l e I t a l i a n feelings were 
90 
a reaction against Alexander Ts journey to France Perhaps 
they were a protest against his v i s i t to Bulgaria 
Ignoring the attitude of I t a l y , King Alexander and Queen 
Marie made a state v i s i t to Sofia at the end of September. The 
v i s i t was to repay that made by King Boris to Belgrade i n December 
1933 and, doubtless, King Alexander hoped that t h i s further gesture 
of friendship would bring a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement even 
clo s e r . Considering the legacy of hatred for Yugoslavia which had 
been generated for years within Bulgaria and the constant attacks of 
the Macedonians which had continued right up t i l l t h e i r dissolution 
i n May 1934, the reception King Alexander received was a considerable 
triumph. He walked with complete freedom and ease through the streets 
91 
of Sofia and showed no fear for his personal safety. When he came 
back to Belgrade, S i r Nevile Henderson said how glad he was to see 
him return unharmed. 
" I was never i n the le a s t nervous on that subject 
89. Henderson to Simon, 5 Oct. 1934, R5742/59/92. A t o t a l of 51 
a n t i - I t a l i a n a r t i c l e s appeared i n the Yugoslav press i n September 
1934 - af t e r many months without the s l i g h t e s t provocation (as even 
the I t a l i a n s admitted) Cowan to Carr, 4 Jan 1934, R219/59/92. But see 
also Henderson to Simon, 30 Sept. 1934, R5429/59/92 and C.F. M e l v i l l e , 
Balkan Racket, (London 1942) p. 31, which suggests that the King him-
s e l f may have been involved i n the Press campaign. I t i s worth noting 
that both B r i t a i n and France were suggesting that the time was ripe 
for an agreement between I t a l y and Yugoslavia. King Alexander did 
not think so. Henderson to Simon, 5 Oct. 1934, R5742/59/92. 
90. During Barthou's v i s i t i n June, the I t a l i a n f l e e t had manoeuvred 
off Durazzo. 
91. J . Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, (London 1939) p. 291, reports 
that several thousand extremist suspects were removed from Sofia 
before the v i s i t to prevent any untoward incident. 
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i n Bulgaria", said the King - and added, 
"That sort of thing i s much more l i k e l y 
92 to happen to me i n France than there." 
92. Henderson, Water Under the Bridges, p. 194. 
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Chapter 9 
Opposition and Regicide 
202 
When the d i c t a t o r i a l regime was f i r s t established, there 
were many who hoped that King Alexander would succeed where the 
p o l i t i c i a n s had f a i l e d . I t was hoped that, by f a i r l y d r a s t i c action, 
he might unite the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, put an 
end to corruption and graft i n high places and i n s t i t u t e new stand-
ards of conduct and morality i n government. To the Croats, the 
King's action was seen as an end to Serbian hegemony within the 
State and the beginning of a more ju s t and equitable treatment for 
themselves. The King appeared to be the one man who stood above 
party and parliament; the one man who had the good of a l l his people 
at heartj the one man who could be trusted.''" At f i r s t , i t was widely 
2 
believed that the Dictatorship would be a temporary expedient. 
Within a few months, people thought, the King would have put things 
i n order and normal parliamentary l i f e would be resumed. The regime 
i t s e l f also gave t h i s impression. 
But, by the time i t was rea l i z e d that there was no easy answer 
to Yugoslavia Ts problems and that the King could not achieve miracles 
1. The Times. 8 Jan. 1929, p. 14, records the enthusiastic reception 
given to the King's action i n newspapers i n Zagreb and favourable 
v 
reports from S p l i t , Sibenik, Subotica and Vinkovci. 
2. Kennard to Chamberlain, 4 Apr. 1929, C2468/97/92. (Vol. 13707). 
When King Alexander was asked how long the Dictatorship would l a s t , 
he said "several long months at l e a s t " . Kennard to Chamberlain, 
11 Jan. 1929, C480/97/92. (Vol. 13706). See also T. Stojkov, Opoz-
i c i . j a u vreme sesto.januarske diktature, 1929-35 (Belgrade 1969)p. 340. 
Also, Adamic, The Native's Return (New York 1934) pp. 343-4. 
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overnight, a l l means of public protest had been suppressed. The old 
p o l i t i c a l parties had been abolished, censorship imposed, meetings 
and associations forbidden and the police given strong powers to 
overcome a l l signs of opposition to the regime. There was therefore 
l i t t l e that the p o l i t i c i a n s could do. Ei t h e r they could sink t h e i r 
p r inciples and co-operate with the regime. Or e l s e , they r e t i r e d 
from public l i f e . As Dr Macek and others found to t h e i r cost, any 
i l l e g a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y very quickly led to a r r e s t , prison or 
internment. Even when the laws governing associations and meetings 
were relaxed i n 1933* there was s t i l l nothing that they could do. 
Neither the Serb nor the Croat p o l i t i c i a n s could reach any common 
decision - not even on how to attack the regime. The Serbs believed 
that a parliamentary solution was a p r i o r i t y ; the Croats, that a 
3 
solution of the "national question" should come f i r s t . They could 
not agree. They could not f i g h t . They were condemned to impotence. 
And the Dictatorship, knowing1 the sort of men they were, knew that 
i t had l i t t l e to fear from them. 
Unable to make any impression within Yugoslavia, Dr Macek 
sent several of his CPP colleagues abroad i n the hope that internat-
i o n a l pressure might be brought to bear on the King. On August 25, 
1929, Kosutic (Radic's son-in-law) and Dr Juraj Krnjevic l e f t the 
Kingdom s e c r e t l y and t r a v e l l e d to Vienna.^ I n September, Krnjevic 
sent a l e t t e r to the Secretariat of the league of Nations, drawing 
attention to the i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s of the m i l i a t r y dictatorship i n 
suppressing the Croat people. I n December 1929, Kosutic'and Krnjevic 
t r a v e l l e d to London to obtain the support of the B r i t i s h Government; 
3. Stojkov, Opozicija, p. 341. 
4. The Times, 28 Aug. 1929, p. 11. The Zivkovic government refused 
them permission to leave l e g a l l y . Dr Trumbic'and Radices widow also 
l e f t the country. 
5. Foreign Office memorandum to Prime Minister, 10 Sept. 1929, 
C7105/97/92. 
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but the Foreign Secretary, Mr Arthur Henderson, refused to see 
them.^ In A p r i l 1930, an appeal was sent to the League of Nations, 
declaring that p o l i t i c a l rights i n Yugoslavia had been destroyed, 
and that the Croats, as a minority people, demanded action by the 
League. The League declared that the Croats were not considered as 
a "minority" people under the terms of the Treaty and t h e i r appeal 
was dismissed. ^ Kosutic, who had been l i v i n g i n I t a l y during his 
e x i l e , now t r a v e l l e d to Geneva, Berlin arid Vienna and made two 
v i s i t s to the United States to publicize his cause. But his efforts 
proved very unsuccessful; he was refused entry into Great B r i t a i n 
i n 1931 and, when he did manage to reach London on a German no-nation-
a l i t y pass, his v i s i t caused great embarrassment to the B r i t i s h gov-
ernment. The only v i s i b l e outcome of the.- mission by these e x i l e s 
was the promotion of a s e r i e s of sensational a r t i c l e s i n foreign 
0 
newspapers, highlighting the worst aspects of the Dictatorship. 
I t might have been thought that, of a l l the p o l i t i c a l forces 
at work i n Yugoslavia prior to the dictatorship, the Communist Party 
would have been the most ably equipped to express popular disapproval 
and discontent. The party had been outlawed since 1921, i t had i t s 
own secret organization and printing press and, judging by i t s 
performance i n the one post-war election i t was allowed to contest, 
i t commanded sizeable support. But i t appears that, l i k e everyone 
6.See l e t t e r i n the Manchester Guardian, 19 Dec. 1929; also C.F. 
M e l v i l l e , Balkan Racket, (London 1942) pp. 26-28. 
7. The Times, 23 Apr. 1930, p. 11. 
8. Foreign Office memorandum following the entertaining of Dr Kosutic 
at the House of Commons, 23 Nov. 1932, CIO508/433/92. 
9. I t was believed that many of the s t o r i e s appearing i n B r i t i s h news-
papers i n the autumn of 1932 were due to t h e i r influence. One a r t i c l e 
i n the Daily Herald,' allegedly by "Our Special Correspondent i n Belgrade 
was i n fac t by Dr Krnjevic. Aide-memoire by Djuric on press attacks i n 
B r i t a i n , 10 Feb. 1933, C1869/24/92. 10. I n the 1920 elections, 
to the Constituent Assembly, 58 Communist deputies were returned. 
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e l s e , the proclamation of royal rule took the Communist Party by 
surprise-at a moment when the leadership was already disorganized. 
The Central Committee of the Party f l e d the country immediately, 
leaving behind them "the senseless slogan of farmed uprising 1'.' 
According to D j i l a s , 
"no one took that too seriously except 
for a few youths. These unfortunate young men 
attempted to get hold of some ammunition and 
lost t h e i r l i v e s i n an encounter with the 
police." 
When the d i c t a t o r i a l regime was established, an old opponent of the 
Communist Party, Milan Acimovic', was appointed Chief of the General 
Police and chief administrator of police i n the Ministry of the 
I n t e r i o r . He had been i n charge of the suppression of the party i n 
1920-1 and he brought to his new task a vigour and a determination 
to hunt out i t s members and a callous indifference as to the methods 
12 
of interrogation. Each member of the Communist Party who was 
arrested, was severely tortured u n t i l he revealed his contacts -
and a l l that he knew - with the r e s u l t that the organization of the 
party was s w i f t l y broken and most of i t s leading members put i n j a i l . 
I n January 1929, 
11. M. D j i l a s , Memoir of a Revolutionary, (New York 1973) p. 20. 
12. I b i d . , p. 73. See also L. .Adamic, The Native Ts Return, (New York 
1934) p. 255, and p. 281. "A young r a d i c a l came to ask me whether I 
would come to a certain house and see burned-out armpits and other 
marks of torture on the bodies of men and women who had passed 
through the torture rooms of Belgrade and Zagreb police s t a t i o n s . . . . " 
AcimovicT became Minister of the I n t e r i o r i n the Nedi6 Government under 
the German occupation i n September 1941. He was "the most hated and 
most compromised of a l l Nedic^s ministers". P o l i t i c a l Branch, A l l i e d 
Forces i n Europe, Handbook of Yugoslav P e r s o n a l i t i e s , (Bari 1944) ' 
Vol. 1. p. 1. 
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"only a dozen or so Communists were i n 
prison. At f i r s t they enjoyed r e l a t i v e l y 
l i b e r a l treatment. However, as the number of 
Communists i n j a i l began to grow, the regime 
treated them as hard-core criminals, which 
resulted i n clashes with the authorities 
13 
through protests and hunger s t r i k e s . " 
Despite suggestions that many thousands of p o l i t i c a l prisoners were 
i n c a p t i v i t y during the Dictatorship, i t i s worth noting that the 
highest number of Communists i n j a i l during the regime was 250 and 
the number of n a t i o n a l i s t s about 50 and that a l l these detainees 
were contained within the three prisons of Mitrovica, Lepoglava and 
15 
Maribor. These figures do not include those who were interned 
i n small v i l l a g e s i n South Serbia, those who died i n battles with 
the police or those who perished i n unsuccessful attempts to cross 
the f r o n t i e r . ^ 
The imprisonment of so many leading party members - and the 
heavy hand of the police against a l l who had any dealings with them 
- e f f e c t i v e l y prevented any concerted action by the Communists against 
the regime. From 1929-31, there was not the s l i g h t e s t sign of public 
13. D j i l a s , Memoir, pp. 157-8. 
14. Adamic, The Native's Return, p. 32. A high figure - of 1000 
ji 
Communists alone - i s given by F. Maclean, Disputed Barricade, 
(London 1957) p. 6 l . 15. D j i l a s , op. c i t . , p. 132. 
16. Kennard to Chamberlain, 1 May 1929, C3183/3183/92J and 20 Jun. 
1929, C4636/3183/92. D j i l a s says that "although the party was banned, 
and i t s members persecuted, the s i t u a t i o n was not as dangerous as i t 
was to become ( i e . a f t e r 1934). "Whippings were rare and not nearly 
as severe as they became l a t e r ; sentences were infrequent and mild 
and there were almost no murders." D j i l a s , op. c i t . , p. 20. Maclean , 
however, states that over 100 party members were k i l l e d . Disputed 
Barricade, p. 6 l . 
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17 protest by the party. Even within the University of Belgrade 
- an i n s t i t u t i o n which continued to enjoy complete autonomy under 
18 
the d i c t a t o r s h i p - there was no organized movement of dissent. 
The f i r s t r e a l demonstration against the regime - i n which both 
Communists and non-Communists took part - did not occur u n t i l 
December 1931 and, even then, the object of h o s t i l i t y was not the 
v ^ I D King but General Zivkovic and the fraudulent elections. Although 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the regime spread from Belgrade University to 
Zagreb and Ljubljana, i t was not u n t i l the autumn of 1932 that the 
ground was ready for a Communist organization i n Belgrade University' 
and, even then, i t " was some two years before the leaders of that 
organization could make any contact with the Central Committee i n 
P a r i s . By 1938, D j i l a s says, there were s t i l l no party organizations 
21 
i n Bosnia or Macedonia. So, although the Communist Party remained 
stoutly opposed to the dictatorship and was, perhaps, the one poL-
i t i c a l force to emerge stronger and more coherent from that period 
i t cannot be said that i t either embarrassed the regime or provoked 
much resistance. 
Having no p o l i t i c a l outlet for opposition, the nation demon-
strated i t s inner feelings i n other ways:-
"In the course of my two years as a student, 
young people sought r e l i e f i n a s p e c i a l form 
of bohemian existence, i n which alcohol was 
perhaps not the chief solace. For one thing, 
they spent most of t h e i r time i n smoke-filled 
rooms, i n groups created according to common 
17. D j i l a s , op. c i t . , p. 20. 18. I b i d . , p. 14. 
19. I b i d . , pp. 46-63. Cf. l e t t e r from Henderson to Sargent, 11 Dec. 
1931, C9332/304/92. Both accounts agree that the King was not the 
object of popular discontent. 20. I b i d . , p. 98. 
21. I b i d . , p. 286. 
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i n t e r e s t . Some gambled; others chased women 
22 
and drank " 
Throughout society as a whole, there was a greater mood of abandon:-
"Belgrade was a f a i t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n of the mood 
in the country. Cafes were f u l l and people were 
drinking as i f the world were submerged i n prosp-
e r i t y Always the same court photographs, the 
same o f f i c i a l press coverage, the same expressions 
of loyalty and affection for His Majesty, who united 
us a l l , always the same favourable quotes about us 
from the foreign press, always the same old songs 
about the Salonika Front and the blood s p i l l e d for 
freedom and unity. There were no s t r i k e s , no public 
meetings or manifestos, no opposition newspaper or 
magazine. A l l the forces that yearned for a breath 
of fresh a i r were packed into underground c e l l a r s . 
Belgrade was l i v e l y , colourful and f u l l of contrasts 
- an ostentatious display of newly-acquired wealth 
on the one hand, and misery, hunger and unemployment 
on the other. I t was a s e t t i n g that gave form and 
23 
encouragement to the conscious reb e l l i o n of the young" 
But there was no "conscious organized r e b e l l i o n " of the young or old, 
of the poor or distressed, of Communist or non-Communist against the 
regime. Those who wished to voice t h e i r opposition did so privately; 
those who wished to use violence were s w i f t l y overcome. 
• " U n t i l disaffection spreads to the Army," wrote 
22. I b i d . , p. 10. He also says (p. 34) " I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note 
that the l e f t i s t movement took l i t t l e root among a r t i s a n s . Their 
protest seemed to be expressed i n alcoholism...." 
23. I b i d . , p. 9 and pp. 12-13. 
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Henderson, " I s h a l l be d i s i n c l i n e d , subject 
to complete bankrupcy or assassination, to 
believe i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of an overthrow 
pi 
i n the ex i s t i n g order of things." 
The only r e a l opposition to the regime came not from those 
inside Yugoslavia but from those without; from Bulgaria, I t a l y and 
Hungary. As we have seen, the governments i n each of these countries 
l a i d claim to different parts of the Kingdom; claims which could 
only be s a t i s f i e d by a general r e v i s i o n of t r e a t i e s i n Europe or by 
the destruction of the Yugoslav s t a t e . Their opposition to the 
regime was aroused precisely because King Alexander fs p o l i c i e s of 
consolidating and strengthening his country - by dictatorship at 
home and diplomacy abroad - made treaty revision more d i f f i c u l t and 
the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r goals almost impossible. I n the past, the 
Bulgarians had been the only nation to support armed incursions 
into Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y but, with the coming of the dictatorship, 
the I t a l i a n s and Hungarians discovered a new group of discontents, 
who were not only h o s t i l e to the regime but who were also quite 
w i l l i n g to work for the destruction of Yugoslavia i n order to bring 
about t h e i r own independent Croat s t a t e . 
/ 25 
As early as October 1928, Dr Ante Pavelic, a lawyer from 
26 
Zagreb, and a member of the Frankist Party, had set up Croat comm-
i t t e e s i n Rome, Vienna and Budapest. At that time, his p r i n c i p a l 
object was to make Croatia a part of Hungary under a Habsburg King, 
24. Henderson to Simon, 15 Apr. 1932, C3327/433/92. 
25. See "Biographies". 
26. For the background to the Croat independence movement, see I . J . 
Lederer and P.F. Sugar, Nationalism i n Eastern Europe (Washington 
1969) pp. 420-423. 
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but, i n January 1929, he formed a Croatian revolutionary organ-
i z a t i o n — Ustase - whose aims were the exact a n t i t h e s i s of a l l that 
27 
King Alexander stood for. I t could not be expected that the regime 
would tolerate the existence of the Ustase, so Dr Pavelic and his 
28 
supporters fled the country and set up t h e i r organization at 
Pesaro i n I t a l y . 
From I t a l y , Dr Pavelic began his attack on Yugoslavia. I n 
v 
A p r i l 1929, he and Gustav Percec, formerly an intelligence o f f i c e r 
i n the Austro-Hungarian army and more recently a defence lawyer for 
Macedonain students accused of seditious a c t i v i t i e s i n Skopje, went 
to Sofia to meet leaders of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. 
There they received a warm welcome. Speaking from a hotel balcony, 
Dr Pavelic said that " i n the future, the existence of Croatia within 
a Yugoslav federal state was unthinkable" and Percec declared that 
now l e g a l methods had f a i l e d to detach Croatia, there remained only 
29 
i l l e g a l methods to achieve t h e i r ends. The v i s i t to Sofia and the 
public denunciation of a l l things Serbian, caused much anger i n Belgrade 
27. The Ustase was formed on January 7, 1929. Their name derives from 
the Serbo-Croat verb - " u s t a t i " - to r i s e up. The Ustase oath, taken 
before a table covered with the Croatian national f l a g , on which were 
placed a knife, a revolver and a c r u c i f i x , concluded with these words: 
" I swear that I w i l l fight i n the ranks of the Ustase for the conquest 
of a free independent Croat state by doing a l l that I am ordered to 
do i n that di r e c t i o n . I f I f a i l my oath, by the rules of the Ustase, 
the penalty of death awaits me. May God help me. Amen." Translation 
of oath from the Sentence pronounced by the Tribunal for the Protect-
ion of the State at the Oreb t r i a l , March 1934. Contained i n despatch 
from Cowan to Foreign Office, 12 Nov. 1934, R6375/30/92. (Vol. 18452) 
28. On January 9, 1929. 29. From a Foreign Office p r o f i l e 
on Percec, Dec. 1934, R6931/5524/92 (Vol. 18462). An account of the 
v i s i t i s given by S. Christowe, Heroes, and Assassins, (London 1935) 
pp. 210-6. 
30. The Times. 22 Apr. 1929, p. 13-
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Both Pavelic" and Percec were t r i e d i n absentia for crimes against 
the s t a t e . The t r i a l was held from July 11-17, 1929. Both were 
31 
found guilty and sentenced to death. 
From 1929 onwards, many of the bomb outrages and t e r r o r i s t 
a c t i v i t i e s i n Croatia were found to be connected d i r e c t l y with Dr 
Pavelic and his Ustase organization. Police investigations following 
32 
the death of Toni Schlegel, the editor of Novosti, eventually 
uncovered the existence of a "Legion of Croat Fighters for the 
33 
Liberty and Independence of Croatia". The "legion" was responsible 
for several bomb outrages i n Yugoslavia and was a c t i v e l y engaged i n 
smuggling explosives over the f r o n t i e r from Hungary. When they 
were brought to t r i a l i n May 1931, the defendants admitted meeting 
Dr Pavelic'at Pecs and joining the Ustase. They were provided with 
bombs by Dr Pavelic and as s i s t e d by Hungarian o f f i c i a l s i n getting 
35 
across the border. Once i n Croatia, they had not only k i l l e d 
Schlegel, but attacked a police barracks, placed bombs on several 
bridges and caused disturbances i n factories i n Zagreb. 
31. The Times, 13 July 1929, p. 15; and 18 July 1929, p. 13. 
32. See above, ch. 3 , p. 67. 
33- The Times, 29 Apr. 1931, P- 13- According to D j i l a s , Memoir, 
p. 131, the Croats involved i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s preferred to 
think of themselves as " n a t i o n a l i s t s " rather than "ustase" since 
the l a t t e r were associated with I t a l y , towards whom many Croats 
had mixed feel i n g s . 
34. Another group were arrested at Valpovo on 23 Aug. 1930. 
35. The Times, 3 May 1931, P- 13; and 7 May 1931, p. 13* The Hungarian 
Government hotly denied any connection with the t e r r o r i s t s , The Times, 
18 Feb. I93I, p. 13; and 21 Feb. 1931, P« 11. In a communication, 
dated November 1934, from the Yugoslav Government to the Council of 
the League of Nations, "with reference to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y incurred 
by the Hungarian authorities i n connection with t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s 
directed against Yugoslavia", twenty instances of Hungarian involve-
ment were cited between March 22, 1929 and March 15, 1934, League 
of Nations O f f i c i a l Journal (December 1934) pp. 1772-1828. 
36. The Times, 7 Aug. 1929, p. 9. 
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From 1929-1933, t h i s was to be the pattern of Ustase 
a c t i v i t y within Croatia. There were attacks on international t r a i n s , 
the k i l l i n g of l o c a l d i g n i t a r i e s , sudden explosions i n public 
buildings i n Zagreb and occasional gun battles with the police. 
The placing of bombs on trains - both inside and outside Yugoslavia 
- was a technique successfully employed by the Macedonian t e r r o r i s t s 
37 
for many years. I t had the "advantage" of drawing international 
attention to the i n t e r n a l condition of Yugoslavia, frightening 
t r a v e l l e r s , discouraging investment and suggesting that the s i t u a t i o n 
was beyond the control of the police. I n the br i e f two month period 
from June-August 1931, there were no l e s s than eleven bomb outrages 
og 
on international t r a i n s . Following the Schlegel'murder, two other 
l o c a l d i gnitaries were shot - the mayor of Nova Gradiska ( i n February 
1931) and Dr Neudorfer, a former member of the CPP who had supported 
the King and been Minister of Agriculture under the dictatorship ( i n 
August 1933). Among the buildings attacked were f a c t o r i e s , banks, a 
provin c i a l tax department and the Yugoslav Young Menfs Society hostel 
39 
i n Zagreb. 
37. The Times, 4 Aug. 1931, p. 9. 
38. The Times, 6 Aug. 1931, p. 9. Other bombs were discovered on the 
tr a i n s even before they arrived i n Yugoslavia., The Times, 4 Aug. p.9 
The group caught at Valpovo stated that they had been ordered to bomb 
international t r a i n s . The Times, 25 Aug. 1930, p. 9. D j i l a s says that 
bombs placed on trains caused disgust - even amongst those h o s t i l e to 
the regime; i t did not achieve i t s objective; rather i t strengthened 
the position of the Dictatorship. D j i l a s , Memoir, p. 12. 
39. A l l these attacks were of a spasmodic and e r r a t i c nature, i n which 
only s i x were k i l l e d and f i v e wounded. The ineffectiveness of the 
t e r r o r i s t campaign says much for the e f f i c i e n c y of the royal police 
and f r o n t i e r o f f i c i a l s . I t also explains why the Ustase l a t e r chose 
Marseilles for t h e i r assassination attempt. Survey of International 
A f f a i r s 1934. (London 1935) p. 543-
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The most serious incident, which evoked widespread comment 
abroad, was the I i k a Uprising of October 1932. For some time, arms 
had been smuggled into Croatia through Fiume.^ One night, a group 
of uniformed Ustase t e r r o r i s t s , equipped with modern weapons, attacked 
a police station and took f i v e hostages. The attack was followed by-
attacks on four police barracks, i n which the Ustase members had the 
support of many of the l o c a l population, who were d i s s a t i s f i e d with 
the regime. Copies of the Ustaca - the Ustase news-sheet - were 
distributed throughout Croatia and, because the capture of the 
t e r r o r i s t s took several days, there were rumours that the revolt was 
spreading into Northern Dalmatia. The regime took the Lika Uprising 
very seriously. Four hundred police re-inforcements were rushed to 
the area; then a further thousand. A mountain battery from Bosnia 
and two mounted machine-gun sections were also dispatched i n case the 
s i t u a t i o n got out of control.^1'"'" According to enemies of the regime, 
the police acted with considerable b r u t a l i t y and used torture - even 
on innocent peasants i n the d i s t r i c t - to find out what was happen-
ing. The ring-leader of the uprising - Juco Rukavina - was brought 
to t r i a l and sentenced to death; but his sentence was reduced to 
l i f e imprisonment by the King. 
By the end of 1933, i t had come to the ears of the Yugoslav 
government that the Ustase were not j u s t a group of discontented 
40. A major uprising against the regime was planned. I . Avakumovic', 
Native Fascism i n the Successor States, 1918-45. Ed. Sugar, (Santa 
Barbara, C a l i f o r n i a , 1971) p. 139. 
41. The Times, 10 Oct. 1932, p. 13. See also Henderson to Simon, 
17 Oct. 1932, C8846/433/92. 42. D j i l a s , Memoir, p. 135. 
43. The King fs compassion was perhaps misplaced for, as D j i l a s r e c a l l s , 
Rukavina was l a t e r released, made a colonel i n the Ustase army i n 
1941 and "exterminated the Serbs a l l over Lika with great gusto, 
believing that to be his mission i n l i f e . He hated Serbs " 
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emigre Croats sending occasional groups of t e r r o r i s t s back into 
Yugoslavia to cause trouble, but a well-organized m i l i t a r y estab-
lishment, s e t t l e d i n training camps on I t a l i a n and Hungarian s o i l , 
paid for and supervised by the I t a l i a n government.^ One report 
spoke of camps of 500-600 men, clad i n grey li n e n unifprms with the 
l e t t e r "U" on t h e i r c o l l a r s , who were given 5 l i r e a day for t h e i r 
46 
s e r v i c e s . ^ The camps were reported to be at Borgotaro, Viscetto, 
San Demetrio and Fontechio i n I t a l y and at Janka Puszta i n Hungary. 
From a l l the evidence available to the Yugoslav government, the 
I t a l i a n s and Hungarians were not only harbouring and encouraging 
in 
known t e r r o r i s t s , but were building up a s e r i e s of m i l i t a r y units 
which could only be intended for one purpose - to support an armed 
attack on Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslav government c a r e f u l l y gathered together a l l the 
evidence they could get about the Ustase camps i n I t a l y and Hungary 
and presented i t to the League of Nations. To the Yugoslav govern-
44- The information received by the Yugoslav Government came from 
the interrogation of Oreb and his fellow conspirators. Simon to Hend-
erson, following a memorandum by Djuric, 15 Jan. 1934, R325/30/92. 
45. Henderson to Simon, 17 Oct. 1934, R5829/59/92. 
46. Dr R.W. Seton-Watson, "King Alexander Ts Assassination: I t s Back-
ground and E f f e c t s " , International A f f a i r s (Jan-Feb. 1935) Vol. XIV, 
no. 1. The farm at Janka Puszta was bought by Percec i n the autumn 
of 1931. According to the Hungarians, the farm was evacuated i n A p r i l 
1934. The " a g r i c u l t u r a l business" was wound up and the farm products 
sold. Memorandum of the Hungarian Government to the League of. Nations, 
8 Dec. 1934, League of Nations O f f i c i a l Journal, Dec. 1934, pp. 1829-38. 
47. As one write r put i t : - " I t was d i f f i c u l t for the Yugoslavs to b e l -
ieve that large camps of a semi-miliatry nature could be maintained 
i n countries where police supervision was so thorough as i t i a i n 
I t a l y and Hungary without the connivance of the a u t h o r i t i e s . " H.F. 
Armstrong, "After the Assassination of King Alexander," (Foreign 
A f f a i r s ,New York) Jan. 1935, p. 222. 
48. Documents of the League of Nations, C190 M79 (Geneva 12 May 1934) 
(contd) 
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merit, i t appeared to be yet another I t a l i a n intrigue i n the 
peninsula. I n the 1920s, i t had been the Macedonians; now i t was 
the Ustase. The Yugoslavs had never doubted for a minute that one 
of .the chief aims of I t a l i a n foreign policy was the destruction of 
t h e i r c o u n t r y ^ but, whereas i n the 1920s they had been weak and 
ill-prepared to r e s i s t (and s t i l l hoping to come to some friendly 
agreement with I t a l y ) ; i n 1934, Yugoslavia was well-armed.^ She 
had many powerful friends. She belonged to two major a l l i a n c e s i n 
Central and South-Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia - neither i n t e r n a l l y . 
nor externally - was not the Yugoslavia of 1929 and, whereas the 
disintegration of the country had then been a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , 
the same could not be said i n 1934. And wild venture by the Ustase 
would not go unpunished. 
But the I t a l i a n s thought d i f f e r e n t l y . They had believed, 
right from the s t a r t , that King Alexander's dictatorship was a 
51 
"heroic policy of despair". They could see quite c l e a r l y that 
the regime had f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the moderate p o l i t i c a l leaders i n 
Croatia and that the i l l - f e e l i n g and bitterness between Croat and 
Serb were s t i l l there. Even amongst those who had at f i r s t given 
t h e i r grudging assent to the need for dictatorship, there was - the 
I t a l i a n s f e l t - a sense of f r u s t r a t i o n that the King's ministers had 
f a i l e d to provide an adequate solution to the nation's problems and 
(contd) and C239 M99 (Geneva, 15 Jun. 1934). A Note verbale prot-
esting to the Hungarian government was sent on March 13, 1934 - the 
l a s t of f i f t e e n representations made to the Hungarians i n four years. 
Survey for 1934. p. 546. 
49- Henderson to Sargent, 26 Apr. 1934, R2644/59/92. 
50. According to Adamic, i n the ten years from 1923-33, 12,000 wagon-
loads of war equipment had r o l l e d into Yugoslavia from France and 
Czechoslovakia. The Native's Return, pp. 340-1. 
51. The Times. 8 Jan. 1929, p. 11. 
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that the parliament of 1931 had become d i s t r e s s i n g l y l i k e the 
parliaments they had known before. As for Yugoslavia Ts standing 
abroad, the I t a l i a n s believed that the whole structure of a l l i a n c e s 
which Alexander had helped to build, was very much his own personal 
policy. They therefore believed that, i f King Alexander were to be 
removed, the whole Yugoslav mosaic would f a l l apart. As one writer 
put i t : -
"The plotters f a i l e d to destroy Yugoslavia, 
but they were able, a f t e r f i v e years, to 
destroy the King. As King Alexander became the 
one man, the State, the on2y authority, i t 
became more p r a c t i c a l to destroy him than to 
52 
invade Yugoslavia or foment c i v i l war." 
The f i r s t serious attempt on the l i f e of the King was planned 
for December 1933* whilst Alexander and Queen Marie were v i s i t i n g 
Zagreb. The would-be assassins - Petar Oreb and two accomplices -
v y 
mingled with the crowd i n the J e l l a c i c Square i n the hope of throwing 
53 
a bomb at the King as he passed by. But Oreb's hopes were thwarted 
by the enthusiastic welcome given to the King and Queen by the people 
of Zagreb. I t was estimated that some 60,000 came out to welcome 
them, and Oreb confessed at his t r i a l that he was unwilling to throw 
52. S. Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia, (London 1938) P- 140. This 
I t a l i a n attitude i s confirmed i n a despatch from S i r E r i c Drummond 
(Rome) to Simon, 12 Oct. 1934, R5684/5524/92. 
53- Henderson to Simon, 29 Mar. 1934, R2053/905/92. The three con-
spirators were Petar Oreb ( 2 l ) a worker from Korcula; Josip Begovic 
(26) a forestry student from Jurjevac and Ante Podgorelec (27) an 
apprentice stonemason also from Jurjevac. They entered Yugoslavia 
i l l e g a l l y on 11 Dec. 1933 from Austria bearing Hungarian passports. 
58 
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his bomb because of the large number of ordinary people who would 
54 
be injured and k i l l e d . By the following day, they had made fresh 
plans and i t was t h e i r intention to k i l l the King i n the Cathedral 
whilst a solemn Te Deum was being sung to celebrate his birthday. 
However, before they could carry out t h e i r plan, they were surprised 
by the police and a gun-battle ensued, i n which two policemen were 
55 56 k i l l e d . When Oreb and his accomplices were put on t r i a l , they 
admitted that the assassination had been ordered by Dr Pavelic, who 
had v i s i t e d Oreb twice a t the camp at Borgotaro and offered him 
57 
500,000 l i r e as a reward. Under examination, Oreb described the 
various bases used by the Ustase i n I t a l y and Austria and revealed 
that there were s p e c i a l hostels i n Milan, T r i e s t e , Venice and Zara, 
which were used by Croat conspirators on t h e i r way from camp to camp. 
A l l three members of the group were found g u i l t y of murder and 
attempted murder and were sentenced to death. Oreb and Begovic were 
executed on May 12, 1934 but King Alexander intervened on behalf of 
59 
Podgorelec and his sentence was reduced to l i f e imprisonment. 
Having f a i l e d once did not deter Dr Pavelic. "You may hide 
yourself, you Gipsy," he declared i n one of his pamphlets, "but no 
matter where you go, we w i l l find you and k i l l you." 'We condemn 
Alexander the Las t . " ^ For h i s next attempt, Dr Pavelic'chose a more 
54. The Times, 13 Jan. 1934, p. 9; and Cowan(Belgrade) to Foreign 
Office , 12 Nov. 1934, R6375/30/92; and tr a n s l a t i o n of the Sentence 
pronounced by the Tribunal for the Protection of the State i n March 
1934. Whilst i n Zagreb, the King walked f r e e l y i n the streets and 
greeted passers-by. He received many delegations and ordered that 
Dr Macek should be released from j a i l for 4 days to attend to his 
father's funeral. 55. Simon to Henderson, following memorandum 
from Djuric', 15 Jan. 1934, R325/30/92. 56. March 19-28, 1934. 
57. Henderson to Simon, 29 Mar. 1934, R2053/905/92. 
58. The Times. 22 Mar. 1934, p. 13. 59. The Times, 14 May 1934, p.13. 
60. Maclean, Disputed Barricade, p. 62. 
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experienced a s s a s s i n - Vlado Chernozemsky.^"'" Chernozemsky, who was 
a Bulgarian and a member of the Macedonian organization, had performed 
several p o l i t i c a l murders i n his own country. He had played an active 
part i n his country's occupation of South Serbia during the World 
War and, since July 1932, he had worked with the Ustase. He was a 
man with the unenviable reputation of being a cold-blooded k i l l e r , 
who would have few scruples about k i l l i n g the King. 
When i t was announced - i n mid-September - that King Alexander 
would repay Barthou's June v i s i t to Belgrade with a royal v i s i t to 
62 «•» 
France i n October, Dr Pavelic decided that his moment had come. 
An assassination i n France would come as a great surprise since 
France was Yugoslavians t r a d i t i o n a l a l l y and, i t might be supposed, 
the King would be safer there than anywhere e l s e . His death on 
French s o i l would be a great embarrassment to France and might w e l l 
undermine the whole basis of the Franco-Yugoslav a l l i a n c e . Certainly, 
nuturing 
i t would put an end to the slowly plans for a Franco-Italian-Yugoslav 
understanding by which M. Barthou hoped to complete France's eastern 
61. See "Biographies". 
62. Although the King promised Barthou that he would repay the v i s i t 
(Graham, Alexander, p. 222) a decision was not made public u n t i l 
early September. Henderson to Garr, 11 Sept. 1934, R5077/2052/92. 
The decision i t s e l f was not made public t i l l Sept. 17. Telegram 
from S i r George Clark ( P a r i s ) to Foreign Office, 17 Sept 1934, 
R5097/2052/92. 63. Armstrong, After the Assassination " 
p. 224. "So long as King Alexander l i v e d , the t i e with France was 
unalterable. The murder of the King on French s o i l i n circumstances 
discreditable to the French police a u t h o r i t i e s , c h i l l e d Yugoslavia's 
t r a d i t i o n a l admiration for France and even the extraordinary efforts 
made by the French government to demonstrate i t s sorrow and dismay 
were not e n t i r e l y successful i n removing the impression caused by 
the i n e f f i c i e n c y of the French Minister of the I n t e r i o r and his agents 
See also Graham, op. c i t . , p. 237, "From the assassination of Alex-
ander dates a coldness to France that was both governmental and 
national." 
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system of a l l i a n c e s against Germany.^ Dr Pavelic r e a l i z e d only 
too w e l l that any such understanding would destroy a l l hopes for 
an independent Croatia and decided that, i f he did not act now, 
he might very well be out-manoeuvred by King Alexander's swift and 
decisive diplomacy. Although Chernozemsky and two other Ustase gunmen 
65 ' 
were moved to Marseilles with great secrecy, Dr Pavelic*s agents 
i n the United States were publicly prophesying the King's death 
two days before j i t occured.^ 
The King was due to land from his cruiser "Dubrovnik" l a t e 
i n the afternoon of October 9, 1934- I t was planned that he would 
be met by M. Barthou and that the two men would drive through Marseilles 
to the s t a t i o n . From there, a t r a i n would take him to P a r i s . The 
route from the Quai de Beiges to the Prefecture was very sparsely 
guarded with troops and the a s s a s s i n , Chernozemsky, stationed himself 
opposite the Bourse. As the open ro y a l car, t r a v e l l i n g very slowly 
along the s t r e e t , reached t h i s point, Chernozemsky ran forward and 
f i r e d twenty shots into the car at" close range. Although M. Barthou 
64. Barthou was intending^o 'Rome on October 15 1934 and i t was by ^ p> 
no means impossible that King Alexander might make a surprise v i s i t 
to see Mussolini on his way home to Yugoslavia. On Oct. 6, Mussolini 
made a major speech i n Milan i n which he spoke of Franco-Italian 
rel a t i o n s as being on the verge of settlement. But the Germans l e t i t 
be known i n Belgrade that, although they were ind i f f e r e n t to a Franco-
I t a l i a n a l l i a n c e , they would regard an Italo-Yugoslav agreement as 
s p e c i f i c a l l y directed against them. Henderson to Simon, 29 Oct. 1934) 
R6073/2934/92. 65. Chernozemsky, for his part, t r a v e l l e d 
from Hungary v i a Switzerland and entered France bearing a Czechoslovak 
passport some two to three weeks before the assassination. Clerk 
( P a r i s ) to Simon, 11 Oct. 1934, R5644/5524/92. 
66. J . Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, (London 1939) p. 291. 
67. This was the matter which p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t r e s s e d the Yugoslavs. 
The French had guaranteed i n advance the safety of the King and refused 
to allow Yugoslav security men to accompany the King. Graham, op. c i t . , 
p. 40. 
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t r i e d to protect the King, Alexander was f a t a l l y wounded and died 
a few minutes l a t e r . His assassin was also k i l l e d , struck down by 
.a sabre blow by the commander of the royal guard of honour, who 
had been rid i n g beside the car. M. Barthou, too, was severely 
wounded but, because the condition of the King was of such immediate 
concern, his i n j u r i e s received l i t t l e or no attention and he also 
died. 
The assassination of King Alexander i n Marseilles caused a 
profound sense of shock throughout Europe. Memories of the outcome 
of the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand I n 1914 were s t i l l 
f resh i n the mind and international statesmen were aware how e a s i l y 
69 
a c r i s i s i n the Balkans could lead to a major war:-
" I f , as seemed only too possible, the Croatian 
t e r r o r i s t s had the support of Hungary, perhaps 
of I t a l y , and the connivance of either of these 
countries could be traced, we should have an 
70 
international s i t u a t i o n of the utmost danger." 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of some follow-up attack by m i l i t a r y formations of 
v 71 
the Ustase and rumours of I t a l i a n troop re-inforcements on the 
72 
Yugoslav-Italian f r o n t i e r could not be ignored. The efforts of the 
68. The King received bullets i n the heart and the l i v e r . M. Barthou 
suffered a broken arm and a severed artery. Chernozemsky, as w e l l as 
the sabre blow, was attacked - and trampled on - by the crowd. An 
account of the assassination i s given i n Appendix I . 
69. Survey for 1934, pp. 538-9. The great difference between 1914 and 
1934 was that, whereas i n 1914, the "backers" (Russia and Germany) 
were prepared to go to war, i n 1934, neither I t a l y nor France were -
the spectre of H i t l e r being a benificent incentive to peace. 
70. Lord Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London 1962) 
p. 109. 71. H.D. Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia (London 194l) 
p. 203. 72. Telegram from Henderson to Foreign Office, 2.00 am 
10 Oct. 1934, R5563/5524/92. According to Harrison, op. c i t . . pp 203-4, 
Henderson was instrumental i n arranging for the B r i t i s h Mediterranean 
(contd) 
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Great Powers were therefore directed towards containing the s i t u a t i o n 
and maintaining .peace at a l l costs. The question '"of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
73 
for the crime was referred to the League of Nations and pressure 
was brought to bear on Yugoslav leaders to prevent any violent 
reaction by the Yugoslav people against I t a l y or Hungary which might 
7ZL 
i t s e l f endanger international peace. 
But, i n Belgrade, steps had already been taken to control the 
s i t u a t i o n . When news of the King Ts death reached the Yugoslav c a p i t a l , 
Prince Paul, the King's cousin, summoned General Zivkovic to the 
palace and, together, they decided what should be done. The royal 
(rcontd) f l e e t , which had been paying a summer v i s i t to Kotor - to 
cruise uprthe Adriatic as f a r as Susak. This discouraged any seaborne 
adventure by the Ustase and was, i n i t s e l f , a sizeable contribution 
to peacekeeping i n the area. 
73• The Yugoslav case was presented to the League i n Geneva on 
November 22, 1934- I t was dealt with by the League Council from Dec-
ember 7-10, 1934. How the matter was handled, can best be seen from 
S i r Anthony Eden's own account, Avon, op. c i t . , pp. 108-120. The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t outcome of the League's deliberations was the blame cast 
on Hungary - not I t a l y - for harbouring Ustase t e r r o r i s t s . I t a l y , i t 
seems, was happy to l e t her protegee take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Survey 
for 1934, pp. 561-3. But, as w i l l be seen from Eden's f i n a l r e s o l -
ution to the Council, i b i d . , pp. 570-1, no positive accusation was 
made against Hungary. A French attempt to obtain the extradition of 
Dr Pavelic proved unsuccessful. Drummond(Rome)to Foreign Office, 
8 Nov. 1934, R6247/59/92. Dr Pavelic was arrested on Oct. 18 i n Turin 
but released on November 26, when the extradition appeal was rejected 
Survey for 1934, pp. 560^ -1. I n I t a l y , there was "no case" against him 
but he was l a t e r t r i e d i n absentia i n France and condemned to death. 
74. S i r Nevile Henderson was i n close contact with the royal palace 
and Yugoslav leaders following the assassination. Henderson to Simon, 
R5743/30/92. A telegram sent the same day said : " I have done nothing 
but urge on a l l concerned here, maintenance of calm and a correct 
attitude towards I t a l y i n these d i f f i c u l t moments." Henderson to 
Foreign Office, 13 Oct. 1934, R5629/59/92. 
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w i l l could only be opened by two people - the Queen and the Prime 
Minister - but, since the Queen was i n France, the only person 
available was Uzunovic so he also was summoned to the palace. 
Uzunovic had already been busy arranging for the immediate return 
7 *5 
of the Crown Prince (now Peter I I ) from England and for the 
transfer of the King's body home from France. When Uzunovic'had 
been brought - somewhat unwillingly - to the palace, and the royal 
w i l l opened, i t was discovered that King Alexander had stipulated 
that, i n the event of his death, the country should be governed -
not by the Prime Minister - but by three Regents, including Prince 
76 ^ Paul. According to one report, Uzunovic had himself already 
nominated his own Regency Council and was reluctant to obey the 
King's l a s t w i l l and testament. But General Zivkovic proved 
extremely f o r c e f u l and Prince Paul threatened to publish King 
7 7 
Alexander's w i l l , so Uzunovic' gave way. 
Members of the Cabinet then took an oath of allegiance to 
the new King and, likewise, a l l o f f i c e r s i n the Yugoslav army and 
navy; throughout the night, many hundreds took the oath to the new 
sovereign. The proclamation of the accession of Peter I I was issued 
alongside an o f f i c i a l statement announcing the death of King Alexander 
and black flags were ordered to be hung on a l l public buildings:-
" A l l through the night, there was a great 
discreet a c t i v i t y as i f conspirators were 
moving s w i f t l y and s i l e n t l y to achieve revol-
ution whilst the masses s l e p t . But the object 
was not revolution, but s t a b i l i t y . The assumption 
of (Yugoslavia's) enemies might be that the assass-
75- I n September 1934, the Crown Prince had been sent to Sandroyd 
preparatory school i n England. Peter I I , A King's Heritage, (London 
1955).pp. 14-23. 76. Graham, Alexander, pp. 233-5. 
77- V. Macek, I n the Struggle for Freedom ^ (Pennsylvania 1968)pp. 155-6. 
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ination meant chaos, separation and c i v i l 
war. The resolution of the Government was 
that there should be di s c i p l i n e d calm and 
78 
a dignified acceptance of Fate." 
When the news reached the people of Yugoslavia on the morning 
of October 10, the reaction of the nation was exactly the opposite 
of what Dr Pavelic and his Ustase had intended:-
"Instead of taking the removal of the 
Dictator-King as a sign for a general 
re v o l t , the anti-Serb and a n t i - c e n t r a l i s t 
and a n t i - d i c t a t o r i a l elements i n the country 
were moved to f e e l compunction ( s i c ) for 
t h e i r dead opponent and s o l i d a r i t y with 
t h e i r Serbian fellow-Jugoslavs i n defence 
of the unity and independence of t h e i r 
79 
common country." 
Only i n Sarajevo was there any v i s i b l e disturbance and, there, the 
objects of l o c a l anger were the I t a l i a n consulate, the Croat Napredak 
society and a l o c a l J e s u i t seminary, a l l of which had t h e i r windows 
80 
broken. For the most part 
"the position i s that everyone here i s i n 
a state of f r a n t i c emotion, though fortunately 
passions are divided, p a r t i c u l a r l y against the 
French who took i n s u f f i c i e n t precautions, against 
the I t a l i a n s who are known to have encouraged 
p o l i t i c a l refugees and the Croats, who are 
81 
believed to have supplied the actual a s s a s s i n " 
78. Graham, Alexander, p. 235. 79. Survey for 1934, p. 551. 
80. H.M. Consul Sarajevo to Henderson, 10 Oct. 1934, R5663/5524/92. 
81. Telegram from Henderson to Foreign Office, 12 Oct. 1934, 
R5615/5524/92. 
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But "for the moment, a l l i s quiet. The 
people as a whole, Croat peasant as much 
as Serb, i s shocked with g r i e f at the loss 
of a r u l e r whose great q u a l i t i e s , as i s so 
often the case, have only been appreciated 
at t h e i r true value when i t i s too l a t e . Of 
82 
the depth of that g r i e f , there i s no question...." 
The B r i t i s h Consul i n Zagreb reported on the Croat reaction as he 
saw i t : -
"Tliie tragedy came as a shock to a l l c l a s s e s . 
The human side of the tragedy precludes a l l 
other thought. With peasant women crying i n 
the market square and prominent men and women 
- many of them b i t t e r l y opposed to the l a t e 
King's p o l i t i c a l actions - sobbing i n the 
churches, the only thing p a r a l l e l I can 
r e c o l l e c t i s my memory of Queen Victo r i a ' s 
funeral." 8 3 
When the King's body returned home, there were further public 
scenes of g r i e f . "Along the whole route of the funeral cortege, up 
the winding railway from the Dalmatian coast, through Bosnia to Zagreb, 
thence across the Croatian plains to Belgrade, the peasants flocked 
i n by the hundreds of thousands to kneel weeping i n the l i t t l e 
stations where the t r a i n paused or beside the tracks as i t slowly 
passed by. The upsurge of national sorrow - for propaganda can do 
much but i t cannot make people weep - must have been a surprise to 
84 
those who had platted the assassination." 
82. Henderson to Simon, 13 Oct. 1934, R5743/30/92. 
83. Henderson to Simon, 13 Oct. 1934, R5695/5524/92. 
84. Armstrong, "After the Assassination...." p. 219. 
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"For when the country r e a l i z e d that the 
King was dead - and how he had died - at 
that moment, i t f e l t more clo s e l y knit than 
i t had since that day i n November 1918, when 
the Croatian and Slovene national delegations, 
meeting exultantly i n Zagreb, had ca l l e d on 
the young Prince Regent to accept the throne 
of the new Triune Kingdom." 
Although Mussolini had sent a telegram expressing his most 
86 
h e a r t f e l t condolence and despite the f a c t that many I t a l i a n news-
papers - even those most t r a d i t i o n a l l y anti-Yugoslav - contained 
87 
long and f l a t t e r i n g obituaries of the late King. Mussolini s t i l l 
remained hopeful that i n t e r n a l events i n Yugoslavia might work to 
88 
his advantage. Certain I t a l i a n radio stations - notably that at 
Bari - continued to put out s t o r i e s of an impending dissolution of 
the Yugoslav s t a t e . The broadcasts only ceased when an o f f i c i a l 
protest was lodged by Ducic, the Yugoslav ohaiAu rt'nffnirrn- i n Rome, 
89 
on October 12. Furthermore, two I t a l i a n army corps remained i n a 
state of readiness"^ and the Ustase continued as i f nothing had 
91 
happened. But, although Mussolini s t i l l had hxs hopes, other nations 
85- I b i d . 86. Graham, Alexander-:?, p. 238. 
87. Drummond (Rome) to Foreign Office, 10 Oct. 1934, R5572/5524/92. 
88. Drummond (Rome) to Foreign Office, 16 Oct. 1934, R5700/59/92. 
This telegram followed an interview with Mussolini. 
89. Telegram from Henderson to the Foreign Office, R5625/59/92, 13 Oct 
1934. Newly-minted coinage for Croatia was also being circulated i n 
Zara. When Ducic protested, Suvich was very unresponsive, but on the 
following day, Suvich informed him with great courtesy that the broad-
casts would cease. Manchester Guardian, 15 Oct. 1934. Suvich, himself, 
was of Croatian o r i g i n . His grandfather was a Croat and his father a 
naturalized I t a l i a n . He was described as a "natural friend of Croat 
emigres abroad" Henderson to Van s i t t a r t , 7 Apr. 1934, R2295/59/92. 
90. Henderson to Foreign Office, 10 Oct. 1934, R5663/5524/92. 
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came to Yugoslavia's side and re-affirmed t h e i r b e l i e f i n her 
existence.as a s t a t e . On October 20, F i e l d Marshal Goering issued 
a press statement saying that i t was " i n the i n t e r e s t of Germany 
both as regards her own;..peace as we l l as for the maintenance of 
peace i n the whole of Europe that a strong and powerful Yugoslavia 
92 
should e x i s t . " And, i n England, the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, 
S i r John Simon, declared i n a speech i n Northampton, that "a strong, 
united, prosperous and contented Yugoslavia i s a major European 
93 
i n t e r e s t . " 
From the evidence - both inside Yugoslavia and without - i t 
can be seen that those who opposed the royal dictatorship did not 
achieve t h e i r goal. Those who wished to see a resumption of demo-
c r a t i c and constit u t i o n a l government l o s t the one man who might 
have made i t possible. Those who wished to see a federal solution 
for the Kingdom were likewise disappointed. For the Communists, 
the death of the King postponed for seven years the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which might have 
a l l e v i a t e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l suppression. Instead, the party faced 
even s t r i c t e r controls 1 under the Regency.^ But, most unsuccessful 
of a l l , were those who hated the "Yugoslav mosaic", who wished to 
destroy the Kingdom and es t a b l i s h t h e i r own separatist s t a t e . By 
t h e i r actions, calculated to foster disintegration, the Ustase 
succeeded i n creating a greater sense of national unity than the 
Yugoslavs had ever experienced. 
"Indeed, i t might be said, without either 
paradox or disrespect, that King Alexander 
91. Drummond (Rome) to Simon, 22 Oct. 1934, R6005/59/92. 
92. Henderson to the Foreign O f f i c e , 21 Oct. 1934, R5823/30/92. 
93. Armstrong, "After the Assassination...." p. 225. 
94. D j i l a s , Memoir, pp. 205-211. 
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did more to j u s t i f y his t i t l e of "The U n i f i e r " 
through his unsought death than through his 
deliberate policy as the f i r s t r u l e r of the 
infant Yugoslav state. His enemies as we l l 
as his friends i n Yugoslavia were ready to 
regard him, post mortem, as a martyr to his 
p o l i t i c a l f a i t h ; and, i n a l l Yugoslav minds, his 
disinterested and single-minded devotion to his 
i d e a l now overshadowed the element of perversity 
i n the i d e a l i t s e l f and the high-handedness of 
the methods by which the la t e King had attempted 
95 
to r e a l i z e t h i s i d e a l d i c t a t o r i a l l y . " 
I t was said at the time that King Alexander's dying words 
were "Preserve Yugoslavia" (Cuvajte mi Jugoslaviju). ^ The story 
may we l l have been apocryphal but, as S i r Nevile Henderson said, 
97 
i t i s what the King would have s a i d , had he had the chance. I t 
i s worth recording that an the archway at Oplenac, through which 
the c o f f i n had to pass on i t s way to the Karadjordjevic' mausoleum 
the following words were inscribed: "Sleep i n peace; we w i l l 
preserve Yugoslavia". Wrote Henderson, " I t may w e l l be that his 
dying words 'Preserve Yugoslavia' w i l l endure when everything 
98 
else i s forgotten." 
95. Survey for 1934, p. 551. 
96. C.F. M e l v i l l e , Balkan Racket, p. 35. 
97. Henderson to Simon, 13 Oct. 1934, R5743/30/92. 
98. Henderson to Simon, 22 Oct. 1934, R6068/30/92. 
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Chapter 10 
King Alexander....An Assessment 
229 
Although Alexander was King of Yugoslavia for almost fourteen 
years - and absolute r u l e r of his country for s i x of those years -
i t must be admitted that, even a f t e r his death, he remained something 
of an enigma. Before 1929, very l i t t l e attention was paid either to 
him or his country, such comment as there was being concentrated on 
the personalities of Nikola Pa^ic or Stjepan Radic, who provided a 
more colourful picture of p o l i t i c a l opinion within the Kingdom. 
During the period of parliamentary r u l e , Alexander kept very much 
i n the background, performing the ceremonies and duties required of 
a constitutional monarch, and, when he became Dictator, he took steps 
to make himself even more remote. Unlike his predecessors - the Princes 
and Kings of Serbia - who had l i v e d i n palaces i n the centre of 
Belgrade, Alexander withdrew to a new home which he had b u i l t on a 
h i l l at Dedinje, overlooking the city."'" The s t r i c t censorship imposed 
by the dictatorship also contributed to t h i s f e e l i n g of remoteness 
and those who wished to know t h e i r King better were obliged to choose 
between the exaggerated mystique accorded to royalty i n the o f f i c i a l 
press or to l i s t e n to the rumour and hearsay - often malicious - of 
those'who were ho s t i l e to the regime. Outside Yugoslavia, Alexander 
was largely unknown. U n t i l he began his royal diplomacy i n 1933, his 
only v i s i t s abroad were private v i s i t s to France or Switzerland for 
1. Peter I I , of Yugoslavia, A King's Heritage, (London 1955) p. 4. 
"This was a magnificent building on the top of a h i l l , two and a 
half miles outside the town. We had bought the entire h i l l and had 
about ten miles of road i n i t . " At the foot of the h i l l , there was 
an army barracks. 
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.medical or personal reasons - and, as such, attracted l i t t l e 
p u b l i c ity. After his death, he became the object of legend - the 
Unif i e r , the Martyr, the Strong Man of the Balkans --and i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t for any writer of Serbian or Yugoslav history - a history 
so f u l l of s o l d i e r s , heroes and saints - not to present Alexander 
as yet another i n his country Ts long l i n e of t r a g i c warrior-kings. 
But those who saw him i n the f l e s h during his lifetime viewed 
Sow* of 
him d i f f e r e n t l y . To^them, he was not a distinguished-looking leader; 
i n f a c t , i f anything, he seemed rather i n s i g n i f i c a n t . ^ Milovan D j i l a s , 
who saw him on a royal v i s i t to Berane (Montenegro) i n September 1925, 
5 
described him as "scrawny and unprepossessing"; and Rebecca West, 
watching him on a newsreel i n 1934, noted that his face was neither 
t r a n q u i l nor handsome.^ Louis Adamicf, who was granted an audience 
with the King, observed him clo s e l y : -
"Alexander i s not handsome, nor i s he the contrary. 
He i s five-foot nine and s l i g h t of build. His ca r r -
iage i s m i l i t a r y , his movements are easy and a g i l e . 
2. According to S i r Howard Kennard, Alexander suffered from some 
abdominal complaint (most probably c o l i t i s ) which had a d e b i l i t a t i n g 
e f f e c t on his health. Kennard to Howard Smith, 27 Apr. 1928, C3004/ 
3004/92. Whether t h i s was caused by the war, overwork or heredity 
i s uncertain. But both Prince Paul and Alexander's son, Peter, had 
stomach disorders, Peter I I , op. c i t . , p. 3« F°r several years, 
Alexander t r a v e l l e d regularly to Paris to see a s p e c i a l i s t . His 
condition was l a t e r helped by Dr Stankovic, who was nominated as one 
of the three regents. J. According to several accounts, King 
Alexander had large amounts of money deposited i n Switzerland. The sum 
most c h i e f l y mentioned i s 400 m i l l i o n dinars (£2 m i l l i o n s ) . Henderson 
to Simon, 9 May 1932, C4173/433/92. Also J . Gunther,. Inside Europe, 
(London 1 9 3 ° ) P- 373 .Uxitrevidevca. ^ugcjeAlb "Wi -^ /w wcu> cj^eaJCUj e$t<xgg<wa.lA£> . 
4. " I n pictures, as the American magazine Time unvaryingly pointed out, 
he resembled a small-town dentist". Gunther, i b i d . , p. 374. 
5. M. D j i l a s , Land Without J u s t i c e , (London 1958) p. 251. 
6. R. West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, (London 1942), Vol. 1, p. 16. 
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His slowly sloping brow, heavy eyebrows, 
slightly-hooked nose, prominent chin are 
t y p i c a l l y Balkanite. He i s dark-complexioned, 
and has a short mustache. His dark h a i r , parted 
on the side, i s graying at the temples. His mouth 
i s rather sizeable, his l i p s are pale, t h i n and 
tense. His dark-brown eyes, deep i n t h e i r sockets 
and with s l i g h t shadows under them, have a look 
7 
which may mean almost anything." 
One of the f i r s t things people noticed about King Alexander was his 
g One. KostiU- wtfiVer 
preference f o r m i l i t a r y dress. £t wfta said that he realized what a 
poor figure he cut i n c i v i l i a n clothes and, f o r that reason, he was 
9 
almost always seen - and photographed - i n one uniform or another. 
A fu r t h e r feature of his character, which was noted by a l l who met 
him, was his great a b i l i t y to charm:-"^ 
"A deft actor," wrote Adamic'', "he was charming 
to a l l ; simple, democratic everywhere, with ju s t 
enough pomp now and then to impress those who 
l i k e d to be impressed. He kissed peasant babies 
throughout the Kingdom. He stopped his car, went 
i n t o the f i e l d s , chatted with peasants, patted them 
on t h e i r backs, joked with peasant women, tasted 
t h e i r bread, became godfather of t h e i r children." 
Foreign reporters who came to Belgrade to interview Alexander often 
7. L. Adamic, The Native's Return, (New York 1934) pp. 328-9 . 
8. V. B a r t l e t t , "King Alexander of Yugoslavia". I n the series, "Strong 
Men of Europe", Listener, 19 July 1933, p.87. 
9. Adamic', op. c i t . , p. 329. 
10. C. Eylan, "Chez le Roi Alexandre l e r , Revue des deux mondes, 
1 July, 1934, PP. 40-52. 
11. Adamic, op. c i t . , p. 340. 
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found a d i f f e r e n t man to the one they were expecting. They came 
to meet a d i c t a t o r but, instead, they found a quiet, gentle man 
with a warm smile who appeared genuinely anxious to please. I t was 
perhaps an act - part of the public relations duty incumbent upon 
any King or Queen; but i n almost a l l the descriptions of Alexander, 
we gain an impression of a simple, ordinary, hard-working man who, 
although a King, did not seem to be of the s t u f f of which dictators 
are made. 
"He had nothing i n common with the d i c t a t o r i a l 
demagogues of postwar Europe who grimace and shriek. 
He had no high-pressure advertising agents and no 
propaganda machine f o r hurling his opinion through 
the ether upon the ears of his subjects or neigh-
bours. There was nothing t h e a t r i c a l or meretricious 
12 
about him, either i n appearance or action." 
Alexander was born i n 1888 - i n e x i l e . His father was the 
grandson of Karadjordje, the pig-dealer who had f i r s t raised the 
standard of revolt against the Turks; his mother was Princess Zorka, 
daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. When he was very young, 
- I I " I c 
his mother died of tuberculosis and f o r the next eight years, he 
12. H.F. Armstrong, After the Assassination of King Alexander, 
(Foreign A f f a i r s , New York), Jan. 1935, p. 209. 
13. Alexander was born i n Montenegro, then an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y 
ruled by Prince Nicholas. Although his grandfather had been Prince of 
Serbia (1842-59), he was deposed by the Skupstina i n favour of the 
Obrenovic' dynasty which ruled Serbia u n t i l 1903. Alexander fs father 
was employed by Nicholas to rebuild and reorganize the Montenegrin army. 
14. I n March 1890, when Alexander was f i f t e e n months old. 
15. Following a quarrel between his father, Peter, and Nicholas. 
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.lived with his father i n straightened circumstances i n Geneva. 
I n 1898, the p o l i t i c a l fortunes of his family changed.'^ His father 
was received by the Tsar i n St Petersburg and accepted Nicholas I I f s 
o f f e r t o educate a l l his children at the best Russian schools. Whilst 
17 
his father succeeded to the throne of Serbia, Alexander became a 
member of the Corps de Pages at St Petersburg and l a t e r , a student 
i n the Russian m i l i t a r y academy. I n 1909, he was summoned to Belgrade 
Caused tut Aeatw 
and made Crown Prince i n the place of his brother, who had murdered. 
a servant. He fought i n the Serbian army i n two Balkan Wars and 
18 
became Prince Regent i n June 1914. 
As might be expected, these many changes of fortune i n the 
f i r s t twenty-five years of his l i f e l e f t t h e i r mark:-
"The d i f f i c u l t circumstances of his youth have 
had t h e i r psychological e f f e c t upon his character. 
They have l e f t him with an i n f e r i o r i t y complex i n • 
some respects, a tortuous method of dealing with 
men and business, an i n a b i l i t y f o r friendship, a 
certain i n s t a b i l i t y of purpose and a mind which 
seems either to t r u s t nobody or to give i t s 
confidence to the most unworthy objects of i t . 
Hence his worst t r a i t as a r u l e r , his incapacity 
to choose good and honest advisers. His impatience 
i s another f a i l i n g . He eats i n a hurry, takes his 
pleasures i n a hurry and often allows his 
19 
impatience to get the better of his truer judgement." 
The one area where Alexander found himself perfec t l y at home was the 
16. Because of the increasing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with Alexander Obrenovic 
l a s t of his dynasty^ r u l e r s . * 17. I n 1903. 
18. King Peter became gradually crippled with rheumatism. 
19. Annual Report f o r 1932, C747/747/92. (Contained i n Vol. 16830). 
234 
Army. The forces over which he had command played a major part 
i n the v i c t o r y at Kumanovo and he acquitted himself with d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n the Second Balkan War. As Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army 
i n 191A^5j he succeeded i n r e p e l l i n g attacks by the Austrian army 
and, when his troops were f i n a l l y forced to r e t r e a t , Alexander 
personally marched with his army over the mountains i n t o Albania 
20 
- an ex p l o i t i n which over 100,000 died. 
"Regent Alexander, l i k e his father, shared the 
nation Ts agony and participated i n i t s heroism. 
He endured hardships as noother r u l e r or general 
i n the World War. He emerged from the war as a 
popular hero of the people, admired and respected 
by persons of other n a t i o n a l i t i e s - j o u r n a l i s t s , 
o f f i c e r s , diplomats, doctors and r e l i e f workers 
i n the Balkans, most of whom, of course, knew 
21 
only of his war record." 
The insinuation made by Adamic i s t h a t , although King Alexander 
was v a l i a n t and brave i n b a t t l e , he was i n normal times - both before 
and a f t e r the war - a scheming, cunning p o l i t i c i a n , i n t e n t only on 
22 
obtaining f o r himself absolute power:-
"He revels i n a l l the license of sovereign 
power. Everything goes through his hands. No 
instructor i n any secondary school can be trans-
ferred or elevated to a higher grade without the royal 
signature. I t T s a disease with him, t h i s craving f o r 
d i r e c t personal authority He i s ambitious f o r 20. G. Gordon-Smith, Through the Serbian Campaign, (London 1916) pp 1A8 
21. Adamic, The Native Ts Return, p. 338. 
22. I b i d . , p. 336. 
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fame. The fame of another person w i t h i n 
Yugoslavia he considers an insolent invasion 
of the royal perogative. As soon as a man achieves 
eminence i n p o l i t i c s , he finds ways and means to 
do away with him. He likes only yes-men who know 
how to keep themselves subdued, i n the background. 
He i s s p i t e f u l , ungrateful. He uses a man, then 
23 
tosses him aside." 
Adamic therefore asserts t h a t , throughout the period of parliamentary 
r u l e , Alexander was instrumental i n creating the p o l i t i c a l crises 
which made government impossible i n the 1920s and that i t was he who 
set one n a t i o n a l i t y against the other, di v i d i n g the nation, and thus 
2.L. 
preparing the way f o r his own assumption of d i c t a t o r i a l power. 
But I do not think Adamicfs assertions are either convincing 
or conclusive. According to a l l the evidence available, King Alex-
ander was brought up i n a strong democratic t r a d i t i o n . His father, 
who translated John Stuart M i l l ' s essay "On Libe r t y " i n t o Serbian, 
23. I b i d . , pp. 345-6. I n t h i s extract from his book, we see a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y extreme example of how Adamic can t w i s t a normal 
f a c t to convey the worst possible impression. According to the 
Law on C i v i l Servants ( A r t i c l e 103), public o f f i c i a l s were 
divided i n t o ten classes. Changes i n classes VIII-X (those 
considered as junior c i v i l servants) were performed by m i n i s t e r i a l 
decree; but those i n classes I - V I I (considered as senior c i v i l 
servants) were appointed, transferred or promoted by Royal decree 
on the proposal of the competent minister. Even then, a royal 
signature was considered merely as a fo r m a l i t y i n classes I I I - V I I . 
For a junior teacher (class V I I I or I X ) , no r o y a l signature was 
needed; and even f o r a senior teacher (classes V-VIl) that 
signature was a form a l i t y . 
was taut and r i g i d . " ) 
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only obtained his throne at the express i n v i t a t i o n of the Skupstina 
and, from his e a r l i e s t days as Crown Prince, Alexander had grown up 
i n a world inhabited by such redoubtable parliamentarians as Protic 
and Pasic. Serbia's great a l l i e s , France and Great B r i t a i n , were both 
strong democratic nations and, with the example of the murder of the 
s 25 Obrenovic family i n 1903 and the memory of the slaughter of the 
Russian r o y a l family at Ekaterinburg i n 1918 s t i l l fresh i n the 
26 27 memory, Alexander was w e l l aware of the p e r i l s of absolute r u l e . 
Furthermore, i t can be .argued t h a t , u n t i l Pas ic* died ( i n 1926), King 
Alexander had very l i t t l e influence on the events i n the Skupstina 
and t h a t , i n that period, the most potent and obvious factor f o r 
disunity w i t h i n the nation was the p o l i t i c a l obstruction of Stjepan 
Radicfand the Croatian Peasant Party. A l l his l i f e , Alexander was 
28 
l i b e r a t i n g , u n i t i n g and consolidating. He was a constant factor i n 
29 
the evolution of his people. Only when that evolution proved imposs-
i b l e - and revolution or c i v i l war seemed the only alternatives - did 
Alexander intervene. And then as i n everything that he did - as we 
have seen - i t was not the glory of himself or his dynasty that he 
25. H. De Windt, Through Savage Europe, (London 1907) pp. 143-157. 
26. Rebecca West reports t h a t , before the World War, Alexander f e l l 
i n love with one of the Tsar's daughters and t h a t , i n January 1914, 
Pasic went to Russia to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of a royal marriage. 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, Vol. 1, p. 610. I f t h i s were the case, 
i t would not have been easy f o r Alexander to forget the fate of the 
Romanovs. 
27. Rebecca West, watching the newsreel of the King's death, says, 
"at each showing of the f i l m , i t could be seen more p l a i n l y that he 
had not been surprised at his own murder. He had not merely known of 
i t as a f a c t u a l p o s s i b i l i t y , he had realized i t imaginatively i n i t s 
f u l l force as an event." I b i d . , p. 21. 
28. A. O'B Christie, "King Alexander of Yugoslavia" (Contemporary 
Review) Feb. 1934, p. 210. 
29. I b i d . 
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sought, but simply the u n i t y , strength and general well-being of 
his country, Yugoslavia, which he believed i t was his kingly duty 
to m a i n t a i n . ^ 
In his royal proclamation of January 6, 1929, Alexander 
j u s t i f i e d his assumption of d i c t a t o r i a l powers by claiming that 
the parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l system established 
under the Vidovdan Constitution had so conspicuously f a i l e d i n t h e i r 
task that they had become the p r i n c i p a l cause of d i v i s i o n and disruption 
w i t h i n the Kingdom. That the King was r i g h t i n making t h i s claim, there 
can be l i t t l e doubt. Not only had i t proved impossible f o r members 
from d i f f e r e n t parts of the country to work and take counsel tog-
ether, but t h e i r differences had reached the point of open murder. 
This, perhaps, could have been the moment f o r members of the Skupstina 
to realize the damage they were doing to themselves and to t h e i r 
country. But, instead, i t became an excuse f o r the parties to take up 
even more entrenched andl.hostile positions, i n which neither side 
would give way. I n these circumstances, parliamentary government 
became impossible. I t could not continue. Alexander fs solution was 
to abolish the Constitutioni But, as Sir Nevile Henderson has said, 
30. Had Alexander r e a l l y been interested i n seizing absolute power 
at the e a r l i e s t opportunity, he .would c e r t a i n l y have intervened a f t e r 
the murders i n the Skupstina or a f t e r Radic fs death. The fact that he 
delayed a further f i v e months i s a clear sign that he s t i l l hoped f o r 
a last-minute change of heart by the p o l i t i c i a n s . As Henderson said:-
"He was a soldier f i r s t and la s t and his recognition of t h i s fact 
made him slow i n his decisions as a statesman." Henderson to Simon, 
13 Oct. 1934* R5743/30/92. I n his royal proclamation, Alexander stated 
" I t i s my sacred duty to preserve by a l l means national unity and the 
State. I am determined to f u l f i l my duty without f l i n c h i n g u n t i l the 
end'.' See Appendix C. 
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the Constitution was only abolished i n order that the p o l i t i c a l 
parties might be abolished f o r i t was they, rather than the Constit-
3 1 
ution , which had f a i l e d . 
"The Crown," wrote the Times Balkan corres-
pondent, "has been r e l u c t a n t l y but inexorably 
forced i n t o the p o l i t i c a l arena as the only 
neutral element i n a complex s i t u a t i o n and, 
f o r that very reason, i s bound to r i s k i t s 
32 
n e u t r a l i t y by d e f i n i t e , constructive action." 
But even i f the circumstances warranted the intervention of 
the Crown, was there no alternative to personal rule? Could Alexander' 
have avoided outright dictatorship? As we have seen, the.options 
open to the King were few i n number. He could have called a Constituent 
Assembly to draw up a new Constitution i n which the Croats would have 
a greater measure of autonomy and self-governemnt. But he well-rememb-
ered that the previous Constituent Assembly had spent two years 
wrangling over the detai l s and that there would have been' no Constit-
ution at a l l , had i t not been f o r Pasic Ts determined e f f o r t s . In the 
dangerous p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n which faced the country i n 1929 - with 
passions mounting - he could not afford to allow more time to be 
spent i n open - and, most probably, s t e r i l e - debate. Nor could he 
be sure that i t would achieve anything, f o r he knew that the Serbian 
p o l i t i c i a n s were opposed to any form of federalism or devolution. 
"Amputation" - the cu t t i n g o f f of Croatia and Slovenia - was one 
option which Alexander could have chosen but, as we have seen, he 
believed i t was his duty to maintain the unity of his Kingdom and, 
i n t h i s , he had the support of the Army. Alexander might also have 
chosen a m i l i t a r y government - f i l l e d with army o f f i c e r s - and given 
3 1 . N. Henderson to A. Henderson, 29 Sept. 1930, C7443/144/92. 
3 2 . The Times, 9 Jan. 1929, p. 1 1 . 
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them a mandate to rule (as Radic himself had suggested) but one 
of the most i n t e r e s t i n g things about the Dictatorship was that the 
Army was kept completely i n the background - w e l l away from p o l i t i c a l 
power - and Alexander preferred, f o r paternalist rather than despotic 
reasons, to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of government i n t o his own hands, 
which he believed would be the option most acceptable to the majority 
of his people. 
To help him i n his task, Alexander chose as his close associates, 
men whom he could t r u s t , those without strong party a f f i l i a t i o n s , 
people who were experts i n t h e i r own particular f i e l d . Throughout 
the Dictatorship - and most p a r t i c u l a r l y during the f i r s t three 
years - Alexander was careful t o include i n his Cabinet a f a i r prop-
o r t i o n of Ministers from each of the d i f f e r e n t regions of the Kingdom. 
The one essential q u a l i f i c a t i o n required of a l l his Ministers was 
that they should share his b e l i e f i n Yugoslavia and t h a t , together, 
they should work towards that goal. The King' believed - r i g h t l y -
that his people were profoundly d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the party 
p o l i t i c i a n s and that once they saw Serbs, Croats and Slovenes working 
together as Yugoslavs f o r a strong, united and prosperous Yugoslavia," 
they would give the new regime t h e i r f u l l support. 
A l l the evidence suggests that Alexander Ts intentions were 
genuine, honest and well-meaning. And so were his policies - a new 
t i t l e f o r his country; new l o c a l boundaries; a new Constitution; a 
new two-chamber parliament; completion of the long-delayed u n i f i c a t i o n 
of laws, codes and administration; an end to corruption i n government 
33- E.J. Patterson, Yugoslavia (London 1936) p. 104- On 19 Feb. 1928, 
Radic' said, "Our national army, which i s our national shrine.in i t s 
f i n e s t form, can perhaps alone provide a generally recognized leader 
strong enough to drive away corruption unmercifully, as w e l l as law-
lessness, to destroy partisanship i n administration and to overcome 
the p o l i t i c a l terrorism which i s turning our entire country i n t o a 
great penitentiary." 
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departments and a new efficiency and economy i n running the country. 
What Alexander was r e a l l y interested i n doing was making the 
machinery of state work - as a single u n i t , with a l l the parts working 
together. I t was, I thin k , a wholly legitimate goal. What he did not 
seek - and he may therefore be c r i t i c i z e d f o r t h i s - was a new or 
imaginative programme of soc i a l or agrarian reform which might have 
benefitted the peasant community, who amounted to almost 80$ of the 
population. Alexander was blinkered i n the sense that;.his eyes were 
simply on the Yugoslav i d e a l . Doubtless, he believed that when the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , parliament and administration worked properly, these 
pressing matters would receive urgent attention. 
"A dic t a t o r s h i p , " wrote Henderson, "must o f f e r rapid and 
spectacular achievements i f i t i s to reta i n i t s prestige." And 
there i s clear evidence, both from the royal proclamation and from 
what was stated at the time, that Alexander and his Ministers believed 
that the task of purging the old and establishing the new could be 
done i n a very short time. 
This i s where King Alexander made his f i r s t mistake. Although 
the i n i t i a l spate of l e g i s l a t i o n was breath-takingly impressive and 
the broad lines of the new Yugoslavia were made clear at an early date, 
there was more to making a nation one than simply passing laws. The 
habits, customs and outlook of a whole generation had to be changed. 
But the Yugoslav people have always been intensely p o l i t i c a l i n t h e i r 
outlook, strongly democratic i n t h e i r principles and vocal i n t h e i r 
expression. However disappointing the party p o l i t i c i a n s may have been 
- and whatever damage they may have done to the country - the people 
had rather enjoyed s i t t i n g i n t h e i r cafes, drinking t h e i r Turkish coffee 
and sipping t h e i r s l j i v o v i c a , arguing and complaining. The Croats, 
although i n i t i a l l y glad t o see the "hated" Skupstina dissolved, were 
34- Henderson to Sargent, 16 J u l . 1930, C5S12/144/92. 
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less than happy to discover that t h e i r beloved Croatia had d i s - . 
Scu/slCa. 
appeared from the map to be replaced with the "Sawa Bahovina". They 
.had wanted more i d e n t i t y - not less! And they quickly decided that 
i f the new regime was going to suppress the freedom of speech and 
destroy t h e i r national i d e n t i t y , then they were against i t . 
The Serbs, f o r t h e i r part, were more kindly disposed towards 
the regime. After a l l , the King himself was a Serb and would not do 
anything to harm t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . But i t was not long before the Serbs 
-and the Slovenes - became d i s i l l u s i o n e d . The new ministers did not 
seem any great improvement on t h e i r predecessors. Thry WIM-H nnt, 
woll-lu'igwa. I n f a c t , they seemed rather faceless men. And a f t e r t h e i r 
f i r s t outburst of e f f i c i e n c y , they appeared rather surprised and 
resentful that the nation should not have given them t h e i r whole-
hearted support. This, i n t u r n , made the Ministers less sure that 
the King Ts policies were the r i g h t ones. With s t r i c t censorship i n 
force, both Alexander and his Ministers were working i n a vacuum. 
They did not know what the people were r e a l l y f e e l i n g . They had no 
desire t o k i l l the Yugoslav i d e a l by forcing i t down the peoples* 
throats too f a s t . So the policies of the Dictatorship were slowed . 
down, the new Constitution was put i n t o cold storage and plans f o r 
a new Parliament delayed. 
But the longer the Dictatorship continued, the less j u s t i f i e d 
did the King's actions appear, the more dubious his o r i g i n a l motives 
became and an increasing number of people began to wonder i f the 
Dictatorship r e a l l y had any plans f o r the nation or whether i t had 
assumed power f o r the sake of power i t s e l f . The regime therefore found 
i t s e l f open to precisely the same c r i t i c i s m as Alexander had l a i d 
against the party p o l i t i c i a n s . He, too, had f a i l e d to bring "order 
and consolidation" w i t h i n the country. Despite the pressing urgency 
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of t h e i r need, he had done nothing to s a t i s f y "the complaints of 
35 
the labouring masses, p a t r i o t i c but exhausted". He, too had f a i l e d 
t o resolve the deep-rooted differences between Serb and Croat. And, 
f a r from binding the nation together, he and his Ministers had created 
an equally "unhealthy p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n " to that which he had sought 
t o remedy i n January 1929. Alexander's f a i l u r e t o work a sw i f t cure -
even assuming that a s w i f t cure was possible - caused great d i s i l l u s -
ionment with the Dictatorship and discouraged many who might otherwise 
have co-operated with i t from coming forward. 
I t i s perhaps d i f f i c u l t f o r us to realize how small were the 
human resources upon which King Alexander could c a l l . Three-fifths 
of Serbia's manpower had been l o s t during the World War and, with 
them, nine-tenths of her university students. A large number of 
talented young Croats had also died f i g h t i n g f o r the Austrian 
36 " " Empire. There were therefore many of the old guard but very 
few of the "new guard". Thus, although Alexander had driven the old 
p o l i t i c i a n s from power and pensioned them o f f , i t was not long 
before he realized how much he needed t h e i r help. 
We can see now t h a t , i n promulgating the Constitution of 1931, 
and holding fresh elections, the King hoped that, he might either 
persuade the old p o l i t i c i a n s to sink t h e i r differences and return to 
Belgrade or else he might f i l l the Skupstina with new men, amongst 
whom there might be people of r e a l a b i l i t y . But, unfortunately, as 
we have seen, the King received neither the support of the old po l -
i t i c i a n s nor any fresh t a l e n t . The deputies returned to the Skupstina 
were not only second-rate material, voted i n unopposed on the o f f i c i a l 
35. I n November 1928, Sir H.W. Kennard wrote: " i f the peasant were 
given order i n administration, i m p a r t i a l i t y of the law and help where 
help i s needed, the Opposition would be rendered powerless." Kennard 
to Cushendun, 18 Nov. 1928, C7852/173/92. 
36. R. West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, p. 612. 
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government l i s t , but as prone to fac t i o n and disagreement as t h e i r 
predecessors i n the pre-1929 parliament. This meant that Alexander 
was obliged t o r e l y on the same col l e c t i o n of Ministers who had 
already proved themselves neither e f f i c i e n t nor i n s p i r i n g . And, at 
the same time, he had to watch a Skupstina - which although of his .. 
making,was soon beyond his control - tearing up, watering down and 
interminably delaying essential reforms i n government, agriculture 
and finance. As we have shown, t h i s unhappy s i t u a t i o n grew and dev-
eloped i n the l a s t three years of the Dictatorship. During that time, 
there was l i t t l e or no progress towards the new Yugoslavia of Alex-
ander's dreams nor a return to f u l l parliamentary democracy. The 
King was wel l aware t h a t , i n the eyes of his people, he was the one 
who bore f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l that happened during the regime 
and there i s ample evidence to suggest t h a t , by late 1933 or early 
1934, the King knew that - i n the task of solving the i n t e r n a l 
problems facing the country - his Dictatorship had f a i l e d . 
This, however, did not mean that Alexander had been wrong to 
proclaim a royal dictatorship, nor th a t , having f a i l e d , he should 
hand over to someone who could do better. As has been made abundantly 
clear, the one thing which the parliamentary regime and the Dictatorship 
both lacked, was an available supply of capable, honest and d i s i n t e r -
ested men. Even those who had considerable doubts about the wisdom of 
dictatorship were obliged to admit that the King was the one man who 
could hold the country together. Although, by 1934, the plans and hopes 
of 1929 had conspicuously f a i l e d , there i s clear evidence to show th a t , 
undaunted, Alexander was planning fresh changes i n his regime - away 
from personal rule and a central parliament - towards a federal solution. 
And there i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t , had he l i v e d , these changes would have 
been made and the whole manner and style of royal dictatorship taken 
yet another and d i f f e r e n t t u r n . 
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I t i s therefore impossible to give a f i n a l judgement upon 
the i n t e r n a l policy of King Alexander's dictatorship because his own 
plans and e f f o r t s were never allowed to reach f r u i t i o n . What can be 
said with some certainty i s that the personal rule of 1929-31 
lasted too long and did not provide the sw i f t solution which would 
have made everyone s a t i s f i e d . What the King discovered - and what 
subsequent rulers of Yugoslavia have also discovered - was that there 
was no easy solution t o the problem facing Yugoslavia. To reconcile 
the Croats and the Serbs and to make the nation r e a l l y one, would 
take many years - and perhaps even several generations - to achieve. 
Nor did the Parliament of 1931-34 help. I t was not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
democratic to win popular support; nor was i t s u f f i c i e n t l y absolutist 
to execute the royal w i l l . I n bringing i t i nto existence, the King 
suffered the worst of both worlds. 
I n the s i x years that King Alexander was royal d i c t a t o r , he 
f a i l e d - but t h i s i s not to say that his Dictatorship was a f a i l u r e . 
Even with a strong p o l i t i c a l party, a powerful ideology, a policy of 
federal republics and t h i r t y years as a united nation - the rulers of 
post-war Yugoslavia have not been spared the same antagonism and d i s -
agreement, between Croat and Serb. The fact that King Alexander - i n 
a mere six years - did not succeed, i s by no means a confession of 
f a i l u r e . 
But i f , i n 1934, King Alexander found himself profoundly d i s s a t i s f i e d 
with events at home, the same could not be said f o r his policies 
abroad. One of his chief reasons f o r procaliming the dictatorship 
was to improve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l standing of his country i n Europe. 
He hoped that the prospect of strong government, an e f f i c i e n t admin-
i s t r a t i o n and honesty i n high places would a t t r a c t foreign c a p i t a l to 
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Yugoslavia and he reckoned that the more powerful and the more 
united he could make his country, the more he could r e s i s t I t a l i a n 
intrigues and adventures i n the peninsula, which he saw as the chief 
external threat t o his Kingdom. 
I t was i n a way symptomatic of Alexander's methods that he 
should have spent a f u l l four years (1929-32) t r y i n g to reach some 
understanding or agreement with Mussolini. Just as he had t r i e d 
p a t i e n t l y and forbearingly to make the parliamentary regime work, 
s i m i l a r l y , King Alexander spent a great deal of time and diplomacy 
t r y i n g to improve Yugoslav-Italian r e l a t i o n s . Again, as we have seen, 
the fact that he f a i l e d to reach any agreement, with the I t a l i a n 
d i c t a t o r was not his f a u l t ; Every avenue of diplomacy was explored; 
the most generous offers were made. And the only c r i t i c i s m which we 
might l e v e l against Alexander was that he spent too long t r y i n g to 
secure an understanding when i t must have already been perfectly 
clear that Mussolini was not interested. 
One of the p r i n c i p a l features of King Alexander's character 
was an unwillingness to be forced i n t o any sudden decision. He 
preferred to act when he himself decided - to spring surprises at 
times of his own choosing^ but when he made some sudden move, i t 
usually represented some major change i n royal policy. Once Alexander 
realized that a l l his e f f o r t s to woo Mussolini were doomed to f a i l u r e , 
he was very s w i f t to develop his country's ex i s t i n g l i n k s with Czech-
oslovakia and Rumania. For years, the L i t t l e Entente had been a sort 
of pale French shadow i n Central Europe, judiciously preserving the 
status quo i n the Danube basin and adding i t s weight to the lengthy 
deliberations of the League of Nations. Now, i n a very short time, 
the L i t t l e Entente became a s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l factor i n European 
a f f a i r s . I t could not be claimed that t h i s change was due simply to 
Alexander's royal diplomacy but, equally, without a strong Yugoslav 
246 
i n i t i a t i v e , nothing would have been possible. 
I t was, as we have seen, very much Alexander's wish that the 
L i t t l e Entente should be complemented by some equally powerful t r e a t y 
i n the Balkan peninsula and the Balkan Entente took shape so rapidly 
that at least one of the signatories - Turkey - found herself taken 
by surprise at the sudden a r r i v a l of a Yugoslav monarch on a personal 
v i s i t to Constantinople. The fact that King Alexander showed u n w i l l i n g -
ness to sign any t r e a t y i n the Balkans without the f u l l e s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of Bulgaria - together with his very detrained e f f o r t s to improve 
relations with King Boris by making two v i s i t s t o Bulgaria i n less 
than a year - show that his wish was not to bu i l d a pact against 
anyone but simply to consolidate the Balkans and Central Europe 
against foreign aggression - ju s t as he had t r i e d t o unite and consol-
idate his own country from w i t h i n . 
The diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e mounted by King Alexander i n the 
years 1933-34 did much to change the standing and r e l a t i v e importance 
of the countries i n Central and Eastern Europe and, had he l i v e d , i t 
i s not too much to say that the two Ententes would have provided a 
more formidable and united obstacle to the designs of the dictators j 
than they did i n the hands of lesser men. From the evidence available, 
i t i s clear that the Germans realized the aims and objectives of his 
policy and did t h e i r best to secure good relations with Yugoslavia 
- as one of the most important - and f r a g i l e - linksjin the chain. I t a l y , 
too, was beginning to realize that a tr e a t y with Yugoslavia would have 
been much better than two s o l i d Ententes speaking with a single voice. 
But France - and, most probably, Great B r i t a i n as w e l l - s t i l l thought 
of Yugoslavia as a minor a l l y of the West, a s a t e l l i t e dependency, a 
poor r e l a t i o n of France. I t was a picture that King Alexander was w e l l 
on his way to shattering at the time of his death. 
A l l that King Alexander achieved f o r his country i n in t e r n a t i o n a l 
son 
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a f f a i r s was done almost single-handedly and - perhaps because he 
was not dependent upon any subordinate m i n i s t e r s - w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
success. His r o y a l diplomacy'showed something t h a t h i s i n t e r n a l p o l i c y 
d i d not - t h a t Alexander was a man o f r e a l v i s i o n , s k i l l , i n g e n u i t y 
and courage, capable of great patience and forbearance towards known 
enemies, but also fast-moving and determined i n pursuing p o l i c i e s 
and making t r e a t i e s which would b r i n g peace and s e c u r i t y t o Eastern 
Europe. I t i s , I t h i n k , s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t - w i t h i n Yugoslavia - where 
h i s p o l i c i e s were s t e a d i l y f r u s t r a t e d and impeded and where he proved 
very unsuccessful i n f o l l o w i n g through h i s plans and hopes t o a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion, there was very l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s 
regime. But, abroad - and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n I t a l y - where h i s v i s i o n 
of a u n i t e d and st r o n g Yugoslavia was considered a r e a l and serious 
p o s s i b i l i t y and where h i s s k i l l as a statesman was c l e a r l y recognized 
(and feared) the o p p o s i t i o n was s t r o n g , organized and - i n the outcome 
- deadly. 
The marked cont r a s t between the King's achievements abroad 
and the per p e t u a l f r u s t r a t i o n s he experienced a t home can, I b e l i e v e , 
have o n l y one explanation. That, a t some moment a f t e r he proclaimed 
h i s r o y a l d i c t a t o r s h i p , Alexander r e a l i z e d t h a t the ta s k of h e a l i n g 
h i s country's d i v i s i o n s and making Yugoslavia one n a t i o n was going 
t o be a very long and slow business and t h a t no amount of l e g i s l a t i o n 
would b r i n g the r e s u l t any quicker. The t a s k , he r e a l i z e d , would take 
years r a t h e r than months and, i n t h a t t i m e , Alexander knew, the most 
pressing problem would not be t h e inn e r workings of the Yugoslav s t a t e 
but the e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y of h i s Kingdom. I t i s t h e r e f o r e possible t o 
det e c t a s h i f t i n Alexander's preoccupations some time a f t e r November 
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1929, when the f i r s t f l o o d of l e g i s l a t i o n had passed, away from the 
process of u n i f i c a t i o n t o an i n c r e a s i n g concern w i t h the t h r e a t of 
I t a l y , the r i s i n g power of Germany and the need f o r wider p o l i t i c a l 
u n i t y i n Central and Eastern Europe. I t seems c e r t a i n t h a t Alexander 
believed t h a t , i f he could secure i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y 
f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e , then he would be able t o take h i s time 
i n b r i n g i n g about - g r a d u a l l y and p e a c e f u l l y - the s o r t of Yugoslavia 
he wanted. 
For t h i s reason, King Alexander was q u i t e w i l l i n g t o delay h i s 
planned reforms. There was no h u r r y f o r a C o n s t i t u t i o n ; no need f o r 
a hasty r e t u r n t o democratic r u l e . Each stage i n t h e process of 
u n i f y i n g the n a t i o n could continue s l o w l y and whether the 
new Banovina s t r u c t u r e s were introduced i n June 1934 or June 1935 was, 
t o Alexander, a mere t e c h n i c a l i t y . What d i d matter was t h a t the task 
of p r o t e c t i n g the country by i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement should proceed 
r a p i d l y . This was t h e sphere i n which King Alexander concentrated h i s 
g r e a t e s t e f f o r t s and where he achieved the most spectacular r e s u l t s . 
And he must have noted w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t the more he improved 
h i s c o u n t r y T s standing abroad, the more he consolidated h i s p o s i t i o n 
a t home. 
There i s no doubt t h a t , i n t h e world of 1929-1934 w i t h the 
widespread economic depression and the r i s e of the d i c t a t o r s i n I t a l y , 
Germany and the Soviet Union, King Alexander was wise t o f o l l o w the 
p o l i c y he d i d . But the p r i c e o f d e l a y i n g reform a t home meant t h a t , 
by the time Alexander d i e d , the n a t i o n had advanced l i t t l e from the 
p o s i t i o n reached by December 1931. The o l d parliamentary system had 
been abolished; the new parliamentary regime had been d i s c r e d i t e d 
(almost before i t began). E s s e n t i a l l e g i s l a t i o n was neglected and the 
Croats and Serbs were s t i l l unreconciled. Neither democracy nor 
d i c t a t o r s h i p had succeeded i n overcoming the deep d i s u n i t y ; no a l t e r -
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n a t i v e leaders had emerged - e i t h e r t o a s s i s t the King, or t o 
•oppose him. There was no proper able government and no coherent 
o p p o s i t i o n . Everything hung upon one man. 
I t would have been reasonable t o suppose t h a t , since so much 
depended upon King Alexander, t h a t - a f t e r h i s assassination - the 
whole s t a t e would have collapsed and the Croats have taken the opp-
o r t u n i t y t o seize t h e autonomy they had so long d e s i r e d . But t h i s 
was not the case. I n s t e a d , a common g r i e f u n i t e d the Yugoslav people 
as no amount of l e g i s l a t i o n could ever have done, and commentators 
have pointed out t h a t , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i n death, King Alexander 
achieved the o b j e c t he had been aiming a t f o r a l l h i s l i f e . 
But, w h i l s t t h i s i s undoubtedly t r u e so f a r as the i n t e r n a l 
c o n d i t i o n of the country and people were concerned,the f a c t remains 
t h a t the death of Alexander brought t o a sudden and t r a g i c end the 
one p o l i c y which was v i t a l t o the f u t u r e w e l l - b e i n g of Yugoslavia. 
Not the process of u n i f i c a t i o n - but the a l l i a n c e system upon which 
the peace and s e c u r i t y o f the Kingdom depended, was i r r e p a r a b l y 
broken. Before h i s death, there had been a s t r o n g and v i s i b l e growing 
together i n Central and Eastern Europe; b u t , a f t e r , many p o l i t i c i a n s 
and statesmen - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Yugoslavia - believed t h a t they had 
more t o gain by b i - l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s w i t h I t a l y and Germany and sacr-
a 
i f i c e d a common u n i t y f o r temporary and i l l u s o r y advantage. I t was 
not an i l l u s i o n which Alexander would have shared. From his long and 
f u t i l e dealings w i t h M u s s o l i n i , he knew the very r e a l dangers h i s 
country faced and t h a t , w i t h o u t s t r o n g f r i e n d s and powerful a l l i a n c e s , 
Yugoslavia could not s u r v i v e . Therefore, although the Regency, which 
f o l l o w e d the a s s a s s i n a t i o n , was able t o c a p i t a l i z e upon the very r e a l 
f e e l i n g s of g r i e f and loss which animated the n a t i o n , and could take 
some steps towards r e c o n c i l i n g the Croats and the Serbs, i t abandoned 
the one fundemental p o l i c y which Alexander pursued and which alone 
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could have enabled a genuine r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t o take place. 
The Royal D i c t a t o r s h i p was one manTs s o l u t i o n t o an i n t r a c t a b l e 
problem. That i t was a problem t h a t merited such strong-handed a c t i o n 
can be judged by the f a c t t h a t the disagreement and d i s u n i t y between 
the Croats and the Serbs i s s t i l l as much a cause f o r a n x i e t y today 
- f o r t y years a f t e r the death o f King Alexander - and t h a t the 
continued existence of the Yugoslav s t a t e i s s t i l l i n doubt. As i n 
the days of King Alexander, the n a t i o n i s s t i l l h eld together by the 
power and w i l l o f one man and the last:,- t h i r t y years o f Communist 
r u l e have witnessed as many changes of d i r e c t i o n - from c o l l e c t i v -
i z a t i o n t o d e - c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , from one C o n s t i t u t i o n t o another, 
from c e n t r a l i s m t o d e v o l u t i o n and back t o a c e n t r a l s o l u t i o n - as 
Yugoslav leaders t r y t o solve the one problem which i s apparently 
i n s o l u b l e . I t may be t h a t from another manfs death, Yugoslavia w i l l 
come clos e r t o being t r u l y one n a t i o n but y e t again - i n the death 
of a st r o n g r u l e r - t h e r e i s a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , i n 
d i f f e r e n t hands, Yugoslavia may today - as i n 1934 - lose the unique 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n which p r o t e c t s her independence and s e c u r i t y . 
I n King Alexander, t h e r e f o r e , we do not see some v i c i o u s or 
c r u e l d i c t a t o r seeking power f o r power Ts own sake - an " A l Capone 
of the Balkans" as Adamic" c a l l e d him - but a q u i e t , responsible and 
s e n s i t i v e man who, although he appeared weak, i n s i g n i f i c a n t and 
i n d e c i s i v e , d i d i n f a c t possess a v i s i o n which he r e l e n t l e s s l y pursued. 
I t was perhaps i n a way symbolic t h a t , i n a land which was born i n 
vio l e n c e - and where democracy perished v i o l e n t l y - t h a t a man of 





A: The D e c l a r a t i o n of Corfu. 
1. "The s t a t e of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also known 
under the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs, w i l l be a f r e e and 
independent kingdom o f u n i t e d t e r r i t o r y and u n i t y of c i t i z e n s h i p . 
I t w i l l be a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , democratic and parliamentary monarchy 
under the leadership of the K a r a d j o r d j e v i c dynasty, which has shown 
t h a t i t shares the ideas and sentiments o f the people and places the 
n a t i o n T s freedom and the nation's w i l l above a l l e l s e . 
2. "This s t a t e w i l l be known as 'The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes', and i t s r u l e r as 'The King of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes'. 
3. "The s t a t e w i l l have a s i n g l e coat-of-arms, a s i n g l e f l a g and 
a s i n g l e crown. These emblems w i l l be composed of the present e x i s t i n g 
emblems. The u n i t y of the s t a t e w i l l be symbolized by the coat-of-arms 
and the f l a g of the kingdom. 
4. "The s p e c i a l Serb, Croat and Slovene f l a g s rank e q u a l l y and 
may be f r e e l y h o i s t e d on a l l occasions. The s p e c i a l coat-of-arms may 
be used w i t h equal freedom. 
5. " A l l three n a t i o n a l designations - Serbs, Croats and Slovenes -
s h a l l enjoy a b s o l u t e l y equal r i g h t s i n the whole t e r r i t o r y o f the 
kingdom, and each may be f r e e l y used on a l l p u b l i c occasions and i n 
d e a l i n g w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s . 
6. Both alphabets, the C y r i l l i c and the l a t i n , s h a l l s i m i l a r l y be 
a b s o l u t e l y equal and e i t h e r may be f r e e l y used i n the whole t e r r i t o r y 
o f the kingdom. Every c e n t r a l and l o c a l a u t h o r i t y s h a l l be bound t o 
use e i t h e r alphabet i n accordance w i t h the wishes of the i n h a b i t a n t s . 
7. " A l l recognized r e l i g i o n s s h a l l be f r e e l y and p u b l i c l y exercised. 
The Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Mohammedan creeds, which are numeric-
a l l y strongest amongst our people, s h a l l rank e q u a l l y and have the 
same r i g h t s i n r e l a t i o n t o the s t a t e . 
8. "The calendar w i l l be u n i f i e d as soon as po s s i b l e . 
9. "The t e r r i t o r y of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
w i l l c o n t a i n a l l t h a t t e r r i t o r y i n h a b i t e d by our t h r e e - f o l d people i n 
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a compact and continuous body, and cannot be m u t i l a t e d w i t h o u t 
i n j u r y t o the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the whole. Our n a t i o n demands 
noth i n g t h a t belongs t o ot h e r s . I t demands on l y what i s i t s own. 
I t desires t o f r e e i t s e l f and achieve i t s u n i t y . Therefore, i t consc-
i o u s l y and f i r m l y refuses every p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n of t h e problem of 
i t s n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n and u n i f i c a t i o n . Our people puts forward as 
one i n d i v i s i b l e whole the problem of t h e i r deliverance from Austro-
Hungarian domination and t h e i r union w i t h Serbia and Montenegro i n 
a s i n g l e s t a t e forming an i n d i v i s i b l e whole. I n accordance w i t h the 
r i g h t s of., s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , no p a r t of t h i s u n i t e d t e r r i t o r y may 
wi t h o u t infringement o f j u s t i c e be detached and incorporated i n t o 
some other s t a t e w i t h o u t the consent of the n a t i o n i t s e l f . 
10. " I n the i n t e r e s t s of freedom and equal r i g h t s o f a l l peoples, 
the A d r i a t i c Sea s h a l l , be f r e e and open t o a l l . 
11. " A l l c i t i z e n s throughout the t e r r i t o r y of the kingdom s h a l l be 
equal and enjoy the same r i g h t s towards the s t a t e and before the law. 
12. "The fr a n c h i s e f o r the e l e c t i o n of deputies t o the N a t i o n a l 
Parliament, as f o r the communes and other a d m i n i s t r a t i v e assemblies, 
s h a l l be equal and u n i v e r s a l and s h a l l be e f f e c t e d through d i r e c t 
and secret b a l l o t by communes. 
13. "The C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o be drawn up a f t e r the conclusion of 
peace,by a Constituent Assembly, elected by u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e , w i l l 
be the basis of the e n t i r e l i f e of the s t a t e . I t w i l l be the source 
and consummation of a l l a u t h o r i t y and of a l l r i g h t s by which the 
e n t i r e l i f e of the n a t i o n w i l l be regu l a t e d . The C o n s t i t u t i o n must 
be passed i n i t s e n t i r e t y by a numer i c a l l y defined m a j o r i t y i n the 
Constituent Assembly. The C o n s t i t u t i o n , l i k e a l l other laws passed 
by the Constituent Assembly, w i l l only come i n t o f o r c e a f t e r having 
received the r o y a l assent. 
"The n a t i o n of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, thus u n i t e d , would 
form a s t a t e of about 12 m i l l i o n c i t i z e n s and prove.... a powerful 
bulwark against German aggression and the inseparable a l l y o f a l l 
those c i v i l i z e d peoples and sta t e s who have upheld t h e p r i n c i p l e s of 
law, n a t i o n a l freedom and i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e . As such, i t w i l l be 
a worthy member of the new community of n a t i o n s . 
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B; The Murders i n the Skupstina, June 1928 
On June 20, 1928, the day's proceedings began w i t h a discussion 
of t h e r e p o r t on the .previous day's debate. A CPP deputy, Mastrovic, 
objected t h a t the r e p o r t made no mention of the f a c t t h a t the Rad-
i c a l deputies, Toma Popovic and Punisa Racic, had declared: "Heads 
w i l l have t o f a l l here; u n t i l Stjepan Radic i s k i l l e d , t h e r e w i l l 
be no peace." Mastrovic' continued: "We f e e l t h a t we are i n an atmos-
phere i n which attempts are being made t o create a psychology of 
murder, the murder of those who represent the most progressive and 
vigorous s e c t i o n of the people." " I request the President of the 
Skupstina t o put an end t o t h i s , f o r anything o f t h i s k i n d would be 
the r u i n o f our s t a t e . " 
The Skupstina refused t o a l l o w the words proposed by Mastrovic 
t o be included i n the r e p o r t , whereupon Toma Popovic' rose t o e x p l a i n 
the cause of h i s dispute w i t h Radic a t the previous day's s i t t i n g . 
His language was such as t o c a l l down a rebuke by the President (Dr 
Peric") a f t e r which he continued as f o l l o w s : 
" I f your leader, Stjepan Radic, who i s making f o o l s 
of the Croat people, continues h i s i n s u l t s , I assure 
you t h a t h i s head w i l l f a l l here." 
The CPP-ID C o a l i t i o n deputies, a t t h i s , jumped from t h e i r seats and 
rushed towards the President's t a b l e , but Toma Popovic continued: 
"Serbia w i l l not be re s p o n s i b l e , but you yourselves 
w i l l be respo n s i b l e , since you are a b s o l u t e l y u n f i t t e d 
t o enter the Skupstina." 
Amid the general commotion, the President i n t e r r u p t e d the s i t t i n g , 
which was resumed 10 minutes l a t e r when Dr Peric announced the 
i n f l i c t i o n upon Toma Popovic o f a w r i t t e n reprimand f o r h i s language. 
The President then gave word t o Punisa Racic who desired t o make a 
personal explanation i n view of the a t t a c k made on him .by Mastrovic' 
i n h i s speech. 
Racic entered the t r i b u n e and complained t h a t the President 
inadequately protected the honour o f the deputies of the m a j o r i t y 
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a g a i n s t the i n s u l t s which were heaped on them day a f t e r day by the 
Opposition; he then proceeded as f o l l o w s : -
"Never have Serbian i n t e r e s t s been so endangered as 
now. As a Serbian and a deputy, as I see the danger 
t h r e a t e n i n g my country, I must openly say t h a t I 
s h a l l use another weapon t o defend Serbian i n t e r e s t s . " 
Amid the uproar which ensued on the Opposition benches, P r i b i c e v i c 
exclaimed:-
"Do you wish i t heard even i n London t h a t t h r e a t s 
of weapons are made here?" 
The President endeavoured t o t r a n q u i l i z e the o p p o s i t i o n and begged 
Racic t o conclude h i s speech* The l a t t e r proceeeded t o r e f e r t o the 
a t t i t u d e of the CPP i n the e a r l y years a f t e r the a r m i s t i c e , when amid 
the general confusion, Dr Pernar, a Croat deputy, c r i e d out t o him:-
"You used t o rob the begs!" thereby r e f e r r i n g presumably t o Racic*s 
previous career as a comitad.ji. Hereupon, Racic c a l l e d out..to Dr Penc: 
'Mr President, I request that, you w i l l punish 
him or I w i l l punish him myself." 
Above the ensuing pandemonium, was heard the voice of Racic:-
" I f anyone dares t o put himself between me 
and Dr Pernar, he w i l l d i e . " 
At t h i s p o i n t , Dr Peric i n t e r r u p t e d the proceedings and l e f t the Chamber. 
When Racic r e a l i z e d t h a t the President had l e f t the Chamber 
w i t h o u t i n f l i c t i n g any punishment on Dr Pernar, he c r i e d t o the l a t t e r : 
"Take back your words!" and a t the same ti m e , drew a r e v o l v e r from 
h i s hip-pocket. The a c t i o n was concealed from the deputies by the 
t r i b u n e but was n o t i c e d by .a Radi c a l member of the Cabinet s i t t i n g 
on the m i n i s t e r i a l bench and by a Radical ex-Minister who both rushed 
forward t o hold him back. The l a t t e r , however, t h r u s t them back saying 
"Let me alone, a Montenegrin cannot f o r g i v e t h i s i n s u l t ! " 
According t o another v e r s i o n , Racic covered Dr Pernar w i t h h i s 
p i s t o l , and t w i c e ordered him t o stand up and apologize, which he 
refused t o do. He t h e r e f o r e . f i r e d a shot a t Dr Pernar who was h i t i n 
the l e f t shoulder, h i s lungs being a f f e c t e d . A number of Croat deputies 
seeing the danger t o Stjepan Radio surrounded him i n order t o p r o t e c t 
him. Four f u r t h e r shots f o l l o w e d i n quick succession. The second h i t 
Basaricek above the heart and proved f a t a l w i t h i n t e n minutes. The 
t h i r d h i t Grandja i n the l e f t hand and s l i g h t l y wounded Stjepan RadicT. 
By t h i s t i m e , the deputies were seized w i t h panic and the 
unfortunate Stjepan Radic, who i s so s h o r t - s i g h t e d t h a t he cannot see 
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what i s going on more than a yard from him, was l e f t alone. He 
himself was the v i c t i m of the f o u r t h shot which h i t him i n the 
stomach. Pavle Radio", who was a l i t t l e distance away, when he saw 
hi s uncle deserted, made a dash forward t o stop Racic but he was 
too l a t e and he himse l f received the f i f t h shot. He died w i t h i n 
f i v e minutes of e n t e r i n g h o s p i t a l . Stjepan Radic was operated on 
and i t i s u n c e r t a i n whether he w i l l l i v e . The c o n d i t i o n of Dr Pernar 
i s serious.but not dangerous, w h i l e the wound received by Granja i s 
s l i g h t . 
I n the general confusion, Racic escaped. He l e f t through a 
back entrance, jumped i n t o a car and drove t o Rakovica, a v i l l a g e 
i n the neighbourhood of Belgrade. I t i s not c l e a r whether t h i s car 
was s p e c i a l l y w a i t i n g f o r him, b u t , i f so, t h i s - and the f a c t t h a t 
c o n t r a r y t o custom,- he mounted the t r i b u n e nearest the Opposition -
would seem t o show t h a t the a c t i o n was premeditated. At Rakovica, he 
arranged w i t h a f r i e n d t o put h i s a f f a i r s i n order and returned t o 
Belgrade where he gave himself up t o the p o l i c e . He asked t o be 
received by Dr Korosec f o r t h i s purpose but the l a t t e r r e p l i e d t h a t 
he d i d not i n t e n d t o receive a common c r i m i n a l . 
From a despatch from Mr Roberts (Belgrade) t o S i r Austen Chamberlain, 
20 June 1928, C4939/173/92. ( V o l . 12982). 
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C: The Royal Proclamation o f January 6, 1929-
"To a l l Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
"The highest i n t e r e s t s o f the n a t i o n and of the State, as w e l l 
as t h e i r f u t u r e , compel me, both as Sovereign and as a son of my 
country, t o address myself d i r e c t l y t o my people t o t e l l them openly 
and s i n c e r e l y the course my conscience and my love f o r my country 
o b l i g e me t o take. 
"The hour has come when there can and may not be any i n t e r -
mediary between the King and h i s people. Notwithstanding my best 
e f f o r t s and the patience I have displayed i n the execution of my 
exa l t e d t a s k , my s o u l has been t o r n by the complaints of the l a b o u r i n g 
masses, p a t r i o t i c but exhausted, who by a n a t u r a l process of reasoning 
have a r r i v e d a t the conclusion t h a t the way we have h i t h e r t o f o l l o w e d 
can no longer be pursued. 
'•My expectations and those of my people t h a t the evo l u t i o n s of 
our i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e would b r i n g about order and c o n s o l i d a t i o n 
w i t h i n our country have not been r e a l i z e d . Both parliamentary l i f e and 
p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k g e n e r a l l y have become more and more negative, and 
both the n a t i o n and the State are today s u f f e r i n g from the consequences 
of t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s . 
" A l l u s e f u l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n the State and the development, 
of our n a t i o n a l l i f e have been jeopardized. Such an unhealthy p o l i t -
i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s not o n l y p r e j u d i c i a l i n i n t e r n a l l i f e and progress, 
but also t o the development of our e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as t o 
our p r e s t i g e and c r e d i t abroad. 
"Parliamentary l i f e , which as a p o l i t i c a l instrument was a 
t r a d i t i o n of my l a t e f a t h e r , has also always been my i d e a l , but b l i n d 
p o l i t i c a l passions have so abused i t t h a t i t has become an obstacle 
t o a l l p r o f i t a b l e work i n the State. The r e g r e t t a b l e disputes and the 
events i n the Skupstina have undermined a l l the confidence of the 
n a t i o n i n t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n . A l l harmony - and even those elementary 
r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i e s and i n d i v i d u a l s - have become a l t o g e t h e r 
258 
impossible. Instead of developing and strengthening the f e e l i n g of 
n a t i o n a l union, Parliamentarism as i t has developed has begun t o 
provoke moral d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n and n a t i o n a l d i s u n i o n . 
" I t i s my sacred duty t o preserve by a l l means n a t i o n a l union 
and the State. I am determined t o f u l f i l my duty w i t h o u t f l i n c h i n g 
u n t i l the end. To main t a i n the union of the people and safeguard the 
u n i t y of the S t a t e , the highest i d e a l of my r e i g n must also be the 
most imperative law f o r me and f o r a l l . 
"This duty i s imposed upon me by my r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the face 
of my people and i n the face of h i s t o r y , by my love f o r my country 
and by my deep g r a t i t u d e towards the innumerable and precious v i c t i m s 
who were s a c r i f i c e d t o t h i s i d e a l . To seek a remedy f o r t h i s e v i l i n 
a change of parliament or government as has been the p r a c t i c e h i t h e r t o , 
or even by f r e s h e l e c t i o n s , would merely be a loss of precious t i m e , 
of which many years have already been s a c r i f i c e d t o such v a i n exped-
i e n t s . 
"We must t h e r e f o r e seek f r e s h methods of work.and open new 
avenues. I am convinced t h a t a t t h i s grave moment a l l Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes w i l l understand the s i n c e r i t y of t h e i r King's word and 
t h a t they w i l l be the most l o y a l helpers i n my f u t u r e e f f o r t s t o 
r e a l i z e as q u i c k l y as possible the o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
the State i n a manner best s u i t e d t o the general needs of my people 
and the i n t e r e s t s o f the State. I have t h e r e f o r e determined and dec-
ided t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
of June 28, 1921 i s no longer i n f o r c e . A l l laws of 1 the country w i l l 
remain i n f o r c e unless suppressed by my decree should occasion a r i s e . 
y 
New laws w i l l be promulgated i n the same manner. The Skupstina elected 
on December 11, 1927 i s di s s o l v e d . 
" I n communicating my d e c i s i o n t o my people, I order a l l State 
a u t h o r i t i e s t o conform t o t h i s d e c i s i o n , which must be obeyed and 
respected by a l l . " 
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D: Cabinet Changes under the D i c t a t o r s h i p . 
January 1929. 
Prime M i n i s t e r 
I n t e r i o r 
+Foreign 
+Communications 
-War and Marine 
Finance 
S o c i a l A f f a i r s 
R e l i g i o n 
J u s t i c e 
A g r i c u l t u r e 
Health 
Public Works 
No P o r t f o l i o 
- General Petar Z i v k o v i c . 
- Bozidar Maksimovic. 
- Dr V o j i s l a v Marinkovic. 
- Dr Anton Korosec. 
- General Stevan Hadzic. 
v 
- Dr Stanko S v r l j u g a . 
- Dr Mate D r i n k o v i c . 
- Trigomir Alaupovic. 
- Dr Milan S r s k i c . 
- Dr Otto Franges 
- Uros K r u l j . 
- Stevan Savkovic\ 
- Dr l a z a r Radivojevic\ 







Slovene. Slovene Party. 
Serb. No p a r t y . 
Croat. No p a r t y . 
Croat. No p a r t y . 
Croat. Democrat. 
Bosnian. Radical. 





( + i n previous Cabinet). 
Changes. 
v ^ 
24 Jan. 1929, Z e l i m i r Mazuranic apptd. M i n i s t e r of Work & I n d u s t r y . 
24 Jan. 1929, Kosta Kumanudi apptd. M i n i s t e r of Posts and Telegraphs. 
3 Apr. 1929» K r u l j dismissed. Not replaced. 
3 Apr. 1929, Alaupovic dismissed. Not replaced. 
3 Apr. 1929* Kumanudi (Posts & Telegs) becomes M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t p o r t f o l i o . 
6 Apr. 1929, Hadzic (War) replaced by DragomirStojanovic. 
22 J u l . 1929, Mazuranic' (Work & I n d u s t r y ) incorporated i n t o M i n i s t r y 
of Finance ( S v r l j u g a ) 
5 Aug. 1929, Korosec (Communications) replaced by Radivojevic. 
5 Aug. 1929, Radivojevic' (Mines and Forests) replaced by Korosec. 
1 Sept. 1929, Work and I n d u s t r y ( S v r l j u g a ; taken over by J u r a j Demetrovic. 
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23 Jan. 1930, Savkovic (P u b l i c Wks) replaced by F i l i p Trifunovic". 
19 May 1930, Drinkovic ( S o c i a l a f f a i r s ) replaced by Dr Preka. 
19 May 1930, Franges ( A g r i c u l t u r e ) replaced by Dr Stanko Sibenik. 
19 May 1930, D r i n k o v i c , Franges and Dr Mirko Neudorfer become 
M i n i s t e r s w i t h o u t p o r t f o l i o . 
28 Sept. 1930, Korosec (Mines & Forests) replaced by Dusan Serhec. 
16 Feb. 1931, Srskic ( J u s t i c e ) replaced by D i m i t r i j e L j o t i c . 
16 Feb. 1931, T r i f u n o v i c ( P u b l i c Works) replaced by Kumanudi. 
19 June 1931, Si'benik ( A g r i c u l t u r e ) replaced by Dr Neudorfer. 
19 June 1931, Demetrovic (Work and I n d u s t r y ) replaced by Kumanudi. 
19 June 1931, Kumanudi ( P u b l i c Works) replaced by Sernec. 
19 June 1931, Sernec (Mines and Forests) replaced by Sibenik. 
19. June 1931, Preka ( S o c i a l a f f a i r s ) replaced by Kostrencic. 
19' J.une-- 1931, S v r l j u g a (Finance) replaced by D j o r d j e D j u r i c . 
19 June 1931, Franges (No p o r t f o l i o ) dismissed. 
September 1921. 
+Prime M i n i s t e r 
+Foreign 
+Communications 
+War and Marine 
+Finance 
+ S o c i a l A f f a i r s 
J u s t i c e 
+ A g r i c u l t u r e 
P u b l i c Works 
- General Petar Z i v k o v i c . 
- Dr V o j i s l a v Marinkovic. 
- Dr Lazar Radivojevic. 
- General Dragomir Stanovic. 
- Dr D j o r d j e D j u r i c . 
- Dr K o s t r e n t c i c . 
- Dr Dragutin K o j i c . 
- Dr Mirko Neudorfer. 
- Dr A l b e r t Kramer. 
+Mines and Forests Dr Stanko Sibenik. 
+Commerce 
+Education 
+No p o r t f o l i o 
+ H tt tl 
n t! +" 




- Kosta Kumanudi. 
- Bozidar Maksimovic. 
- Dr Milan S r s k i c . 
- N i k o l a Uzunovic. 
- Dr N i k o l a Preka. 
- Dr Stanko S v r l j u g a . 
- Paul Matica 
Kosta T i m o t i j e v i c . 
Dr Ivan Palacek. 
Andre Stanic. 
I v a n Pucel. 
Dr Avda Hasanbegovic 
( + i n previous Cabinet) 
Changes. 





I n t e r i o r 
Finance 
Agriculture 
General Petar Zivkovic. 
Dr V o j i s l a v Marinkovic. 




Mines & Forests Dr Stanko Sibenik. 
Communications - Dr Lazar Radivojevic. 
oj „ 
War and Marine - General Stanovic. 
S o c i a l A f f a i r s - Dr Kostrentn.c. 
Dr Dragutin K o j i c . 
Dr Preka. 
Dr Albert Kramer. 
Bozidar Maksimovic. 
Physical Education Dr Dragan K r a l j e v i c . 




Just i c e 
A p r i l 1922. 
The Marinkovic Government was i d e n t i c a l to General Zivkovic Ts 
Cabinet of January 1932, with the exceptions that Zivkovic 
disappeared and Marinkovic became both Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s . 
Changes. 
21 Apr. 1932, Preka (Public Works) replaced by Dr S r k u l j . 




I n t e r i o r 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Mines and Forests 
Communi cat ions 
War and Marine 
S o c i a l Affairs 
Education 
Public Works 
- Dr Milan S r s k i c . 
- Bogoljub J e v t i c . 
- Zika L a z i c . 
- Milorad Djordjevic. 
- Juraj Demetrovic. 
-Dr Viktor Pogacnik. 
- Dr Lazar Radivojevic. 
- General Dragomir Stojanovicf. 
- Ivan Pucel. 
- Dr Dragutin Ko j i c . 
- Dr Stevan S k r u l j . 
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Commerce 
Jus t i c e 
Physical Education -
No portfolio -
t l M I I _ 
i t i i t i _ 
There were no changes. 
Ivan Mohoric. 
Dr I l i j a Sumenkovic. 
Dr Dragan K r a l j e v i c . 




Prime Minister - Dr Milan S r s k i c . 
Deputy Prime Minister - Dr Albert Kramer. 
Foreign 
I n t e r i o r 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Mines and Forests 
Communications 
War and Marine 




Just i c e 
Physical Education 
No portfolio 
t i I I t i 
Bogoljub J e v t i c . 




Dr Lazar Radivojevicf. 
General Dragomir Stojanovic. 
Ivan Pucel. 
Dr Stevan S k r u l j . 
Dr Radenko Stankovic. 
Dr I l i j a Sumenkovic. 
Bozidar Maksimovic". 
Dr Hanzek. 
Dr Dragutin Kojic". 
Dr Hamdija Karamehmedovic. 
Changes_ 
8 May 1933> Demetrovic (Agriculture) replaced by Ljubo Tomasic', 
20 Oct1933> Tomasic (Agriculture) replaced by the Prime Minister, 
Dr Milan S r s k i c . 
January 193_4. 
The f i r s t Uzunovic Government was s i m i l a r to the Srskic Government 
i t replaced with the following exceptions:-
Nikola Uzunovic replaces Dr Milan Srskic as Prime Minister. 
J u r a j Demetrovic replaces Dr Sumenkovic as Minister of Commerce. 
Dr Sumenkovic replaces Dr Stankovic' as Minister of Education. 
Ministries of Agriculture and Mines and Forests l e f t vacant. 
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A p r i l 193_4. 
Prime Minister 
Foreign 
I n t e r i o r 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Mines and Forests 
Communications 
War and Marine 






- Nikola Uzunovic. 
- Bogoljub Jevtic. 
- Zika Lazic. 
- Milorad Djordjevic. 
- Dr Dragutin Kojic. 
- Dr Ulmanski. 
- General Svetislav Milosavljevic. 
- General Milan Milanovic. 
- Dr Fran Novak. 
- Dr Stevan S k r u l j . 
- Dr I l i j a Sumenkovic. 
- Bozidar Maksimovic. 
- Juraj Demetrovic. 
- Dr Budislav Andjelinovic. 
E: Bans appointed i n October 1929. 
l ) Drava Dusan Sernec 
Sava Dr Josip Silovic 
3 ) Vrbas Gen. Milosavljevic 







8) Morava Djordje Nestorovic 
9) Vardar Zika Lazic 
- Professor of Ljubljana. Formerly 
Minister of Public Works. 
- Professor of Zagreb University. 
A lawyer. 
- Retired General. Former Minister 
of Communications. 
- Vice-President of the Municipality 
of S p l i t . A lawyer. 
- Former Radical Minister without 
p o r t f o l i o . 
- A Montenegrin r e t i r e d general. 
- Former Minister of Agrarian Reform. 
Member of the Radical party. 
- State Councillor. A lawyer and 
member of Democrat party. 
- Assistant Minister of the I n t e r i o r . 
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F: The Background to the French Loan 
•At the time the Royal Dictatorship was proclaimed, there was 
t a l k i n the f i n a n c i a l world of an int e r n a t i o n a l loan being made 
available to Yugoslavia i n order to s t a b i l i z e her currency. The 
size of the loan envisaged was about £12 m i l l i o n s , of which half 
would be used to s t a b i l i z e the currency and the other half used f o r 
2 
development. The prospect of the Yugoslav loan - as an economic 
proposition - was viewed with some cynicism by the B r i t i s h Foreign 
Office who did not think the bankers f u l l y appreciated the p o l i t i c a l 
3 
si t u a t i o n w i t h i n Yugoslavia. A representative of the Bank of England, 
Mr Siepmann, was i n contact with the Yugoslav Minister of Finance,^1" 
but the Foreign Office recommendation was that B r i t i s h investors 
should not be i n v i t e d t o subscribe to any loan f o r Yugoslavia unless 
there was a d e f i n i t e assurance that at least 5Q& of any orders placed 
5 
on the strength of the loan would go to B r i t i s h industry. 
A Mr Porters, of Rothschild's bank, tra v e l l e d to Yugoslavia i n 
February 1929 and had talks with Dr Svrljuga, the new Minister of 
Finance under the dictatorship. From these talks i t emerged that 
Yugoslavia did not want to be t i e d to any specific committment as 
to how or where the loan should be spent. What Yugoslavia wanted was 
immediate l i q u i d funds and, i f these could not be produced by a B r i t i s h 
bank, then Yugoslavia would turn t o France f o r help.^ 
1. Letter from Rothschilds to Foreign Office, 1 Jan. 1929, C47/47/92. 
2. Foreign Office memorandum by O.G. Sargent, 15 Jan. 1929, C416/47/92. 
3. Foreign Office memorandum attached to the Rothschild l e t t e r , 
3 Jan. 1929, C47/47/92. 
4. Sir H.W. Kennard to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 2 Jan. 1929, C98/47/92. 
5. O.G. Sargent to Rothschilds, 5 Jan. 1929, C47/47/92. 
6 . Talks between Mr Porters and the Yugoslav Minister of Finance, 
5 Feb. 1929, C1173/47/92. 
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However, wh i l s t Mr Porters was i n Belgrade, he discovered 
that during the summer of 1928, the then War Minister had entered 
i n t o contracts with Skoda and other Czech firms, amounting to 
2 ,500 m i l l i o n dinars. Apparently, t h i s sum (of around £9 m i l l i o n s ) 
was either "unknown" or "forgotten about" by the Yugoslav Ministry 
of Finance f o r t h e i r o f f i c i a l l i a b i l i t i e s - upon which the talks 
about a loan were proceeding - were reckoned at only £4»5 m i l l i o n s . 
"The Finance Minister t o l d me that the disclosure 
had come as a complete surprise to him and he stated 
t h a t , unfortunately, his predecessors had granted 
without question any sums demanded by the War Minister. 
A l l of them had worked on the assumption that they 
would not be i n o f f i c e f o r long and that they had 
simply l e f t t h e i r successors to clear up any d i f f -
7 
l c u l t i e s that might arise afterwards." 
A l l i n a l l , some £18 millions had been voted f o r m i l i t a r y purposes 
during 1928 - half of the sum being met from the budget (20$ of i t ) 
g 
and half to be paid over the next ten years i n annual sums. 
"The impression I gain not only from ^ v r l j u g a 
but also from other Ministers to whom I have spoken 
is that they are only j u s t beginning to realize 
the extent of the errors and ommissions of t h e i r 
predecessors. The new men I believe to be absol-
u t e l y sincere i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to clean up the 
s i t u a t i o n , but they are r e a l i z i n g more and more 
9 
the magnitude of the task before them." 
The Foreign Office f e l t that a l l t h e i r doubts about the loan 
had been amply j u s t i f i e d : -
"Rothschilds have been treated abominably. They 
sent out a man to t r e a t about s t a b i l i z a t i o n and 
reconstruction on sound f i n a n c i a l l i n e s . He i s 
presented with false balance sheets and finds 
out the t r u t h by chance, which i s that a country 
which i s admittedly i n a precarious f i n a n c i a l 
position, has been induced to pledge the future 7 . Mr Porters to Rothschilds, 7 Mar. 1929, C1910/47/92. 
8. I b i d . 9. I b i d . 
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to a vast extent f o r purely unproductive 
expenditure i n war preparations. I t seems 
possible that t h i s sort of thing may seriously 
compromise the future of Yugoslavia." "^ 
To the B r i t i s h Foreign Office, the whole idea of a loan seemed out 
of the question and the general a t t i t u d e was "leave i t to the French""*""1' 
who, i t was reported, were eager to obtain any advantages they could 
g e t . 1 2 
Once the Yugoslavs had discovered the extent of t h e i r own 
l i a b i l i t i e s , some of the more expensive ventures considered by the 
13 
new Government were dropped. In A p r i l , great e f f o r t s were made 14 " to c u r t a i l government expenditure and Mr Porters informed Dr Svrljuga 
t h a t , i f the Yugoslav Government could put i t s p o l i t i c a l and finan-
c i a l house i n order, Rothschilds would be prepared to make a loan of 
15 
£8 m i l l i o n s . Their genuine interest i n t h i s venture was confirmed 
by Lionel Rothschild who v i s i t e d King Alexander i n Bled i n September 
1929. And Dr Svrljuga t o l d Kennard that he hoped that perhaps some 
loan could be arranged by the spring of 1930."^ 
The French, however, were not to be l e f t behind. Ever since the 
war, they had regarded themselves as Yugoslavia^ primary benefactor 
and they were most unwilling to allow any other nation - or even any 
in t e r n a t i o n a l consortium of bankers under thejaegis of the League of 
17 
Nations - a stake i n the Yugoslav f i n a n c i a l world. King Alexander 
t o l d Henderson:-
"that ever since the beginning of discussions 
at Paris (on Serbia Ts pre-war debts to France) 
10. Foreign Office Memorandum on Mr Porter's l e t t e r , 14 Mar. .1929, 
C1910/47/92. 
1 1 . O.G. Sargent to Kennard, 23 Mar. 1929, C2074/47/92. 
12. Confidential Report by Mr Leith Ross (Belgrade) to Treasury, 
28 Mar. 1929, C2411/47/92. 
13. For instance a loan to purchase more equipment f o r Yugoslav 
railways ( £ 5 ^ m i l l i o n s ) . Mr H. Sturrock, Commercial Secretary 
(Belgrade) to Mr Farrer (Department of Overseas Trad.e) 10, A p r i l 
1929, C2776/47/92. 14. See ch. 3 , pp. 64-66. 
16. Kennard to Arthur Henderson, 13 Sept. 1929, C7097/100/92. 
15. Kennard to Chamberlain, 29 Aug. 1929, C6874/47/92. 
17. This was suggested by Mr Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, 
Foreign Office memorandum, 13 Mar. 1930, C2081/1145/92. 
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he had been besieged by the French Minister 
here with proposals of one kind or another. 
During the negotaitions, several i n d i r e c t 
offers of loans had been made to the Yugoslav 
delegates. He (the King) had refused to consider 
any of them Generally speaking, the impression 
I derived from my conversation with the King was 
that His Majesty sincerely desired to go to London 
rather than anywhere else f o r money but that 
he i s so anxious to obtain a loan i n order to 
develop his country and convince his people of the 
benefits of the present regime that he may i n the 
last r e s o r t , not be able to r e s i s t French bland-
ishments." 
v 
I n May 1930, Dr Svrljuga paid an'.official v i s i t to France and spoke 
19 
of the pressure put on him to obtain a loan under French auspices. 
I n July, a representative of a French bank arrived i n Belgrade and 
offered Yugoslavia a loan of 1,500 m i l l i o n French Franc*, repayable 
20 
over a period of 20 years. None of these e f f o r t s would perhaps 
have had any r e s u l t but f o r the decision of Rothschilds to make a 
loan to Austria i n July 1930. This decision greatly annoyed King 
21 
Alexander. To him, the Austrians were not only a less deserving nation, 
they were also an ex-enemy. Profoundly i r r i t a t e d , he l o s t patience with 
Rothschilds. Whilst Marinkovic continued to assure the B r i t i s h Minister 
that the French loan would not come to anything, and that he would t i p 
22 
the Cabinet scales i n favour of Rothschilds, reports reached Henderson 
that Bogoljub J e v t i c , then Minister at Court and confidential servant 
23 
of the King, had paid two secret v i s i t s to Paris i n October 1930. 
Marinkovic knew nothing of these v i s i t s which were done secretly while 
he was i n Geneva.^ 
Later, he t o l d Henderson:-
18. Nevile Henderson to Arthur Henderson, 13 Mar. 1930, C2081/1145/92. 
19. Henderson to Sargent, 21 May 1930, C4177/1145/92. 
20. P. Leigh Smith to O'Malley, 5 Sept. 1930, C6914/1145/92. 
21. Henderson to Sargent, 5 Nov. 1930, C8277/11A5/92. 
22. Henderson to Foreign Office (Telegram) 23 Nov. 1930, C8587/1145/92. 
23. Nevile Henderson to Arthur Henderson, 7 Nov. 1930, C8307/1145/92. 
24. Henderson t o Foreign Office (Telegram) 10 Nov. 1930, G8348/1145/92. 
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"The decision to turn to France had been 
taken at a moment when the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
appeared to Yugoslavia so desperate as to compel 
her to seek immediate f i n a n c i a l aid and i n the 
25 
circumstances France could furnish e f f e c t i v e help." v 
On December 5 1930, Dr Svrljuga informed Mr Porters that the Yugoslav 
Government would not proceed any further with Rothschilds. The way 
was therefore l e f t open f o r the Union Parisienne to conclude a loan 
worth 2,280 m i l l i o n dinars (£8.3 m i l l i o n s ) repayable at 7% over a 
period of 1+0 years. For King Alexander, there were certain benefits 
to be gathered from such a loan. I t was not subject to delay. I t 
was p o l i t i c a l - but i n the autumn of 1930 when relations with I t a l y 
and Bulgaria were poor, t h i s was an advantage. There were no strings 
attached. Details of the loan agreement were made public i n May 193!•' 
25 . I b i d . 
26 . The Times, 9 May 1930, p. 11. 
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G: The Electoral Laws of September 1931. 
l ) The Law of_September_10. 
The Electoral Law of September 10 was concerned with the election of 
deputies to the lower house of the new Legislature. 
l ) The Chamber of deputies would be elected f o r 4 years and would 
assemble i n Belgrade each year f o r a session beginning Oct. 20 . 
I f the Chamber was dissolved w i t h i n that 4 year period, a gen-
eral election would take place w i t h i n 3 months of the dissolution 
and a new Chamber convened w i t h i n 4 months at the l a t e s t . 
2') Voting would take place on a Sunday and would be d i r e c t and 
public. Votes would be recorded verbally i n the p o l l i n g stations. 
3 ) There would be 305 seats i n tne new Lower House:-
City of Belgrade 3 Primorje 20 Morava 32 
Drava 25 Drina 37 Vardar 37 
S a v a 5 8 Z e t a 2 0 Total 305. 
Vrbas 22 Dunav 51 
The pr i n c i p l e guiding the d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats was that i f the 
c a p i t a l of a Banovina had 50,000 inhabitants or more, i t received 
one seat; i f 100,000 or more - two seats. I n the event, the only 
l o c a l c a p i t a l to have two seats was Zagr,ebi.rThe remaining seats 
were d i s t r i b u t e d proportionately through the rest of the banovina. 
4 ) No party could contest the election unless i t had nationwide 
support. A new party must have the support of 100 people and 
present i t s programme to the Court of Cassation. I f approved, the 
party must then draw up a nomination l i s t , with the w r i t t e n consent 
of at least 60 supporters i n each of the 305 constituencies. The 
Court of Cassation would then decide whether the party had f u l l 
national support i n each constituency and give o f f i c i a l approval i n 
the Sluzbene Novine. A l l t h i s would have to be done at least 25 
days before p o l l i n g day. Once the party had been l e g a l l y c o n s t i t -
. uted, i t could c a l l p o l i t i c a l meetings without special permission 
from the Minister of the I n t e r i o r but i t was required to n o t i f y 
the l o c a l police 24 hours before a meeting was held. 
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A l l candidates standing f o r election must have at least 200 
supporters i n t h e i r constituency and must submit a c e r t i f i c a t e 
to the l o c a l court to show that the leader of his " l i s t " has 
approved his nomination. 
5) The determination of the r e s u l t of the election i s as follows:-
a) F i r s t of a l l , the t o t a l votes secured by each nomination 
l i s t i s added together to see which l i s t has the majority. 
b) The leader of the majority l i s t i s automatically a deputy 
(even i f he i s defeated i n his own constituency). So also 
are a l l candidates who secure 50,000 votes ( ie.:a clear 
majority) 
c) The Belgrade constituency seats are awarded to candidates 
on the winning l i s t . 
d) The victorious party i s awarded two-thirds of the seats 
i n the new Chamber, and the seats are d i s t r i b u t e d i n 
proportion to the t o t a l number of seats held by each 
banovina. 
e) The other one t h i r d i s d i s t r i b u t e d i n proportion to 
the other competing party or parties. 
6) A deputy must give up his seat i f he becomes a c i v i l servant 
or a state contractor. Also, he must surrender his seat i f he 
ceases to be a member of the party on whose nomination l i s t he 
was elected. 
2) Law £f_September_J30. 
The Upper House would consist half of royal nominees and half of 
elected senators. The Banovinas would elect 47 Senators and Belgrade 
1 Senator, making an elected t o t a l of 48 (96 i n a l l ) . 
A Senator was required to be 40 years old or over, a Yugoslav subject, 
and a person able to speak, read and w r i t e the national language. He 
could not be a member of the Upper House and the Lower House at the 
same time. 
An elected senator would s i t f o r a period of s i x years once he was 
elected. However, i n three years time, half the elected senators 
would r e t i r e or stand f o r re-election. 
Election of a senator would be on the basis of an extremely r e s t r i c t e d 
franchise. Only deputies, Banovina councillors and l o c a l mayors would 
be e l i g i b l e to vote. 
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There would be one senator f o r every 300,000 of the population. 
(Hence i n the Sava banovina, there would be a need f o r 9 Senators. 
And there would be 650 e n t i t l e d to vote:- 58 Deputies 
85 Councillors 
507 Mayors 
The 650 would choose the candidates f o r election according to accepted 
party l i s t s . 
To determine the resu l t of the senatorial election, each " l i s t " 
would be divided by 1 , 2 , 3 , etc to determine the exact number of 
candidates from each l i s t f o r the Senate. Thus, f o r example, the 
650 electors i n the Sava banovina, voting f o r 4 l i s t s t o elect 9 
Senators, would determine the number of seats as follows:-
44 46 47 48 49 
60 40 35 30 25 
50 • 
35 
Thus Party A and Party B would have 3 senators; party C - 2 ; Party D 1 . 
I n the event of a t i e between the last two candidates, votes would 
be cast to see which one i t would be. 
4 l 42 •*3 
Party A 250 125 80 
Party B 200 100 22 
Party C m. 70 50 
Party D 60 30 
From two despatches from Sir Nevile Henderson to the Marquess of 
Reading, ( l ) 17 September 1931, C7136/304/92. (Vol. 15271). 
( 2 ) 5 October 1931, C7585/304/92. (Vol. 15272). 
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H: The Zagreb Points 
1. "Subscribing to the principles of democracy we consider the 
sovereignty of the people as the foundation on which the organization 
of the State must rest and the people themselves as the sole and 
unique source of a l l p o l i t i c a l sovereignty and of a l l public power. 
2. "The peasantry, viewed as a co l l e c t i v e concept, i s the dep-
ository of the national culture and the basis of economic l i f e , 
upholds the social structure as we l l as i t s standard of moral values, 
and represents the majority of the nation; i t should form the corner-
stone i n the organization of our national l i f e . 
3. "We must point out that Serbian hegemony, imposed from the s t a r t 
on Croatia and on a l l other lands on t h i s side of the Sava, the Drina 
and the Danube, has acted destructively through i t s obvious incapacity 
to govern, i t s tyranny and i t s use of immoral means. I t has monopolized 
a l l the power of the state and destroyed our moral values and our 
progressive i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as our t r a d i t i o n s . I t has not respected 
the material possessions of the people and even robbed i t of i t s 
s p i r i t u a l peace. This state of misrule reached i t s peak when the 
absolutist regime was introduced on January 6, 1929> re-inforcing t h i s 
hegemony with f a t a l consequences and, worst of a l l , abolishing c i v i l 
and p o l i t i c a l freedom. 
4. "Considering these disastrous experiences, we have arrived at 
the inevitable conclusion that we must go back to the s t a r t i n g point 
of 1918 i n response to the pressing need to conduct a decisive and 
organized b a t t l e against that hegemony, i n order to free our lands 
from i t and deprive i t of power and influence by eliminating i t s 
representatives. 
5. "OSfly by carrying out the programme previously l a i d down can the 
new organization of the common state be undertaken. Without entering 
i n t o d e t a i l s at t h i s time, the p r i n c i p a l basic ideas underlying such 
an organization may be summarized as follows:-
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"The Commonwealth, as we conceive i t , must be 
an association of in t e r e s t s , founded with the 
free consent of each member, r u l i n g out domin-
ation of one or more over the others and thereby 
giving each the r i g h t to safeguard i t s p articular 
interests on i t s own t e r r i t o r y , or to administer, 
i n concert with the others, the j o i n t a f f a i r s of 
general concern, on the strength of mutual agree-
ment. Thus w i l l progress be assured i n respect 
to the moral development, as w e l l as to the 
gradual improvement of material conditions, among 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The i n d i v i d u a l 
interests of minorities speaking a foreign language 
s h a l l be specially guaranteed." 
From Vladko Macek, I n the Struggle f o r Freedom, 
(Pennsylvania State University Press 1968) pp. 139-1A-0. 
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I : The Assassination of King Alexander; 
The King arrived i n the early afternoon. His vessel, the 
"Dubrovnik" was escorted to the harbour at Marseilles by units of 
the French F i r s t Mediterranean Fleet. At 4.00pm, the King landed at 
the Quai des Beiges and was received by M. Barthou and a guard of 
honour, composed of colonial and Senegalese troops together with the 
140th French I n f a n t r y Company. 
After the usual presentations had been made, M. Barthou and the 
King proceeded to a waiting motor car, the rear half of which was 
open, leaving the occupants to the f u l l view of the crowd. The King 
took his seat on the r i g h t and M. Barthou took his place beside him. 
The streets leading from the Quai de Beiges to the Prefecture were 
but sparsely lined with police and gardes mobiles, who were stationed 
at intervals of about 5 yards from each other along the route, and 
i t i s noteworthy that there were no other troops on duty except those 
who formed the ceremonial guard of honour. 
When the procession, which was going at walking pace, turned 
i n t o the Place de l a Bourse, an outburst of w h i s t l i n g and jeering 
by a section of the crowd took place. Certain observers of what 
subsequently happened have since stated t h e i r b e l i e f that t h i s out-
burst was a preconceived arrangement destined to draw away the at t e n t i o n 
of the police while the murder took place. At a l l events, the h o s t i l e 
demonstration, which does not seem to have been large, was quickly 
drowned by a roar of cheering. The royal car was jus t passing the 
Bourse, when a man was seen to dodge his way through the police cordon 
and a f t e r running across the road to the car, to jump on the running 
board. Holding on with one hand, he f i r e d some twenty shots from an 
automatic p i s t o l at the King and M. Barthou. I t was discovered l a t e r 
that the assassin also carried a bomb. M. Barthou, i t i s thought, 
put out his hand i n an attempt to d i v e r t the weapon and was shot through 
the arm, a bone being broken. 
At t h i s juncture, Lieutenant-Colonel P i o l l e t , the commander of 
the guard of honour which had received the King on his a r r i v a l , who 
.275 
was r i d i n g beside the carriage on the l e f t , cut down the assassin. 
The p i s t o l , which would s t i l l f i r e as long as there was pressure 
on the t r i g g e r , was s t i l l f i r i n g as the assassin lay on the ground, 
which may explain how General Georges and certain persons i n the crowd 
were wounded and an agent k i l l e d . A b u l l e t was also f i r e d from the 
d i r e c t i o n opposite to that i n which the assassin was shooting, but 
t h i s may have been discharged by one of the police, several of whom 
f i r e d at the assassin. 
Immediately the outrage had taken place, there was a scene of 
considerable confusion, police and gardes mobiles charging w i l d l y 
i n t o the crowds while the King lay unconscious i n the car and M. Barthou 
continued to bleed to death from a severed artery. The King was then 
taken in t o the Prefecture and i t was found that he had been struck 
by two b u l l e t s , one of which had lodged i n the l i v e r and the other 
i n the neighbourhood of. the heart. His Majesty died a few minutes 
a f t e r being carried i n t o the building. 
M. Barthou, who displayed the greatest courage and whose own 
condition seems to have passed unnoticed i n the general disturbance 
took a t a x i t o the Hotel Dieu, where a transfusion of blood was 
immediately performed, too l a t e , however, to save his l i f e . I t was 
the opinion of the doctors who attended him that had a tourniquet 
been applied immediately a f t e r the outrage, his l i f e would not have 
been endangered. A chapelie ardente was l a t e r prepared at the Prefecture 
i n which were l a i d the two bodies, pending t h e i r removal from Marseilles. 
The assassin, whose s k u l l had been c l e f t by a sabre cut and who 
had been badly battered by the crowd, died i n a few minutes without 
regaining consciousness. His name i s given as Peter Kelemen and he 
i s stated to be a Croat, born i n Zagreb i n 1899. He had i n his pocket 
a Czech passport, which may have been forged, issued e a r l i e r t h i s 
year, from which i t appears that he entered France' by way of Vallorbe 
from Switzerland some three weeks ago.... 
The Queen of Yugoslavia meanwhile had been t r a v e l l i n g overland 
from Belgrade and intended to j o i n the King Ts t r a i n at Lyons on i t s 
way from Marseilles to Paris. Her Majesty's t r a i n was stopped at 
Besancon and the trag i c news broken to her by M. P e r e t t i de l a Rocca, 
Prefect of the Doubs. The Queen decided to go at once to Marseilles, 
where she arrived on the morning of October 10, and was met by the 
President of the Republic, who had tr a v e l l e d to Marseilles the previous 
night, accompanied by M. Herriot and M. Tardieu, representing the 
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.French Government 
Arrangements have been made f o r the body of the King t o 
leave Marseilles by the vessel i n which His Majesty had made the 
journey to France the previous evening and the cruiser l e f t at 
sunset, escorted by a d i v i s i o n of French destroyers, together 
with two cruisers, one of which i s carrying M. Pie't r i , the 
Minister of Marine who, with Marshal Petain, w i l l represent the 
French Government at the funeral. 
From the despatch from Sir George Clerk to Sir John Simon, 
October 11 , 1954, R5644/5524/92. (Vol. 18458) 
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Biographies of Leading Personalities 
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BASARICEK, Bjuro. b. Zagreb. Educ. Zagreb. Son of well-known 
educationalist. Was one of the f i r s t i r i t e l l i g e n s i a to j o i n CPP. 
During World War, set up Narodna Zastitfe. (National Society of 
Protection) which saved live s of many starving children i n 
Hercegovina, Bosnia and Dalmatia. Became CPP deputy i n 1918. 
Deputy f o r Tuzla (Bosnia). I r o n i c a l l y , one of the CPP deputies 
most ac t i v e l y engaged i n rapprochement with the Serbs. Died 
i n Skupstina, 20 June 1928. 
CHERNOZEMSKY, Vlado. b.1899. Real name, Veliko Dimitrov. Agent of 
Bulgarian War Office. In occupied South Serbia during War. On 
return to Sofia i n 1918, came under the Mihailovist wing of the 
Macedonian Revolutionary Org.. Sept. 1924, murdered Dimov (Communist 
deputy i n Bulgarian pari.) Dec. 1930, murdered Tomalevski, veteran 
member of M.R.O. July 15, 1932 l e f t Bulgaria to work with Ustase. 
Under cover name of Peter Kelemen, k i l l e d King Alexander i n 
Marseilles on Oct. 9, 1934 and was himself k i l l e d . 
DJORDJEVIC", Milorad. b. 1896. Sabac. Studied law i n Algiers. After 
war, became o f f i c i a l i n the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance. June 1931 
became Vice-Governor of the National Bank. Nov. 1931, Minister of 
Finance. "An ardent protector of the state purse against extravagance 
DJURIC, Djordje. b. 1880. Belgrade. Educ. Belgrade, Cologne and Paris. 
Doctorate at Univ. of Paris. 1911, Apptd. Extraordinary Prof, of 
P o l i t i c a l Economy. Asst. at Reparations Comm. Yugoslav Min. i n 
London, 1925-31- Min. of Finance June-Nov. 1931- A very r i c h man. 
From 1931, again Yugoslav Min. i n London. 
JEVTIC, Bogoljub. Career Diplomat. London and Paris 1919-23. Minister 
i n Tirana 1926-8. Minister i n Vienna 1928-9. At time of Dictatorship, 
recalled to be Minister at Court. No.friend of Marinkovic or Svrljuga 
Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s July 1932 - November 1934. Prime Minister 
of Yugoslavia 1934-5. 
KOROSEC. Anton, b. Biserjani, Styria, 1872. Educ. P t u j , Maribor and _. 
Graz. Decree i n Theol. at Graz. Held a chaplaincy post a f t e r ordin-
ation u n t i l 1899. Espoused Slovene Nationalist cause. Editor of 
Slovene Master from 1898. Elec. as Slovene Clerical Pary deputy to 
Styrian Diet i n 1906 and thence to Reichsrat u n t i l 1918. I n 1917, 
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became Pres. of the Yugoslav Pari. Club and i n May 1917 pub l i c l y 
decl. i n favour of Yugoslav state. Took leading part i n forming 
National Councils i n Ljubljana i n Aug. 1918 and the Nardno Vijece 
i n Zagreb i n Oct. 1918. Deputy Prime Minister i n f i r s t Yugoslav 
Cabinet. Min. of Communications, Feb. 1920; Minister of Education 
July 1924, Minister of. I n t e r i o r , Feb-July 1928. Prime Minister of 
Yugoslavia July 1928-January 1929. I n F i r s t Dictatorship Cabinet 
u n t i l Sept. 1930. Returned to Univ. l i f e . Arrested and interned, 
January 1933. Released a f t e r the assassination. 
KRAMER, Albert, b. 1882. Educ. Graz and Prague. Lawyer. Editor of 
Jutro. Gen. Sec. f o r Slovenia i n Narodno Vijece. Member of delegation 
to Belgrade i n Nov. 1918. Twice Minister of Commerce 1919-20. 
Not a fr i e n d of Dr Korosec. A member of the ID. U n t i l Jan. 1931 
was Yugoslav Min. i n Prague. Joined Dictatorship Cabinet i n Sept. 
1931* rose to be Deputy Prime Minister under Srskic. General Sec. 
of Yugoslav National Party. Regarded as somewhat untrustworthy. 
A f r i e n d of Pribicevic. 
KUMANUDI, Kosta. b. 1874, Belgrade. Educ. Belgrade and Paris. Lect. 
i n Belgrade Univ i n 1902. Professor of Law, 1904. Pre-War republican. 
I n 1920, became a Democrat deputy. I n 1921-2, was Min. of Finance. 
Mayor of Belgrade u n t i l 1929. Held a variety of posts under the 
Dictatorship. Nov. 1931> became Chairman of new Chamber of Deputies. 
Suave and well-groomed but a hopeless financier. Left finances of 
Belgrade i n t e r r i b l e muddle. 
MACEK, Vladko, b. 1879, Educ Zagreb. Became Croat deputy and President 
of the Zagreb Provisional Council. A lawyer by profession. Was legal 
adviser to Radic. Appointed his succesor i n Aug. 1928. Took extreme 
views on Croatafor fear of being ousted by extremists i n c l . Radic fs 
widow. Pensioned out of p o l i t i c s i n Apr. 1929, he nonetheless found 
engaged i n a running.battle with the regime and was t r i e d i n 1930 
and 1933» acquitted the f i r s t time and imprisoned on the second. 
MARINKOVIC, Vojislav. b. 1876. Educ. Paris. Financial o f f i c i a l i n 
Serbian Ministry of Finance u n t i l the coup of 1903. Revived the 
Progressive Party i n 1903. Became deputy i n 1905. I n 1913 was the 
Serbian rep. at Paris at Conf. to liquidate Balkan War Debts. From 
1915, leader of the Progressive Party. I n 1916, Serbian delegate at 
the I n t e r - A l l i e d Conf. i n Paris. Minister of Agriculture 1915-8. 
Often acting Foreign Minister i n Pasic Ts absence. I n 1919 created 
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the Democratic Union. Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s i n many pre-
Dictatorship Cabinets and from Jan. 1929-July 1932. From A p r i l 
to J u l 1932, he was also Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. He was an 
able financier and President of the Belgrade Stock Exchange. He 
suffered from tuberculosis. 
PRINCE PAUL. b. 1893• Cousin of King Alexander. Nephew of King 
Peter. Educ. Oxford. Acted as- Sec. to King Alexander i n early 
days of Kingdom. Appointed Prince Regent upon the assassination 
of Alexander, according to royal w i l l . Regent of Yugoslavia t i l l 
March 1941. 
PAVELIC,' Ante. b. 1889. Signatory to decl. i n favour of 
i n d i v i s i b l e Yugoslav state i n Reichsrat i n Oct. 1918. Croat n a t i o n a l i s t . 
Was an early member of CPP and signed i t s f i r s t programme as Sec. 
In 1921 and 1922 appealled t o Alexander against treatment of 
Croats. Became Frankist. Entered Skupstina as deputy i n 1924. 
A lawyer. Gave support to-CPP-ID Coalition i n Aug. 1928. By Oct. 
1928, was i n t r i g u i n g abroad. Jan. 1929, founded Ustase and f l e d 
abroad. Led Croat emigres and engineered plots against Yugoslav 
state during Dictatorship. Was responsible f o r the death of Alex-
ander. Became leader of Independent Croat State i n 1941. Fled 
Yugoslavia f o r South America i n 1945. 
PRIBICEVIC, Svetozar. b. 1875. Karlovac. I s a Serb from the Lika 
D i s t r i c t . Educ. Zagreb. Schoolteacher. Elec. Croatian Sabor 1900. 
Leading member of Serbo-Croat Coalition i n Croatia and i n Narodno 
Vijece. Played leading part i n the foundation of the state. Deter-
mined c e n t r a l i s t u n t i l Jan. 1928. Was Min of I n t e r i o r 1918-21. 
Min.. of Education 1920-5. Left the Democrat Party i n 1924. Formed 
ID party. Joined forces with Radic against VukiSevic i n 1927-8. 
F e l l f o u l of the Dictatorship. Interned. Later went to Prague and 
Paris. Died i n 1936. 
RACIC, Punisa. Radical deputy from Montenegro. During the war he was 
a comitad.ji. Because of his enthusiasm f o r national l i b e r t y he was 
elected a deputy and became a most unwelcome s a t e l l i t e of Pa£ic. He 
married in t o a very respectable Belgrade family but continued t o 
show vio l e n t t r a i t s - on one occasion,, o f f e r i n g to go to Zagreb 
with 6 followers to give Radic 25 blows with a whip t o make him 
change his p o l i t i c a l policy. K i l l e d three i n outrage i n Skupstina 
i n June 1928. Tried 1929. Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. 
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RADIO, Pavle. b. 1880 at Trebarjevo Desno, near Zagreb. Of peasant 
stock. Educ. Zagreb and Prague. Bank employee. Employed by Ogulin 
Savings Bank f o r 15 years. Got involved with formation of peasant 
co-operative societies i n Croatia. Elec. deputy i n 1923 f o r 
Banjaluka. Acted as leader of CPP i n 1925 whilst Radio*was i n 
prison. Was Minister f o r Agrarian Reform from July 1925 - Jan. 1927. 
Shot i n the Skupstina on June 20 1928. 
RADIC, Stjepan. b. 1871 at Trebarjevo Desno. Educ. Karlovac and 
Zagreb. At an early age took part i n demonstration against Hungarian 
Ban of Croatia and was expelled from school. Travelled to Russia 
and Prague. Constantly involved i n anti-Hungarian protests. I n 
j a i l , 1895. I n 1897 went to Paris to study p o l i t i c a l science and 
got degree. Produced pro-Serbo-Croat periodical Hrvatska Misao 
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